MIGRATION DYNAMICS
AND NEW TRENDS IN EUROPEAN (IN)SECURITY

CRISES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

CLAUDIA ANAMARIA IOV

(EDITOR)

Migration Dynamics and New Trends in European (In)Security

*Crises, Challenges and Opportunities*

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Referenți științifici:

Prof. univ. dr. Ludmila Coadă

Conf. univ. dr. Ovidiu Toderici

CUPRINS

PREFACE

In the 21th Century, migration-security relationship in Europe, in the context of globalization, takes on new dimensions with ample reverberations on the societal, economic, demographic, political, military and social fields. The refugee crisis, East-West/South-North chaotic migration, regional interethnic disputes, the "special operation" from Ukraine, became top priorities on the European security agenda. In this context, the volume brings to the fore, through a multidisciplinary analysis, the "complicated" relationship between migration and (in)security with a special focus on the integration process of migrants and refugees and the image of " the other" (alterity).

The book is part of a constructivist approach with a dynamic perspective on the political, social, economic, military and societal field, where the actors and the system structure are interconnected.

Migration Dynamics and New Trends in European (In)Security – Crises, Challenges and Opportunities volume brings together the scientific works presented at the Eight Edition of the International Conference "Migration Dynamics and New Trends in European (In)Security" organised at Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, October, 27th-28th, 2021, within the Jean Monnet Module *Quo Vadis Europe? European Security, National and Ethnic Minority Issues: from Theory to Practice,* 2020-2023. The conference brings together world-class specialists, professors, young researchers and students, covering two separate, but interconnected topics: on one hand, migration issues, involving topics related to societal security, governance, identity(ies),

minority issues and refugees and on the other hand, security studies. The scientific activity of this event is divided into three panels: *Intelligence and Governance for sustainable migration policies*; *Migration – (In)Security Nexus: International Migration and Security* and the third one, *Citizenship, Identity and Social Challenges*.

The volume has nine chapters. The first chapter is focusing on the depopulation of the rural areas of Romania, extended for more than 30 years (1990–2021), in order to identify specific patterns of territorial evolution, focusing on socio-economic, cultural, historical and geographical factors. The aim of the second chapter is to assess social challenges addressed in the integration process of refugees settled in Romania, in terms of better understanding the role of the local community in the inclusion of newcomers and of self-perception of integration. The third chapter examines migration governance in Germany pursued by state and non-state actors in the period following 2015, focusing on whether, and if so how, the approaches employed by different actors changed. The fourth chapter brings to the fore the protection of ethnic and religious essence of the Muslim communities in Bulgaria between 1944 and 1989. The fifth chapter focuses on immigration and anti-immigrant opposition in Europe at national and supranational levels, using a variety of intellectual instruments in the framework of the securitization process. The sixth chapter examines the role played by universities in the governance of cyber security. The seventh chapter presents the securitisation policies of the European Union and Member States adopted to provide an answer to the migration and insecurity created in the aftermath of the refugee crisis from 2015. The eight chapter aims to make an assessment of the measures taken by the European Union in the field of migration policies after the wave of terrorist attacks launched in 2015 in Europe, as well as the capabilities of Member States to absorb the impact of another massive migration, similar to that from Syria, which greatly affected the quality and safety of

European citizens. The last chapter of the volume is focusing on the challenges, particularities, vulnerabilities and implications over national security posed by migrants in the host state.

Migration Dynamics and New Trends in European (In)Security – Crises, Challenges and Opportunities volume is a research and analysis tool created for students, professors, researchers, stakeholders, politicians, specialists on international relations and security studies. This volume is also a guide for the general public interested in the evolution of migration – identity – (in)security relationship in Europe and beyond.

We would like to thank all those involved in the implementation of the Jean Monnet Module *Quo Vadis Europe? European Security, National and Ethnic Minority Issues: from Theory to Practice* and in the creation of this volume for the human and professional quality they showed in the implementation of activities, for the support provided, their expertise and high scientific works.

Finally, we invite you to go through the pages of this volume, guaranteeing you an interesting and challenging reading of current topics from the fascinating world of international relations and security studies.

Lecturer Claudia Anamaria Iov, PhD.
Cluj-Napoca, September, 2022

THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF RURAL DEPOPULATION IN ROMANIA BETWEEN 1990 AND 2020 – A PROBLEM OR A DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY?

Claudia Anamaria IOV[1]

Abstract. The important demographic crisis that Romania has been going through, like most European states, requires a constructivist approach with a multidisciplinary perspective. In this context, we will analyze the depopulation of the rural areas of Romania, extended for more than 30 years (1990–2021), in order to identify specific patterns of territorial evolution, focusing on socio-economic, cultural, historical and geographical factors. Our attention will be focused on two regions with high net migration loss, internal and external, North East and South-Muntenia, the reference to the other development regions being made only for comparative purposes. These regions are predominantly characterized by high shares of employment in subsistence agriculture, an accelerated ageing of population, lack of education, lack of ability to adapt to various transitions, a low level of infrastructure and a GDP per capita that makes up only 50-60% of the national average. The situation of these two regions allows discussions on the need for local community – oriented public policies tackling the most urgent local problems. In order to elaborate the paper, we used the method of analyzing the specialized literature, numerical evolution of the rural population of Romania and case studies.

Keywords: *depopulation, rural areas, migration, public policies.*

[1] Lecturer, Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Claudia.iov@ubbcluj.ro.

Introduction

At the beginning of 2022, Romania registered 31 years of constant population decrease and there was no basis, project or scientific projection in identifying a solution to stop this phenomenon in the coming years.

The depopulation of Romanian villages is not a new, specific phenomenon of the last 30 years, but an activity that began with the installation of the communist regime and forced industrialization caused by the policies promoted by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and later by Nicolae Ceaușescu, which continued and mainly diversified after Romania's accession to the EU. This phenomenon has affected the Romanian society from all points of view, from the economic, financial, social, demographic and political, to the educational, cultural or tourist fields. The image of the peasant woman with blonde hair and a flowery dress walking barefoot through the dewy grass or the peasant riding bare-chested in the early hours of the morning are just myths and stories meant to attract tourists. The realities of life in rural Romania are marked by the lack of jobs, low income, poor infrastructure and limited access to education, cultural activities, health or the lack of other facilities specific to the urban areas. All these encourage the migration towards the economical city centers within the country or abroad – France, Italy, Germany, Spain – with irreversible consequences on the future of the Romanian village.

In this paper, we do not propose an exhaustive analysis of all the socio-economic causes and effects produced by the depopulation phenomenon of rural areas in Romania, but we will highlight some disturbing situations that have a long-term effect on population, economy, education and culture.

The theoretical importance of the paper

The theoretical importance substantiates by expanding the knowledge base, this paper presenting different theoretical approaches and relevant issues caused by the depopulation phenomenon of rural areas in the socio-economic field. Rural areas represent 80% of Europe's territory and 30% of its population. In this context, this paper aims to critically analyze both the causes and the socio-economic effects of the depopulation process of rural areas in Romania. The analysis focuses on the situation in the North-East and South Muntenia (Wallachia) regions, the reference to the other development regions being made only for comparative purposes. In the second part of the paper, our attention is drawn to the analysis of European policies, central or local governmental measures to combat this phenomenon and its consequences. The situation of these two regions allows discussions on the need for local community-oriented public policies tackling the most urgent local problems.

Research methods

In order to elaborate the paper, we used the method of analyzing the specialized literature, numerical evolution of the rural population of Romania and case studies.

The purpose and objectives of the paper

The purpose of the research is to examine the causes and socio-economic effects of the depopulation process of rural areas in Romania. We will analyze specific situations in the North-East, North-West, West and South-Muntenia regions, focusing on the cause-effect-solution rapport, to obtain a descriptive analysis of the implications of the rural areas depopulation on population and economy. The analysis will help us understand whether the depopulation of rural areas is a problem or an opportunity for development.

Theoretical substantiation

The depopulation of rural areas is one of the structural changes in the population of Romania, which has increased in the last 30 years, although the phenomenon appeared long before this. The decline of the rural population, which started as a consequence of the modernization of the post-communist Romanian society, became permanent through the participation of several demographic, economic and social factors, in the context of Romania's accession to the European Union (EU). We can say that Romania "aligned" itself with the trends of the member states' demographic decline, combined with a continuous deterioration of the age structure, caused by the aging population and the negative natural growth, much more pronounced in the rural areas than in the urban ones. Territorial mobility takes the form of inter-rural, rural-urban and (temporary, circular or permanent) international migration.

According to a statistic of the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration[2] (2016), Romania has 758 localities with less than 100 inhabitants, most of them, 44, being in the Hunedoara County, in the West Region. An interesting village in this category is Ineleţ, (47 inhabitants), Cornereva commune in the Caraş-Severin county, which can be reached with the help of an improvised ~100-meter staircase, fixed to the rocks. The locals rarely use it because they make or grow sustenance in their household[3]. Of these, 126 are "ghost settlements[4]",

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[2] Ministerul Dezvoltării Regionale și Administrației Publice, http://www.marsplan.ro/ro/ministerul-dezvolt%C4%83rii-regionale-%C8%99i-administra%C8%9Biei-publice.html, accessed 12.02.2022.

[3] Valentin Iliescu, "Cornereva, O minune a lui Dumnezeu", *Colţişor de România*. 05 August 2019, Available online: https://coltisorderomania.ro/2019/08/05/cornereva-comuna-cu-40-de-sate-si-cu-o-suprafata-mai-mare-decat-a-capitalei-romaniei/, accessed on 12.03.2022.

[4] "Ghost settlements" in Romania are represented by the completely depopulated or vanishing localities which have not been dissolved by a normative act. This is why they are

which although uninhabited for decades, appear in the national registers with name and postal code (Huştiu, Lindenfeld, Geamăna, Pădureni, Tomnatec, Mosoru, Grabicina de Sus, Ponorici, Alun, Bădila, etc.). These localities, were actually dissolved following the displacement of the population, floods, landslides or works on reservoir lakes.

The freedom of movement of people (one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU), the possibility of finding a better paid job, continuing vocational training and the educational process or the economic crisis of 2008 have pushed many young professionals with higher education in rural areas to consider Western European states. The crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which reduced or closed down economic activities (the worst affected being the HORECA sector) and increased youth unemployment, has accentuated this trend, generating a new wave of domestic and international migration of young people, with long-term effects. These events show us that the depopulation of rural areas is a process that depends on the events that mark the international political life, security and the national economy.

We are simultaneously witnessing a pronounced aging process in rural areas, in 2016 only, the elderly population in rural areas in Romania reaching 21% compared to the national average of 17%[5]. This phenomenon is due to the attractiveness of the rural environment for those over 50 who are vulnerable in the urban labor market, who prefer to reorient towards a subsistence farming or agritourism activity. The vacancy is filled in the urban area by the young population (aged 19-30) looking for a decent job and an active lifestyle.

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still included in the documents of public institutions (SIRUTAS nomenclature). In reality, these localities no longer exist, barely have a few decaying houses left, there are no access roads and can only be found with the help of historical maps.

[5] Dănuţ Jemna, Provocările demografiei României, *Alteritas*. 22 Februarie 2019, Available online: https://danutj.wordpress.com/2019/02/22/demografice-demografice-ale-romaniei/, accessed on 10.02.2022.

The intensity of the internal migration of the rural population reached an all-time high in 1990 when about 550,000 people gave up their homes in the rural areas in favor of the urban environment[6]. This is an exceptional moment generated by the previous restrictions imposed by the communist regime.

To exemplify the main demographic causes of depopulation in Romania (population aging, negative natural growth, higher mortality in the rural areas – 4.6 deaths per thousand inhabitants – and migration) we chose to analyze the situation in 2 development regions, North-East and South Muntenia. These regions are predominantly characterized by high shares of employment in subsistence agriculture, an accelerated aging of population, lack of education, lack of ability to adapt to various transitions, a low level of infrastructure and a GDP per capita that makes up only 50-60% of the national average. The reference to the North-West Development Region in the analysis is for comparative purposes, in order to highlight the differences in development and the way in which they influence the behavior of the population.

According to the National Institute of Statistics of 2018, a relevant indicator in capturing the effects of rural migration is the level of poverty, the lowest risk of poverty being registered among the population of Bucharest and Ilfov (4.1%), at the opposite pole being the North-East Region, where over 35% of the population was living in poverty[7].

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[6] Vasile Zotic, "Migraţia internă a populaţiei rurale din România după anul 1989", in *International Conference volume. Evoluţia demografică şi politica securităţii demografice*, Ed. ASEM, Chişinău, 2010, p. 155, Available online: https://geografie.ubbcluj.ro/ccau/articole ZV/37_ZV_2010.pdf, accessed on 20.03.2022.

[7] Tudorel Andrei, (Coord.), *Tendinţe Sociale*, Institutul Naţional de Statistică, Bucureşti, 2019, p. 65, Available online: https://insse.ro/cms/sites/default/files/field/publicatii/tendinte_ sociale_0.pdf, accessed on 07.03.2022.

Map 1. *Geographical distribution of the marginalized rural areas in Romania[8]*

According to Map 1 and the Atlas of Marginalized Rural Areas and Local Human Development in Romania, Vaslui County has the most marginalized rural areas in the country, of about 23% (almost four times

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[8] Emil Teşliuc, Vlad Grigoraş, Manuela Sofia Stănculescu, (Coord.), *Atlasului zonelor rurale marginalizate şi al Dezvoltării Umane Locale din România*, The World Bank, Bucureşti, 2016, p. 34, Available online: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/2374814671186558 63/pdf/106653-ROMANIAN-PUBLIC-PI-6-Atlas-Iunie2016.pdf, accessed on 03.01.2022.

higher than the national average). Other high rates of rural marginalization (between 9 and 15% of the total rural population in each county) were also recorded in 3 other counties in the North-East Region, respectively Iași, Botoșani, Bacău and Mehedinți county in the South-West Region. At the other pole, Ilfov and Timiș counties have rural marginalization rates of only 0.5%[9].

The North-East territory, especially the rural areas in Vaslui and Botoșani counties, are also facing a significant illiteracy rate. In 2011, the percentage of the country's population aged at least 10, without any graduated grade, was 3.8% in Vaslui County, and in Botoșani 3.6%, compared to the national average of 2.8%[10].

This region is also facing an pronounced phenomenon of the aging rural and urban population (decrease of over 10% of the 0-14 age group population, accompanied by an increase of over 10% of the over 60 age group population[11]. 6 such affected communes stand out, 4 being in the Suceava county and one in Bacau, respectively Vaslui counties. This phenomenon is all the more dangerous for the region as it has been accompanied by a negative value of the natural growth in the last 10 years. In 2019, the natural growth rate in the North-East region was -2.2‰, Iași County being the only one that has constantly registered positive values in the natural growth rate[12].

All this encourages the phenomenon of rural environment depopulation in these areas, through permanent or temporary emigration (economic migration), which is constantly increasing the among young people in the region, who are looking for higher earnings

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[10] Paul Gheorghiu, Florin Tacu, Vasile Dîncu, Cristian Ghinea, "Memorandum", Cancelaria Prim-Ministrului, p. 8, Available online: https://zch.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/memorandum-zone-marginalizate.pdf, accessed on 21.10.2022.

[11] Agenția pentru Dezvoltare Regională Nord-Est Serviciul Politici, Strategii și Analize Teritoriale, *Planul de Dezvoltare Regională Nord-Est 2021-2027*, 2020, p. 66, Available online: https://adrnordest.ro/storage/2021/02/PDR-NE-2021-2027-dec.-2020.pdf, accessed on 12.03.2022.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

and a better lifestyle, either in other developed localities in the country (urban centers – Iaşi, Cluj-Napoca, Bucharest, Timişoara) or abroad. According to North-East Regional Development Plan 2021-2027[13], between 2012 and 2018, 223,260 people had temporarily emigrated from the region, 130,743 (58.5%) of which came from rural areas, mostly from Iasi, Suceava and Neamt counties. The phenomenon of international migration gives rise to two diametrically opposed consequences. On the one hand, it drives and supports the phenomenon of depopulation in the rural areas and that of damage to the local infrastructure and economy, and on the other hand, it can represent an opportunity for local development through the investment of savings in home construction and new local businesses which create new jobs, in infrastructure upgrade and twinning with other localities.

In Suceava County, there is a 'champion' village in terms of international migration, the main choice being Italy (Torino, especially), but other destinations as well, such as North America and Israel. This village is located in the Marginea[14] commune[15]. This commune is a special case (an exception) for the phenomenon of international migration from rural areas, as is the village of Certeze, in Satu Mare county, in the North-West Region, as here it did not cause depopulation, but helped the locality in the transition from the traditional-agricultural to the rural-modern. The people who went abroad invested in the development of the locality, replacing the farming activities and animal raising with the opening of small businesses (trade, passenger transport, services, wood processing). The men opened businesses in the field of constructions (activity they carried out when working abroad), the agricultural lands

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[13] *Ibid.,* p. 71.

[14] Marginea commune is made up of a single village with the same name.

[15] Andra Jacob (Larionescu), "Efecte ale migraţiei internaţionale asupra locuirii în ruralul românesc. Cazul comunei Marginea, judeţul Suceava, România", *Calitatea Vieţii*, XXVI, No. 3, Editura Academiei Române, 2015, p. 245, Available online: https://www.revistacalitateavietii.ro/ournal/article/view/72/51, accessed on 12.03.2022.

were turned into urban areas, their price increasing considerably. The price of the land (of about 2000 Euros / ar (100 sq meters) in the center of the commune[16]) did not discourage the local real estate request, the density of houses in the Marginea Commune being the highest in the county[17]. From a socio-cultural point of view, the people from the Marginea Commune, as well as those from the Certeze Commune, copied the Western lifestyle and reproduced it in their daily lives, from their children's education to the clothing style, house building and expectations from the local public authorities.

On the other hand, one of the long-term effects of the uncontrolled migration process in the region is the disruption of social balance and the emergence of vulnerable groups: single-parent families (due to high divorce rates), children left alone or in the care of grandparents, sick elderly left in state care or NGOs. Thus, migration, first of all, affects the family, changing both its structure and functionality[18], as well as the role within the society.

In the Annual Report (2017), the organization Save the Children Romania compiled a statistic of children with parents who went abroad. According to the data obtained by them from the County School Inspectorates, a number of 212,352 children had at least one parent who went abroad to work, but the organization's estimates advanced a maximum of 250,000 children in this situation, also taking into account the children excluded from the educational system[19].

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[16] *Ibid.* p. 247.

[17] Pietro Cingolani, *Romeni d'Italia. Migrazioni, vita quotidiana e legami transnazionali*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2009, p. 150.

[18] Aurora Lupaş, Efectele migraţiei în societate şi familie, in Maria Sinaci, Cristian Măduţă, (Ed.), *Comunicare, Cultură şi Societate, De la Teorie la Practică*, Trivent Publishing, Budapesta, 2018, p. 139, Available online: https://trivent-publishing.eu/libri/comunicare/14.%20Aurora%20Lupas.pdf, accessed on 12.03.2022.

[19] Save the Children Romania, *Annual Report,* 2017, p. 17, Available online: https://www.salvati copiii.ro/sci-ro/files/e8/e8709252-caed-419d-8112-c0022bce84bc.pdf, accessed on 12.02.2022.

The absence of a family member (parent), as a result of migration has social, psychological and behavioral effects on the child, regardless of age, especially on those aged 0 to 18. These children need more affection, encouragement and recognition of performance precisely because, in the absence of the parent(s), they only have a limited access to unconditional parental love in terms of quality time spent within the family[20]. Childhood traumas, especially the deprivation of parental care and affection, are later seen in their evolution and behavior as adults.

Such "borderline situations", determined by the migration of parents from the rural areas, lead to the appearance of people "who sanctify the place", through the activity and dedication for the work they carry out, people who replace the absent parents. Such a case belongs to the teacher (a real heroine) from Dobraia, a village from the Cornereva commune in the Caras-Severin county, who hiked over a mountain, for 4 hours, every Monday, regardless of the weather, and came back on Friday[21], only to teach to 4 students.

At a national level, the state authorities have started initiatives and projects in order to fight the phenomenon of depopulation in the rural environment. At a local level as well, depending on the severity of the phenomenon, the authorities have also started their own initiatives.

Such an initiative, which can be considered an example of good practice, is the solution proposed in 2016 by Costel Nazare, the mayor of Concești, Botoșani County, to encourage the birth rate in the village, given that it had decreased to half, that the migration of the young people was high, and most of the inhabitants were in the 60+ age group. The mayor's office bought some abandoned houses with 250,000 lei, renovated them and announced, including on Facebook, that they can be

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[20] Tereza Bulai, *Fenomenul migrației şi criza familială,* Ed. Lumen, Iaşi, 2006, p. 57.
[21] Carmen Lălu, *Cum poate fi resuscitată România rurală?,* 14 August 2019, Available online: https://semneletimpului.ro/international/europa/romania/cum-poate-fi-resuscitata-romania-rurala.html, accessed on 12.02.2022.

inhabited, free of charge, by young families with children[22], willing to start a new life in the village.

The program was a real success and the houses were immediately occupied by large families, with a difficult situation (either due to financial problems, domestic violence or alcohol consumption), from neighboring localities or from neighboring counties: Neamţ, Iași or further away, like Hunedoara. In the first two years since the project started, the school population of the village increased by 50%, and the teachers were able to keep their jobs, after 12 families with 58 children moved to the renovated houses, where they could live without paying rent[23].

If the issue of education and the preservation of schools in the village has been solved through this initiative, unfortunately, the lack of jobs in the area makes the long-term success of this or other projects of this kind unlikely, without a partnership with the business community to provide decent jobs, a fact also recognized by the deputy mayor of the village: "Everyone is satisfied. It was a desperate situation and we had to take measures not to disappear from the map"[24].

Another strongly affected region by the problem of depopulation in the rural areas is the South-Muntenia Region. Located in the South-South-East part of Romania, the region borders on the North with the Central Region, on the East with the South-East Region, on the South with Bulgaria, the limit being given by a natural border – Danube River, and on the West with the South-West Region. The paradox of this region is that, in its center, but not a part of it, is the country's capital, Bucharest, part of the Bucharest-Ilfov Region, which

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[22] *Ibid*. See also "Un primar din România dă gratuit case şi locuri de muncă celor care vor să se mute la el în comună. Preferate sunt familiile cu mulţi copii", *ARQ,* 02 Ianuarie 2016, Available online: https://www.arq.ro/un-primar-din-romania-da-gratuit-case-si-locuri-de-munca-celor-care-vor-sa-se-mute-la-el-in-comuna-preferate-sunt-familiile-cu-multi-copii/3712, accessed 13.05.2022.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.*

is, through the social and institutional infrastructure, a real advantage, but also a disadvantage in terms of population and migration to the economic pole, as shown in Map 2 – Net internal migration by regions of economic development in 2020 – per thousands of people[25].

Map 2. *Net internal migration by regions of economic development in 2020 – per thousands of people[26].*

According to this map, we notice that the South Muntenia Region is the leader in the net internal migration (-8), followed closely by the North-East Region (-7). At the opposite pole, the most attractive region is

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[25] Vasile Ghetau, Dimensiunile teritoriale ale depopulării țării în anul 2020, 30.11.2021, *Contributors.ro*, Available online: https://www.contributors.ro/dimensiuni-teritoriale-ale-depopularii-tarii-in-anul-2020/, accessed on 28.01.2022.

[26] *Ibid.*

Bucharest-Ilfov (+20), followed by the North-West Region (+3). In these cases, the internal migration undoubtedly has an economic incentive, especially in the case of mobility between the localities of the same or neighboring counties, from the same economic region or to Bucharest, as is the case of the South-Muntenia Region, but the education, marriage or real estate development incentives are to be taken into account as well. In conclusion, in the period of 2012 – 2018 under analysis, the balance of changes of residence by areas of residence revealed a dramatic decrease in the rural area population[27]. The uniqueness of the area is given by the fact that the balance of changes of residence has been negative, in the last 10 years, in both rural and urban areas. This feature is partly due to international migration (the region ranking 2nd among the 8 development regions in 2018, in terms of the number of migrants, with a percentage of 15.86%[28] but also to the internal migration, mainly to Bucharest-Ilfov, although the mobility to the West and North-West Regions, for education or better paid jobs, is not to be neglected. What is alarming is the fact that the young people who leave the region to work in other states are overwhelmingly rural and up to 35 years old.

This map and the statistical data of The National Census Registration Service (INS, 2019) on the change of residence show us that behind the internal mobility decisions are a number of economic, educational, psychological, cultural, professional, interdependent factors causing it, this mobility being sometimes short-termed, medium-termed or permanent.

One certain thing is that the effects of this mobility are long-termed, both on the population and on the economy and infrastructure, in a positive or negative sense. The steady decline in the share of young people in the region, especially those in the rural areas, entails a lack of

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[27] Agenția pentru Dezvoltare Regională Sud-Muntenia, *Planul de Dezvoltare Regională 2021-2027 al Regiunii Sud-Muntenia*, 2021, p. 94, Available online: https://www.adrmuntenia.ro/planul-de-dezvoltare-regionala-sud-muntenia-20212027-si-strategia-integrata-de-d/article/1421, accessed on 12.03.2022.

[28] *Ibid.*

skilled labor and favors the aging process of the population, effects that put pressure on the pension system.

Analyzing the situation in the two regions, the natural question is *What do the public authorities, NGOs, the inhabitants of those villages do in order to reduce the effects of depopulation of the rural environment?*

The public policies that start from the specifics of the area, which emphasize the investment in mechanized agriculture, agritourism, infrastructure, education and health, in order to create jobs, are a possible solution to the crisis of the Romanian village.

The European non-reimbursable funds offered through the National Rural Development Program (NRDP) are an opportunity created to favor the return of the young people to rural areas in order to revitalize it. This program finances innovative projects with 50,000 up to a maximum of 200,000 Euro / project for various agricultural and non-agricultural businesses: farms, orchards, forestry, animal breeding, tourism, leisure, production, handicrafts, car service, IT, medical, social, sanitary-veterinary services, as well as other services intended for the rural population, in order to increase the standard of living. Within NRDP of 2014-2020, projects worth over 8 billion Euros were submitted, won and implemented, representing an absorption rate of 85%.

The case of Viscri village, in Brașov county (Central Region), is a happy one, not only thanks to Prince Charles, who made the village famous after buying a house there, but also through the entrepreneurial spirit of the inhabitants who knew how to turn the local cultural heritage to advantage (craft goods, authentic Romanian food, drinks, traditional dress, crafts) in order to obtain additional income for the population and to favor the return of young people who went to work abroad.

The case is not a singular one, another success story also being the Sâncraiu Commune[29], from Cluj County, North-West Region, which has

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[29] See also S.C. IDEACONSULT S.R.L., *Strategia de Dezvoltare a Comunei Sâncraiu 2015-2020*, Cluj-Napoca, 2015, Available online: http://uj.kalotaszentkiraly.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Strategia-de-Dezvoltare-a-comunei-S%C3%A2ncraiu-2015-2020.pdf, accessed on 12.03.2022.

attracted, from 2008 until now, 5 million Euros for the investment in infrastructure, the arrangement of traditional pensions (46 to number[30]) and promotion (the village has its own travel agency, created with European funds). This money radically changed the face of the town of 1800 inhabitants. Today, the town rivals the picturesque Austrian, Swiss, Italian or French villages both in terms of the number of tourists, the quality of services, but also the attendance at profile fairs abroad. Locals, together with the local authorities have realized that diverse and well-preserved natural and cultural heritage is an important resource for development as it ensures the true dimension of local creation, identity and authenticity of the area. Knowledge, promotion and passing down of local crafts, traditions and symbols are important for the development of rural tourism and agritourism, which attracts thousands of tourists from Italy, France, Denmark, Hungary and Austria each year.

This case is a success because the local authorities have made investments in an integrated manner, not only in tourism but also in the transport infrastructure, to facilitate the access of tourists in the area, in education, by building a new school, with boarding school and base sports (hosting international football competitions for children), in health services and connection to utilities. The results of the rural development investments did not take long to appear in the decrease of the rural-urban migration rate from 50% in 1990, to 20% in 2015, both for the young people up to 35, but also for the elderly over 65.

These models and many others from the North-West Region, through the National Local Development Program II[31], (investment

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[30] Bianca Tămaş, "Sâncraiu, un sat ca un colț de rai, la doar câțiva kilometri de Cluj-Napoca", *Monitorul de Cluj,* 16 Iulie 2019, Available online: https://www.monitorulcj.ro/actualitate/ 72813-sancraiu-un-sat-ca-un-colt-de-rai-la-doar-cativa-kilometri-de-cluj-napoca, accessed on 30.07.2022.

[31] Planul Național de Dezvoltare Locală II, 2020, Available online: https://www.mdlpa.ro/ pages/programulnationaldezvoltarelocala, accessed on 12.01.2022.

projects in education, health, culture, water, gas and road infrastructure,[32] tourism – Colibiţa Lake, the wooden churches from Maramureş and Sălaj – some included in the UNESCO World Heritage Site -, the Roman archaeological site of Moigrad-Porolissum, the spas in Bihor, Satu Mare and Cluj) can be taken as landmarks of development for the mayors in the communes of the North-East and South-Muntenia Regions, which face an important international migration affecting their demographic balance.

Conclusions

Each region of the country has a specific cultural identity, agricultural land, forest fund, pastures for animal breeding, which can be enhanced with the help of European non-reimbursable funds, favoring the stay or return of the young people, who trained at renowned faculties in the country and abroad, to the depopulated rural areas. The implementation of public policies for the granting of land / housing to the young population (up to 35 years old), in order to stop their emigration, the creation of business hubs can be a solution for the depopulation of rural areas. The most important local development resource is the investment in local human capital first, all the other resources coming second.

In conclusion, we believe that if the emphasis is on the potential for local development through investments and concrete plans, anchored in the realities of the Romanian rural area and subject to constant monitoring, the depopulation of rural areas would decrease considerably, communes and villages becoming, perhaps, even a pole of attraction for young people after graduation.

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[32] Agro Business, The rural area in the Northwest of the country, between a medium agriculture and great challenges of tourism development, 08.01.2020, Available online: https://www.agro-business.ro/spatiul-rural-din-north-west-of-the-country-between-a-medium-agriculture-and-big-tourism-development-challenges / 2019/01/08 /, accessed 29.01.2022.

The rural area depopulation phenomenon in Romania, although not as pronounced as in the rest of Western Europe, is a source of instability for economic growth, sustainable development and social cohesion, with economic, social, cultural and educational consequences that are difficult to estimate, given the multitude of factors, actors, institutions and processes that seem to play an important but unclear role in it.

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Available online: https://www.arq.ro/un-primar-din-romania-da-gratuit-case-si-locuri-de-munca-celor-care-vor-sa-se-mute-la-el-in-comuna-preferate-sunt-familiile-cu-multi-copii/3712, accessed 13.05.2022.

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INTEGRATION THROUGH THE LENS OF REFUGEES LIVING IN ROMANIA

Flavius ILIONI-LOGA[1]
Delia STEFENEL[2]

Abstract. The last two years have brought a record number of asylum applications in Romania. In such context, the word "integration" is used perhaps as often as the word refugee itself, without enough empirical evidences on what it implies and how is it perceived by refugees, themselves. Therefore, the aim of the present paper is to assess social challenges addressed in the integration process of refugees settled in Romania, in terms of better understanding of the role of the local community in the inclusion of newcomers to Romania, and of self-perception of integration. The data was collected among refugees settled in Romania (n=103), originally mainly from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan. The main findings highlight the importance of the local communities for the integration of refugees, which is given mainly by the quality of the contact and the sense of safety, provided mainly by the host country. Implication of the study for the local authorities in building a welcoming system of integration for refugees will be discussed.

Keywords: Integration, Refugees, Intercultural Exchange, Romania.

Introduction

In the world, the year 2020 brought a new record of displaced people over 82 million persons being registered by the UNHCR

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[1] PhD, West University of Timisoara, Romania, ilioni.flavius@yahoo.ro.
[2] PhD, "Lucian Blaga" University of Sibiu, Romania, delia.stefenel@ulbsibiu.ro.

according to the Agency's 2020 Global Trends Report Out of these, 26.4 million are refugees, 48 million are internally displaced, 4.1 million are asylum seekers and another 3.9 million are Venezuelan internally displaced persons[3].

The country that hosts the most refugees in the world is Turkey (3.7 million), followed by Colombia, (1.7 million) and Pakistan (1.4 million). 68% of displaced people come from only 5 countries: Syria (6.7 million), Venezuela (4 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million), South Sudan (2.2 million) and Myanmar (1.1 million). The UN Refugee Agency estimates that between 2018 and 2020, 1 million children were born refugees.

Romania has registered since 1991 until now over 10,000 people benefiting from a form of protection. At the end of 2020, a number of 3597 refugees with a valid residence permit were registered in Romania[4]. The year 2020 also brought a record number of asylum applications, respectively 6158 applications for access to a form of protection of the Romanian state, compared to 2589 in 2019 and 2138 in 2018. October, November and December of 2020 registered over 1000 asylum applications every month, most of them being registered in the western part of Romania, being processed in the Asylum Center in Timișoara. More than 34,666 people were stopped from entering Romania illegally, compared to 6042 in 2019, which shows a major change in the migration route through Romania.

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[3] UNHCR, Global Trends Forced Displacement In 2020, available online: https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/60b638e37/global-trends-forced-displacement-2020.html accessed September, 17, 2021.

[4] Romanian General Inspectorate for Immigration, 2020 Activity Report, available online: http://igi.mai.gov.ro/ro/comunicat/repere-din-activitatea-poli%C8%9Bi%C8%99tilor-inspectoratului-general-pentru-imigr%C4%83ri-%C3%AEn-anul-2020, accessed September, 10, 2020.

The concept of refugee integration

In the context of analyzing the phenomenon of refugees in recent years in Europe, the word "integration" is used perhaps as often as the word refugee, itself. Integration is the opposite of segregation and separation[5] and it considers that segregation is based on social inequality and practices that are not in line with democracy; therefore, integration is based on equality and democracy and is an imperative of social justice. The International Organization for Migration defines integration as "the mutual process of adaptation between the host society and migrants, both individually and as a group"[6]. On the other hand, community acceptance plays a decisive role when it comes to psychosocial integration, to dissemination[7]. According to migration researchers Scholten, Penninx "Integration is the process by which immigrants, [refugees and migrants] are accepted into society"[8]. The concepts of cultural diversity and acculturation are defined by Redfield, Linton and Herskovits in 1936, as the phenomenon that results when groups of individuals with different cultures come into direct and continuous contact leading to clear changes in origin cultural patterns of both groups. Although acculturation is a neutral concept which implies changes in both groups in practice, the action of change is stronger in a single group[9].

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5   Andreson, Elizabeth, *The Imperative of Integration*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2010.

6   International Organization for Migration *IOM and migrant integration, 2015,* available online: https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/IOM-DMM-Factsheet-LHD-Migrant-Integration.pdf, accessed September, 15, 2021.

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8   Scholten Peter; Penninx Rinus; *The Multilevel Governance of Migration and Integration*, Holand, Springer, 2016.

9   *Apud* Berry, John. W; Poortinga Ype H; Marshall H Segall; Pandey, Janak; Kagitcibasi Çiğdem; *Handbook of Cross cultural Psychology: Social behavior and applications*, Pearson, Pearson, 1997, p. 34.

At European level, in November 2004, the European Commission, at a conference of ministries responsible for integration in the Member States, agreed on a set of eleven basic principles for immigrant integration policies (CBP Policy). These principles define integration as a two-way process of accommodation and emphasize the importance of language, interaction and active participation in society. The acquisition of new cultural competences requires a permanent intercultural contact.[10]

In Romania, the national strategy on immigration for the period 2015-2018 approved by GD no. 780/2015 defines integration as "a dynamic, two-way process of mutual interaction, which requires not only efforts on the part of national, regional and local authorities, but also an increased commitment on the part of the host community and immigrants"[11].

The current study

Accordingly, with the theories mentioned above, we aim to address the following research questions: How do they define / understand the integration process and what are the main factors that shape the integration of refugees in Romania?

In order to provide with an answer to the questions addressed above we set two objectives:

1. Identifying the perception on the process of integration of refugees in Romania

2. Analyzing of the main factors that affects the integration of refugees in the Romanian community.

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[10] Alastair, Age; Alison, Strang; *Indicators of Integration: Final Report*, London: Home Office, 2004, p. 6.

[11] Romanian Parliament; *Strategia națională privind imigrația pentru perioada 2015-2018*, Available online: https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocumentAfis/173049, accessed September, 17, 2021.

Therefore, these hypotheses were addressed:

1. The refugee self-perception of integration in the Romanian culture is given by the quality of the contact with the members from the host society.

2. The integration in general in the Romanian society is determined by the motivation for safety reasons and by the quality of the contact with the members from the host society.

Methods

Participants

The composition of the sample by gender is not homogeneous, mostly male, (76.7%), young people between 18-29 years old. (73.8%). Regarding the length of stay in Romania, 73.8% of respondents declare living the country for over 2 years. From the perspective of family status a large majority of respondents are accompanied by their family in Romania (husband, wife, parents, brothers, sisters, etc.). From the point of view of religious affiliation, most respondents declared to identify themselves as Muslims (83.3%). When it comes to refugees plans to move out of Romania in the next 5 years, most respondents answered negatively (37.9%) or were unsure (37.9%). A percentage of 24.3% stated that they want to leave Romania and thus have no long-term plans for integration in the country.

Table 1. Refugee sample structure

Dimensions					
Gender (%)	Male	Female			
	76.7	23.3			
Age in years (%)	18-29	30-39	40-49	50+	
	73.8	12.6	4.9	8.7	
Origin Country (%)	Syria	Iraq	Afghanistan	Other	
	68.6	9.8	16.7	4.9	
Education (%)	Elementary	Middle School	High School	Bachelor	Master
	2.9	6.8	13.6	60.2	16.5

Instruments and procedures

The composition of the instrument applied to people with a refugee background included predominantly closed questions designed to register the general situation on the integration process in Romania (e.g. "Integration implies that the host community is welcoming towards the refugees", "Integration means refugees culture maintenance and cultural involvement in the host country"); the motivational factors for integration (e.g. "Romania is a safe country", "People are welcoming") and the quality of contact between the local community (e.g. Police, local authorities, NGO, language teachers) and the refugees. The data collection was undertaken through an online platform, based on a questionnaire with 21 questions. The answers were rated on a five point Likert scale, ranged from 1 to 5. (1 = totally agree, 5 = totally disagree). The most surveys were filled in English language, with high participation in western part of Romania.

Preliminary Analysis

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was done for the instrument measuring the self-perception of integration, using Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Therefore, the sampling adequacy indexed reports appropriate values for (KMO = .612) and chi-square, χ^2 (28) = 156,671, p <0.001.

From the results obtained after rotation, two main components were extracted. The first factor (non-integrative strategies) explains the most of the variance of the observed variables, respectively 27.46%, the second factor (integrative strategies) 23.47%, of the total variance of the variables.

The representation of the personal definition of integration led to a binary structure resizing of what it means, for people with a refugee

background, to integrate into a new host country. Thus, we obtained two major categories of factors, which we defined as follows:

a. Non-Integrative Strategies, (M=3.57,SD=.732) which includes the following items: "Integration means that refugees must have contact and behave exactly like the locals, so to be welcome", "Integration is when refugees keep their own culture, but have no contact with the locals", "Being integrated just means speaking the language, working and paying taxes", "Integration is when you stay exactly the same, but avoid contact with the locals".

b. Integrative Strategies, (M=1.72,SD=.495) which includes the following items: "Integration implies that the host community is welcoming to refugees", "Refugees must respect the culture of locals", "Integration means preserving the culture of refugees but also involvement in cultural aspects of the country host", "Integration means that no culture is superior").

Results and Discussions

The research started with the presumption that the refugee self-perception of integration is given by the quality of the contact with the members from the host society. The correlation analysis showed that there is a statistically significant relationship between how refugees understand the integration process and the extent to which they are satisfied with the interaction with the authorities and the local community (r = .503, p <0.01). Moreover, if refugees are satisfied with the interaction with the authorities and the local community (r = .470, p <0.01), then they perceive integration as two groups that come together with the reality of cultural differences, but with an accentuation of cultural similarities, in a constant intercultural exchange (r = .195, p <0.05). In addition, the other meanings of integration (lack of cultural superiority, unity, equality, non-discrimination and acceptance) are not

affected by the quality of contact with local authorities and community (r = .099, ns).

Table 2. Correlations between quality contact and integration dimensions

Dimensions	1	2	3	4	5
Quality of contact with the host company	-				
Integration at the societal level	470**	-			
Cultural integration	,195*	,469**	-		
Non cultural superiority	,099	,279**	,054	-	
Integrative strategies (total)	,503**	,351**	,018	,298**	-

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The second presumption researched was that the integration in general in the Romanian society is determined by the motivation for safety reasons and by the quality of the contact with the members from the host society. The regression analysis showed that integration in general in Romania is affected by motivation in terms of safety factors and the quality of contact with members of the host society. Two models were included in the regression block: the motivational categories and the quality of contact with the host country. Because several components proved to be statistically significant predictors for the variable, generically defined as "Global Integration", we used regression analysis, that pointed out to these factors proved significant in integrating at the global level (R^2=.464, F(102=21.243,p<0.01): 1. Safety Motivation (beta = .506); 2. Quality of contact with the host society (beta = .482, p =.017).

Conclusions

The analysis concluded that the correct understanding of the principles of integration of refugees in Romanian culture is given by the quality of contact with members of the host society. The more welcoming local communities are, the more they express their expectations for intercultural integration. Thus refugees will respond in the same

direction, preserving their cultural identity or, as the case may be, renouncing to their cultural identity (assimilation). If there is any openness towards integration on behalf of the majority group, represented by local authorities and local community, refugees will manifest stronger integration attempts and will express their desire to participate in community life.

The authorities' initial response to the basic needs of refugees has impactful effect on the degree of motivation for the integration of refugee. The quality of contact with the members providing first hand assistance or the interaction with the local community, complementary to the assistance to cover basic needs is also definitory for the refugee integration process, as stated in the present research.

The research findings might serve as a useful tool for stakeholders and future policy makers, in charge of adapting the refugee integration process, as well as the asylum procedure. The importance of an intercultural society, welcoming towards the refugees is underlined as a strong pillar of creating refugees inclusion communities.

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MIGRATION AS A WICKED POLICY PROBLEM
A study of approaches to migration governance pursued by state and non-state actors in Germany since 2015

Sarah DIEHL[1]

Abstract. This paper examines migration governance in Germany pursued by state and non-state actors in the period following 2015. The focus of interest was whether, and if so how, the approaches employed by the different actors changed during the period observed. After laying the foundation for the analysis through providing an overview of migration theory and relevant international law, which is an important instrument of governance at the international level, a case study was conducted using relevant literature and freely available data. Within this framework, relevant national legal provisions as well as responses by the different actors were analysed. The most important finding of this study is that approaches to migration governance have changed considerably over the course of time with a focus on securitisation and externalisation of border controls. The main challenge in this respect is to reconcile migrants' human rights with the concept of national sovereignty. Besides, there is a considerable gap in the way highly demanded migrants (that is high-skilled workers) and unwanted migrants were and are treated. In the latter case, Germany employs a mitigation strategy that is characterized by the reliance on a security approach to control migration flows. Furthermore, it became evident that non-state actors play an important role in the governance of migration. The paper concludes by presenting possible recommendations for action. What stands out in this respect is that a change in attitude to migration as well as further international cooperation are indispensable to provide for effective migration governance.

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[1] MA in International Relations and Governance, Andrássy University Budapest/University of Passau, Hungary/Germany, e-mail: sarah.diehl@andrassyuni.hu.

Effective Migration Governance as a Challenge

Human migration has been a constant throughout the species' history, and it can fairly be argued that looking for a better place to live forms part of mankind's nature.[2] However, ever since humans settled in almost all inhabitable parts of the planet, this process has always been accompanied by a struggle for resources occurring between two different groups: the inhabitants and the newcomers. Even though Homo sapiens created more and more sophisticated societies over time, which resulted in the inception of sovereign states or state-like entities, this basic conflict line remains relevant to this day. The first two decades of the 21st century were no exception. Migration may be due to different motives and can take different forms, but it nevertheless remains a global phenomenon – at that, one which is increasingly gaining momentum due to the phenomenon of climate change rapidly altering living conditions in large parts of the planet. According to a study conducted by the United Nations (UN) "the number of international migrants (…) reached 244 million in 2015 for the world as a whole, a 41 per cent increase compared to 2000"[3]. In 2019 that number was up to 272 million, with further growth predicted.[4] Because of its (potential and de-facto) economic, social, and cultural impacts, migration as a phenomenon is increasingly contested in

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[2] Garcia Zamor, Jean-Claude, *Ethical Dilemmas of Migration. Moral Challenges for Policymakers,* Springer, Cham, 2018, p. 1.

[3] United Nations, "244 million international migrants living abroad worldwide, new UN statistics reveal", 2016, accessed October, 11th, 2021: [https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/01/244-million-international-migrants-living-abroad-worldwide-new-un-statistics-reveal/].

[4] United Nations, "International migrants numbered 272 million in 2019, continuing an upward trend in all major world regions", *Population Facts No. 2019/4,* 2019, accessed October, 11th, 2021: [https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/populationfacts/docs/MigrationStock2019_PopFacts_2019-04.pdf].

migrants' preferred host societies. This is especially true in the Global North, where a decline in economic growth[5] together with the securitisation of immigration led states to adopt a more restrictive approach.[6] *Collier* in this context even speaks of "a phenomenon overloaded with toxic associations"[7] when it comes to migration from poor to rich countries. At the same time, it is difficult to govern due to the wide range of actors and influences, which is why it is often described as a "wicked policy problem"[8].

Migration governance has thus become an increasingly important field of action for state and non-state actors alike at the national as well as the international level. This is especially true for the period since 2015, when migration eventually popped up on the agenda of the EU, thereby destabilising the hitherto most successful effort of creating a supranational regional entity. The ensuing crisis after the influx of more than one million people in 2015 and 2016 and the breach of trust between EU-member states has still not been overcome.

Germany was one of the countries that was hit hardest by the crisis due to its location and its allure for migrants and refugees. In the face of an increasing influx and growing hostility to the newcomers at home, the country was forced to adapt its policy, doing a U-turn from welcoming culture towards a policy of deterrence which mainly consist of externalising border controls, a change that is most likely due to securitization. The given paper set out to analyse this shift in German migration governance and its causes in the period following 2015. Regarding the methodology, a qualitative approach was chosen, which

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[5] Rana, Kishan, *21st Century Diplomacy. A Practitioner's Guide*, London/New York, Continuum, 2011, p. 13.

[6] Üstübici, Aysen, *The Governance of International Migration. Irregular Migrants' Access to Right to Stay in Turkey and Morocco*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2018, p. 17.

[7] Collier, Paul, *Exodus. How Migration is Changing Our World,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 11.

[8] Scholten, Peter, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation. A Complexity Approach to the Governance of Migration and Diversity*, Cham, Palgrave MacMillan, 2020, p. 190.

consists of a case study using relevant literature and available data. To address the research question, the paper is structured as follows: In the first chapter, basic concepts like governance, migration and securitisation will be defined, before turning to the case study, which consists of various parts. Lastly, policy recommendations are given regarding migration governance at the national and the legal framework, before concluding with some final remarks.

Theoretical Background

In the given chapter, the most important concepts used in this paper shall be defined briefly to lay the theoretical foundation for the further deliberations.

The first important concept is that of migration governance. While there is no formal legal definition of migration, it is generally assumed that the term refers to the process of leaving one's place of usual residence for a longer period irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status, either across an international border or within the state of residence.[9] Migration can occur within a legal entity or across borders, for example between national states. The type of migration of interest in this paper is migration across international borders. Following *Oltmer*, migration always has a wide-ranging impact on the course of the migrant's life and his or her living conditions while at the same time promoting social change at the migrants' destination. It can occur in a unidirectional way or via several intermediate stages. Fluctuation brought about by the circular movement of people who move back and forth between the host country and their country of origin or return migration is also a vital element of the phenomenon. This means that permanent settlement in another country or region is just one possible outcome out of many, as

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[9] International Organization for Migration, *Glossary on Migration*, Geneva, 2019, p. 137, accessed October 11th, 202: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf]

intentions and conditions vary constantly.[10] There is also a common differentiation between regular and irregular migration. The latter is of special concern to states given that it takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the state of origin, transit, or destination.[11] Refugees are a special subgroup of migrants. The key difference between refugees and other kinds of migrants is the motive: The formers' "decision to move is not primarily made voluntarily but as a necessary act"[12], as external circumstances – such as war, oppression, persecution, or violence – endanger their lives. Thus, they are not able to choose when to leave their country or to decide when to return.

Governance, on the other side, stands "for any strategy, process, procedure or program for controlling, regulation or managing problems on a global, national, local or organisational level"[13]. Its focus lies thus on processes carried out within the range of not only formal institutions or rules, but also in the realm of informal practices.[14] Due to this rather wide definition, it is sometimes criticised as a 'catch-all-term' without real meaning.[15] It is commonly juxtaposed to the term government, which is carried out by formal institutions and actors. Having in mind the two concepts, migration governance as a conundrum can be understood as "the combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organisational structures (…) and the relevant processes that shape and regulate states' approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and

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[10] Oltmer, Jochen, *Globale Migration. Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 3. EditionMunich, C.H. Beck, 2016, pp. 9-10.

[11] Üstübici, Aysen, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[12] Garcia Zamor, Jean-Claude, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[13] Lemke, Thomas, "An indigestible meal? Foucault, governmentality and state theory*"*, p. 53, in: *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory*, 8 (2), 2007, pp. 43-64.

[14] Üstübici, Aysen, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[15] Lemke, Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

promoting international cooperation"[16]. Especially the governance of international migration is increasingly relevant given that this phenomenon has important social, economic, and political impacts that are visible across different levels of governance[17].

Securitisation is another phenomenon that plays a key role when addressing Germany's migration governance. The term, which was first coined by a group of researchers at the Copenhagen School, deals with the question how certain policies or subjects can be turned into security-relevant matters in order to legitimise extraordinary measures. The main assumption in this context is that this can be done via an extreme version of politicisation[18]. Securitisation is an inherently constructivist approach to international relations: It assumes that whether an issue is securitised does not necessarily have anything to do with an objective threat to state-security being present. Instead, the relevant aspect is whether someone was successful in framing the respective issue as an existential problem or threat:[19] "Securitization is a rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion"[20]. In this context it is especially relevant whether the targeted audience accepts the framing of an issue as security-relevant or not. The ambiguity regarding what can be considered as a security issue requiring urgent action is one of the main reasons why securitisation is often criticised or seen as a process with negative repercussions, since it

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[16] International Organization for Migration, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

[17] Geddes, Andrew/Espinoza, Marcia Vera/Abdou, Leila Hadj/Brumat, Leiza, "Introduction: the Dynamics of Regional Migration Governance", p. 1, in: Geddes, Andrew/Espinoza, Marcia Vera/Abdou, Leila Hadj/Brumat, Leiza (eds.), *The Dynamics of Regional Migration Governance*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham/Nordhampton, 2019, pp. 1-14.

[18] Buzan, Barry/Wæver, Ole/de Wilde, Jaap, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1998, p. 25.

[19] Williams, Michael C., "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics", p. 512, in: *International Studies Quarterly*, 47 (4), 2003, pp. 511–531.

[20] Balzacq, Thierry, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," p. 179, in: *European Journal of International Relations*, 11 (2), 2005, pp. 171–201.

makes it impossible to differentiate between real existential challenges to security and ordinary risks. Rather, the concept provides for "an almost indefinite expansion of the security agenda"[21]. Besides, there is a risk that purely subjective threats lead to panic politics and measures taken that would otherwise not be compatible with the self-perception of the respective society. *Buzan et al.* vividly summarise the negative consequences of an excessive fixation on security: "National security should not be idealised. It works to silence opposition and has given power holders many opportunities to exploit 'threats' for domestic purposes, to claim a right to handle something with less democratic control and constraint. Our belief, therefore, is not 'the more security, the better[22].'"

Migration, especially that of 'unwanted' individuals who lack the relevant documentation, is one of the topics that have become increasingly securitised in recent decades[23]. This has often led to externalisation, which is especially common with regard to refugees. The term refers to a strategy whereby States instigate measures beyond their own borders to prevent or deter the entry of foreign nationals who lack the requisite legal entry permission and is often used to target prospective asylum seekers. The main aim of this practice is to prevent the perceived negative impacts associated with migration of certain groups. Externalisation is thus characterized by a primarily economic logic, weighing the prospective costs against the prospective benefits. Externalisation may consist of a large range of practices which include enhanced control of borders, shifting the responsible for border security to third parties, rescue operations, to measures addressing the drivers of

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[21] Williams, Michael C., *op. cit.*, p. 513.

[22] Buzan, Barry/Wæver, Ole/de Wilde, Jaap, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[23] Schierup, Carl-Ulrik/ Likić-Brborić, Branka/Delgado Wise, Raúl/Toksöz, Gülay, "Migration, civil society and global governance: an introduction to the special issue", p. 6, in: *Globalizations*, 2018, accessed October, 11th, 2021: [https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2018.1503840].

migration, the so-called push and pull factors.[24] The externalisation of border security to deter prospective asylum seekers and other migrants often goes hand in hand with the securitisation of migration given that the measures required to deter them (like push backs at sea) would not be seen as morally sound in normal circumstances.

A Case Study of Migration Governance in Germany in the period following 2015

After having laid out the theoretical base for the following deliberations, it is time to turn to the subject at hand. The case study consists of various chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to the migratory situation in Germany since 2015. The second chapter gives a short overview of the relevant legal framework, before turning to the mitigation strategies used by state and non-state actors in the third chapter. The case study concludes by presenting various policy recommendations in the fourth chapter.

Overview

Given its location and history, migration flows have always had a huge impact on Germany, which is one reason why a considerable amount of literature on this topic exists. Even so, most Germans and their governments were not keen on recognising the fact publicly until the year 2005, when a new immigration law came into effect. This is surprising because German population growth in recent decades can mainly be attributed to positive net immigration[25]. Nowadays, Germany is even

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[24] Stock, Inka/Üstübici, Aysen/Schultz, Susanne U, „Externalization at work: responses to migration policies from the Global South", pp. 1-2, in: *Comparative Migration Studies, 7*, 48, 2019, accessed October, 12th, 2021: [https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0157-z].

[25] Fachkommission Integrationsfähigkeit, *Shaping our immigration society together: Report of the Federal Government Expert Commission on the framework for sustainable integration,* Federal Chancellery, Berlin 2020, p. 24.

considered the second most popular migration destination in the world, ranging directly after the United States[26]. Besides, it is a leading destination for refugees among Western countries and has been the largest recipient of asylum applications within Europe since 1985: nearly one third – that is more than 3.6 million – of all applications were processed there[27].

Consequently, migration, the refugee issue and its impacts have been a recurrent topic in German politics, even though attention and scientific interest have varied widely depending on current events.[28] Aside from the refugee issue, one of the main preoccupations of the German government is and has been the lack of qualified labour, a phenomenon that is also called 'Fachkräftemangel'.[29] At the same time, the entry of other individuals, especially low-skilled workers and refugees, is more and more restricted due to public opposition. This became especially evident in the period following 2015, when public debate was extremely narrowed on the refugee issue after the German government permitted the entry of refugees that were grounded in Hungary without receiving the assistance provided for by European asylum law. In 2015 and 2016, around one million prospective refugees arrived. While a culture of hospitality predominated among large parts of the population during the first months, with people carrying relief supplies flocking to train stations, this changed quickly: From winter 2015 onwards, public discussion focussed on how to deter refugees and, in

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[26] Webb, Alex, *Germany Top Migration Land After U.S. in New OECD Ranking*, Bloomberg, 2014, accessed October, 12th, 2021 [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-20/immigration-boom-propels-germany-past-u-k-in-new-oecd-ranking.html].

[27] Connor, Phillip, "Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015. Recent wave accounts for about one-in-ten asylum applications since 1985", *Pew Research Center*, 2016, pp. 17-19.

[28] Müller, Doreen, *Flucht und Asyl in europäischen Migrationsregimen*, Universitätsverlag, Göttingen, 2010, p. 139.

[29] Federal Ministry of Interior, Building and Community, *Skilled immigrants: an asset to our country*, 2021, accessed October, 12th, 2021: [https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/migration/immigration/labour-migration/skilled-immigration/skilled-immigration-node.html].

some cases, migrants in general. These negative sentiments reached a peak after the events that took place in Cologne on New-Years-Eve 2015, where asylum applicants assaulted women during public gatherings[30]. Terrorist attacks committed by individuals of Muslim faith, like the one that took place in Berlin in winter 2016, also contributed to creating a climate of fear among Germans. Some politicians, especially those affiliated to parties on the right of the political spectrum instrumentalised these events so as to push for further restrictions. As hostility towards migrants increased, calls for restricting the entry of migrants of any type grew louder as well[31]. In consequence, relevant changes to refugee policy and migration law in general have been introduced in the period following 2015. It is evident that the rapid influx of migrants and refugees acted as a catalyst for policy change in this respect.

Legal framework

The given chapter is devoted to the legal framework, which is spread out across different levels of governance due to European integration and Germany being a party to a variety to different international treaties.

First of all, it has to be noted that Germany has ratified various international treaties which have an impact on migration governance. This includes, at a general level, the Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Refugee Convention and various other treaties like the International Convention of Economic and Social Rights, the Global Compact on Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. In this respect, it has to be mentioned, however, that Germany has not ratified the International Convention on Migrant Workers Rights and the ILO Migrant Workers Convention – a trait that it shares with most

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[30] Scholten, Peter, *op. cit*, p. 30.
[31] Oltmer, Jochen, *Migration. Geschichte und Zukunft der Gegenwart*, 2. Edition, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2020, pp. 273-274.

industrialised Western countries[32]. Without discussing the aforementioned legal provisions more in detail, it can be stated that they oblige Germany to offer comprehensive protection to asylum seekers and to treat migrants and migrant workers in a manner that does justice to their inalienable human rights – a commitment that Germany formally upholds.

Secondly, it must be noted that Germany's EU membership also has important legal repercussions. In this context, it should be mentioned that the responsibility for migration governance has at least partly shifted to the supranational level in 1999 when the field became a shared competence of the EU. Art. 4 TEU mentions the establishment of a common area of freedom, security, and justice, which comprises the management of migration from external countries, as one of the block's main aims. Besides, the German migration law has been highly europeanised as the EU holds the regulatory competence for the areas of border controls, asylum and immigration as stated in Art. 77-80 of the AEUV. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between migration of EU nationals and that of individuals from third countries when discussing migration governance in Germany. The former have to be treated as equal to German nationals and therefore do not need a visa or a residence permit to enter the country. The relevant legal norms in such cases can be found in the European Union Treaties (EUV and AEUV) as well as in the directive 2004/38/EC, which concretise the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move, work and reside freely within the territory of the Member States foreseen by the treaties. This high degree of Europeanisation does not necessarily mean, however, that Germany has no sovereignty in the field. Instead, like other member states, Germany uses the interaction between the national and the European level of policymaking strategically so as to enhance the executive's room

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[32] International Organization for Migration, *Migration Governance Indicators (Germany. Profile 2018),* Geneva, 2019, p. 12, accessed October, 16th, 2021: [https://migrationdataportal.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/Migration%20Governance%20Profile-The%20Federal%20Republic%20of%20Germany.pdf].

of manoeuvre by freeing itself from domestic constraints[33]. In this respect, it should also be noted that, until this day, the EU has not been successful in establishing a common European governance framework for external migration, which is among others due to the fact that intergovernmentalism has prevailed over Europeanisation. This is especially true in the field of labour migration,[34] but also for the policy towards asylum seekers, who – owing to a lack of legal routes accessible while still being in their countries of origin – are in nine out of ten cases forced to enter the region without the necessary documentation[35].

The third level is the national one. Here, no comprehensive migration and integration law exists. This differentiates Germany from other countries that are subject to large influxes of migrants. Instead, the relevant norms are spread out across different laws and different levels of government. Besides, the regulatory framework has been adapted constantly in the last decades, in response to migratory, economic and demographic developments. The main laws and their key provisions shall be outlined briefly in the following. Firstly, the German constitution must be mentioned since it is at the core of all provisions. Some of its rights are valid not only for citizens but for everyone and therefore apply to migrants as well. The most important provision is without a doubt Article 1 GG, which stresses the existence of dignity and inviolable and inalienable human rights that constrain the room of manoeuvre of the government. The constitution also foresees a right to asylum in Art. 16 GG, even though it has been more and more restricted over the last decades. Especially relevant in the case of migrants are the right to move

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[33] Fitzgerald, David Scott, *Refuge beyond reach. How rich democracies repel asylum seekers*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, pp. 160-161.

[34] Carrera, Sergio/Hernández I Sagrera, Raül, "Mobility Partnerships. 'Insecurity partnerships' for policy coherence and migrant workers' human rights in the EU", pp. 98-99, in: Kunz, Rahel/Lavenex, Sandra/Panizzon, Marion (eds.), *Multilayered Migration Governance. The promise of partnership*, Routledge, Oxon/New York, 2011, pp. 97-115.

[35] Moreno-Lax, Violeta, *Accessing Asylum in Europe: Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, p. 466.

freely through the federal territory as stated in Article 11 (1) GG as well as the right to choose one's occupation, notwithstanding regulations (Art. 12 (1) GG), which are both valid for German nationals only. The aforementioned restrictions open up the possibility of limiting the scope of action for individuals from third countries through more specialised laws. The most important legal document in the field of migration governance is the Residence Act, which was established through the immigration act in 2005 and regulates entry, permanence, labour rights and the integration of foreigners from third countries present on German territory regardless of their legal status[36]. It includes provisions regarding the handout of visas, the conditions for gaining residence and for taking up employment. Within this framework, high-skilled workers are privileged given that they are of key relevance for the development of the German economy. The skilled immigration act, which entered into force in March 2020 within the scope of a controversial migration bill containing different amendments[37], can be seen as a milestone in this respect. It facilitates the immigration of university graduates, scientists and skilled workers who have completed quality vocational training if they can present a job offer. People without vocational training, in contrast, have only limited opportunities to enter Germany given that they require a specific job offer and approval from the Federal Employment Agency. It is therefore evident that German migration law is biased in favour of high-skilled individuals, who are seen as an asset to the German economy.

Mitigation strategies of state and non-state actors

After having examined the legal background, the question arises what authorities have done in order to cope with the challenge posed by

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[36] Dietz, Andreas, *Ausländer- und Asylrecht,* 3. Edition, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2019, p. 34.

[37] Mischke, Judith, *Germany passes controversial migration law,* Politico, 2019, accessed October, 16th, 2021: [https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-passes-controversial-migration-law/].

migration. When doing so, it is necessary to differentiate between different types of migration given that policies vary widely.

Germany is an important destination for skilled workers from within and outside the EU, whom the country needs in order to satisfy demands for qualified labour and to cope with demographic developments[38]. As became clear in the previous chapter, Germany is deeply committed to European integration. It therefore comes as no surprise that Germany pursues a liberal policy regarding migration from other member states even though migration has been increasingly contested in German society during the period observed. This can mainly be attributed to the fact that freedom of movement is one of the core principles of European integration. In consequence, Germany has only a limited room for manoeuvre about its migratory policy, even with respect to labour migrants[39]. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that no significant policy changes have been made in this respect during the period observed.

The second type of relevant migration is that of high-skilled workers from third countries, the German government actively tries to facilitate labour market access and integration. Besides, since the first decade of this century, Germany actively wants to promote partnerships with third countries to open up legal pathways for migrants in accordance with labour market needs. One measure to be mentioned in this respect is a website launched by the government, which is targeted at skilled workers, e.g. scientists or IT professionals. The website offers information about the eligibility as well as the proceedings to take up

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[38] Oltmer, Jochen, *op. cit.,* pp. 268-269.

[39] In 2019, 66.4 % of all immigrants came from European countries, the majority from other EU member states; Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, *2019 Migration Report Key Results*, 2020, pp. 2-3, accessed October, 16th, 2021: [https://www.bamf.de/ SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2019-zentrale-ergebnisse.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4].

residence in the country[40]. Furthermore, the German government introduced the Skilled Labour Act, which was already briefly discussed in the chapter about the legal provisions, to facilitate immigration of this group.

The third type of migration and the focus of this chapter, however, shall be on the management of humanitarian and irregular migration given that these issues have been of primary concern given that the influx of refugees has increased especially fast in the time period following 2015. The following graph shows the number of applications for the period from 2014 to 2021 and the corresponding decisions taken by the German migration authority (BAMF):

Table: Number of asylum applications and corresponding decisions by the BAMF

Year	Overall number of decisions	Rate of individuals recognised as refugee (Art. 16a GG and §3 AsylG)	Rate of individuals granted subsidiary protection (§4 AsylG)	Rate of individuals under suspension of deportation (§60 AufenthG)	Rate of rejections	Rate of formal decisions
2014	128,911	27.6 %	4 %	1.6 %	33.4 %	35.2 %
2015	282,726	49.2 %	0.6 %	0.7 %	32.4 %	17.8 %
2016	695,733	37.1 %	22.1 %	3.5 %	25 %	12.6 %
2017	603,428	21.2 %	16.3 %	6.6 %	38.5 %	18.1 %
2018	216,873	20.4 %	11.6 %	4.4 %	34.8 %	30.2 %
2019	183,952	25.7 %	10.6 %	3.2 %	29.4 %	32.4 %
2020	145,071	27.3 %	13.1 %	3.9 %	32.1 %	24.8 %
Jan-April 2021	60,275	16.5 %	12.3 %	3.1 %	20.6 %	48.1 %

Source: https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Statistik/AsylinZahlen/aktuelle-zahlen-april-2021.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, p. 11.

As can be seen when looking at the data, the number of applications and therefore the number of decisions doubled from 2014 to 2015 and then tripled again to reach a temporary peak in 2016. At least in

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[40] Federal Government, *Make it in Germany: the official website for qualified professionals*, 2019, accessed October, 12th, 2021: [https://www.make-it-in-germany.com/en/about-the-portal/make-it-in-germany].

2015 and 2016, almost half of all applicants were granted some sort of protection, mostly refugee status or subsidiary protection. This changed substantially afterwards, which is mainly due to an important policy change.

Even though Germany was initially welcoming to migrants and refugees that arrived in 2015 – especially to those fleeing war-torn Syria – it swung back in line with other European states who were trying to deter future arrivals[41]. This is, among other reasons, due to the fact that migration became increasingly securitized as policy makers from the conservative and the right wing party as well as other influential actors exploited the fear of terrorist attacks, assaults and 'foreign domination' to reap political gains. In consequence, government used various approaches to migration during this period:

Traditionally, externalisation of migration governance within the European framework has been the method of choice to prevent an influx of unwanted migrants from third countries. In the case of Germany, externalisation first shifted the burden onto economically weakened EU member states like Italy and Greece[42]. This *cordon sanitaire* established through the Dublin Agreement which obliges member states in the EU's border regions to process asylum applications held until 2015, when the failure of the European migratory and asylum system became evident. In the light of this, the German government adopted an active policy of deterrence towards (irregular) migration. At the national level, this is visible in even more restrictive access to asylum and family reunification, despite some improvements for specific groups like labour migrants. The same is true for the fight against illegal employment as hope of illegal employment increases the incentive to enter the country illegally. Consequently, attempts to control borders and movements have become

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[41] Ferris, Elizabeth G./Donato, Katharine M., *Refugees, Migration and Global Governance*, Routledge, Oxon/New York, 2019, p. 80.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

more frequent. Besides, visa requirements, carrier sanctions and other types of offshore barriers established to limit the movement of asylum seekers and unwanted migrants in general made it much more difficult for them to realise their rights without embarking on perilous, mostly illegal journeys[43]. This shift towards deterrence also had repercussions at the European level: following the so-called refugee crisis, the EU's external border controls were enhanced and a controversial agreement with the Turkish government was concluded under the leadership of German Chancellor Merkel. This is mirrored by the investment in border controls and new control instruments, prohibiting marriage of convenience or entry of foreigners without the relevant documentation. Some scholars in this respect speak of an "outsourcing of EU border security regimes into regions peripheral to the EU"[44], a policy that Germany actively promotes, as its support for the EU-Turkey agreement shows. Furthermore, like many EU member states, Germany has linked its migration policy interests to its development policies[45]. Funds are used to discourage migration through improved conditions in the main countries of origin. One problem with such a policy is that it is not successful in deterring 'unwanted' migrants in all cases since migration flows are not only contingent on incentives the host country offers but also on the situation in the respective country of origin. If individuals considering to migrate see no prospect of improving their living conditions, this does not deter them from migrating but rather prompts them to seek other illicit ways. This also became clear during the so-called 'refugee crisis', in the course of which some individuals tried to migrate for the purpose of labour using the provisions of German asylum law despite lack of eligibility. While this is understandable from the

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[43] Taylor, Savitri, "Offshore Barriers to Asylum Seeker Movement: The Exercise of Power without Responsibility?", pp. 94-100, in: McAdam, Jane (ed.): *Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security*, Hart Publishing, London, 2008, pp. 93–128.

[44] Üstübici, Aysen, *op. cit*., p. 205.

[45] Scholten, Peter, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

individual's perspective, it should come as no surprise that such cases of alleged 'abuse of the right to asylum' sparked indignation and resistance among the German public after becoming known, which in turn led to a populist backlash in the 2017 elections[46].

The measures outlined above led to a paradoxical situation. While Germany is formally committed to protecting migrants' human rights, as well as to international law in general, the country encounters various challenges when it comes to complying with these obligations in practice. This is, among other reasons, due to the fact that policies regarding migration are increasingly shaped by security concerns aside from economic needs like labour supply and demand, which prompts the government to restrict entry and enhance border security. One example of how this kind of policy can lead to the neglection of human rights obligations is the focus on deterrence policies aimed at preventing unwanted migrants and refugees before embarking on their journey from reaching German territory. Through deterrence, the individuals affected are hindered from claiming their rights. This is especially problematic in the case of refugees who are unable to reach safe haven. The fact that – at least in Europe – on average at least on third of asylum applications are granted provided that asylum seekers managed to overcome all the barriers in place shows that the primary goal of deterrence is not just to keep potential migrants without valid claims to asylum out, but rather to restrict entry in general[47]. The focus on deterrence also led to a surge in criminal activity, especially human trafficking, in the border areas, a phenomenon states try to combat although they created or fostered it through their policies in the first place. Another huge issue is that the German government is only partially working towards improving conditions for those (irregular) migrants already inside the country by creating legal pathways to employment and residence. Instead,

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[46] Dietz, Andreas, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[47] Fitzgerald, David Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

individuals remain in a legal and social state of emergency for years, which impairs their prospects of integrating successfully[48].

Regarding the measures of non-state actors like NGOs, civil society and international organisations, the picture is somewhat mixed. In the beginning, civil society was highly active in the field of migration and refugee governance. This became especially evident in 2015, when many Germans spontaneously flocked to points of refugees' first arrival to assist them or to make donations. In the months and years that followed, civil society aided in the form of integration assistance, shelter, or German language classes. Such initiatives are key in promoting the integration of refugees and migrants by offering them long-term perspectives and connecting them to local communities. Civil society organisations thus often perform important functions the government is not willing or able to perform and are sometimes even criticised by the government for doing so. At the same time, their efforts in monitoring migration flows and identifying suitable alternative public policies often serve as a guideline for state actors. One group of especial importance regarding migration governance are employers' associations, in particular those uniting representatives of large industries. Especially since the mid-1990s they have been putting pressure on the government to permit migration of skilled individuals to satisfy the demand for (cheap) labour[49]. On the other hand, there are various actors in Germany society which lobby for the enhancement of controls and a higher degree of externalisation. There are even some who argue that the admission of asylum seekers in 2015 constitutes a breach of law, a hypothesis that despite being unfounded was taken up by right-wing parties like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) to delegitimise the German government[50].

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[48] Poutrus, Patrice G., *Umkämpftes Asyl. Vom Nachkriegsdeutschland bis in die Gegenwart*, Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2019, pp. 190-191.

[49] Menz, Georg, *The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate Actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 190.

[50] Poutrus, Patrice G., *op. cit*, pp. 195.

In consequence, attitudes towards immigration to Germany amongst the country's citizens have become increasingly negative since 2015. A study conducted by YouGov revealed that 45% of people believed that there were too many immigrants in Germany. By the following year, this figure had risen to 62%[51]. This indicates that the public continues to see migrants as a group of deficient individuals that must be integrated in order to fit into society[52].

In sum, political elites setting the policy are often torn between the interests of the electorate, parts of whom favour a closed-door-policy because of concerns about the social effects of immigration while other parts focus more on the moral implications of such decisions, and the interests of the economy, which favours an open-door approach in order to reap benefits like cheap labour. The result is an inconsistent migration governance[53].

Policy recommendations

The last part of this case study is devoted to policy recommendations. While Germany is permissive in the sense that it actively promotes the immigration of high-skilled individuals and has a liberal stance towards the immigration of persons from other EU member countries, the contrary is true for so-called unwanted migrants from third countries. They are forced to embark on life-threatening journeys and even if they manage to reach the country, they have little prospect of achieving any kind of legal status and the labour market access that comes with it – except in the case of being granted asylum or subsidiary protection, which brings comparably generous welfare benefits with it, a

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[51] Dahlgreen, Will, *German attitudes to immigration harden following Cologne attacks*, YouGov, 2016, accessed October, 17th 2021: [https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/01/12/germans-attitudes-immigration-harden-following-col].

[52] Thränhardt, Dietrich, „Entwicklung durch Migration: ein neuer Forschungsansatz", pp. 3-4, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 27/2005, pp. 3-11.

[53] Collier, Paul, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-15.

fact that should not be neglected. This subjects them to precarious conditions if they find work on the black market – which they paradoxically often do, given that there is demand for cheap labor – as fear of being intercepted by authorities discourages them from contesting violations of their rights. In order to allow for successful migration governance and compliance with human rights obligations, the more liberal handout of (temporary) visas might be a part of the solution, given that this helps to reduce irregular migration while permitting management of flows and satisfying demand for labor[54]. Besides, it does justice to the often circular patterns of migration, which in case of hermetically sealed border areas often tend to become permanent, even if this happens involuntarily. Besides, prospective asylum seekers should be able to make their claim while still being in their countries of origin or safe neighbouring countries and be provided with safe means of travel if their claim is granted. Such measures would significantly reduce incentives for embarking on perilous journeys while governing migration in an orderly fashion. To permit for such changes, however, it is indispensable German policy makers and citizens alike finally accept the fact that their country has been and will be shaped by migratory developments. Germany nowadays is a country of immigrants from all different sorts of origin. Denying this obvious fact hampers the countries' prospects of developing suitable policies in this field, even though progress has been made in recent years.

Regarding the global level, the international community should work towards improving conditions for refugees in the countries of first arrival – a necessity that many activists, NGOs and the UNHCR have highlighted for decades[55]. If living conditions were not so dire and if the individuals hosted there had perspectives of leading a normal life in the

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[54] Carrera, Sergio/Hernández I Sagrera, Raül, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
[55] Gatrell, Peter, *The making of the modern refugee*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 199.

country of first arrival, it is conceivable that many more would chose to stay instead of moving onwards. Furthermore, it is without a doubt necessary to improve living conditions in countries of origin on a broader scale, especially in the case of refugee-sending countries like those in the Middle East. While this has become a priority for much of international public policy and development assistance, it is without a doubt not easy to help fragile countries to become resilient[56].

Conclusion

Migration is and will be a topic of the future. In some respects, it can even be seen as the ordinary way of the world. This is especially true for the European continent given that Africa, its neighbor to the South, hosts a lot of people of working age without relevant employment opportunities in their own countries. Having the demographic developments in mind it can be assumed that this number will only increase in the future.[57] Consequently, a steady influx of migrants in search of labor opportunities will ensue. The same is true for the refugee issue. Considering the possible long-term impacts of climate change on livelihoods – especially in the Global South – and the consequences of internal migration and conflicts ensuing conflicts concerning vital resources, it is likely that the world will see an increase in failed states and the accompanying refugee movements. Given that migration "created a myriad of political, economic and social issues and affects both sending and receiving locations"[58] it is paramount that effective ways of addressing these issues are found.

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[56] Betts, Alexander/Collier, Paul, *Refuge. Transforming a Broken Refugee System*, Allen Lane, London, 2017, p. 32.

[57] Garcia Zamor, Jean-Claude, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[58] Meierotto, Lisa, *Immigration, Environment, and Security on the U.S.-Mexico Border*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020, p. 27.

Bearing the importance of this topic in mind, the given papers' aim was to analyse the migration governance of a country especially affected by migration flows, namely Germany. As became clear during the analysis, migration governance in Germany has shifted considerably in the period following 2015: while an opening, welcoming attitude prevailed in the beginning, policy makers quickly resorted to more restrictive policies focused on deterrence. This was mainly achieved through the externalisation of border security to countries located on the periphery of the Schengen area and other neighbouring states like Turkey and Libya, which led to a slowdown of the influx. This also serves as evidence for the fact that the scope of action that migrants have depends on the attitude of host countries as "more restrictive regulations indeed lead to lower migration flows"[59].

This does not mean, however, that simply restricting entry is necessarily the most effective way of governing migration, even though it seems an easy way to avoid the associated issues. This is due to several reasons. Firstly, migration has a lot of beneficial effects for individual migrants and host societies its alike. Secondly, states do not act within a vacuum and can thus not open or close borders as they wish. Liberal norms and values like human rights have become entrenched in societies around the world and call for a migration governance in line with human rights. This could also be observed regarding the EU-Turkey deal, supported by Germany, which as heavily criticised. Thirdly, hermetically sealed borders are also often unfeasible and produce economically undesired effects due to their high costs and the loss of potentially skilled labour.[60] Fourthly, migration movements do not only depend on national

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[59] Helbling, Marc, "Migration Governance at the State Level: Policy Developments and Effects", pp. 131-132, in: Krieger, Tim/Panke, Diana/Pregernig, Michael (eds.), *Environmental Conflicts, Migration and Governance*, Bristol University Press, Bristol/Chicago, 2020, pp. 121-136.

[60] Lindley, Anna, "Exploring crisis and migration. Concepts and issues", p. 11, in: Lindley, Anna (ed.), *Crisis and Migration. Critical perspectives*, Routledge, Oxon/New York, 2014, pp. 1-23.

states' immigration policies but are intrinsically related to other factors like social, political, and economic developments, like unemployment, in the country of origin and the country of destination, which might prompt people to migrate no matter the stakes.

Having this in mind, it is evident that there cannot be any 'one-size-fits-all' when discussing solutions.[61] Migration needs to be carefully managed and potentially burdens be shared to avoid its potential negative side effects. As a conclusion, in order to be able to make substantial progress within the migratory framework it is paramount that relevant policy actors in national states like Germany and at the global level recognise the existence of migration flows as a normal human condition instead of perceiving it as a sort of crisis. Only based on this realisation will it be possible to create a comprehensive framework for migration that safeguards the legitimate interests of migrants (regardless of type) as well as the sovereignty of states and functions effectively.

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[61] Scholten, Peter, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

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Federal Ministry of the Interior, "Building and Community; *'2019 Migration Report Key Results'*, 2020", [https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Forschung/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2019-zentrale-ergebnisse.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4], accessed October, 16th, 2021.

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TO PROTECT YOUR ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS ESSENCE
(Muslim communities in Bulgaria in the period 1944-1989)

Georgi KRASTEV[1]
Evgenia I. IVANOVA[2]
Velcho KRASTEV[3]

Abstract. With a coup d'état on September 9, 1944, a radical change in the political system began in Bulgaria. A communist regime was imposed, which lasted until the end of 1989. The huge influence of soviet communism on Bulgarian determined the degree of influence of Moscow's views on the strategies and direct actions towards ethnic minorities undertaken by the Bulgarian communist party. Through a developed strategy towards ethnic and religious minorities, the new party and state elite, based on the repressive apparatus, has been striving for 45 years to integrate and gradually merge them. After a short period of promoting ethnic equality (the second half of the 1940s), there is a move towards "unification of society" and they must resemble the majority as much as possible. The state uses both voluntary and violent measures, which are mostly resisted by Muslim communities. This resistance takes various forms – open, fierce, uncompromising resentment, leading to extreme actions or stubbornly silent passivity, to the actions of the authorities. It is an indication that people from minority groups want to preserve their ethnic and religious identity.

For propaganda in the mid-1980s, the communist government in Bulgaria reported that "unified nation-state" had been established, but the resistance of minorities preaching Islam to preserve their identity showed that this was not the case.

[1] Georgi Krastev, PhD, Assistant, Academy of Ministri of Interior of Sofia, Bulgaria, e-mail: krastev.g@gmail.com.

[2] Evgeniya I. Ivanova, PhD, Assoc. Prof., Regional Historical Museum town of Stara Zagora, Bulgaria, e-mail: evgenia_iv@abv.bg.

[3] Velcho Krastev, PhD, Stara Zagora, Bulgaria, e-mail: tehnitari@abv.bg.

Keywords: *Muslim Communities, Religious Affiliation, Identity, Resistance.*

Introduction

With the restoration of statehood in 1878, Bulgaria was a constitutional monarchy for almost seven decades. In general, the state with its institutions (with some exceptions during the Second World War) and the Bulgarian public show tolerance towards ethnic communities, guaranteed by the constitution in force in those years.

With the *coup d'état* of September 9, 1944, a radical change in the political system began in the country. Virtually all power was taken over by the Communist Party, which began to implement its social project not only directly through its party structures, but also through the subordination of the administrative apparatus, the economy and the bodies of state legal order and violence. Following the model of the USSR, the internal order and security bodies gradually power to act directly in all spheres of public life without restrictions and with regard to ethnic, religious and social groups. The period up to November 10, 1989, in terms of the essential characteristics of the regime, is defined as "state socialism, totalitarianism", with the addition of the Soviet type.

Officially, the socio-political system in Bulgaria was changed by a monarchy in the People's Republic through a referendum and a Grand National Assembly convened in 1946. The following year a new constitution was adopted, which lasted until 1971. It guaranteed the rights of national minorities, who "have the right to study in their mother tongue and to develop their national culture, and the study of the Bulgarian language is compulsory" (Article 79).But what is actually happening in practice?

Our thesis is that despite the policy of the party and the state towards the various ethnic and religious communities in Bulgaria and in

general aimed at their inclusion and gradual merging, they manage to largely preserve their ethnic and religious identity. In order to abolish the term "national minority" in the new constitution of 1971 and ten years later to declare a "united socialist Bulgarian nation", the state used both voluntary and violent measures, which were most opposed-already the Muslim communities (Turks, Gypsy Muslims, Bulgarian-Mohammedans/ Pomaks, partly Tatars). When the minority is subject of assimilation, always there is resistance. This one takes various forms – open, fierce, uncompromising resentment, leading to extreme actions or stubbornly silent passivity to the actions of the authorities. It is an indication that people from minority groups want to preserve their identity.

We build our position by introducing into scientific circulation, comparing and analyzing hitherto unused historical material, mostly from the archives of the Ministry of Interior and the Dossier Commission[4]. Various sources of information are considered – party, governmental and administrative documents, ordinances, reports, correspondence, etc. The historical method is used to follow and consider the dynamics in the development of the studied processes. Given the limited volume of the message, the thesis is supported only by individual examples. We use the names of the different ethnic groups, as they are named in the archives. The period we cover is from the mid-1940s to the late 1980s. of Twentieth century.

The Muslims in Bulgaria belong mostly the Sunnis (Orthodox Islam) and to the Alevis (Shiites/Kazalbashi/Alians). As of December 31, 1946, there were 675,989 Turks, 128,940 Bulgarian-Mohammedans and 167,481 Gypsy Muslims, small groups of Tatars and Circassians living in the country[5].In the following decades, as a result of various factors,

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[4] The Committee for Disclosing the Documents and Announcing Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to the State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Armed Forces (CDDAABCSSIBNAF),

[5] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, V-L-447, v.3, pp. 145-151; f.2, inv.1, a.u.1832, p. 2.

including emigration and resettlement, natural increase and others, their number is constantly increasing.

Party and state policy towards Muslim communities in the years of totalitarian rule

In the first years of its rule, through party propaganda rhetoric and cultural and educational events modeled on the Soviet model, the Bulgarian Workers' Party (k)[6] relied on concessions to minorities in order to win them over to its side. Actions have been taken to improve their socio-economic situation. The Muslim religion and Islamic traditionalism are tolerated. Turkish-language periodicals have been resumed, and the number of schools teaching in Turkish has increased. The Turkish-Arabic names and clothing of the Bulgarian-Mohammedans have been restored[7]. To strengthen the Gypsy identity, the establishment of many local Gypsy organizations, cultural institutions and sports societies was initiated, and Gypsy printed publications were created[8].

At the same time, however, a second trend is emerging – suspicion of the compact Turkish and Pomak population in Bulgaria. They began to be seen as a potential threat, and in January 1948 Muslims were relocated to the interior of the country – Turks and Bulgarian-Mohammedans living along the southern state border. As a result, began "spontaneous" emigration to neighboring Turkey in 1950–1951 of nearly 150,000 Bulgarian citizens, mostly Turks, but there were also Tatars and Gypsy Muslims. At the same time, the desires of nearly 40,000 Pomaks to migrate to Turkey were thwarted by the Bulgarian state.

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[6] The Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) was renamed the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) at its Fifth Congress in 1948.

[7] After 1937, in the conditions of strong state nationalism, attempts were made to join the Bulgarian people of the Pomaks living in the Rhodopes. A campaign has been launched to change the Turkish-Arabic names to Bulgarian and to remove the distinctive men's and women's clothing.

[8] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.13, inv.1, a.u.774, pp. 26-27.

Gradually, the totalitarian communist government began to strive to unite the minorities into the Marxist-Leninist ideology and, in the long run, to create a unified Bulgarian socialist nation. After its April plenum in 1956, the BCP made a sharp turn in minority policy. For the social unification of the separate ethnic groups, the new leadership headed by Todor Zhivkov promulgated a number of party and government normative documents in this direction. The attitudes towards Muslim communities are changing and they have become the object of special party and state supervision. Its implementation is carried out through the structures of the State Security with various measures. Actions have been taken against their oppose, and an agency is being recruited from among them[9].

Thus, the policy of the party and the state towards the Muslim communities can be defined as inconsistent and in some moments hesitant, but at the same time the planned and considered ones have been completed.

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The document, which describes the future actions of the party and the Bulgarian state towards the Turkish population and other Muslim communities, is a secret report of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army[10], provided to the rulers Party in June 1947. Raises "the question of the state policy towards the Turkish minority and the periodic waves of emigration" and demands that "the

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9 Evgenia I. Ivanova, Velcho Krastev, *Gender relationship samong the Gypsy/ Roma in Bulgaria*, Stara Zagora: Litera Print, 2013, pp. 225-226; *State Security and Minorities*. Documentary Volume, Sofia, 2015, DVD, 11, available at: https://comdos.bg/media/DVD%20SBORNIK% 2032_Minorities%20opt.pdf, accessed 20.09.2021

10 At that time, the Bulgarian army in 1946 was finally controlled, politically cleansed and reorganized according to the Soviet model. For more see: Georgi Krastev, Evgenia I. Ivanova, Velcho Krastev. *The law enforcement system and the Gypsies/Roma in Bulgaria (from 1878 to the second decade of the XXI century).* Sofia: Avangard Prima, 2020, 183, pp. 186-187.

struggle for the preservation of the vital state interests in the field of nationalities in our country"[11].

It is noted that the Turkish minority for the most part does not participate in the Fatherland Front[12] and party organizations, does not participate in socio-political life, and in the elections for the Grand National Assembly held in October 1946, voted for the opposition. This behavior is due to the "extraordinary influence and suggestion of Turkish politics and propaganda in our country", and "in the last two years there has been an increased desire to emigrate to our southern neighbor". For national security, the General Staff recommends: "Let us not look at the Turkish minority in our country in such a way that we want to keep it in Bulgaria at all costs". There are two prospects: release from a certain category of Turks (some will emigrate to Turkey their own, others will be expelled by the Bulgarian government), and for those who remain in the country and are in the majority, conditions must be created for inclusion.

The Turkish emigration issue includes both Bulgarian-Mohammedans and Gypsies. The first "They forgot their Bulgarian origin a long time ago, they consider themselves Turks and do not want to hear about being Bulgarians. ... For them, the consciousness of religious affiliation completely covers their felling for nationality. In their religious fanaticism, they surpass the Turkish population itself. ...". Many of the Bulgarian-Mohammedans are suspicious of the new government, others for some time join the OF committees and party organizations, join the bodies of the Ministry of Interior (MI)[13].

Some of the gypsies are self-conscious Turks, profess Islam and speak Turkish, "adopt Turkish emigrant and nationalist tendencies and become one with the Turkish population". The observation of the

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[11] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.3, inv.3, a.u.55, p. 2.

[12] PF – The Patriotic Front emerged on the initiative of the BWP (c) in 1942 as a union of opposition parties. After 1944 it was transformed into a mass political organization under the direct rule of the Bulgarian Communist Party until 1989.

[13] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.3, inv.3, a.u.55, pp. 3, 7, 11, 18, 60-62; f. 2, inv.1, a.u.1826, p. 15, 18-20.

authorities is that "Initially, the gypsies show affection for the people's government, loudly express their affection, actively participate in demonstrations, rallies and other actions of the Fatherland Front"[14].

The relatively small community of Tatars, only a few thousand, has also adopted Turkish customs and traditions, according to all Islamic holidays. In them, religious fanaticism is manifested in a weaker form than in other Muslim communities. They have their own hodges and mosques. There are mixed marriages with Turks and Gypsies. A small number have relatives in Turkey who emigrated in the second half of the 1930s. Twentieth century. Most welcome the new government, but there are those who are "hostile to government action"[15].

Resistance against passportization – the first administrative measure against religiosity

The first actions by which the party and the state encroached on the ethnic and religious nature of the Muslims were aimed at the Pomaks. They were also involved in the 1948 campaign to displace Muslim minorities from the southern border, and this led to a breakdown in their compactness. Through administrative measures in the early 1950s, when issuing new passports, they had to be registered as "Bulgarian Muslims" and the photos of the women were to be with inexposed faces. This is contrary to the Koran's prohibition on human images. Since the beginning of passportization in 1951, the Pomaks have been openly dissatisfied. Men do not allow their wives to be photographed naked (without headscarves). They threaten not to allow them to obtain passports, will kill them and then flee abroad. This position continues to be maintained in the coming years. For example, in 1953, "A person from the village of Valkosel, Blagoevgrad region, told to a t State Security

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[14] *Ibid*., f.3, inv. 3, a.u.55, p. 2; f. 2, inv.1, a.u.1826, p. 15, 18-20; f.13, inv.1, a.u. 759, p. 43.

[15] *Ibid*., District Department of the Ministry of Interior in Varna,f.1, inv.6, a.u.107, pp. 1-2; f.13, inv.1, a.u.1921, pp. 31-34, 38.

officer that they would not accept the removal of women's towels, would not leave the house, would eat whatever they was to eat, and then they will eat soil and be poisoned, but they not agree to take off their wives' towels. If they accept the removal of the towels, they will lose their religion. Another man from the village of Tuhovitsa, Blagoevgrad region, said that "now they take off the women's towels, and tomorrow they will make them wear dresses. This is pure Bulgarianization. Itis better to kill them, but they don't agree with that"[16].

Until 1957, there were extreme difficulties in the passportization of the Gypsy katunari (nomads) buffalo-herders. "They are constantly moving, they are Muslims and they are religious to the point of fanaticism. They have Hodges who enjoy great authority among them. These Hodges are kept in deep conspiracy and are not known to the Ministry of Interior"[17].

Resistance against the forcible removal of external religious and ethnic marks in clothing

The resistance of the Bulgarian-Mohammedans against the forcible abolition of traditional clothing (veils, traditional trousers - shalwars, fezzes, kyulafi) and the related with it traditions and way of life or the so-called "Unveiling". It also covers other Muslim communities – Turks, Gypsies and Tatars. The administrative measures and the actions of the bodies of the Ministry of Interior, reaching in some moments to demonstrative actions, blocking of whole villages, humiliations and tortures, affect both women and men. Special commissions went around the homes, confiscated veils, trousers, fezzes, and in some places forcibly disguised women.

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[16] *Ibid.*, f.2, inv.1, a.u.768, pp. 2-3, 5, 22-24.
[17] Archive of the Ministry of the Interior (AMI), f.26, inv.1, a.u.431, pp. 1-2, 8-9.

The Communist Party reports that during the 1958 and 1959 disveiling campaigns, many Bulgarian-Mohammedan women threw on their veils, shawls, and shalwars. However, men and the elderly often resist. They disagree because "they would lose their faith in Allah". Strongly religious people arrange prayers, talk about preserving traditions and faith, express open dissatisfaction, make threats. A number of BCP members also oppose it. In some villages, women do not accept the event and resist. "In Dospat on December 22, 1958, about 200 women in the square in front of the village demonstrated their disagreement with this party event". They also make statements that they will be poisoned and will fight, but they will not take off their veils. Resistance of a similar nature was also offered by women in the village of Yagodina, Smolyan region. In some places, to deceive the authorities, women are trying to replace the veil with silk towels. In the Blagoevgrad district they resort to cunning – in front of the commissions they put on dresses and raincoats, but after they return to their homes they put on the veils again[18].

There is also resistance from the Turks to the unveiling activities. In some places there were gross perversions, for example in some villages of Razgrad district at the end of 1959 the veils and fezzes were forcibly removed and burned, the seized shalwars were cut. Very soon, the traditional symbols of religion gradually returned to people's clothes, and this happened mostly at home, at family gatherings and weddings[19]. Elsewhere, such as in Aytosko, about 15 days after the event, they started wearing their veils and shalwars again, adapting them for another fabric. Some men wear fezzes under their caps[20].

In the actions of the authorities against the traditional clothing of the Muslims, the mass violence was alternated with a temporary suspension as a result of the resistance. In fact, this process never ends.

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[18] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.2, inv.3, a.u.134, pp. 18-19; f.13, inv.1, a.u.1467, pp. 133-136; f.2, inv.3, a.u.11, pp. 5-6, 8-9.

[19] *Ibid.*, f.1, inv.5, a.u.74, p. 45; f.2, inv.1, a.u.2108, pp. 2-3; a.u. 2133, pp. 44-46.

[20] *Ibid.*, f.2, inv.3, a.u.15, pp. 1-3.

While some women wear headscarves (thus observing the requirements for the faith), others are veiled again (such cases were noted among Bulgarian-Mohammedans at the end of 1964 in Pazardzhik district). In the clothes come the dress, the mantle, the apron, which are an outward expression of loyalty to the regime, but some do not stop wearing shalwars. Even in the late 70's on the streets of major cities such as Ruse, Varna, Shumen, Burgas, Gabrovo and others. Gypsies with shalwars are found. For example, at the several-days wedding celebrations in the large Gypsy neighborhoods "Young Guard" in Shumen and "Music Quarter" in Varbitsa, "women demonstratively continue to wear them"[21].

The big goal of the campaign to unveiling, to eliminate the difference between Christians and Muslims in clothing, has not been achieved by Muslim women. They manage to some extent to preserve the external symbols of their ethno-religious affiliation.

Struggle against the restriction of Muslim traditions and the imposition of new socialist rituals

Simultaneously with the unveiling, the authorities also turned against religion and Muslim traditions[22]. Mosques were closed, many tekets[23] were destroyed, the number of clergy was reduced, some of them were recruited by the SS, pressure was increased against visits to mosques, observance of Ramadan and the celebration of Eid al-Adha, ritual circumcision of boys (sonnets) was forbidden, the performers (sonnets makers) are subjected to prosecution, and subsequently the

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[21] *Ibid.*, f.2, inv.1, a.u.2133, pp. 68-70; inv.3, a.u.99, pp. 10-12; f.22, inv.1a, a.u.1011, p. 53; VI-L-46, pp. 22-23.

[22] The atheistic nature of communist ideology is notorious.

[23] Teketas are sanctuaries of the Alevi Muslims – places built around "the turbe" (tomb) of a saint.

parents. The main Baba[24] of the Allies/Kazalbashi, the religious Alevi traditions and rites performed at certain times in the tekke and prayer houses are placed under surveillance[25]. In the first half of the 1980s, a new passportization was carried out in the country, and the passports no longer have the column "nationality", but citizenship. In the following years, the number of operating mosques and their staff was reduced again. Atheistic propaganda is accompanied by the imposition of new socialist rituals among Muslim communities[26]. All this causes additional dissatisfaction among them, while at the same time doing everything possible to preserve their customs.

Mosques, denominations and chambers are increasingly becoming places to meet and strengthen the religious community. Literature is sought, especially the Koran, and is mainly obtained from travelers to and from Turkey. In addition to the legitimate Hodges in force, there are also self-proclaimed, but mostly recognized by the community, those who also perform "treatment" of the sick by reading the Koran and making musk. There are women among them[27]. Bulgarian-Mohammedan women declared themselves in January 1961 against attempts to turn the mosque into a cultural center in the village of Barutin, Smolyan district. They threaten that whoever tried would "kill him with picks and stones"[28]. In Pazardzhik district alone at the end of 1964, there were 16mosques Bulgarian-Mohammedan, which were visited by more on Fridays. They are served by 14 elected by the District People's Council, who are eligible. There are also about 50 self-proclaimed Hodges[29]. The

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[24] Babá (Turkish-Persian – father) – used as an address to a person of high social status and placed after the personal name. In the religious aspect, the Alevis denote a teacher or a dervish.

[25] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.2, inv.1, a.u.2059, pp. 15-16; a.u.2057, pp. 18-21.

[26] *Ibid.*, f.1, inv.10, a.u.2007, pp. 9-11.

[27] *Ibid.*, f.2, inv.1, a.u.2057, p. 68; a.u.2133, pp. 88-90; 95, 97-98.

[28] *Ibid.*, f.13, inv.1, a.u.1952, p. 20.

[29] *Ibid.*, f.2, inv.3, a.u.99, pp. 10-12.

Muslim gypsies in the town of Sliven are religiously served by the imam of the Turks. They visit the local mosque and celebrate all religious holidays[30]. In Plovdiv, a Muslim gypsy was appointed Hodja to the Turkish mufti's office, serving in the city's central mosque, "making muski, reading the eternal calendar, predicting the future". He is wanted by both Gypsies and other people in religious circles"[31]. Two gypsies from the town of Silistra, self-proclaimed Hodges, visit Turkish homes, do Mevliths[32], pray and read the Koran. In the summer of 1962, ten Korans were distributed among the Gypsies and Tatars in the villages of the Silistra District. They were imported by two Gypsies on their return from Turkey. One of them is used by Tatar Hodja in the village of Sredishte, Silistra region, where there is also a mosque. There are also Hodges Tatars in the village of Cherkovna, Silistra region, and in the village of Debovo, Pleven region[33].

At the same time, religious literature is not distributed among Muslim Roma in Sofia and they do not attend the mosque. As confessors of Alevi Islam, for them a place of high sacred status is the tekke Ali Babá (the tomb of the Muslim saint Bali Effendi), which is located in the courtyard of the Christian church "St. Iliya", Knyazhevo district of Sofia. Tekkes are found in many places in northeastern Bulgaria, the Rhodopes and the Thracian lowland. Alevi gypsies also visit them on holidays attached to important moments of the annual calendar cycle. There were large gatherings, known to the surrounding population as "gypsy fairs". They lasted until the mid-1970s, when, with the imposition of atheism by

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[30] *Ibid.*, inv.1, a.u.2133, pp. 53-54.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 26-28.

[32] Mevlid-i Şerif is a long poem commemorating the birth of the Prophet Muhammed written in Turkish in 1409 by Süleyman Çelebi (1351-1422) in Bursa. It is often chanted on special occasions such as the birth of a child or as a commemoration of the dead.: https://cmes.fas.harvard.edu/event/bilingual-mevlid-s%C3%BCleyman-%C3%A7elebi%E2%80%99s-masterpiece-greek-and-turkishaccessed 20.09.2021

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 19-21; f.13, inv.1, a.u.1921, pp. 28-28 back, 37.

the communist authorities, these gatherings were banned and part of the tekkes was destroyed[34].

As a form of preserving their distinct ethnic community, Gypsies professing the Muslim faith built mutual aid funds called lounges. The members swear in the Koran in the presence of Hodja. These essentially semi-legal, self-contained groups help to preserve a number of traditional elements in the minds and way of life of this population. In 1970, there were 18 lounges in Sofia, to reach 50 in 1976. That same year, all of them were liquidated from State Security[35].

Throughout the period under consideration, Islamic religiosity served as a means of preserving certain family and cultural traits, as well as ethnic self-preservation. In the 80's in the areas with population of Bulgarian Turks, Bulgarians of Muslim faith and Muslim Gypsies, the observance of the respective customs and traditions was intensified. Visiting the mosque, mass participation in Friday prayer, reading mevlid, family celebrations, weddings, funerals often with an open demonstrative character. This is especially evident in the sonnets. They become a mass and florid celebration, as the gypsies demonstrate a mixed Turkish and gypsy way of life and mentality. Just a few examples. In 1981 in Ruse a Bulgarian gypsy, working in the beer factory, organized a florid celebration on the occasion of the circumcision of his son. 500 people were invited, BGN 5,000 were spent, and BGN 15,000 were collected as gifts. During the summer months of 1986, 25 large family celebrations were held in the gypsy neighborhoods and in the center of Sofia – weddings and birthdays, at which "more 500 people gathered and took place in strict observance of gypsy rituals and performance of gypsy and Turkish music and dances. In the gypsy neighborhood of Shumen, a man

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[34] *Ibid.*, f.2, inv.1, a.u.2133, pp. 92-94; Evgenia I. Ivanova, Velcho Krastev. *Cult places and cult practices: the example with the gypsies in Bulgaria.* – Balkanistic Forum, book 2, 2017, p. 197.

[35] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, VI-L-825, v. I, p. 144d; f. 22, inv. 1, a.u. 88, pp. 7-8.

organized mevlids in his home, attracting children to study the Koran[36]. And in the town of Kaolinovo, Varna region, in 1987, individual Turkish girls aged 12 – 13 were trained as hafiz[37] and able to make mevlids[38].

Resistance to name change

The culmination of the communist government's attempts to assimilate Muslim communities and finally destroy the pillars of their religious identity was the replacement of Turkish-Arabic names with Bulgarian ones. A process that took place from tides to lows from the 1950s to the mid-1980s and in which administrative coercion and repressive actions were applied by the Ministry of the Interior. At the beginning of this policy, the authorities began to "encourage and stimulate the expressed desire and inner conviction" to change the name of the Bulgarian-Mohammedans and Gypsies, as well as pressure on the parents to give Bulgarian names to newborns from mixed marriages[39]. Without publicity, the Alevi Gypsies were renamed in the years 1960 – 1962. The things were going well not everywhere. For example, in villages in the area of the town of Kubrat, they flatly refuse to accept Bulgarian names because they say they are Muslims, write requests to the Council of Ministers and Ministry of Interior. Gospodin Kolev[40], who at that time worked in the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, wrote in his memoirs about this campaign: "In quarter "Stolipinovo" of town of Plovdiv on amass meeting speak Dimitar Genov, head of Minority Department of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, someone threw a large stone through the

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[36] *Ibid.*, f.22, inv.1, a.u.141, p. 5; inv.1a, a.u.1535, pp. 2-4, 28; VI-L-46 (Shumen), p. 146; f.1, inv.12, a.u.761, p. 59; Georgi Krastev, Evgenia I. Ivanova, Velcho Krastev. *Op. cit.,* pp. 336-337.

[37] Hafez is a man who memorized the Holy Koran.

[38] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.1, inv.11a, a.u.524, p. 223.

[39] *Ibid.,*f.2, inv.1, a.u.2133, pp. 1, 3.

[40] Gospodin Kolev, a gypsy from Sliven, was an officer in the BPA from 1947 to 1958, and an instructor in the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party from 1958 to 1990.

window, which accidentally did not hit him. In Nova Zagora, the car I was traveling was attacked by hail of stones. The main argument of the fierce opponents for the name change was: "We are not gypsies, we are Turks!". In many places in the country, despite having passports with new names, gypsies continue to use their old ones in the neighborhood and at home. This way of naming between them is preserved and used in the following decades[41].

In the period 1980-1983, a campaign was launched to rename Sunni Gypsies, which also did not go smoothly everywhere. The counteraction takes place in different ways. In early 1982, gypsies from Silistra, Sliven, and Tutrakan refused to change their names, talking about murders and suicide attempts. Others threaten that if the pressure continues, they will kill their families and end up committing suicide. And this actually happened in December 1983, when in the village of Dabravino, Varna region, where a man committed suicide because he did not want to change his name. There are also threats and attempts at physical violence. In the village of Ruse, about 50 gypsies, instigated by a woman, are trying to lynch an employee of the Ministry of Interior. He was slightly stabbed by the woman. A few months later, a gypsy woman from the village of Dunavtsi, Stara Zagora region, on the occasion of her renaming, got into an argument with the mayor of the village and hit him. In Varna, the home of a renamed gypsy who works in the Municipal People's Council was attacked. All the windows are broken. He was warned that if he continued to help change the name, his wife would be raped.

In almost all districts with compact masses, gypsies run away from work, leave their residences, move from one district to another to hide and avoid changing their names and passports. There are also isolated cases of sabotage in the industrial enterprises where they work-

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[41] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.2, inv.1, a.u.2133, pp. 20, 44-46; f.1, inv.11a, a.u.277, p. 42; Gospodin Kolev. *A gypsy in the Central Committee of Bulgarian Communist Party.* Sofia: 2003, p. 159.

forced shutdown of technological lines, intentional damage and shutdown of machines. A group against this administrative measure has been organized in the town of Oryahovo. In Plovdiv, the gypsies visit the mosque in a masse and demonstratively, loudly and floridly celebrating the Muslim religious holidays to show that they are Turks[42].

A campaign for the forcible imposition of new names on the Pomaks began in March 1964, but strong resistance in the village of Ribnovo, Gotse Delchev region, halted these attempts for some time. There the special commission for changing the names met with organized resistance from the locals. The telephone connection was cut off, a headquarters for the defense of the village was formed. The whole population – "men, women, young people and children – take to the streets. Many of the men and women carried axes, trees and stones and attacked the agitators and guards in a timely manner. Despite the shooting in the air, the commission and police were driven out of Ribnovo. Almost all of them received blows with stones and trees from the villagers. The locals capture and confiscated the weapons of a policeman and a soldier, beat them, in which women also took part[43]. In 1970 the rulers again took action to change the names of the Pomaks, this time starting from Smolyan, and in the following years covered the other parts of the Rhodopes. From the very beginning there were protests demonstrations in the towns of Madan and Rudozem. There is an organized resistance. Requests have been sent to local and foreign authorities, anonymous and open threats of terror against local leaders. Protests were expressed in front of the local town halls, deliberate absence from work, overstocking with food products and hiding when coming to the settlements of the commission were organized. In some settlements the forms of resistance become especially acute. In the village

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[42] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, VI-L-62 (Vratsa), p. 6; f.22, inv.1a, a.u.1535, pp. 1-4, 44; f.1, inv.12, a.u.414, pp. 107, 234-235; a.u.415, pp. 32-33, 152; VI-L-14 (Varna), v.1, p. 9.

[43] *Ibid.*, f.1, inv.5, a.u.2 (Blagoevgrad), pp. 216-219; f.1, inv.10, a.u.90, pp. 263-264.

of Barutin in Dospat, in March 1972, an armed guard and night vigils were organized, leading to open clashes with the militia, in which two women died. Self-government was established in the villages of Kornitsa, Breznitsa and Lazhnitsa, a own collective defense was organized, offered resistance to attacking militia and army unit in March 1973. In the village of Kornitsa in November "a round-the-clock duty was organized on the square. on the streets and around the village, to prevent a possible surprise. 250-300 people regularly go to the square, night patrol couples are appointed, surveillance of all those entering and leaving the village is organized. ... the most active are eight men who regularly go around the groups in the square, maintain their spirit, threaten those who are hesitant or refuse to take part in the events"[44]. Despite their attempts to preserve the names and the resistance, the process of renaming the Bulgarian-Mohammedans ended in early 1975. Along with them, separate groups of Turks were renamed in Smolyan and other parts of the Rhodopes, the reason being that they are "descendants of mixed marriages from the surrounding Bulgarian-Mohammedan population".

As early as February 1974, a plenum of the Central Committee of Bulgarian Communist Party raised the issue of "the integration of the population of Turkish origin into the united socialist Bulgarian nation". In the early 1980s, persecution of Muslim rituals and clothing intensified, the construction of new mosques was banned, and, from the first half of 1984, the use of Turkish in public places was banned. More radical actions have been taken – renaming and adopting the idea of mass emigration to Turkey. At the end of December 1984 and in January 1985, the Bulgarian Turks, were forcibly renamed administratively, first in Southeastern and then in Northeastern Bulgaria[45]. Thus, the events of the second half of the 1980s, when Todor Zhivkov's communist regime tried to change the ethnic identity of Bulgarian Turks by forcibly changing their names and

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[44] *Ibid.*, f.20, inv.1, a.u.340, pp. 3-8; III section, 3573 (Blagoevgrad), pp. 20-21.
[45] *Ibid.*, f.1, inv.10, a.u.2007, pp. 9-11; f.22, inv.1, a.u.254, pp. 1-3.

banning them from speaking Turkish, performing religious rituals and wearing typical clothes, for the Turkish ethnic community, go down in history as a "Revival Process".

Part of the Turkish ethnic community has embraced the campaign with tacit discontent, but at the same time there have been unexpected reactions from the authorities. From the very beginning, mass protests were organized in the Kardzhali, Momchilgrad, Krumovgrad, Shumen and Targovishte regions, which were dispersed by armed force. The organization of illegal resistance groups begins. By the end of September 1984, the State Security established 117 nationalist informal groups, and between the end of January and the middle of March 1985, it registered 304 signals of subversive activity. The scale of the terrorist acts committed in August 1984 (in the parking lot of Varna Airport and in the waiting room of Plovdiv railway station), March (explosive carriage at Bunovo station by the passenger train Bourgas – Sofia) and June 1985 (in the lobby of the hotel "Sliven" in Sliven) and on July 31, 1986 (planted, but not exploded, a powerful explosive device in the Black Sea resort "Druzhba"[46] near Varna). Although some were killed and injured, the perpetrators remain undiscovered. At the same time, there are a number of other acts of sabotage and terrorism, which the State Security determines that, regardless of their political resonance, are on a personal and domestic basis and their perpetrators are quickly discovered[47].

The campaign of the party and administrative authorities changed the names of more than 800,000 people, but failed to influence their self-determination and ethnic identity. Among families, relatives, clans and closeness, the desire to be together is growing in order to separate and keep from assimilation. Temporary workers in other districts are returning to their native places. In the villages, in the enterprises, in the

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[46] Today the resort "St. Constantine and Helena".

[47] ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.1, inv.12, a.u.656, pp. 64, 131-133, 143-4, 157-8; a.u.600, p. 63; f.1, inv.11, a.u.252, pp. 16, 24, 69, 195; f.22, inv.1, a.u.254, pp. 9-10.

institutions, where renamed Turks predominate, there are informal groups on the principle of silent group solidarity. The communication between them is in Turkish and the native Turkish-Arabic names are used. Children born after 1985 have Turkish and Bulgarian names. Baptisms with Turkish names take place illegally in homes, at celebrations with relatives and friends, without a priest. All customs are observed. During weddings, wrestling and horse racing are arranged. The Eid al-Adha is celebrated in a masse and solemnly, the homes of the believers are visited by hodges, prayers are said at the slaughter of animals, people go to mosques in a masse, they gather in prayer houses, the so-called meschidi[48].

This shows that the policy towards the Bulgarian Turks of the communist state, despite all measures, is failing. The idea of mass tet out in the report of June 1947 of the Intelligence Department of General Staff of the Army, was resorted to prelude the so-called "Big Excursion". From the summer of 1989 was the series of hunger strikes and protests at the end of March and April, organized in settlements with Turkish population, and the rallies and demonstrations that followed in May, which in places grew into riots. The brutal intervention of the authorities was accompanied by the rapid expulsion of hundreds of Turkish activists to some Western European countries. Subsequently, the border with the Republic of Turkey is open to all Bulgarian citizens who want to "stay and live there", thousands of passports have been issued in a short time, but in many cases local authorities put pressure on ethnic Turks. Eventually, until the closure of the Bulgarian-Turkish border on August 21, 1989, as a result of the largest forced migration in Europe since World War II, about 360,000 ethnic Turks left Bulgaria. At the same time, Bulgarian gypsies and Bulgarian-Mohammedans are not issued passports and are not allowed to leave the country[49].

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[48] *Ibid.*, f.1, inv.11, a.u.41, p. 111; a.u.252, p.175-6; inv.11a, a.u.277, p. 42; a.u.764, pp. 3-3 back.; a.u.41, pp. 7-8, 110; f.1, inv.12, a.u.600, pp. 204-206; a.u.647, p. 11.

[49] *Ibid.*, f.1, inv.11a., a.u.753, pp. 8, 155-156, 167-174; a.u.761, pp. 44-46.

Conclusion

The communist regime in Bulgaria lasted until the end of 1989. Since its establishment, the actions of the Communist Party and controlled from in state are aimed at consolidating both their power and statehood. Through a strategy developed by the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party for ethnic and religious minorities, the new party and state elite, based on the repressive apparatus, has been striving for this for 45 years. Under the influence of various factors, including and this one of USSR, the approach to minorities is variable. After a short period of promoting ethnic equality (the second half of the 1940s), there has been a move towards "unification of society" and they must resemble the majority as possible. Measures for this have been implemented through the structures of the State Security with various measures. Operational combinations have been developed, the line of conduct for each task is outlined, and an appropriate agency is involved. Minority ethnic groups are constantly recruiting new agencies of all ages, social strata, different education and employment. Particular attention is paid to the agency network of women, the intelligentsia, local leaders and authorities. The creation of fictitious illegal organizations by well-tested and trained agents is also resorted to. The work is organized on the basis of dependence or on the basis of material interest – payment. For the State Security, the rule is in force "when we solve such a historical task for the development of our country and nation ... we must buy thousands of people. We have been told most responsibly that as much money as we need to buy such people will be given to us"[50]. Those who work voluntarily stand out as loyal, disciplined, proactive and active agents, and collaborators make political or academic careers, occupy high responsible positions[51]. In any attempt by an agent to betray or knowingly misinform, serious measures are taken, incl. detention and trial.

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[50] *Ibid.*, f.22, inv.1, a.u.254, pp. 4-5; f.1, inv.11a, a.u.527, p. 10; inv.12, a.u.648, pp. 4, 12.

[51] The examples are numerous, but we will mention only two. The ethnic Turk Nedim Gendjev has been an operative agent in the State Security since 1974 and the last communist Chief Mufti of the Muslims, elected in 1986. Prof. Hristo Kyuchukov, a gypsy Muslim, was

In the years of its existence, the greatest failure of the communist State Security was the failure to reveal the perpetrators of the attacks in the mid-1980s. Despite the national conferences held at the highest party and state level, of the Main and District Directorates of the State Security, of the operative groups, the transcripts show that no one has sought responsibility from the top communist leadership. For the authorities, attacks became one of the strongest arguments before the Bulgarian society for the emigration campaign called the "Great Excursion" and it is believed that the State Security itself is behind them and its long-term goal is the emigration of ethnic Bulgarian Turks to our southern neighbor[52].

The communist governments in the People's Republic of Bulgaria propagandistically acknowledges that a "single-nation state" has been established, but the resistance of the minorities preaching Islam to preserve their identity shows that this is not the case.

The essentially assimilation policy, organized and conducted under the control of the Central Committee of Bulgarian Communist Party with the forces and means of the main repressive instrument – the Ministry of Interior and specifically – the State Security, does not receive real mass support and even understanding among Bulgarian citizens. This became especially clear in the first weeks after the removal of Todor Zhivkov's regime on November 10, 1989, and the announcement by the new party leadership of the right to restore the names. This announcement itself took place under the pressure of the Bulgarian citizens from the affected ethnic minorities demonstrating in the area of the National

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recruited in the summer of 1984 as an agent of the State Security – Varna. He was involved in the task force for detecting the perpetrators of terrorist acts. Belonging to the State Security Agency gives him the opportunity to make a remarkable academic career. He is a member of the High Attestation Commission at the Council of Ministers, whose main function is to award scientific degrees and titles. ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, Personal file of Hr. Kyuchukov, pp. 1-8; https://www.comdos.bg; http://www.omda.bg/public/bulg/news/perso nal/n_genjev.htm.

[52] http://www.omda.bg/public/biblioteka/mihail_ivanov/praznik_2.htm; https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%92%D1%8A%D0%B7%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD_%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B5%D1%81, accessed 20.09.2021.

Assembly. The media at that time reflected a number of cases of support for their demands by the citizens of the capital and the country.

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ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.1, inv.11, a.u.41, a.u.252.

ACDDAABCSSIBNAF,f.1, inv.11a, a.u.41, a.u.277, a.u.524,a.u.527, a.u.753, a.u.761, a.u.764.

ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.1, inv.12, , a.u.414, a.u.415, a.u.600, a.u.647, a.u.648, a.u.656,a.u.761.

ACDDAABCSSIBNAF,f.2, inv.1, a.u.768; a.u.1826, a.u.1832, a.u.2057,a.u.2059, a.u.2108, a.u. 2133.

ACDDAABCSSIBNAF, f.2, inv.3, a.u.11, a.u.15,, a.u.99, a.u.134.

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THE CHALLENGES OF NEW SECURITIZATION THEMES IN EUROPEAN MIGRATION ISSUES

Aysel MUSAYEVA-GURBANOVA[1]

Abstract. The increasing intensity and consequences of international migration have elevated the issue of migration to the top of today's political agendas. International migrations, in this sense, illustrate the socioeconomic and social challenges that Europe has faced since WWII. It is one of the most significant economic transformation experiences. From the reform of the welfare state to the vision and practices of multiculturalism, this experience is impacted by a broad and interwoven policy axis. The issue of international migration and the placing of immigrants in the political and economic arenas of European countries, regardless of their size and scale, is not a natural phenomenon. Many diverse players are actively involved in this positioning process; they play a part in the formulation of policies on a variety of problems, from immigrants' rights to public perceptions, at various levels and with varying impacts. In this regard, this research aims to analyze looking at immigration policies in European countries, it's vital to consider how this positioning is created and how it affects newcomers.

When we consider the overall situation in Europe, it is worth noting that in recent years, there has been a growing propensity to associate the issue of migration and immigrants with security concerns. Local, national, and international players who play a part in the development of this position play an active role in influencing not only immigration laws but also how immigrants are seen by European citizens. Linking Europe's exclusionary responses to immigration and immigrants to a single actor and just xenophobia, from the perspective mentioned above, is tantamount to disregarding the complete picture and simplifying the situation. In the same sense, it means reading the "securitization" element of this process as provided by the Copenhagen School in the literature on a single plane and

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[1] Ph.D. candidate on Political Economy, International Programs Manager, Azerbaijan State University of Economics (UNEC), Baku, Azerbaijan, ayselmusayeva@unec.edu.az.

incompletely. This research's main focus is that immigration and anti-immigrant opposition in Europe is shaped by the actions of numerous national and supranational actors at various levels, using a variety of intellectual instruments in the framework of the securitization process.

Keywords: Migration, Hungary, European Union, securitization, challenges.

Introduction

The starting point for most of the debates on migration is usually numbers. Understanding the scale changes, new trends, and changing demographics related to a phenomenon that includes social and economic transformations at the global level, such as migration, enables us to make sense of the ever-changing world we live in and it helps us make plans. The vast majority of people apply for international migration for work, family, and education reasons, including migration processes that do not put the immigrants themselves or the countries they entered into difficulties in fundamental matters. However, some people do not want to leave their homes and countries in difficult situations such as conflict, persecution, and natural disaster. Sometimes they are forced to leave under tragic circumstances. Although refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) make up a relatively small percentage of all immigrants, they are often the most in need of help and support. Here, it aims to assist policymakers, practitioners, and researchers in the field of migration to better understand the big picture of migration by providing an overview of migration and immigrant knowledge, focusing on key data and trends in the field of global migration. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Labor Organization (ILO), World Bank, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC)

and It uses up-to-date statistical resources compiled by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

In the relevant literature, migration is used to cover different types of human mobility. The concepts of asylum seeker, refugee, and immigrant refer to different causes of migration and vary in terms of causes and consequences. Immigration and immigration can occur for different reasons, such as economic, social, or political. However, when discussing the relationship between security and migration, we need to look at the causes and consequences of these movements from a security perspective. When we look at the security issues that cause migration movements, we see that the vast majority of today's large-scale migration events occur due to different war environments. We can observe the most obvious example of this in the recent migration movement of millions of Syrians to different geographies caused by the Syrian Civil War and its results.

Migration also arises due to an environment of insecurity by nature and it occurs with the desire of people who aim to get rid of the conflict environment in a certain geography to leave the region. Especially in civil war environments, there is a significant amount of cross-border forced migration from these countries due to the possibility of targeting certain segments of the society and/or the control of resources in the hands of certain actors due to the balance of power within. While discussing the relationship with security in the context of the problems created by migration, we need to address the different security problems that are supposed to be caused by the intense cross-border human movements.

In state-centered traditional security studies, migration events from one country to another can be defined as a national security problem in terms of recipient countries. In particular, if intense migration events result in a change in the social fabric in the receiving country, or if it is perceived that this may happen, states may define this development as a

threat to their social cohesion, and thus to their institutional integrity. The need for support and difficulties in the fields of economic, shelter, and health, especially as a result of large-scale migration events, combined with the inability of the states to bear this new burden, can have a disruptive effect. This, in various instances, may cause the state to fail to fulfill its basic responsibilities towards its citizens. For example, in Turkey, the structural problems stemming from international migration, which has recently turned to the country, are the subject of intense debate in terms of the sustainability of the state. Additional burdens on basic social state support such as education and health strain the state capacity and cause intense migration events to be defined as a source of insecurity. This aspect of the migration-security relationship is an issue addressed by the securitization literature. When immigration is made a part of the official discourse as a "threat to the integrity of the state", the way is opened for the management of the related process with extraordinary policies. Measures against immigrants such as harsh border security practices, intrusive monitoring policies, forced return, intensive surveillance in camps emerge as a result of this securitization. In various cases, such developments define immigrants as potential terrorists or radical elements, making it difficult to resolve the human rights violations that lie in the background of immigration incidents.

Within that securitization approach, it is not enough to just create discourse. Securitizing actors also need an audience that will accept the discourse. In most cases, this refers to society. Therefore, persuading the public is indispensable for an issue to be constructed as a security issue. Mass access elements, such as the media, play an important role in securitization practices. In this framework, politicians often try to convince their society, in other words, the electorate, about how terrible the issue is. When considered in the context of migration, it can be seen that refugees or sometimes all immigrants who come to the country are claimed to harm the structure and institutions of the relevant country in

different ways, thus preventing them from exercising their legal rights, and sometimes even creating obstacles with military measures.

Securitizing European Immigration in Terms of Political Policies

The European Union's (EU) formulation of a unified migration strategy is entwined with broader societal, political, and professional processes that describe an endangered society. The mechanisms of societal integration and political legitimacy in Western European welfare states face a variety of issues. Economic and financial globalization, rising poverty, worse living conditions in cities, the resurgence of racist and xenophobic parties and movements, voter alienation from the political class, and the spread of multiculturalism are among them. In this regard, migration is a threat to public safety, cultural identity, the stability of the community, and labor; it is being securitized. The social construction of migration as a question of security is being contested (include, for example, social groups which support liberal multiculturalism but it is due to a powerful political and social dynamic which revives migration in Western European societies as a force that threatens good life.

Although it is difficult to derive diverse policies and nations, it can be claimed that in most Western European countries in the 1950s and 1960s, immigrants were essentially an extra workforce. The economic circumstances and labor market demanded a low-cost, adaptable workforce, which did not exist in the local market. Countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands utilized a liberal or even promotional migration policy in response to a labor need. In comparison with the current scenario, where the issue of illegal immigration necessitates the establishment of more stringent migration policies, the legal status of the early post-war. For a more comprehensive summary of the parallels and contrasts in European migration policy. Immigrants

were unconcerned about politics. In France, for example, specialist organizations actively recruited immigrants in their home country without always resettling them in the host nation. Their legal standing was unimportant. In the 1980s, there was a considerable Europeanization of migration policy. Policy coordination and development have been formalized through European interstate cooperation, the European Union, and European transnational collaboration among functional groups such as the police. Transnational and intergovernmental policy networks engaged in cooperative migration regulation emerged within the context of intergovernmental and bureaucratic fora. These all contributed significantly to the progressive inclusion of migration policy within the EU's constitutional structure. The Treaty on European Union of 1992 introduced the third pillar of justice and home affairs, after the Single European Act (1986) and the dynamism achieved in the Schengen group, which expressly declared migration to be the topic of intergovernmental regulation in the European Union[2].

In the securitization process, most of the state, society, and economic structure are presented as reference objects. Moving from the example of migration, it is claimed that immigrants harm the sovereignty of the state, the identity of the society, and/or the social security system. Refugees who cross the borders illegally and flee from conflict or persecution in their countries are constructed as a threat because they threaten the integrity of states and border security. In addition, it is claimed that societies hitherto assumed to be homogeneous are in danger of losing their identity due to immigrants. Actors securitizing immigrants also present the weakening of the country's social welfare system due to refugees as a reason. To begin with, immigrants depart their home nations out of necessity and resort to unlawful means when they are not

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[2] Benjamin Boudou, „*Migration and the critique of 'state thought': Abdelmalek Sayad as a political theorist Benjamin Boudou* accessed October 20, 2021: [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14748851211041906].

permitted to come lawfully. Second, in most situations, the idea that the society in issue was homogenous before the migratory wave is misleading. Many civilizations today already have a diverse structure. Third, the fact that immigrants profit from the social security system is not owing to an arbitrary circumstance, but rather because they have no other option. Furthermore, nations that sponsor refugees must follow international law. When it comes to refugee law, one of the first regulations that come to mind is the rule of non-refoulement. Another problem is that decision-makers who securitize refugees by stating that they would safeguard the security of their state and society instability for them by closing borders or violating refugees' rights under international law. As a result, on the one hand, it should be questioned how much security the created securitization produces for the reference object, and on the other hand, it should be examined what vulnerabilities this process causes for refugees.

According to the Copenhagen School, the securitization process may be reversed. In other words, if the issue presented to the public as a security concern is shifted back to the political arena and conventional policy instruments are employed, normal political procedures can work. As a result, the problem is no longer regarded as a danger and may be handled using standard rules. The Paris School, led by Didier Bigo, believes that the Copenhagen School's securitization analysis is insufficient and offers some comments and suggestions. The Paris School, which stands for "Political Anthropological Research for International Sociology," contributes to the Copenhagen School's securitization approach in two ways. The first contribution is to concentrate on practices as well as speech. In addition to evaluating decision-makers discourses, Paris School theorists emphasize the necessity of scrutinizing how policymakers execute policies in this process and what they do in practice. In the context of refugees, it is vital to assess what is new in practice, in addition to critically examining the terminology and concepts

utilized in a country surrounding refugees. For example, are borders with adjacent nations being created, refugee rules being tightened, or border controls being increased?

The analysis of actors other than politicians is the Paris School's second addition to the securitization literature. According to Paris School thinkers, individuals whose rhetoric and deeds should be scrutinized include not just politicians, but also those working in bureaucratic organizations, intelligence officials, army personnel, customs officers, and even academics. Employees in the listed institutions attempt to legitimize themselves by asserting how much danger the country or society is in, and so security employees in many areas contribute to the political discourse. Indeed, the situation has deteriorated to the point where formerly peripheral institutions may play a significant role in the formulation and execution of security measures in this process. In other words, as the securitization process progresses, institutions gain additional areas of legitimacy and reinforce their positions. If the securitized constituent is a refugee, this procedure might harm the standing of immigrants while improving the career chances of security experts.

Germany is an interesting example. Even if the German economy maintained its growth pace during the global financial crisis and the subsequent European economic crisis, the ascent of the far-right 'Alternative for Germany' (AfD) party, which kept immigration on its agenda, could not be prevented. The fact that the AfD received the third most votes in the 2017 elections aroused concerns about the future of German democracy. Furthermore, France's National Unity Party, led by Marine Le Pen, defended its strong political base. At the same time, Turkish decision-makers, who maintained an open-door policy in the early years of the Syrian Civil War, stated, "Turkey is not the custodian of any country." "This is not their migrant warehouse."

The process of leaving the EU caused by the Refugee and Securitization debate, the Orban administration's blatant anti-immigrant opposition in Hungary, and similar movements in other EU nations have lately made it hard to implement unified policies towards refugees in the EU. In this context, the EU has attempted to externalize the migrant problem by passing it to the region's countries by negotiating separate agreements with countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan to reduce the number of refugees entering its borders. On the other hand, the fact that EU nations, which are facing a labor shortage owing to an aging population, require immigrants on the one hand while closing their borders on the other is inconsistent, and it is ethically questionable that they aim to attract only qualified immigrants.

The present Syrian refugee crisis appears to have pushed migration to the top of the EU agenda. According to Lehne, "the EU's present institutional and legal systems were manifestly unable to deal with the massive influx of migrants, and the crisis exposed fundamental differences among member states." The Schengen system of open borders, like the EU's monetary union, proved to be a fair-weather solution lacking the sturdiness to deal with crises." This crisis also rendered the Dublin Regulation untenable, since Greece and Italy were forced to abandon it, allowing migrants to flee to other EU member nations. The topic of migration may be secured not only through spoken acts, but also via social behaviors.

The basic goal underlying this endeavor was to develop new redistribution criteria for asylum seekers across EU member nations in the context of emerging new securitization migration policy issues. Given the failure of the 'EU Dublin system,' new procedures for assigning asylum seekers were necessary to balance burden-sharing across the union. On this basis, the temporary relocation system introduced a new 'distribution key' model of allocating responsibility among member states based on new criteria such as GDP, population, unemployment, the

average number of asylum applications per one million inhabitants between 2010 and 2014. It is easy to comprehend that "Dublin rules" posed a considerable burden for bordering nations, but the new relocation system appears to be a more practical method, bearing in mind that it includes more criteria than the "Dublin system." Adoption of a new relocation system, it appears, is not intended to have a migration prevention impact, as it does not address the origins of immigration. Rather, it deals with the internal adjustments of migratory outcomes, and based on that, I would not consider this policy to be securitizing. Another point would be to see that FRONTEX launched Poseidon Rapid Intervention with more police and technological equipment to assist Greece in dealing with the extraordinary number of migrants coming on its islands. Third, the crisis proved to be fertile ground for traffickers and smugglers to grow their operations, and they attempted to profit by carrying migrants in overloaded boats from the Middle East and Africa to Europe. Unfortunately, hundreds of migrants perished on such perilous treks.[3] The EU determined to implement a program to combat traffickers and smugglers. In this context, the EU launched Mission Sophia, a CSDP operation in the southern Mediterranean. By international law, the EU naval operation in the Mediterranean against people traffickers will be permitted to board, search, seize, and reroute boats suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking on the high seas"[4]. These operations aim to address the core causes of irregular migration and have an explicit migration prevention aspect as part of Europe's new securitization of migration policy in challenges. Furthermore, through these activities, the EU made major efforts to strengthen member states' capacity to regulate their borders more effectively in the aspect of securitization of migration policy.

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[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *EU expands Triton mission to help Italy*, https://www.thelocal.it/20150527/eu-expands-triton-mission-to-help-italy/, Accessed October 15, 2021.

The next point for challenges of new securitization migration policy is that the 'European border and coast guard' was envisaged as the Union's next semi-military force to be established. This agency would be involved in maritime border surveillance and would have two main competencies: first, facilitating the development and implementation of common EU border management standards; and second, operationally supporting front line EU Member States whose national border authorities are not effectively replicating the challenge on the ground.[5] Last but not least, one of the most significant steps implemented by the EU member states was the reintroduction of internal border control in the EU. Eight Schengen member nations, including Germany, Sweden, Austria, France, Denmark, and non-EU member Norway, have reinstated temporary border checks in the passport-free zone. The first nation to reinstate control along its border with Austria was Germany, which did so in early September. As a result of Germany's announcement that it will not turn away Syrian asylum seekers, the country has become a top destination for migrants, necessitating immediate action. The EU policy might be interpreted as securitizing migration in Europe as a result of these actions. To begin, the EU's recognition of the need to respond quickly might be viewed as one of the challenges of the new securitization of migration policy that began in 2015.

The EU naval operations are a striking illustration of securitization in the sense that they cover a range of actions: the EU aimed to prevent migrants from entering the EU by destroying smugglers' boats and networks. Asylum seekers were also sent back from the high seas to Turkey or Africa as part of these efforts. Furthermore, FRONTEX's mandate was expanded to act within third-country borders to stem refugee flows by eliminating incentives. Second, the establishment of hotspot zones was meant to first remove irregular migrants, i.e. those who came to Europe for economic reasons, and second, to register and

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[5] *Ibid.*

record information about asylum-seekers. Without a doubt, this step was viewed as critical to safeguarding EU security. By developing a list of "safe third countries," the EU hoped to reduce the number of immigrants from countries that had not experienced a humanitarian catastrophe. All of these actions demonstrate that the refugee intake was viewed as a threat that demanded an immediate reaction to defend the EU. Thus, the EU's securitization of migration occurred not just discursively, but also on the EU level through securitizing activities in the challenges of new securitization on migration policy between 2015 and 2021 years.

Regulations on EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy

EU migration concerns tend to promote an approach to migration motivated by security. The shifting domestic environment in Europe has entrenched a rising sense of migration as a danger to security and led to increasing measures and policies to curb migratory flows. The Euromed Survey shows that immigration securitization does not well augur for EU ties with the South. To better comprehend the securitization of EU migration policy, a framework for EU management of the so-called migrant problem must primarily be provided. Over one million migrants, asylum seekers and many of them moved to other EU nations like Greece and Italy in 2015. Between 2015 and 2016, EU Member States received more than one million asylum petitions. In the shared Schengen travel zone and common European asylum system (CEAS), this new reality has almost caused a "total collapse". The viability of the present asylum and border control framework was called into doubt as reception and registration services in the Member States failed to keep up and deal with this surge. The Euromed survey indicates that migratory securitization does not speak well for the ties between the Union and its southern neighbors. Many Member States have chosen unilaterally in the middle of the crisis and have decided to reset border surveillance and force asylum seekers back to Europe. Border controls not only go counter to

the notion of a shared area but are also detrimental to EU Directive on Asylum and Dublin. Interestingly enough, this method was original as, for example, France has been participating in the pushback of migrants to Italy for years. The issue of migration, therefore, raises issues about the competence of Member States to manage new securitization themes about the border and regulate migration and "pulling tensions between national and supranational interests.

Firstly, The EU no longer just ensures border security to deal with irregular migration. The growing power battle between far-right skeptics about the EU and pro-European parties has meant the EU's future as a whole. There has been increased worry that migration is a danger to national security and that there is a relationship between irregular migration and the entry of terrorists into EU territory. Border restrictions are contrary to the principle of a shared area and impede compliance with the Directive and the Dublin Regulation on EU asylum procedures. Defense and security have played a central role in EU migration policy because of the view of irregular migration as a danger to national security.[6] Although this tendency of EU migration securitization is not new, in the past few years it has grown dramatically. Within the Southern Quarter area, the securitization and externalization of the administration of migration have always tended to make North Africa a buffer zone (Bach, 2010). This is best shown by the recently proposed EU 'regional landing pads' in the southern Mediterranean in third nations.

Secondly, in essence, in exchange for financial and technical help, the EU aspires to achieve collaboration with the nations of North Africa to receive migrants and applicants. It expects that such forums will first and foremost discourage migrants from beginning on the perilous voyage. And they might be deported to Africa immediately if they do. This plan for a landing platform seems to rest on the assumption that if Europe takes responsibility for the reception of immigration, the issue of

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[6] VÖLKEL, J. C., „*Money for Nothing, the Cricks for Free Five Paradoxes in EU Migration Policy*. Comparative Migration Studies, 2(2), 2014.

internal unity will not be addressed by the Southern Neighbors. While security-driven measures may appear to provide results in the near term, but externalizing migration management to a ring of surrounding nations is not the best solution for some reasons. Security-driven methods risk ignoring the needs of individuals escaping crises and wars and so need international protection.

Thirdly, securitizing migration comes at the price of true and successful collaboration with southern neighbors. Repercussions for relations with the southern neighboring countries as the Euromed Survey illustrates the increased securitization of migration has ramifications for the EU's image of and ties with its southern neighbors. According to the survey results, the securitization of migration policy is one of the important elements that are likely to impact the EU's credibility in the Mediterranean.

Graph 1. *What is most likely to affect the EU`s credibility in the Mediterranean?*

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of 9th Euromed Survey[7]

Migration cooperation must take both parties' interests and concerns into account. Both the EU and the southern nations must

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[7] https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Descriptive_report_2_engaging_with _europe.pdf, accessed October, 21,2021.

demonstrate greater readiness and political will to move their collaboration ahead and focus on areas of common interest. When asked, "What do you believe your government should do in terms of its ties with the EU?" several Euromed Survey respondents said that their governments should collaborate more with the EU on migration. This is not to suggest that collaboration on migration is inherently bad; nonetheless, any cooperation must take into account the interests and concerns of both parties.

The Interrelation of Hungarian Immigration Securitization with EU Law

The features of Hungarian migration are linked to its location and history, particularly the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed and strong Hungarian migration patterns in adjacent countries. Hungarian former Communist Government's relative openness also explains the uniqueness of the issue. As Hungary is the region's most western country, many migrants utilize Hungary as a springboard for further migration. It helps migrants to establish themselves, experiment, and prepare themselves to further migrate. As Hungary is the region's most western country, many migrants utilize Hungary as a springboard for further migration. It helps migrants to settle, test, and prepare themselves for later travel. Transit migrants have a diversified socioeconomic position. These include academics, manual laborers, and market dealers on a modest scale. The age of moreover half is under 30 75. The law on foreigners' residency and the limits on foreign workers in Hungary are quite tight. At the same time, visa-free agreements with neighboring nations and others make it easy to visit the country as a tourist.

This helps the significant number of foreigners who stay or are seeking to move unlawfully in Hungary. As regards constant migration, the number of foreign nationals having work authorizations have varied, declining from 48,700 in 1990 to 18-20,000 each year in the next years.

Although their numbers are decreasing, the largest group is Romanians. There is a growing community of Chinese; many run tiny enterprises, some for money laundering and others for investment. It is believed that there are 10,000 Chinese residents in Hungary now. Moreover, Russian and Bulgarian capital is becoming more and more Hungarian banks.

Borders are empowered to take out investigations into organized crime since the introduction of the new border protection law in November 1997. The border control in Hungary has already altered dramatically since 1989 so that its practice complies with European norms in Hungary. Professional workers were replaced by recruited staff. Special entities such as the research groups of the Directorates and the Service for Action of the Border Guard have been established. Austria is the busiest borderline, while Romanian, Slovenian, and Slovak parts follow. Increased capabilities for Hungarian authorities to limit entries inside their borders were enhanced by the Controlling of foreigners Act of 1 May 1994. The large-scale trafficking at borders, international organized crime, and illegal immigration have required a renewal of the control system, which is also needed if it is to conform with the Schengen Agreement's rules. A double screening system was implemented in Hungary which fits the Schengen Agreement's control technology criteria. The information system must be completed during preparations for accession to the Schengen Agreement.

Hungary was the first to join the Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol of March 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe. Given the prevailing political and economic circumstances, only in Europe were persecuted persons subject to a territorial restriction. Asylum tasks were moved in March 1998 from the police to the civil administration. A separate body has been established to evaluate asylum applications, ORMA (Office for Migration and Refugee Affairs). Applications to their local organs must be submitted. It also judges on appeals against the refusals of applications. Rejected applicants may launch court

proceedings to review the judgments of the Office. Within 60 days after the submission of the claim, ORMA shall render a decision. In warranted instances, the time limit may be extended by 30 days[8]. The judgment must be announced in the mother tongue of the applicant or any other language is spoken by the applicant, in the Hungarian language. The choice has to be written. A judicial review of the judgment may be requested by the petitioner within 5 days. Within 15 days, the court must determine. The denial, albeit taken into account, of an asylum application in an EU Member State is not itself an issue in Hungary. In both the legislation on asylum and practice, there are certain inadequacies, but the UNHCR believes that Hungarian authorities will be improving themselves[9]. These should be improved: training of eligibility officials and interpreters, conditions of community shelters for border guards, the information provided to asylum applicants on their rights, updating the origin database of the country of origin, integration of recognized refugees. Because of the recent changes to the regime, security officers (usually investigating criminal cases), despite the failure to properly train in the field, have been permitted to deal with migrants arriving at the Budapest airport. A few human rights organizations have criticized the provisions on asylum seekers and foreigners in the Anti-Crimes Legislative Package to Parliament (November 1998), because they have not complied with the international standards on human rights, including the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, the Hungarian Human Rights Center, and the Refugee Association.

Hungary is the only EU state to vote against a proposal to recruit highly educated immigrants to work in Europe, even though Budapest

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8 *Ibid.*

9 Archer, Nandini, „*Hundreds of Europeans 'criminalised' for helping migrants – as far right aims to win big in European elections,*[https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/hundreds-of-europeans-criminalised-for-helping-migrants-new-data-shows-as-far-right-aims-to-win-big-in-european-elections/?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_A6r88B7M4kDId3O_OmZNEiZzxBpEwsHuzI9hxfCnNwE-1635772112-0-gqNtZGzNArujcnBszQil]* accessed October 14th, 2021.

only attracts six in 2019. Hungary 'does not consider the further harmonization of the relevant legal migration requirements essential or suitable.

In December 2015, the Commission initiated a proceeding for violation of Hungary's asylum legislation. The Commission submitted a reasoned opinion in December 2017 following a series of interactions at administrative and political levels and a supplementary letter of formal notice. The Commission is satisfied that the bulk of the concern expressed was still not addressed following the analysis of the Hungarian authorities' reply, thus it has now decided to send Hungary to the Court of Justice – the ultimate step of the infringement proceedings. In particular, the Commission considers that in the following aspects Hungarian law is incompatible with EU law[10]:

- Asylum Procedures: whereas EU law allows the Member States to establish transit zones at external borders, the Hungarian law falls short of the asylum proceedings Directive as it only allows applications for asylum for transit zones to be submitted where access is available only to a limited number of persons and after excessive waiting periods Hungary's border process does not comply with EU legislation since it does not respect the maximum 4 weeks in which anyone can be kept at a transit center and does not give particular safeguards for vulnerable applicants. In Hungary, while irregular migrants are led back over the border even if they intend to seek asylum, they do not allow adequate access to asylum processes within their territories.

- Conditions of reception: The Commission finds, without complying with necessary procedural safeguards, that the

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[10] Bertaud, Natasha, „*Migration and Asylum: Commission takes further steps in infringement procedures against Hungary,* accessed October 15, 2021: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ presscorner/detail/LT/IP_18_4522].

indefinite detention of asylum seekers in transit zones violates EU norms laid forth in the Directive on receiving conditions.[11]

- Return: The Hungarian legislation does not respect the Return of the EU since it does not ensure that return judgments be given separately and that legal remedies are included. Migrants risk returning without adequate protections and in violation of the principle of non-refoulment.

The Commission concluded, therefore, that Hungary does not comply with its responsibilities under the EU Treaties, EU regulations, and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights[12]. The first stage in a proceeding for an infraction of EU law is a letter of official notification. Their analysis determined that the laws evaluated violated and should be abolished the right to freedom of association and speech.

Conclusion

The process of securitization of refugees is being pursued aggressively by many parties in many nations throughout the world. The difficulties caused by immigration are overstated, specific crimes committed by immigrants are generalized, and the causes of the issues are ignored. In the following years, academics will be able to investigate the ups and downs in different nations' refugee policies, the role of social media in securitization, and the influence of far-right parties on the rhetoric and actions of mainstream parties. The EU's new securitization migration policy must conduct further study on the process of social perception of threats. How can the EU control migrant security by constructing threats? Second, how has the Syrian crisis altered the situation in Europe in terms of internal security, economic conditions, and so on in the EU's securitization policy?

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[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Nielsen, Nikolaj, ,,*Hungary only EU state against bill to attract skilled migrant,* accessed October 17, 2021: [https://euobserver.com/migration/153102].

Following the epidemic, increasing levels of immigration into the EU in the next years will offer both advantages and problems. Many economists feel that, given the low birth rates in the majority of EU nations, a high number of immigrants will be required to retain economic development potential and assure the long-term funding of European social systems. Simultaneously, too quick and unmanaged imports can exceed host nations' capacity to integrate newcomers, strain social and educational systems, and give rise to racist and nationalist political backlash. As a result, the new securitization of migration policy is going to become the final make-or-break problem for the EU. The existing degree of integration in areas such as free movement, migration, and asylum is manifestly insufficient to allow for an effective collective response such as the Hungarian regulation policy. However, the essential strengthening of the EU's policies and tools will be hampered by the union's diversity of interests and social attitudes. And if a stronger and more connected EU cannot be accomplished, the likely conclusion will be fragmentation or perhaps loss of the current degree of integration.

As a theoretical framework, all of the challenges analyzed are based on the Copenhagen School of security studies, which suggests that securitization migration policies are socially constructed through the speech act and are not always objective. Member states would increasingly rely on restrictive national choices, such as limiting the number of refugees let in, impeding the restoration to a functional Schengen system. More regulated flows of asylum seekers would lower the problem's political sensitivity and make it easier to overcome the gaps between member states. The nature of the European economy, political developments within and between member countries, and the security situation, notably in terms of terrorist threats, would all play important roles in establishing the circumstances for dealing with the crisis under the new securitization strategy. The cost of securitizing migration is real and successful engagement with EU law regulations.

Consequences forties with southern bordering nations as demonstrated by, growing securitization of migration has consequences for the EU's image of and ties with its southern neighbors. According to research findings, one of the key factors influencing the EU's credibility in the Mediterranean is the securitization of migrant policy.

The EU must avoid one-sided suggestions that distort its perspective and foster distrust in the partnership. At the same time, it is indisputable that irregular departures from Maghreb nations to Europe have grown, and that these countries must spend significantly in resolving the conditions that motivate their young people to risk their lives at sea. While border security cooperation is vital, it should be only one component of a larger multi-faceted plan that places job creation and human development at the center of the answer to irregular migration. Approaches based on crises should not be preferred above long-term partnerships.

Universities, major actors
in the governance of cybersecurity

Darius-Antoniu FERENȚ[1]
Adrian-Liviu IVAN[2]

Abstract. The European Union has created the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and the Member States have imposed laws regulating and ensuring the application of the GDPR at national level (in Romania's case, Law no. 190/2018). In this context, universities in the country can take part in the training of people who have the necessary skills to use computer devices safely. Universities can play an important role in training graduates who are able to identify the main types of malware and cyber attacks and know the essential rules of security and use of computer equipment (computer, laptop, smartphone, tablet).

Keywords: cybersecurity, information society, cybercriminals, cybersecurity culture, Internet.

Introduction

According to the European Cybersecurity Regulation, which entered into force in the summer of 2019, cybersecurity includes all activities necessary to protect computer systems and networks, users of these systems and other people affected by cyber threats[3].

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[1] PhD. Candidate, Babeș-Bolyai University, darius.ferent@ubbcluj.ro.
[2] Professor, Babeș-Bolyai University, Adrian_ivan2007@yahoo.com.
[3] The European Council, „Securitatea cibernetică: în ce fel combate UE amenințările cibernetice" *[Cybersecurity: How the EU tackles cyber threats]*, January 4th 2022, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/cybersecurity/,accessed on 26.04.2022.

Good governance of cyberspace is "all policies, strategies and means implemented in a balanced way in support of security, democratization, prosperity and sustainable development of cyberspace."[4] International cooperation is one of the pillars which can ensure good governance in the virtual environment, along with a flexible legal framework, powerful technical tools and an adaptable organizational structure[5]. The development of the cybersecurity culture is also needed to ensure cybersecurity.

The cybersecurity governance actors can be represented by international organizations (for example: the EU), national cybersecurity institutions, universities. In order to fight the growing thread of cybercrime and cyberattacks, the European Union strengthened its cybersecurity rules and the cybersecurity authorities, together with the national and public order security institutions within the European states are collaborating to destabilize cybercrime groups. Also, the Romanian institutions responsible with cybersecurity (The National Cybersecurity Organization, the Romanian Intelligence Service) are issuing documents in support of raising awareness about cybersecurity threats and disseminating the culture of security in the field of cyberspace.

Some authors consider that the cooperation between international organizations (NATO, EU) and the representatives of academia, civil society and the business community is a key component in ensuring the good governance of cyberspace[6].

In this paper, we shall answer the following research question: *What can be the role of universities in the cybersecurity governance process?*

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[4] Iulian-Florentin Popa, "Securitatea și guvernanța spațiului cibernetic contemporan – Teză de doctorat" *[Security and the governance of modern cyberspace – PhD Thesis]*, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, 2015, p. 29.

[5] Hamadoun Toure, „Defining cybersecurity and cyber-resilience", in *Where Cyber Security is Heading*, Security and Defence Agenda, 2013, p. 14.

[6] Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, *Guide to Good Governance in Cybersecurity*, Geneva, 2021, https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/CyberSecurity_Governance_EN_Jan2022.pdf, p. 85.

The European Union, the actor of cyberspace governance

Cybersecurity is a major concern for the European Union. In this respect, the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) was created in 2004 and is working to increase the resilience of critical informational networks in the EU. In 2009, ENISA defined a set of capabilities required by a CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) structure[7].

In 2013, the European Commission developed a cybersecurity strategy, which includes justice and home affairs, the internal market and foreign policy approaches to cyberspace issues. The European Union's cybersecurity strategy is accompanied by a technical-legal proposal from the European Commission's General Directive for Communication Networks, Content and Technology, which aims at increasing the security of information systems in the European Union. This proposal includes four priorities: 1). freedom and openness, 2). the laws, rules and core values of the European Union apply equally in the cyberspace and physical world, 3). Developing the cybersecurity capacity, 4). developing international cooperation on cyberspace issues[8].

The role of the European Security Agenda for 2015-2020 is to "support the cooperation of Member States in fighting security threats and increasing joint efforts in the fight against terrorism, organized crime and cybercrime"[9]. In the same year, the "Digital Single Market Strategy" was developed.

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[7] Mirela Atanasiu, „Abordări conceptuale ale spațiului cibernetic în NATO,UE și România", *Impact Strategic [Conceptual approaches of cyberspace in NATO, EU and Romania, Strategic Impact]*, no. 2/2017, available at https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is63.pdf, p. 56, accessed on 28.04.2022.

[8] Amos Corneliu Preja, Ioan Bogdan, *Introducere în teoria generală a informației și studii de intelligence [Introduction into the general theory of information and intelligence studies]*, CA Publishing Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2017, pp. 111-112.

[9] The official website of the European Commission: „The Commission takes up measures to strengthen cooperation in the EU in the fight against terrorism, organized and cybercrime",

The period between April 2016 and September 2017 was marked by five European Union initiatives in the field of cybersecurity. It should be emphasized that the EU is concerned about the security of personal data. In this respect, on April 27th2016, the European Parliament and the EU Council adopted a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. The provisions of Regulation 2016/679 are binding on EU Member States starting with May 25th2018[10]. Another important initiative was the adoption of Directive (EU) 1148/2016 (NIS Directive) on the security of networks and information systems which states that "the magnitude, the frequency and impact of security incidents pose a serious threat to the functioning of networks and information systems"[11].

Moreover, this Directive requires the EU Member States to develop their own cybersecurity strategies by defining cybersecurity policies, developing the legal framework at national level and designating competent authorities[12]. Also in 2016, the European Union developed a new strategy on cybersecurity. The 2016-2020 EU Cybersecurity Strategy emphasized the need for a unified approach to cybersecurity, the need for collaboration and the ongoing updating of policies to ensure the security of the European cyberspace[13].

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available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ro/IP_15_4865, accessed on 28.04.2022.

[10] Ioan-Cosmin Mihai, Costel Ciuchi, Gabriel-Marius Petrică, „Provocări actuale în domeniul securității cibernetice – impact și contribuția României în domeniu", în *Studii de Strategie și politici-SPOS 2017 ["Modern challenges in the field of cybersecurity – impact and Romania's contribution", in Strategy and policy studies – SPOS]*, no.4, Bucharest, 2018, available at http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/SPOS-2017_Studiul_4_FINAL.pdf, p. 45, accessed on 28.04.2022.

[11] „The European Parliament and Council's Directive (UE) 2016/1148 of July 6th 2016 on measures for a high common level of network and information systems security within the Union", July 19th 2016, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016L1148&from=EN, accessed on 28.04.2022.

[12] Ioan-Cosmin Mihai, Costel Ciuchi, Gabriel-Marius Petrică, *work quote,* p. 35.

[13] *Ibid*, p. 43.

On December 16th 2020, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a new European Union Cybersecurity Strategy. This strategy sets out "the way in which the Union will respond to large-scale cyberattacks on citizens, governments, industry and institutions, and how the EU could be a global leader in a secure and open Internet"[14].

Universities and cyberspace governance

The European Union has created the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and the Member States have imposed laws regulating and ensuring the application of the GDPR at national level (in Romania's case, Law no. 190/2018). In this context, universities in the country can take part in the training of people who have the necessary skills to use computer devices safely. This approach would benefit all organizations, especially small companies, which cannot afford to make financial efforts in terms of staff training. Compliance with the GDPR requirements is not an easy task and sometimes requires financial resources to secure networks, computer equipment and employee training.

The culture of security represents "the set of values, attitudes and behaviors manifested at the level of society, with a preventive role in the personal, group and state defense and protection, against real and potential risks, threats and, aggressions"[15].

The creation of a culture of security is necessary in a digital society that is constantly evolving. Without it, we cannot talk about good governance in cyberspace, because end users (employees) are a vulnerability that cybercriminals are interested in taking advantage of.

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[14] The official National Cyber Security Division website: „The EU's new cybersecurity strategy for the Digital Decade and its impact on Romania", December 29th 2020, available at https://dnsc.ro/citeste/noua-strategie-de-securitate-cibernetica-a-ue-pentru-deceniul-digital-si-impactul-sau-pentru-romania, accessed on 28.04.2022.

[15] The Romanian Intelligence Service official website: „What is the culture of security?", available at https://www.sri.ro/intrebari-frecvente, accessed on 29.04.2022.

Increasing the number and complexity of cyberattacks on IT&C infrastructures, theft of sensitive data and information (confidential data of organizations, personal data, financial-banking information) can affect the security and prestige of businesses, companies, institutions and lead to cyberspace insecurity, while also affecting its sustainable development.

Mankind is in the age of the information society, a society in which "the production and consumption of information is the main activity"[16]. The information society has brought changes into all areas of human life: e-commerce is booming in the business sector, the administration is focusing on e-government, digital education has appeared in the field of education and there is possibility to access bibliographic resources in electronic format, numerous virtual libraries being available on the internet. In a society where the IT&C technologies are widely used, one can notice a digitalisation of the professional activities. This digitalisation has led to an increase in cybersecurity risks, especially as some cyberattacks are fueled by a lack of awareness of the dangers and poor education of cybersecurity employees. Consequently, universities can play an important role in training graduates who are able to identify the main types of malware and cyberattacks and know the essential rules of security and use of computer equipment (computer, laptop, smartphone, tablet).

Universities can be actors in the governance of cyberspace, bringing a contribution through training, educating future generations, to form a cybersecurity culture that is useful to safely use computer equipment and the internet. Even if there are policies, procedures, regulations, rules developed by the European Union and the governments of the Member States, without the training of end users within organizations, we cannot talk about a high level of cybersecurity. In universities, this culture of cybersecurity among students can be achieved by encompassing bachelor's and/or master's degrees subjects

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[16] Amos Corneliu Preja, Ioan Bogdan, *work quote,* p. 19.

addressing cybersecurity in the curricula. Also, universities can organize courses to raise awareness of the risks, vulnerabilities, threats and opportunities of cybersecurity for students, MA/MSc, doctoral students, teachers and / or support teaching staff. We consider that the Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca acts in both directions.

We believe that a cybersecurity discipline aimed at developing a culture of security should include the following subjects / courses:

a) Basic computer information (hardware and software components)

b) Cybersecurity-specific terminology (e.g. the confidentiality, integrity and availability triad, data risks and threats, firewall, antivirus software, VPN – Virtual Private Network tunnel, Digital Certificate).

c) Types of malware, the presentation of the main cyberattacks (the following courses on malicious programs and cyberattacks can be presented to students: ransomware, rootkit, spyware, keylogging, trojan, man-in-the-middle, Denial of Service, phishing, adware, virus, computer worms, watering hole, APT attacks, cryptojacking); and following the presentation of each type of attack, the corresponding measures of protection against that cyberattack can be presented.

d) Security rules and use of computer devices (computer, laptop, tablet, smartphone).

The Faculty of History and Philosophy at the Babeș-Bolyai University has a bachelor's degree program in the field of Security Studies. This study program includes an optional subject called Introduction to Cybersecurity. The aim of this subject is to both theoretically and practically familiarize students with the introductory notions specific to cybersecurity. One of the skills acquired by the students who opt for this subject is the capitalization on the culture of security. The example of the Security Studies specialization can be extended to other specializations and faculties within the Babeș-Bolyai University.

It is essential for students and master's candidates in the field of Security Studies to form a cybersecurity culture, as they will work in businesses, companies, institutions where they will perform risk analysis, develop security plans and ensure the organization's security / protection of sensitive information. In 2021, the Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science at BBU organized an online awareness course called Internet Security. In order to be a part of this course, BBU students, master's and doctoral candidates, as well as teachers required the basic skills in using digital equipment.

Students, master's and doctoral candidates with a culture of cybersecurity represent an advantage for future employers, who no longer have to waste money and time training end users, data protection staff, analysts and security referents, system administrators, employees handling personal data. These graduates will have the necessary knowledge and skills formed by universities. Creating a cybersecurity culture for end users (employees) who use computer devices connected to the global internet at work is essential, given the cyberthreats and the European GDPR, which obliges all organizations to take technical and organizational measures in order to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of such data.

Conclusions

The European Union's efforts in the field of cybersecurity underline its concern to protect this dimension of security, to deter cyberattacks and to implement international cooperation on cybersecurity. In the context of the emergence of new legislation on personal data protection and cybersecurity, the Romanian universities can significantly contribute to the training of people who have the necessary skills in safely using computer equipment.

Universities can play an important role in the governance of cyberspace, by developing the cybersecurity culture of students, master's

or doctoral candidates, as well as all others interested in learning about cybersecurity practices.

Subjects addressing cybersecurity can be encompassed in the specializations at a bachelor's and/or master's level to ensure the development of the cybersecurity culture in students and master's candidates. Further, another course of action to form a cybersecurity culture are awareness-raising courses on cybersecurity risks, vulnerabilities and threats for students, master's and/or doctoral candidates, teachers and / or support teaching staff.

The creation of a culture of security is necessary in constantly evolving digital society. Without it, we can't talk about good governance in cyberspace, because end users (employees) are a vulnerability that Black Hat hackers / cybercriminals are interested in taking advantage of. Students, master's and doctoral candidates with a cybersecurity culture represent an advantage for future employers, who no longer have to waste time and money on their training.

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European discursive acts on migration generated by the refugee crisis from 2015

Rareș-Alexandru VĂSCAN[1]

Abstract. In the last years, Europe has experienced a major migration phenomenon. This circumstance emphasized the issues the European Union faces particularly at the decision-making and at the diplomatic level. These issues are related to adopting policies geared to solve efficiently this crisis. The aim of this paper is to present the securitisation policies of the European Union and of the Member States, adopted to provide an answer to the migration and insecurity created in the aftermath of the Refugee's Crisis from 2015. The EU's securitisation policies and directives created, various "pro" and "counter" positions at the time of implementation across the Member states, mainly at the discursive level.

The analysis of the paper is focusing on the official position of Germany, Romania, and Hungary. The reason for choosing the three Member States was due to considerations of strategic importance. The first reason relies on Germany being the state where most migrants from the "Middle East" want to settle. Romania and Hungary are the countries through which the migrants go towards to the West, they are chosen because of the presentation of two types of speech, from the official point of view. The second aim of the paper is to identify the position of the European Union toward migration through the main interpretative frameworks delivered by official documents and speeches, analyzed to identify the main discursive narratives.

Keywords: migration, securitisation, discourse, policy, insecurity.

Introduction

The refugee crisis of 2015 has emphasized the problems faced by the European Union at decision-making and diplomatic level, both the

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[1] PhD student, Doctoral School of International Relations and Security Studies, Babes-Bolyai University, vascan_rares@yahoo.com.

Union institutions and the Member States, failing to take decisions on this issue. In this case, the European Union faced a lack of cooperation between Member States, many of which did not comply with the Directive adopted in July 2001 by the Common European Asylum System, which was based on the principle of common solidarity.

Migration has been one of the biggest challenges for the European Union. The large number of immigrants entering the European area required a new approach and implicitly the adoption of policies to manage this situation effectively.

The policies adopted by the European Union were primarily aimed at managing and stopping the massive flow of people who want to reach Europe, integrating asylum seekers and removing the feeling of insecurity and insecurity created among citizens of European States.

The research argument

The preliminary findings of this Article are related to the split of European leaders' perceptions on the EU's external security and cooperation policies.

The implementation and adaptation of these policies have favored the emergence of different official speeches and declarations at European level in countries such as Hungary, Romania and Germany, in relation to the management of the migratory flow.

The objective of the research

In the context in which migration has become in recent years a phenomenon that the European Union is facing, this paper aims to present, in the first part, a theoretical framing of migration. We consider this presentation relevant in the process of identifying and presenting the policies adopted by the EU, with the aim of removing the feeling of insecurity created by the wave of immigrants generated mainly by the war in Syria.

The second objective of the article is to present the position of the European Union, from the perspective of official documents and declarations starting with 2019, and then through the qualitative method, to identify the main discursive narratives.

The last and main objective is to identify and state the speeches made in the official statements of European leaders in the context of migration, since 2019. In this part we will present the speeches of the leaders of Germany, Hungary and Romania. We chose to present the speeches to the leaders of these three States, because they represent the main States on the immigrants' route to Western Europe.

Research question

In view of the research objectives set out above, the main research question this paper addresses is:

- What types of speeches are European countries addressing in the context of migration?

Theoretical framework

Concept

Migration is a phenomenon known since ancient times, being a complex phenomenon that involves a multi-perspective approach. This phenomenon is quite pronounced today, because the evolution of human societies is also based on mobility. We want to give an overview of what migration means, given the most relevant explanations of the phenomenon.

International statistics from the beginning of the 21st century show that one person in 35 is a migrant, which means that if all these migrants occupied a defined territory, they would form a state that would be the 6 number of inhabitants[2].

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[2] Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Migraţie şi securitate*, Bucureşti: Universitatea Naţională de Apărare "Carol I", 2008, p. 5.

The United Nations defines a migrant as "anyone who changes the territory where he usually resides"[3]. We infer that tourists or businessman do not fall into this category, because travel generally does not involve a change of residence.

If we look at the phenomenon of migration, we will find that migration is not something random or specific only to a certain period or geographical area. The causes, forms and intensity of the phenomenon were different, both in terms of time and period, as well as in relation to the area of the phenomenon, either at regional or global level. The phenomenon of migration originates from economic factors, the development discrepancies between States forcing the population to migrate to those States that were more economically developed.

Migration, according to the encyclopedic dictionary, is the voluntary movement of individuals or populations from one state to another, from one region to another, determined by social, political, cultural or economic factors[4].

Migration is a complex phenomenon, consisting of the movement of people from one territorial area to another, followed by the change of residence or the employment in a form of activity in the arrival area[5]. This definition does not refer to national borders, but the typology of migration distinguishes, according to this criterion, between internal migration and external or international migration.

A general classification is that of its main forms, depending on borders: temporary or permanent external migration (emigration and immigration) and internal migration. Emigration is the process of leaving the country of origin, taking place before that of immigration.

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[3] Ozden, Cl. Schiff, M. (ed.), *Inter: Polity national migration, economic development and policy*, Washington DC: World Bank, 2007, p. 19.

[4] Ion A. Candrea, Gheorghe Adamescu și I. Oprişan, *Dicționar enciclopedic ilustrat*, Bucureşti, Editura Saeculum I.O, 2010, p. 832.

[5] Traian-Ioan Rotariu, *Demografie şi sociologia populaţiei. Structuri şi procese demografice*, Iaşi, Polirom, 2009 (col. „Collegium. Sociologie, antropologie "), p. 19.

Immigration is the process by which a person enters and establishes himself as a permanent resident in another country[6].

International migration means the process of the geographical mobility of the population, starting with leaving its own state, called the donor state, and ending with entering the destination state, called the receiving state[7].

International migration occurs when individuals voluntarily move – immigrants, or involuntarily – refugees, from one state to another, settling permanently or temporarily in another state. Depending on the domestic and international regulations on population movement, we can say that migration is generally classified as legal or illegal migration. To this classification, Weinstein and Pillai also add forced migration, which occurs when the person leaves the state of origin against their will – slavery, or when the departure is generated by external factors such as natural disasters, civil wars[8].

The distinction between internal and external migration is essential because it takes place for different reasons. Due to structural barriers, external migration is harder to achieve compared to domestic migration, as international migration involves more administrative procedures, higher costs, more problems getting a job by accessing services from the host state, learning a new language[9].

As a result, the motivations behind international migration are usually stronger and decisions more calculated than those involved in internal migration. In the receiving society, discrimination, lack of knowledge of the rights and duties of foreigners, administrative problems, illegal employment of foreigners may occur. Not being a good

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6 Viorel Sîrca, "*Migraţia externă a populaţiei judeţului Cluj, după integrarea României în Uniunea Europeană*", (teza de doctorat, Universitatea Babeș-Bolyai, 2013), p. 11.

7 *Ibid*, p. 11.

8 Jay A. Weinstein and Vijayan K. Pillai, *Demography. The science of population,* Londra, Pearson, 2001, p. 12.

9 John R. Weeks, *Population. An introduction to concepts and issues,* Belmont, CA, Wadsworth Cengage learning, 2012, p. 34.

or bad phenomenon, migration is a natural human action, the consequences of which must be carefully analyzed in the short, medium and long term[10].

According to Constantin Vert, migration is not only a change of address; it also represents a change in the social, cultural, economic and emotional environment. Migration does not have a double character, biological and social, such as death or birth; it is entirely a social event[11].

From the perspective of migration, as a social phenomenon that directly affects a significant part of the population, with complex implications for the entire society, it is important to know and highlight the profile of the migrant, the immigrant and the immigrant. This makes it possible to correctly orient measures to manage the immigration phenomenon and implicitly to aid migrants.

An explanation of the terms migrant and refugee is essential, as we note that these two terms are often used interchangeably in political discourse, although they have different meanings.

The refugee represents the person who decides to emigrate: *"following a justified fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality of belonging to a particular social group or political views, he is outside the country of which he or she is a national"*[12]. Most of the time their situation is so dangerous that they must cross national borders to find safety and receive assistance from other States.

Unlike a refugee, a migrant is a person who decides to emigrate from the state of his or her nationality to improve his or her life by seeking employment, studying or even family reunification, but not from a direct threat such as persecution or death.

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[10] Caroline Brettell, James F. Hollifield, *Migration theory. Talking across disciplines,* London, Routledge, 2008, p. 8.

[11] Constantin Vert, *Geografia populației. Teorie și metodologie,* Timișoara, Mirton, 2001, p. 104.

[12] Convention on the status of Refugees, *https://www.unhcr.org/ro/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2016/12/1951_Convention_ROM.pdf,* accessed in 11.05.2021.

As a sensitive variable of freedom of movement, migration regulation is also at the confluence between the norms of the domestic law of the States involved in the migration phenomenon and the provisions of international law in this field[13].The fundamental reasoning that determines the two categories of domestic and international norms is the need to permanently protect the rights and legitimate interests of individuals, regardless of their place of establishment or their status: citizen, stateless person, refugee[14]. In this context, we can highlight the important role that must be recognized by international law in ensuring the status of migrants.

One of the definitions of migration and migrant that has generated controversy is that of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which says: a long-term international migrant is a person who moves to a state other than his or her residence for a period of at least one year[15]. In this context, we can say that migration is caused by a variety of reasons, the most significant being overpopulated territories, social causes based on political, historical, religious and cultural considerations, and natural disasters.

Causes

The migration literature identified and highlighted the main causes that generated the migratory movements of the population, being highlighted, in particular:

1. Main causes, which directly influence the need for migration to other States:

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[13] Anghel Stoica, *Migrația ilegală la confluența cu traficul de persoane,* București, Pro Universitaria, 2014, p. 49.

[14] *Ibid*, pp. 49–50.

[15] Pauline Fron, Georges Lemaitre, Thomas Liebig, Cécile Thoreau, „Standardised statistics on immigrant inflows results, sources and methods", in *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*, septembrie, 2008, pp. 1–24, p. 3.

- *Religious, political and historical reasons* have also led to significant migratory movements, which may be accidental causes: cataclysms and diseases; and current causes: coups, armed conflicts, etc.
- *Overpopulation,* a process that creates a discrepancy between the number of population and the available, accessible resources, resulting in a reduction in income and the impossibility of satisfying consumption.

2. Specific causes, which generally do not involve immediate or forced migration:

- *The redundancy of labor and the dispersal of industries* has created a high incidence of migration in some countries.
- *Ecological causes*, which cause population movements from areas affected by natural environment transformations to other regions, this migration being known as ecological migration[16].

Conclusions

Migration will continue to be widely influenced by demographic trends and economic incentives. Due to fluctuations in government policies, the drivers of migration will persist in the coming years globally, fueling debates in destination countries on migration and producing social divisions.

The main attraction factors for immigrants are the need for labor in European countries facing aging populations and the economic benefits that developed European States offer, and the driving factors that have accentuated migration are civil wars and political instability in certain States.

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[16] D. Roșca, *Introducere în sociologia populației și demografiei,* Ediția a IV-a, București, Editura Fundației România de Mâine, 2007, pp. 99-100.

We can say that migration is a complex phenomenon that considers both the natural dynamics of the population and political, economic, social, military and environmental factors. This phenomenon is a continuous one, being known since ancient times, manifested in the present and certainly will manifest in the future, the evolution of societies based on mobility. Being a continuous phenomenon, it makes it impossible to stop, which is why it requires a deep knowledge of this phenomenon and at the same time the involvement of mechanisms capable of managing it as best as possible.

As I mentioned, due to the complexity of the phenomenon, it must be treated from different perspectives: historical, sociological, psychological, demographic, cultural, religious, political and ideological, they emphasize its implications for the functioning of migrant groups and society as a whole.

Securitisation policies adopted by the European Union

The refugee crisis in Europe was a migratory phenomenon, which began in the second half of 2014 and was characterized by an immigration of several people, quite high and difficult to manage by the European Union, from North Africa and the Middle East to the European States in the Mediterranean. According to statistics provided by *the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,* the number of migrants reached European States in 2015 was 1,2 million, and the three main States they came from were Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq[17]. The causes of this wave of immigrants in Europe were political in nature, with most of the States from which they emigrated being involved in various armed conflicts, such as *the civil war in Syria*, the armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[18]

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[17] "Refugee situation," UNHCR, http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean?page=1&view=grid&Type%255B%255D=3&Search=%2523monthly%2523%7cjournal=Refugees/Migrants, accessed 21.04.21.

[18] "Refugee crisis: apart from Syrians, who is traveling to Europe?", *the Guardian*, accessed 21.04.21.

However, the crisis ended in 2019, as the number of migrants coming to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa has dropped considerably, she stressed that migration flows should be analyzed in the light of a threat to European security. Viewed from a threat perspective, the European Union has developed various actions and policies aimed at securing migration and ensuring the security of Member States

According *to the Copenhagen School's theorists*, security issues are closely related to the discursive act, which implies that the securitisation process occurs when there is also an audience or audience to accept it in the form of a security issue[19]. The securitisation of migration by the European Union has been achieved through two processes, the first being a discursive one used by the leaders of European States and EU representatives, and the second being the adoption of common policies and the creation of security agencies, such as FRONTEX, on migration.

The European Union wants to put in place an effective, humanitarian and safe European migration policy even after 2019 when illegal immigration was 90% lower compared to the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015. In this regard, the European Council, the institution setting political priorities, has outlined a series of actions and policies aimed at providing a strong response to migratory pressure[20].

The first action on migration by European bodies concerns *the reform of EU asylum rules*, as they have been found to be incomplete and not adapted to current conditions and migration flows. The main problems of the rules were the way asylum seekers were treated in certain States and the criterion by which only one State is responsible for processing asylum applications, in this case the first country of entry, which created difficulties for frontline Member States, like Greece, Italy, Spain. The new reforms aim to:

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[19] See Jeff Huysmans, *The politics of insecurity: Fear migration and asylum in the EU*, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 15.

[20] "EU migration policy", Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/migratory-pressures/, accessed 22.04.21.

- Replacing or updating *the Dublin Regulation*, the main asylum instrument, with a Regulation setting out more effectively the state or States to process asylum applications, to ensure a fair sharing of responsibilities between Member States through a solidarity mechanism.
- Implement a common asylum procedure to replace procedures that Member States apply in the process of granting or withdrawing international protection, with a view to defending the rights of applicants and preventing abuse of them[21].

The second policy promoted by the EU is *to secure the external borders of the European Union and manage migration flows* through the Agency, the European border and Coast Guard (FRONTEX), which aims to improve the management and security of the external borders of the Member States, support national border police institutions, in actions to prevent irregular migration by combating trafficking in migrants and their return to their countries of origin, as well as rescue operations for migrants in danger, through various missions in the Mediterranean, such as: operation Themis, maritime surveillance and military operation Irini, to combat human trafficking. This policy is still being promoted and supported, with the agency expected to maintain a corps of about 10.000 police officers by 2027[22].

The third action, which I consider essential in the context of migration, adopted in *the new Pact on Migration and Asylum*, is linked to the process of integration and inclusion of migrants. It is important for the efficient and successful management of people immigrating to the EU, but also for social cohesion. It aims to provide targeted and tailored support to people of migratory origin, for whom social integration and inclusion in general tends to be a challenge. Through its integration and

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[21] "Reform of EU asylum rules", Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium. europa.eu/ro/policies/migratory-pressures/, accessed 22.04.21.

[22] EU migration policy", Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ ro/policies/migratory-pressures/, accessed 22.04.21.

inclusion policy, the European Union provides economic support to Member States governments to implement programs and form partnerships in:

- The field of inclusive education and training, with a focus on rapid recognition of qualifications and language learning.
- Creating and improving employment opportunities for migrant communities based on the recognition of skills.
- Providing access to health services for people born outside the European Union, as well as opportunities for Member States to share experiences and good practices.
- Access to affordable housing that at the same time provides a set of suitable housing conditions[23].

The above mentioned in the paper were the main actions that the European Union has taken internally. They are relevant because they are found during a person who immigrates to the EU and offers effective solutions for managing each stage of the migration process.

With a view to managing migration effectively, the EU has also adopted external policies by concluding treaties and peace of cooperation with countries such as Turkey by maintaining its commitment to the EU-Turkey Declaration signed in 2016, which provides financial support from the European Union with the aim of further reducing migratory pressures on Greece and the dangerous journeys of migrants on the Eastern Mediterranean route.

Working with Morocco and Libya has become crucial to strengthen border control and combat migrant trafficking on the Central Mediterranean route, as it has become one of the main ways for migrants to access the EU. Through these treaties, the European Union has created a beneficial framework through which illegal migrants are returned to

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[23] „Action Plan of Integration and Inclusion", European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/integration/action-plan-integration-third-country-nationals_en, accessed 22.04.21.

their countries of origin and to the countries from which they have emigrated[24].

In conclusion, through these policies, the European Union offers a response to the high and intense pressures on the external borders of the union by migration. This will persist if the economic and geopolitical situation in the countries of origin does not change or at least improve, with the European Union being exposed to waves of immigrants soon.

Methodology

The corpus consists of the official speeches and statements given to the press, from 2019 to 2020, by the various political leaders on the European stage. I believe that the chosen period is an interesting one, because the political discourse addressed after the end of the migratory crisis presents in a transparent way the strategies and the way in which certain political actors position themselves on the migratory phenomenon

Through the content analysis, focused on interpretation, we aim to highlight the main themes addressed in the European discursive act and to identify the main types of discourse addressed by political leaders. In the first part, we want to find out what the position of the European Union is and what are the main lines of discourse addressed in the speeches of European Commission President von der Leyen and in the declaration by the High Representative of the Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Joseph Borell.

In the second part of the analysis, we want to see, how the Member States, Germany, Hungary, Romania, are positioned at the discursive level, in relation to migration, by interpreting the speeches of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and

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[24] EU migration policy, Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/migratory-pressures/, accessed 22.04.21.

Romanian leaders, President Klaus Iohannis and Prime Minister Viorica Dăncilă.

In the constructivist view, the discourse is presented and understood from the perspective of two dimensions, as social practice and as individual practice. Speech as a social practice involves the use of language and other communication resources "as *elements of social life*"[25] through language practices established in institutional spheres, organizations and the media. Speech is also an individual practice because it involves the use of verbal and nonverbal language mechanisms by a social actor in dealing with his interlocutors to present and assign a position. This type of speech, through both dimensions, depending on how it is perceived, can generate new social practices.

The conceptual discourse highlights how the social actor uses language, regardless of its form, along with other communication resources, to build a position on what he communicates, by relating to his interlocutors. It is also important that the speech is not confused with the text, simply because, through the speech, the communication process is carried out and goes beyond the text.

Moreover, speech can be perceived as a grid for interpreting a situation or action, when an actor or institution uses a specific language in a social situation that is characterized by norms and values[26].

Speech is considered political when presenting, dealing with, or evaluating situations of public interest. The distinction between a political discourse and other types of speech is emphasized by its conventionality. For example, the political discourse operates on the basis of a conventional supporting argument regarding the role of the institution and the public image of the person representing that institution. The role of this type of discourse is to communicate presumptively a correct version of facts.

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[25] Norman Fairclough, *Analysing discourse,* London, Routledge, 2003, p. 26.

[26] Camelia Beciu, *Sociologia comunicării şi a spaţiului public: concepte, teme, analize,* Iaşi, Polirom, 2011, p. 32.

The main elements of a political discourse are the sender – the person who performs the discursive act, the audience – the audience that is targeted through the speech and its content. One of the most important features of this type of speech is semantics, which highlights how political ideas and beliefs are transmitted to convince the receivers to support the cause of the transmitter.

The language used in a political discourse, through style, structure, content, and through adaptation to the political context, generates attitudes and actions that generally serve the interests of the sender, to induce the receiver certain values and beliefs[27].

The typology of speeches selected for content analysis is an argumentative one, because these speeches are aimed at convincing. Argumentative discourse is an interactional discourse, because it always targets an audience, being in turn susceptible to receiving a reply through a counter-discourse, in this sense the argument being built on the model of communication-action theory. According to the interactional theory, the effect of this type of speech is not just about achieving a sense of recognition, but it must produce a change or change in the state of the receiver[28].

According to the researchers, the main features of argumentative discourse are orientation toward the interlocutor, its location in the plane of plausibility and probability, targeting a decision of the type of rejection, but also the actualization of logical relationships such as deduction, induction and analogy[29].

From the structural point of view, argumentative discourses are generally composed of two components and can be mixed discourses, because they combine several discursive typologies, the first being the

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[27] Drd. Oana Tătaru, Retorica promisiunii în discursul politic actual, *Analele Universității „OVIDIUS"- Seria Istorie*, Vol. 5, Constanța, 2008, pp. 195-196.

[28] G. Vignaux, *L'Argumentation. Essai d'une logique discursive*, Genéve, 1976, p. 73.

[29] Nicoleta Nesu, Argumentarea ca „tip de discurs", in *DACOROMANIA, seria nouă, V-VI*, 2000-2001, Cluj-Napoca, p. 273.

explanatory one, which contains reasoning, logical and true, most of the time, and the second the *seductive*, based on their own views and views on the main topic. In this regard, the explanatory component has the role of familiarizing the interlocutor with the main theme of the speech, by presenting it in a logical – deductive way. Instead, the seductive component represents the creative part of an argumentative discourse, relying on discursive operations materialized through strategies such as analogies, the power of examples, metaphors[30].

EU position through statements of officials

Migration is an important topic addressed in speeches by European officials after 2019.The speeches of the President of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy from 2019-2020 promote norms and values-based multilateralism as essential in managing and solving the EU migration issue. Multilateralism is a global government based on the principle *of "opposition to bilateral arrangements"[31]* and has the role of deterring unilateralism in solving problems such as migration.

The speeches of the representatives of the European Commission present a series of common ideas and principles to argue and convince the partners of the need for a common approach to the phenomenon from a positive perspective. The main ideas promoted by their speeches are the need for solidarity, based on a new Regulation of migration rules, the sharing and fair sharing of responsibilities and the need to provide protection for citizens' security.

A first finding is that the European Union continues to take a positive and encouraging stance on migration, from the perspective of

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[30] B. Grize, *L'argumentation, déduction ou explication,* in *Linguistique et Sémiologie,* Lyon, 198, pp. 29-41.

[31] M. Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, International *Organization*, 46, 3 (Summer 1992), p. 681.

providing international protection to migrants in situations of need and humanitarian aid, with the aim of saving lives, through a *"human-centered and humanity-impregnated approach"*[32].

Analyzing another speech by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, underlines the need to implement a new migration and asylum strategy, representing an important point on the European agenda, stating "*the current system no longer works"*[33]. The same problem is found in the statement of Joseph Borrell, the high representative of the Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, who presented a skeptical position on migration policy: "*European migration policies have been a point of discussion for several years and have not yielded results"*[34].

In the same speech, it also invokes the principle of solidarity between States, as the main instrument for managing the situation of southern European States, which look with skepticism, the response which they offer through national policies to future waves of migration, the *fundamental elements are the fair sharing of responsibilities and solidarity on the other hand*[35].

Based on the principle of solidarity, the European Union wants its actions to discourage Member States that address other visions of migration policies, for example nationalist policies, hostile to immigrants. This position is presented with the statement "*Migration is a challenge for the whole of Europe, so the whole of Europe must do its job"*[36].

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[32] Von der Leyen, State of the Union Address, Brussels, 16 Sep 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ro/SPEECH_20_1655, accessed 20.04.2021.

[33] Speech by President von der Leyen at the „High-level conference on migration and asylum in Europe", Brussels, 19 Nov 2020, p. 1.

[34] "Borell returns: His vision for Europe" https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_borrell_returns_his_vision_for_europe/, accessed 23.04.21.

[35] *Ibid*, p. 2.

[36] Von der Leyen, State of the Union Address, Brussels, 16 September 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ro/SPEECH_20_1655, accessed 20.04.2021.

Another finding about the European Union's position is that it intensifies action to combat migrant trafficking, "*we will take measures to discourage the actions of those who bring illegal migrants into Europe*" and want to strengthen external borders as effectively as possible, all this with the aim of providing a response to illegal migration and creating the safest security environment possible[37].

In analyzing the speeches on migration, we identify in the allocations of European officials, who addressed both the European institutions and the Member States in the period 2019-2020, that the main ideas are related to the continued provision of international protection to persons seeking asylum and actions to combat the trafficking of migrants, the need for solidarity-based cooperation on the reception of migrants, reforming the asylum system and renouncing nationalist migration policies.

Divergent positions of European leaders on migrants

The adoption of migration policies and actions by the European Union, based on respect for solidarity, fair sharing of responsibility, security and the provision of humanitarian aid, has created tensions on the part of some Member States, which have decided not to comply with the proposed obligations.

The phenomenon of migration has developed and affected the Member States of the European Union in a different way, which has automatically attracted discursive views from political leaders.

In this regard, we will present two different types of speech addressed by European leaders, representatives of Germany and Romania, addressing a speech based on a pro-migration rhetoric, in contradiction with the speech promoted by Prime Minister Viktor Orban, which presents an anti-migration rhetoric with a strong populist tinge.

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[37] *Ibid.*

German Chancellor Angela Merkel's speech maintains mainly the same strong direction over the years, according to which Germany is an important actor and directly involved in managing the challenge created by the migration phenomenon. With the statement "*we must do everything humanly possible to address this challenge*"[38] on managing and combating the causes of migration, he stressed the importance of multilateral collaboration and the need to find common solutions across all European States.

A second argument, which supports the idea that the speech promoted by the German leader is a pro-migration one, is brought by her statement in 2020: *"I would essentially make the same political decisions,"* although 5 years after the adoption of the open doors policy, it has generated around 1,6 million migrants in the last three years alone and has generated debate and discontent among both the population and the political class. In this regard, the German Chancellor maintains his point *of view "when people stand on the Austrian or Hungarian borders, they must be treated as human beings"[39]*. With these statements we note that Germany's position remains positive from the perspective of solidarity and asylum to refugees, although it has established transit centers on the Austrian border from which migrants are returned, in a more efficient way to the States where they have applied for refugee status.

In contradiction to Germany's position, presented by Angela Merkel's speech, is the anti-migration stance shared by Hungary's leader Viktor Orban, who States that "*her country's position has remained unchanged since 2015*"[40] and has been known since then to vehemently reject the action of imposing mandatory quotas of refugees. A first element of populist discourse identified in his argument is the critical conception of migrants, calling them "*a threat to national sovereignty*".

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[38] Angela Merkel, "New year's speech," dated Dec 31, 2019, https://www.dw.com/ro/mesajul-de-anul-nou-al-cancelarei-angela-merkel/a-51846104, accessed 11.05.2021.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] *Ibid.*

Viktor Orban uses a strong populist rhetoric criticizing the EU's binding relocation policy proposals, clearly rejecting the European principle of multiculturalism by stating: "*In Hungary, we are very strict, we would not like to have a parallel society or a culturally open and mixed society*"[41].

In his speeches he uses a strategy in his argument, by which he appeals to religion, to persuade the people, the majority of States in Eastern and Central Europe attach great importance *to religion by saying that "a society of Muslims and Christians cannot ensure peace, security and a good life for the people".* Through them, Viktor Orban presents the image of migrants in the form of a threat to European Christian civilization and values[42].

In this respect, through his populist speeches addressing a position of rejection of migrants, Prime Minister Viktor Orban, in fact, shows a fierce desire to make known his point of view and his own visions about the future of the European Union, criticizing almost every occasion the initiatives and actions adopted by the European Commission.

Romania's position, in the context of the debates on migration, was stated both by the statements of Romania's President Klaus Iohannis and by the speeches presented by Viorica Dăncilă, Romania's Prime Minister, in 2019, underscored the need to identify common solutions to manage extra-Community migration and ensure the security of external borders. In this regard, the Romanian Prime Minister stated that it is *"necessary to contribute to the formulation of solutions based on a comprehensive approach both in the Union's action at internal level and in promoting cooperation with the States of origin and transit"*[43] by intensifying the dialog between the Member States. In the light of official speeches, Romania

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[41] *Hungary's Orban rejects criticism over rule of law, says he is a 'freedom fighter'*, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-interview-idUSKCN26G26Q, accessed 11.05.2021.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] Viorica Dăncilă, "Speech at the plenary meeting of the European Economic and Social Committee", https://www.romania2019.eu/2019/01/24/discursul-prim-ministrului-romaniei-viorica-dancila-in-cadrul-reuniunii-plenare-a-comitetului-economic-si-social-european/, accessed 11.05.2021.

approaches a positive discourse on migration, consolidating and supporting the European position and agenda for migration, continuing to be an important player in the promotion and implementation of European policies.

Conclusions

Through the speeches, presented by the leaders of the European States Germany, Hungary and Romania, we have identified that migration from Europe together with the policies implemented by the European Union have favored two different types of speeches based on a pro- and con-type argument.

Following the content analysis presented in this Article, we have identified that the speeches that were the subject of our study are part of the category of argumentative discourses, because they are built in a way their purpose is to persuade the auditor to change his or her positive perception, negative on the issue of migration from the European Union.

In this regard, the first type of speech, belonging to the leaders of the European institutions and the leaders of Germany and Romania, addresses and presents the topic of migration from a positive perspective, placing them in the category of European discourse, of consolidating and supporting the actions of the European Union, by promoting the principles of solidarity, fair sharing of responsibilities and ensuring the protection of citizens.

The second type of speech identified, which is in total contradiction with the typical European one, is the populist discourse, stated by Hungary's representative Viktor Orban and which deals with migration from a negative perspective in the form of a threat to national values. We believe that his speech fits into the patterns of populist discourse because it promotes negative rhetoric against migrants, rejects and criticizes the principle of multiculturalism by invoking the religious

element and takes an anti-European stance on EU migration policies, it does not fully promote national priorities.

Given the complexity of using a mixed methodology, the emergence of boundaries is inevitable. The limits are highlighted by the lack of a qualitative analysis of speech, by analyzing the frequencies of a concept, by the period analyzed, which is quite short and does not contain many speeches. In accordance with the limits identified, I propose to expand my research on a type of speech identified by my study, through a critical analysis of Viktor Orban's populist discourse.

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MIGRATION FROM AFGHANISTAN: HUMANITARIAN CRISES VERSUS SECURITY THREATS FOR EUROPEAN UNION

Adrian MOCAN[1]

Abstract. The paper aims to make an assessment of the measures taken by European Union in the field of migration policies after the wave of terrorist attacks launched in 2015 in Europe, as well as the capabilities of Member States to absorb the impact of another massive migration, similar to that from Syria, which greatly affected the quality and safety of European citizens.

The takeover of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban Movement, since August 2021, has generated numerous reactions at the international level. Excluding those of terrorist organizations, which have openly expressed their euphoria, the international community is concerned about the fragility of the security environment in the region.

In this context, European Union is concerned about the evolution of the security situation in Afghanistan, with the aim of preventing a possible transfer of security risks, keeping in mind the recent migration shock suffered by the massive wave of Syrian migrants, which put high pressure on Member States.

After this experience has Europe integrated the lessons learned from migrant crisis form 2015? Could be Afghanistan a surprise in this matter? Can European Union and NATO prevent a migrant crisis from Afghanistan? By evaluating official documents regarding the evolution of security risks generated at EU level by the phenomenon of migration, I want to assess possible scenarios, having in mind the need for a coherent cooperation between intelligence agencies and government, in order to achieve resilience when facing extremism and radicalization.

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[1] PhD student, University Babeș-Bolyai, Faculty of History, Romania, adi21mocan@yahoo.com.

Keywords: migrant crisis, security, humanitarian crisis, terrorist organizations.

International security environment

By September 11, Europe had shared Francis Fukuyama's optimistic view that the world would enter the sign of "democratic liberalism"[2] with the end of the Cold War, and would experience the perpetual peace envisioned by Immanuel Kant. Subsequently, with the initiation of the Total War on Terrorism by the United States, it was convinced that it was on the right track, if not at least eliminating the risk of terrorism in Europe. However, the Arab Spring has helped fuel the insecurity of Western countries, with a peak in 2015, as the effects of the Syrian civil war escalate, generating a massive wave of migrants and the opening of a new cycle of terrorist attacks against European citizens. This recent wave of terrorist attacks launched in 2015 in Europe urges us to consider the pessimistic scenario assumed by Samuel P. Huntington regarding the inevitable "clash of civilizations"[3].

From a balanced perspective, of course, these predictions represent the extremes, and reality will shape another factual situation, in direct relation to the complexity of today's world.

Currently, the international security environment is characterized by areas of insecurity that generate the reorientation of the citizens of those states to areas / regions / countries considered safe.

The main states generating insecurity are: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and the Maghreb states, states that constantly feed migration flows with citizens who start looking for a safer life.

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[2] Francis Fukuyama, *„Sfârşitul istoriei şi ultimul om"*, Bucureşti: Paideia, 1997.
[3] Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash Of Civilizations*, Bucureşti: Antet 1996.

The whole phenomenon of migration transforms relations between states and leads to negotiations (Turkey / 2016 EU Agreement, which evolves and is frequently reviewed and re-evaluated) or blackmail / provocative pressures of other states in relation to the European Union (Belarus).

In general, migrants have two motivations underlying the decision to apply for refugee status: the situation of insecurity or the lack of economic prospects in the country of origin.

To get to Europe, migrants use a legal way (legal migration) and illegal means (fraudulent crossings, clandestine travel for which they resort to organized crime groups/illegal migration).

The phenomenon of immigration is not a new topic of reflection in Europe. Immigration is a reality of the twentieth century, when, after the Second World War, for many Western countries it was a necessity, in terms of labor: Germany brought Turks, France Maghreb. A little later, with the collapse of the European colonial empires, an important community of Pakistanis and Indians settled in England, and Algerians in France.

The unification of Europe after the fall of communism was an unprecedented historical achievement, which led to the initiation of waves of migration within the EU.

Relevant analysis shows that the EU has a considerable labor shortage, which it wants to fill by attracting new employees. Countries with a high birth rate seem to be a handy solution, but the reality is a bit more complicated when immigrants fail to integrate.

This opening up of Europe to cover the labor shortage with immigrants willing to take up these jobs has come with other complications: cultural, social, religious, which have created friction and smoldering or direct conflict. Obviously, Europe is changing, ethnic diversity is also changing under the influence of migration in recent years.

In fact, many Europeans share Douglas Murray's pessimistic view of "Europe's Strange Suicide," that Europe is in an inevitable decline[4], driven by a policy of openness to immigrants, mostly Muslims.

As a support of this perspective official data showed that by 2020 in the EU almost 37 million (8%) people were not born in Europe, and 23 (5.1%) million were not EU citizens[5].

Organized crime groups quickly felt the opportunity in the "market", which is why they were oriented and actively involved in illegal migration activities, which facilitate the access to the national and EU territory of aliens from terrorist areas, some with an extremist-terrorist historical past.

Europol estimated that a large proportion of the more than 1.2 million migrants who entered Europe in 2015 benefited from the support of people who smuggle migrants illegally[6].

But the aftermath of the "Syrian migrants" crisis shows us that a simple mathematical calculation is not necessarily the solution to the socio-economic (labor-migrant) equation that the EU tried to solve in 2015 – by inviting migrants to Germany in particular – because with the establishment of migrants in the EU, other variables (security: increase in crime rate, terrorist attacks) appeared, not initially anticipated.

Simultaneously with this crisis, Europe went through a difficult year of terror in 2015, when hundreds of people were killed in a series of jihadist-inspired attacks by extremist Muslims.

The year 2015 began with terrorist attacks in Paris and so it came to an end.

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[4] Douglas Murray; , *Europe's Strange Suicide,",* București: Corint, 2019.

[5] On-line: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_ro#situaia-imigranilor-n-societatea-european-n-cifre, accessed 20.08.2021.

[6] Napoleoni, Loretta; *Negustorii de oameni: refugiați, răpiri și afaceri de miliarde,* București: Corint, 2016.

In January, the target was the editorial office of the satirical publication Charlie Hebdo and a Jewish shop, after the attack 17 people were killed.

In November, Islamist terrorists killed 130 people in central Paris and near the Stade de France.

There have been other smaller-scale attacks in France than in Paris. In April, an assassin shot dead a woman while trying to rob a Christian church.

In June, an attack on a gas plant near Lyon failed at the last minute. However, a man was beheaded there by terrorists close to the Islamic State.

In August, an attacker was immobilized by brave passengers on a high-speed train before he could open fire. And on November 18, a Jew was stabbed in the street.

In Denmark, an attack on a cultural center and a synagogue in February resulted in the deaths of two people.

Terrorist attacks have also been carried out in Berlin and London.

Victims of attacks carried out by radical Islamists have also been registered in countries close to Europe: Turkey and Russia. Hundreds of people have been killed in attacks on Ankara and Suruc, as well as the crash of a passenger plane in the Sinai Peninsula.

As a result, an association between the access of immigrants and the increase in terrorist attacks in Europe has been made in the collective memory of European citizens. The immediate reality has shown us that migrants from areas with active terrorist issues can pose security risks to the EU, some of them have fought / activated in terrorist groups and seek to reach Western countries to act violently.

Migrant crisis 2015

In 2015 Muslim migration from the Middle East and Northern Africa countries made Europe the first battlefield, with multiple social,

political and humanitarian implications. The International Organization for Migration estimated that in 2015 more than 1.2 million migrants got to Europe, the majority being from Syria and South Asia[7]. Thus, thinking about the events, the civil conflict in Syria created one of the greatest humanitarian crisis in history. According to UNHCR, 3.3 million people were Syria refugees and almost 7 million citizens were moved all along the country[8].

Many countries reacted to the tens of thousands of people passing through them by closing their borders to neighboring countries. While intended to regain some measure of control, these measures often contributed to chaos as huge numbers of people repeatedly became trapped in one country or were shunted back and forth to another.

The migrants' wave that Europe encountered affected the structure and the characteristics of Western societies, mostly social and cultural processes and patterns. As people migrate, their cultural ideas and features spread along with them, creating new cultural environments and modifying the existing ones.

For the Europeans, Muslim migration is a big challenge. A lot of nations in Europe are built around a single ethnicity population. Moreover, these states have historical, religious, cultural and linguistic traditions. Settling in these areas, the hundred thousand or million migrants, who look and behave differently, will challenge an integration process. This issue gave birth to a lot of questions and speculations. Are these people ready to accept the European lifestyle, the culture and integrate efficiently, without demanding to impose their culture and religion? Which is the solution to integrate Islamic civilization in the Judeo-Christian matrix characterized by civil liberties and pluralism?

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[7] On-line: http://www.iom.int/news/iom-releases-global-migration-trends-2015-factsheet, accessed 21.09.2021.

[8] On-line: http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/ro/despre-noi.html, accessed 17.09.2021.

Even before 2015 it was not unusual to encounter, in European cities, women wearing burka and men with their heads covered and wearing beards. Yet, within a couple of decades, neighborhoods from London, Rotterdam and Paris suffered unconceived changes. After they witnessed centuries of European history, now, these cities know a transformation with regard to cultural and architectural habits specific to people from other places in the world. This is the `new Europe` within which a Muslim minority, a fast growing one, speaks for its presence inside the society which, not until far ago, was considered homogenous.

Unfortunately, Islam institutionalization represented a phenomenon in progress in Europe and Muslims here identify with the Muslim world they came from, rather than the European nations where they moved and live today[9].

Europe promoted multiculturalism towards solving the problem of Muslim minority, inside which individuals are free to conserve their cultural and religious identity as long as they do not affect the others. Moreover, some `multicultural` rights (practicing your own religion, reuniting the family, association on religious basis) are individual rights taken as reference for liberal societies.

Multiculturalism doctrine is part of the big European tradition and the Western civilization. But multiculturalism becomes dangerous for each and every culture when it presents an idealized version of this cultures that is invented and not inherited[10].

Currently, in Europe, multiculturalism is considered through political and rhetorical lenses. Whereas the European integrations policies' objectives reflected in the minority economic and educational failures, the rhetoric approach against multiculturalism is reflected in the growth of Islamist and fundamentalist extremism[11].

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[9] Timothy M Savage, *Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,* The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004.

[10] Bernard Lewis, *Culturi în conflict*, Bucureşti: Integral, 2002.

[11] *** *Europe Backs Away From Multiculturalism*, Oxford Analytica.

The construction `all the cultures are equal` represents the essence of multiculturalism. In practice, this means that Europe has to be open to `subordinating` the Western culture, in order to display respect towards other cultures with which they interact.

Stanley Fish affirms that we encounter a `multiculturalism boutique` that respects other cultures more than our own and also a `strong multiculturalism` that is imperative in front of an intolerant culture towards the promotion of fundamental democratic values. According to him, no matter how liberal somebody wants to be, the ones that promote assassinations or religious decrees (fatwa) are hard to be accepted[12].

Francis Fukuyama considers Europe had to take into consideration the necessity of integrating Muslim minorities decades ago, before the `wings of fundamentalism opened`[13].

Also, Tom Hundley, says that `Europe, with a population of migrants growing day by day and offering them limited opportunities of social integration, becomes a factory of transforming frustrated individuals into fundamentalists or terrorists`[14].

Initiatives to transform cities in England into independent Islamic states by "Muslims against the Crusaders", the emergence in France of "zones urbaines sensibles", in the Netherlands of lists of forbidden areas, and the emergence in Sweden (with the most generous law of immigration in Europe) of the non-Muslim forbidden areas, the increase in the crime rate in Italy in direct relation to the increase in the number of immigrants European public opinion reacted by expressing concern about the possibility of increasing extremism in Europe.

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[12] Stanley Fish, *Professional correctness*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

[13] Francis Fukuyama, *Europe vs. Radical Islam. Alarmist Americans have mostly bad advice for Europeans*, February 27, 2006, www.slate.com.

[14] Tom Hundley, Anti-*Semitism Debate Swirls Across Europe: Muslim alienation seen as 'new' worry*, The Chicago Tribune, January 4, 2004.

As a result, in European states, like France, Austria, Italy, Denmark, Great Britain and Netherlands, the idea of Muslims not managing to integrate is largely spread and the right-wing parties speculate the tendency of the local population of marginalizing the Muslim community using it as a basis of their political platforms.

The degree of acceptance towards refugees decreased after it became known that one of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks in November 2015 was an asylum seeker with a Syrian passport.

The Visegrád Group states were most vehement against the refugee quotas, the distribution of refugees between the Member States of the European Union, as proposed by Germany, Austria and Sweden.

Changes made by Europe after the crisis and attacks

In initial and immediate response to the unprecedented levels of migration flows to Europe in 2015, the European Commission adopted a 10-point action plan in April 2015, also supported by the Council and the European Parliament (EP). As the measures included in the plan proved insufficient, the Commission adopted the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015, offering concrete immediate and long-term measures to establish a EU asylum policy, save lives and secure external borders, to discourage illegal migration, to provide more legal avenues for asylum seekers and to ensure cooperation with third countries.

Parliament adopted a number of own-initiative resolutions on migration, in particular the Resolution of 12 April 2016[15] on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a comprehensive EU approach to migration and the Resolution of 5 April 2017 on addressing the movement of refugees and migrants: the role EU external action. These

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[15] On-line: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016IP0102, accessed 30.07.2021.

resolutions evaluate the various policies applied and develop a set of recommendations.

Initially, only a few countries – due to their geographical location – were held responsible for almost all asylum applications submitted in the EU. In order to make this legal framework more efficient, harmonized, fairer and more resilient to future migratory pressures, the Commission initiated its reform in May and July 2016.

To this end, the Commission has introduced two packages of proposals, covering the equitable distribution of asylum applications between Member States and establishing a common set of rules at EU level to simplify and shorten the asylum procedure, ensure uniform standards of protection and recognition of asylum. the rights of beneficiaries of international protection, further harmonization of reception conditions in the EU, discouraging secondary travel and improving the prospects for integration.

In practice, however, it has been observed that the reform of the system is not progressing due to the contradictory attitudes of public opinion and the difficulties of balancing solidarity and responsibility between the different EU countries.

The EU has focused on making better use of the opportunities offered by information systems and technologies, such as strengthening external border controls and creating a system for recording the entry and exit of third-country nationals. One of the biggest achievements was the establishment of the European Agency for Border Police and Coast Guard (Frontex) in September 2016, which took place in record time[16]. The Agency provides increased support to Member States in the field of migration management, the fight against cross-border crime and search and rescue operations.

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[16] On-line: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R1624, accessed 19.08.2021.

To reduce illegal migration and increase returns in addressing the challenges of migration along different routes, the EU has focused on ensuring presence at sea, saving lives and dismantling trafficking networks and illegal smuggling. In order to prevent the loss of human lives, especially in the Mediterranean Sea, and to combat the human trafficking networks and guides involved, the EU has set up a number of naval operations, such as EU NAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA.

In response to low return rates, the EU has also focused on improving its capabilities through the renewed return action plan and cooperation with EPRS | European Parliament Research Service, European Border Police and Coast Guard Agency, as well as on the conclusion of readmission agreements or practical arrangements with countries of origin and transit in Africa and Asia.

Several directives on legal migration were adopted in 2016 (Directive (EU) 2016/801). With its adoption, the package of legal migration measures proposed by the previous European Commission was finalized, a package that included a directive on third-country nationals transferred within the same company (Directive 2014/66 / EU) and a directive on seasonal workers (Directive 2014/36 / EU) In June 2016, the Commission proposed a new package on legal migration, which includes an action plan on the integration of nationals In September 2016, the Commission launched a review of the adequacy of legal migration in order to assess the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and added value at EU level of several EU legal migration instruments. those mentioned above, the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86 / EC), the Long-Term Residents Directive (2003/109 / EC).

Noting that migrants suffering from serious human rights violations in their countries of origin, the European Parliament emphasized its concern and solidarity with the large number of refugees in its resolution of 5 April 2017[17].

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[17] On-line: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/migration-timeline/, accessed 07.09.2021.

The EU has called for personalized and long-term partnerships with neighboring countries, as well as with other countries of transit and origin. The impact of migration flow on the political dimension and, in particular, on the relationship between development and security was analyzed in the EU's overall strategy on foreign and security policy, presented in June 2016. The strategy established the concept of "principled pragmatism", emphasizing approaches adapted to individual countries.

Intelligence services in crisis management

In general, the intelligence services have the role of ensuring the state of security of the states and aim at fulfilling the functions of knowledge, prevention and counteracting the internal and external threats to the constitutional values. The state of security is quantified by revealing the level of protection of the determining values of a state. Practice shows us that, despite the sustained efforts, there is no state of total / absolute security, which would imply the absence of any threats or risks. The state of "normality" of a society is that of "partial insecurity", which depending on the evolution of some factors in a continuous change can be framed at a certain level of intensity. In the knowledge activity, the services draw up diagnoses, analyzes and evaluations regarding the state of normality and the state of abnormality, with "consecutive passage through the phases of pre-crisis, crisis and conflict"[18]. Based on these analyzes, warnings are formulated addressed to decision makers / governments on the possibilities of materializing the forms of aggression. In the context of a security environment in perpetual dynamics influenced by migration risk, the role of intelligence services is major in ensuring the security of citizens. They must contribute to the early warning of governments about the emerging risks that may arise from the phenomenon of wonder. The intelligence services assume the

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[18] Adrian Ardusătan, *Intelligence şi decizia politică,* Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2012.

responsibility to provide key perspectives on the phenomenon of migration and to assess the possibilities for the long-term evolution of this risk in relation to the security status of European states. The issue of migration is constantly addressed in the assessments of intelligence services in order to continuously adapt government responses to the risks induced by this phenomenon.

It is obvious that the dynamics and complexity of the global security environment, the reduction of deadlines for issuing geopolitical / geostrategic predictions or reconfigurations have contributed to the transformation of "early warning" into a comprehensive process, which involves more than monitoring known factors using predefined indicators. , respectively the focus on identifying the weak signals / "week signals" of the most often unknown risks and threats.

Most of the time the intelligence services manage to make relevant and useful assessments, other times they fail to ensure the role of "early warning" when we face a new crisis or a totally unanticipated evolution such as "black swans". Eloquent in this regard is the failure of intelligence services in anticipating the terrorist attacks in the US on 11.09.2001, which could not anticipate the patience, audacity, determination and dedication of Al Qaeda members in order to carry out the attacks. Subsequently, the evaluation of the aspects that allowed these events to happen without being noticed by the intelligence agencies, generated extensive debates materialized in decisions to transform the services based on the lessons learned. The investigations on 9/11 attacks concluded, referring to the broad system of intelligence agencies that "the system had all the red lights on,"[19] but the architecture and operation they did not ensure their efficiency. Prior to the events of 11.09.2001, the intelligence agencies had different indications of the possibility of committing an attack in the USA, but the functioning of government agencies did not allow their timely integration for countermeasures.

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[19] "The final report of the American Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001," București: ALLFA, 2006.

These events immediately led to the reform of services and the change of the need to know paradigm with the need to share paradigm, realizing that better cooperation within the intelligence community is essential in ensuring a better response to security risks.

The new paradigm that emphasizes cooperation has also been adopted by European intelligence services, as a form of recognition of strategic and operational advantages in ensuring the security of citizens, being established new forms of cooperation as Counter Terrorism Group (CTG).

CTG was founded after the September 11 attacks to combat the threat of international terrorism. It is an off-shoot of the Club of Berne, an intelligence-sharing initiative that started in 1971 and is composed of the heads of security and intelligence agencies in the European Union. However, while the Club of Berne focuses on a wide variety of intelligence functions, including counterintelligence and counterespionage, the CTG was created to focus exclusively on terrorism, specifically jihadi terrorism. When it was created, the CTG did not have a permanent office or a formal status. In 2016, in response to the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the CTG established a permanent office at the Hague under the Dutch presidency and started to take a more active role in counter-terrorism. Before that, the CTG had only consulted with the EU on a case-by-case basis.

Due to the importance of intelligence-sharing in the current climate UK does not plan to leave the CTG after Brexit, according to the head of MI5, realizing the benefits of cooperation.

However, limitations on the efficiency of the new work format were also noted, such as the informal nature of the organization that has been criticized by scholars who say it prevents the CTG from being effective at combating terrorism, and that the existence of the group itself prevents Europol from being effective[20].

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[20] COOLSAET, RIK (2010). "EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera?". *International Affairs*. **86** (4): 857–873. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00916.x. hdl:1854/LU-1008449. ISSN 0020-5850. JSTOR 40864999.

In direct connection with the 2015 terrorist attacks, Europol, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, established in 2016 the European Center on the Illegal Introduction of Migrants, designed to proactively support EU Member States in their efforts to dismantle the criminal networks involved in organized activities of illegal introduction of migrants. As it has no executive powers (it cannot arrest criminals), Europol assists Member States mainly through its function as a platform for the exchange of information on criminal activities and by providing coordination and operational and strategic support for Member States' criminal investigations.

Law enforcement authorities in the Member States and third parties have actively provided information to Europol, although the level of involvement has varied from one partner to another. The exchange of information has continuously increased since 2016. Despite this positive trend, problems were found in launching bilateral negotiations to conclude international agreements with priority third countries and Europol's inability to collect and analyze information directly from private parties undermined the completeness of the information obtained by the agency.

The same limitations were found in an assessment by the European Court of Auditors, which considers that Europol has limited efficiency, stating that "as a European criminal intelligence platform, Europol must have access to all relevant databases. However, not all relevant external data sources are currently available for use by Europol or the Agency does not use them sufficiently[21].

Each European state has realized the danger posed by the rise of security risks induced by sympathizers / members or Islamist jihadist groups that threatened to act in Europe, but also the violent reactions of right/ left wing extremist groups and initiated measures to amend

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[21] Online: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_19/SR_migrant_smuggling_ RO.pdf, accessed 09.09.2021.

legislation in the field of terrorism, to create new and effective tools to counter trends.

Romania, like other EU countries, in response to the increased risks posed by terrorism, amended Law 535/2004 in April 2019, introducing new responsibilities and prerogatives in the field of combating the phenomenon.

The security situation in Afghanistan

Recent developments in Afghanistan, resulting in the ultra-rapid overthrow of the A. Ghani government by the Taliban Movement (TM), have taken everyone by surprise, including the region's top intelligence services. Official studies did not foresee even in the darkest scenarios such an accelerated establishment of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan by TM.

The report focuses on the process of establishing a just and lasting peace through coherent and convergent efforts of international actors. The report noted the important progress made in the last two decades in civil society, rights and social developments. It is noteworthy that during this time the Taliban's views have changed very little, with the fact that at the end of 2020 there was an alarming increase in targeted killings of government members, journalists, elders of different tribes, society activists. civil, teachers. "A systematic massacre of the educated and independent voices with long-term implications for Afghanistan and no end in sight," said Shaharzad Akbar, head of the commission for assessing progress in civil society[22].

The intervention of the International Coalition in Afghanistan was seen from the beginning as an occupation force frequently challenged by the Taliban, who predicted the takeover of Afghanistan using the saying

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[22] United States Institute of Peace -*Afghanistan Study Group Final Report*, printed in February 2021 by the /www. usip.org.

"You have the watches, but we have the time." Referring to the fact that history has often seen a better-equipped, high-tec armed force defeated in the long term by a force employing guerrilla warfare and prepared to play the long game, the talibans proved to be right.

AL QAIDA (AQ) remains at the forefront of international Islamist-jihadist terrorism, continuing to be a global threat vector alongside DAESH. AQ is faithful to the goal of establishing a transnational Islamic caliphate, through violent methods directed against governments that oppose this desideratum (kufr). The two terrorist entities continue to build plans and operations targeting the West.

AQ continues to be present in many parts of Afghanistan, from where it supports the inspirational propaganda of the attacks in Western countries, showing interest in rewarding acts of terrorism through difficult-to-follow payment instruments. In the magazine "Wolves of Manhattan" included such "prizes" in crypto currencies for those who will carry out attacks in these countries.

In the current configuration, AQ seems more dangerous than DAESH by trying to redefine itself as a "global network" of affiliates. Identifying the global network is an ongoing concern for intelligence services, but the exact situation remains an unknown / intelligence gap.

As a consequence the humanitarian situation inside Afghanistan deteriorated in 2021 with significant consequences for the most vulnerable among the population. Some 3.5 million people are currently displaced by conflict. UNHCR is responding to this emergency. In Iran and Pakistan, which are neighbors of Afghanistan, there are also 2 million registered Afghan refugees. The majority of these refugees fled Afghanistan over the years, including from as early as 1979. A further 5.3 million refugees returned to Afghanistan in phases since 2002, but this trends has been declining in recent times. In August 2021, UNHCR has also released a non-return advisory for Afghanistan, calling for a halt on

forced returns of Afghan nationals, including asylum seekers who have had their claims rejected[23].

The fact that the Taliban Movement is not homogeneous, with about 3-4000 terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan (some with weak ties to the Taliban Movement, others independent) and the lack of representation of the government in Kabul for Afghan political and ethnic groups creates premises for the worst case scenario of the disintegration of Afghanistan. Such a situation will have negative security effects, including a massive wave of emigration to the west.

However, since NATO withdrawal, no major migration flows have been recorded from Afghanistan, with the border being closed mostly by the Taliban Movement, with the only crossings allowed being of economic and social interest.

Europe's reaction to the situation in Afghanistan

It is clear and unanimously accepted by the governments of the Member States that the EU does not want to repeat the migrant crisis of 2015, which caught Europe on the wrong foot, unprepared and divided /, while the scandal over refugee camps in Greece fueled the formations extremists. Decision confirmed by the interior ministers of the EU Member States who adopted a joint declaration pledging to prevent a wave of uncontrolled migration from Afghanistan. In the statement, ministers pledged to deter and block possible threats to the security of European citizens from Afghanistan and to step up controls for those evacuated from Afghanistan.

"Based on the lessons we have learned, the European Union and its Member States are determined to work together to prevent new, large-scale uncontrolled migration movements similar to those they have faced

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[23] Afghanistan source UNHCR https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations#.

in the past, and to prepare a common coordinated and coherent reaction", is mentioned in the statement[24].

As a precaution, the EU has prepared new aid for Afghanistan and the countries in the region, despite all the implementation difficulties identified once the Taliban took control of the country.

The authorities stated their readiness to ensure a coordinated and orderly response:

–   in the future, it is hoped to adopt tools to avoid incentives for illegal migration;
–   in order to achieve the EU's objectives, it is essential to adopt a unified and coordinated communication, both externally and internally,
–   launching specific information campaigns to combat the rhetoric used by traffickers, including in the online environment, which encourages people to embark on dangerous and illegal journeys to Europe.

The concern of European officials is generated by the security situation in Afghanistan, which is characterized by relative stability after the Taliban movement took power on 15.08.2021. It is estimated that the deterioration of the security environment in Afghanistan has the potential to generate:

–   huge and complex humanitarian crisis[25] leading to new waves of refugees, including in the EU (using even Romania as a transit country);
–   the resurgence of the terrorist phenomenon, through the increase of the phenomena of Islamic radicalization and of the recruitment activities carried out by the terrorist organizations.

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[24] Statement by EU Home Affairs Ministers on the situation in Afghanistan September 2021 (meeting nr. 3811 Bruxelles 31 august 2021 13:00).

[25] On-line: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/press/press-releases/2021/08/17/afghanistan-declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union/, accessed 11.10.2021.

Cooperation or individualism in Europe

However, a number of misunderstandings persist at EU level on how to manage the effects of the security crisis in Afghanistan, with a focus on migration issues, in the context of major risks to the European space. The intensification of divergences creates the premises for blockages in obtaining consensus and advancing the implementation of some common pragmatic solutions on this issue.

The EU's common positions are expressed in several areas: the Schengen area – an urgent concern with a long-term impact, the European migration agenda, the financial resources available for 2014-2020 and the integration of refugees into the labor market.

The dynamics of migration in an increasingly interconnected world is a phenomenon that will last, imposing the need to establish a set of basic measures, as well as a coherent and unitary common policy on migration, asylum and social integration. The established policies must ensure the transposition of programmatic documents developed at European level in order to find solutions to the problem of migration, as well as to fulfill the international obligations assumed, in accordance with the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility.

An objective of the strategy is to promote the development of legal migration channels and to raise awareness of the benefits of controlled migration for Europe, with a role in covering the labor shortage.

The position established at European level and to which Romania also aligns is to combat illegal migration, forms of exploitation of migrants, trafficking in human beings, as well as to secure Europe's external borders.

In spite of that, Austria, along with other countries, is strongly nationalist, rejecting[26] any initiative to receive new Afghan refugees, as it already hosts the largest Afghan community in terms of population. The

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[26] On-line: https://www.dw.com/ro/ue-coali%C5%A3ia-anti-migra%C5%A3ie-cre%C5%9Fte/a-45290785, accessed 13.05.2021.

speech of the Viennese authorities follows a message line, translating anti-migration rhetoric into all forms of international cooperation. The Afghan community is made up mostly of young men, a major source of risk to public order (drug trafficking, theft, violence, migrant trafficking) and at the level of national security (terrorism).

Danish migration policy is shown to be more balanced through the voice of the Danish Minister for Immigration and Integration, who advocates for:

– Providing substantial humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and the states in the region
– Improving the management of external borders
– Developing a communication system that reduces Europe's attractiveness for migrants.

The Copenhagen government will continue to pursue the outsourcing of the asylum process, by setting up reception centers located outside Europe, where asylum applications can be processed. In the event of a favorable response, asylum seekers will remain in the territory of that State.

In order to ensure the integration of immigrants and refugees, the Danish government proposes a change in the way social benefits are provided in proportion to their participation in Danish society.

The anti-migration coalition is growing and the aim of this policy, shared by EU states, is to avoid a migration crisis similar to the one in 2015.

Migration is still a problem for the Romanian authorities, an aspect revealed both by the statistics registered at European level and by those established at national level, context in which a National Strategy on Immigration for the period 2019 – 2022, was recently elaborated.

In 2021 the migrant flow in Lithuania separates Europe into two blocs in the context in which twelve member states have urged the European Union to pay for countries to build walls to secure external

borders and prevent illegal migration, in a letter sent in October to the bloc's executive arm. Romania is the only exception in the region while ministers from nations including Austria, Greece, Hungary and Poland describe "a physical barrier"[27] as "an effective border measure that serves the interest of the whole EU, not just member states of first arrival".

This legitimate measure should be additionally and adequately funded from the EU budget as a matter of priority," says the letter sent to Margaritis Schinas, vice president of the European Commission, and Ylva Johansson, commissioner for home affairs.

Lithuania, one of the signatories of the letter, has already decided to build a 508-kilometer (316 miles) long fence on its border with Belarus to stop an unprecedented wave of migrants pouring into the EU's east. Neighboring Latvia, which also signed the letter, has dusted off a similar plan to build a 134 kilometer-long barbed wire fence on its border with Belarus.

Additional pressures hampering the EU mission

Despite the restrictions imposed by the pandemic and the losses suffered in conflict areas (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan), Daesh and AQ maintain their status as poles of the international and European terrorist phenomenon, respectively as driving forces of radicalization processes, continuing to inspire single actors to carry out attacks on the EU population.

The economic problems caused by the pandemic, the frustrations of immigrants and minority communities (lack of opportunities, integration difficulties, marginalization, difficult access to medical services) and the attraction of other ideologies that promote violence accentuate the tendencies of radicalization at European level.

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[27] On-line: https://europunkt.ro/2021/08/23/fortareata-europa-grecia-lituania-si-polonia-ridica-ziduri-impotriva-migrantilor/, accessed 10.10.2021.

Issues that hinder a united and effective European action against Islamic extremism:

The adoption of inappropriate measures by the governments of the pandemic threats was exploited by extremist groups, which, by intensifying the narrative of reduced government capacity, intended to increase the profile and support of the activities carried out:

- Islamophobia; terrorist organizations have turned the subject into the leitmotif of propaganda activity, becoming tools in the proliferation of radicalization, European citizens and the justification of violent actions;
- the marginalization or social exclusion of people from regions with active terrorist issues, is exploited by terrorist groups and plays an important role in the radicalization of individuals and involvement in terrorist activities;
- the inefficiency of de-radicalization programs and social reintegration is a major problem. Lately, most terrorist attacks have been carried out by people in charge of intelligence services for terrorist-related activities;
- the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan has created a power vacuum exploited by the Taliban Movement.

The prospects of strengthening the Taliban government in Afghanistan favor the increase in the number of Afghan citizens who intend to emigrate and implicitly the number of people with a radical profile and combat experience in the EU.

The migration flow generated by the security status in Afghanistan will create favorable conditions for sending foreign fighters to the region, in order to carry out violent / terrorist actions.

The decision of some Balkan states (Albania, Kosovo, and Northern Macedonia) to allow the presence of Afghan refugees on national territory contributes to heightening fears of increasing the number of migrants to EU states.

Also, Russia is putting pressure on Europe, exploiting the refugee situation in propaganda campaigns that have as its narrative, the inability of the EU and NATO to maintain the security of Afghanistan and to manage the humanitarian problems generated by the security crisis in this state.

However, Russia has shown its willingness to cooperate with the EU on issues triggered by the Afghan crisis. In a discussion between Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, and Charles Michel, President of the European Council: "The region must be prepared for any future developments"[28]. Russia will not tolerate a migration flow from Afghanistan to Central Asia, which reassures Europe, at least for the time being, that a route through the northeast of the continent will not be activated.

Conclusions

The EU tends to opt for a strategy to avoid surprises in managing security risks, including those induced by migration.

Decision-making in the current dynamic and rapidly evolving environment becomes a challenge, especially from the strategic point of view. In this paradigm many intelligence professionals or academics argue that the decision making process becomes increasingly dependent on strategic analysis, a process that underlines the relevance of the complexity of factors or actors that can shape a process or even a phenomenon and encourage the identification of medium or long / term outcomes of processes, as well as their impact at local, regional or global level.

In this context it is difficult to make accurate predictions about future developments, but assuming possible scenarios is likely to give us

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[28] On-line: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/press/press-releases/2021/06/07/readout-of-the-telephone-conversation-between-president-charles-michel-and-russian-president-vladimir-putin/, accessed 12.09.2021.

the conviction that at least to some extent, the future is controllable by decisions taken by EU states jointly or individually, in present. However some possible scenarios for the evolution of the security situation in Europe in line with the phenomenon of migration could be:

1. States will be able to control migration in Europe by implementing assistance plans with or around their countries of origin, assuming a more substantial financial contribution and closer monitoring of refugee flows, while ensuring controlled access. of refugees in Europe. In this scenario, the EU manages to optimally manage future migration flows, including by integrating them into Western society.

2. Migrants will continue to access the European space in cyclical waves, which will also directly influence regional security risks. A large part will integrate into society, accepting a higher standard of living. Another part will increase crime and will be the basis for selection for future bombers in Europe.

3. The power vacuum created by the weak or failed state will continue to exist and provide the framework for instability, radicalization and the rise of terrorist organizations, which will destabilize along the borders of NATO countries and large masses of refugees to Europe leading to increased insecurity. of European citizens.

The change is perpetual, and Europe is also changing under the influence of immigrant flows, and this is to be expected. But it will change in an irreparable way from the perspective of the fundamental values currently shared?

In order to avoid the pessimistic scenario and preserve the status quo in the present management of cultural diversity, well-articulated measures are needed to increase the resilience of EU citizens in the face of radicalization and extremism.

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SOCIAL INCLUSION OF MIGRANTS – CHALLENGE TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Ioan-Adrian MOŞUŢAN[1]

Abstract. Migration has a potential risk for state security from the perspective of social inclusion. Migration is not a new phenomenon but recent events have generated new challenges.

In order to maintain the security climate is necessary for migrants to comply with the rules imposed by the host state and also is necessary to be included in social life (education, access to health care services, employment), which can be an extremely difficult process because differences of opinion, culture, education are significantly and from this point serious difficulties can appear.

Managing a large number of migrants, generally those from conflict zones in the Arab area have tested state mechanisms for security both due to the very large number of people (which also involved the increase of certain illegal acts committed by migrants) and also created real challenges for the social inclusion of these people, having direct implications for state security. Effective management of migrants is closely dependent on ensuring a climate of state security and to achieve this goal we must not only think about security police/ military perspective but we must also approach the situation in terms of social inclusion and even medical/public health security – in current epidemiological context, the management of large masses of migrants or refugees can generate considerable security risks.

Keywords: *Migrants, Social Inclusion, Challenge, Security.*

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[1] PhD student first year at Doctoral School International Relations and Security Studies within the Faculty of History and Philosophy of Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, Romania, ioan_mosutan@yahoo.com.

Introduction

Migration is not a new phenomenon, the European Union had to face with this aspect since its establishment. Economic well-being, security, health and social care services, the prospects for a decent life and development make the European Union a highly attractive destination for migrants. Confronted with migration, both Member State and European level, measures have been conceived and implemented to allow the efficient management of this phenomenon, the exchange of data between states and the integration of newcomers because migration brings, especially nowadays a series of challenges: the efficient management of large masses of people, the provision of social and medical assistance, the protection of the host state citizens but also the social integration of migrants, without seriously affecting the balance and the existing local relations.

Migration can be the result of three causes:

– on the one hand we are talking about migration caused by conflicts- in this case, immigrants arrive in host countries usually in large groups, unprepared, deprived of a minimum means of subsistence, being a humanitarian issue that requires measures immediate;

– then, there is migration due to the fact that people from certain states/geographical areas, especially developing countries, choose to move to countries where they find better opportunities for development/a much higher standard of living. In this case, migrants are motivated to find a better paid job, which offers them higher development opportunities than they had in the origin country and most of them aim to get back after a certain interval time- after they have managed to obtain a certain amount of money or a level of well-being;

– last but not least, there is a rather small category of migrants who leave their origin country not because they are fleeing the war or because economic conditions force them to do so, but as a personal choice, because they are looking for a change, a place of life more

compatible with their personality, a better career opportunities or just for personal reasons. This special category is not very numerous and can be neglected because it does not raise major issues.

Managing Migrants Efficiently

Managing a large number of migrants, generally those from conflict zones in the Arab area have tested state mechanisms for security both due to the very large number of people (which also involved the increase of certain illegal acts committed by migrants) and also created real challenges for the social inclusion of these people, with direct implications for state security. Effective management of migrants is closely dependent on ensuring a climate of state security and to achieve this goal we must not only think about security from a police/military perspective but we must also approach the situation in terms of social inclusion and even medical/public health security- in current epidemiological context, managing a large number of migrants or refugees can generate considerable security risks.

Furthermore, I do not want to go into much detail about the policies adopted at EU or state level on migration and I will not address the presentation either from the perspective of legislative packages or statistics related to migration (number of migrants, areas of provenance etcetera) but I would like to present an aspect that I consider very current: the social inclusion of migrants- challenges, particularities, vulnerabilities and implications on national security.

Ensuring the states security involves a set of measures and activities in complex areas that go beyond the military or public order institutions and involve much broader areas, including social assistance and public health. Recent events have highlighted how important this aspect of health security is and when we talk about migrants things can become very sensitive.

Social inclusion is a comprehensive and relatively new concept aimed at the access of marginalized people to opportunities and resources, which allows them to participate fully in the economic, social and cultural life of society. This approach is relevant for migrants, who are often in unacceptable situations of social marginalization, discrimination and exclusion. It is not only a matter of human rights but also of respect for the fundamental values on which the European Union is built[2].

Analyzing the main challenges that the social inclusion of migrants may involve, we identified, without claiming that we approached all the possibilities, the following scenarios/ main security risks from the perspective of social inclusion:

– *Large cultural differences- opposition to changing or law rules*

Managing a large number of people from different cultural backgrounds is not an easy task because after an individual has lived up to that point according to certain patterns- which for him represented normality, his universe, it is a real challenge (even a shock for some) to put aside everything he knew in a very short time and to adapt as he went to completely foreign situations and environments. The European Community encourages diversity, competitiveness, freedom of opinion and action, mobility- principles completely opposite to the societies from which most migrants come, whether we are talking about Eastern European countries or referring to those from conflict zones in the Arab world and the adaptation process involves significant changes for migrants.

– *Differences arising from religious belief (customs, usages, refusal of medical care or medical procedures for religious reasons or discrimination against women)*

Also, religion can be a very important factor in social inclusion especially among migrants from the Arab zone, where religious values and principles are very strong. Beyond the daily manifestations and

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2   EU Inclusive Comparative Study – Roma in Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and Spain, between social inclusion and migration, Bucharest, 2012, ISBN 978-973-0-13053-9.

rituals, religious beliefs can be in the form of manifestations that involve the refusal of certain medical procedures (refusal to undergo treatments or surgeries, refusal to receive or donate blood even if it represents major risk for health) considered normal in today's society and which, together with other factors (COVID pandemic for example) can generate situations of vulnerability, difficult to manage and which may affect not only the person themselves but the entire community.

– *Immigrants who fail to adapt to Western life (do not adapt to work or do not want to work)*

If we consider the large number of migrants from the Arab world, the principles underlying the Arab family versus the principles on which the Western family operates are completely different. Thus there are real difficulties in integrating women into work, for example, whether we are talking about the opposition of husbands – who although now living in the European community, want to maintain the traditional family, in which women's duties are very limited and do not involve activities outside the home, but in the same time for a woman who until the age of 30- 40 did not work or did not got out of his home, will be quite difficult to adapt to the new status, the new requirements and the new position in which has arrived.

– *Lack of information about people's past and lack of possibility to exchange information with the state of origin, in order to verify and discover possible violations of the law)*

When we talk about migrants from outside the EU and especially about those from countries affected by war or states on whose territory there are terrorist cells (Syria, Iraq) it is very difficult for the security services to exchange data and information with country of origin, in order to be able to establish the profile of a certain person (migrant), possible criminal record, connections or membership in terrorist cells.

For security services it is normal to have a certain reservation regarding the unknown past of a person, until certain suspicions are verified and removed, there is a risk that a person will be viewed with

reservations or may not have access to certain occupations in the host state, which can generates discrimination and marginalization.

Also, in my opinion, in order to have the highest chances of success when approaching a group/a multi-ethnic problem, it is very important to know as much as possible about that problem/subject and a smart approach would be to include in the team that manages that project, the members of that group- people who know that community, their habits and who have credibility due the minor group. On the other hand, this approach allows access to information, to the decisions that will be made and therefore it is necessary that people who are elected for working with the authorities to have a background check, which can pose particular problems if we are talking about people who come from conflict areas- where there are no collaborative and diplomatic relations and this kind of situation may affect national security.

- *The existence among refugees of extremists or members of terrorist cells, which through their actions on the territory of the host state can affect social security*

Terrorism has become a permanent threat to European security and events that took place in recent period demonstrate this fact and in the activities of ensuring common security, migration is a phenomenon that must be approached carefully because among people arriving in the EU as migrants, there may also be infiltrated people who have terrorist concerns or followers of extremist groups, who intend to commit hostile acts against the host state and it's citizens. The information in the area of counter-terrorism is very sensitive, it involves various activities carried out by the security structures (many of them classified, inaccessible to the public). The general public only knows the consequences of the actions of people with radical concerns (the terrorist result) and in the context in which many of the hostile acts against state security were committed (for example) by Muslims, the population tends to generalize. Terrorist acts have a special impact and seriously affects the feeling of insecurity so in the context of such events the public opinion will label a certain ethnic

group and will automatically associate it with the actions committed by some members of that group/ minority. Even if in reality less than 1% of migrants with Arab origin actually have tendencies to radicalize, there is a risk of generalization and rejection against the migrants from this area, the reason being the fear of the host state citizens for possible illegal actions by migrants.

– *Adversity coming from citizens of the host state*

Even if the European Community means education, civilization, culture, tolerance and openness to other community members, there may be situations in which it seems that the citizens of the host state reject the idea of the presence/acceptance the migrants. The reasons can be diverse- ideological, racial, religious, generated by the feeling of insecurity (especially if the locals were victims of law violation committed by migrants) but the central idea is that to achieve social inclusion of migrants it is necessary to collaborate with the local community. In this partnership, without local acceptance, the social inclusion of migrants is almost impossible.

Adapting to the requirements of the host state can be difficult, both from a mental perspective and from daily activities and in context of adversity from locals, the inclusion of migrants is much more difficult and at this point the state must intervene and try to involve the community and find problems with local or regional applicability.

– *Feeling of insecurity caused by law enforcement actions committed by immigrants*

Often, the presence of migrants in a certain area also leads to antisocial acts. In general, the feeling of security is affected, being normal for the inhabitants of a certain area to have certain fears of insecurity when a significant number of foreigners (who do not have their means of subsistence) arrive in an area. The reality shows us that with the appearance of migrants, a number of certain violations of the law increases (thefts, violations of social rules) and in such situations it is

necessary for the state to intervene to discourage such behaviors coming from migrants and to strengthen the feeling of security for local population.

- *The lack of experience for the host state regarding the management of situation and activities undertaken for social inclusion*

There may be situations when a host state has less experience in managing refugee issues or in managing certain categories of refugees (Muslims or gypsies for example), situation in which standard policies will not work and appears the necessity to adapt social inclusion measures to particularities and beliefs of each managed group, so in each situation a very important role is played by the cooperation with the other EU states, in order to exchange information which can be implemented/adapted, so the best solution, preferably one that previously functioned to be implemented (being real situations, in which vulnerable people are involved, there is no time for experiments because the lack of concrete actions can lead to suffering). We should study already functional models, which only need to be perfected.

Case study – social inclusion of Roma in the EU

The Roma minority (without referring only to the one from Romania) represented and still represents a minority group that migrated massively from East to Western Europe, especially in the highly developed countries of the EU and that generated and continues to generate real challenges, regarding social inclusion, with implications for the security of the Member States.

- Although more than 20 years have passed since EU states confronted members of the Roma minority who migrated to the West, social inclusion measures have not yielded the expected results (in fact, many countries have real problems to integrate their own citizens belonging Roma minority), possibly due to the following factors:

- Lack of education;
- Mentality deeply rooted in conventional traditions and concerns (musicians, pastors, craftsmen)- which leads to the mismatch of available jobs;
- Opposition to change and a certain opposition to work (prefers easy earnings);
- Lack of education;
- Mentality deeply rooted in conventional traditions and concerns (musicians, pastors, craftsmen)- which leads to job mismatch;
- Opposition to change.

One aspect that needs to be emphasized regarding to the European Roma population is the extremely high incidence of unemployment, in the sense that if for the 27 EU Member States the average unemployment rate is 8.3% in the case of this ethnic group the values are significantly higher- 47.1%, which represents a difference of 40 percentage points[3].

Percentage distribution according to the employment situation and the main indicators of the labor market

	Roma, Bulgaria	Roma, Romania	Roma, Italy	Roma, Spain	Roma, Europe	UE- 27
Occupational situation	100	100	100	100	100	100
Employee	30,9	36,3	37,8	43,8	37,4	57,3
Unemployed	43,9	34,3	22,5	25,1	33,3	5,2
Unemployment rate	58,7	48,6	37,3	36,4	47,1	8,3

Source: EU-INCLUSIVE research

Conclusion

Migration is an ongoing phenomenon that poses significant challenges for the countries involved. Whether we are talking about refugees from conflict zones, citizens from Eastern Europe, temporary

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[3] EU Inclusive Comparative Study – Roma in Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and Spain, between social inclusion and migration, Bucharest, 2012, ISBN 978-973-0-13053-9- pg. 31.

workers or asylum seekers, ultimately, the goal remains the integration of migrants into host communities.

To this end, EU countries take similar action when it comes to integration, all under the umbrella of European legislation, but for the success of the process it is absolutely necessary to take into account the individual particularities of each case. Cultural and opinion differences, both on the part of immigrants and on the part of the local community where they arrive, can create different results, even if the state policy is identical.

I believe that a key factor for a successful integration of migrants is for host states to take into account the particularities of migrants and to implement programs that combine national legislation and social requirements but at the same time take into account the cultural and ideological background of migrants. I consider that there are no standard programs to ensure the social inclusion of a certain group of migrants, but each case must be analyzed in particular and adapted measures must be implemented and also, in order to increase the chances of successful social inclusion for minority groups it is necessary for the host state to know their particularities (religion, principles, values) and to try to involve in projects both the members of the local community and the members of the minority group.

Beyond the approach from the perspective of EU fundamental values and those related to non-discrimination and respect for human rights, social inclusion significantly influences national security because one of the very important aspects is access to health services and health care, and the current pandemic situation has demonstrated to everyone how a medical problem/situation can have a particularly serious impact on national security. The existence of a significant number of people (migrants) who do not have access to adequate health care services can be a real vulnerability, of which states must be aware and the provision of health care must be the first priority of host states in managing the problem of migrants.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqzqmwacw6c.

In the 21th Century, migration-security relationship in Europe, in the context of globalization, takes on new dimensions with ample reverberations on the societal, economic, demographic, political, military and social fields. The refugee crisis, East-West/South-North chaotic migration, regional interethnic disputes, the "special operation" from Ukraine, became top priorities on the European security agenda. In this context, the volume brings to the fore, through a multidisciplinary analysis, the "complicated" relationship between migration and (in)security with a special focus on the integration process of migrants and refugees and the image of " the other" (alterity). The book is part of a constructivist approach with a dynamic perspective on the political, social, economic, military and societal field, where the actors and the system structure are interconnected.

Migration Dynamics and New Trends in European (In)Security – Crises, Challenges and Opportunities volume is a research and analysis tool created within the Jean Monnet Module *Quo Vadis Europe? European Security, National and Ethnic Minority Issues: from Theory to Practice*, Project number: 620535-EPP-1-2020-1-RO-EPPJMO-MODULE, for students, professors, researchers, stakeholders, politicians, specialists on international relations and security studies. This volume is also a guide for the general public interested in the evolution of migration - identity - (in)security relationship in Europe and beyond.

Claudia Anamaria Iov, PhD. in Geopolitics, International Relations and European Studies, is Lecturer at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History of Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca. She teaches courses on European security, National and ethnic minority issues, Diplomatic protocol and etiquette, Societal Security, Compared public policies, Leadership and team mana-gement. She is the author of several studies, articles and books on European security, minorities and migration. Among her latest books is worth mentioned *Rethinking (In)Security in the European Union, The Migration-Identity-Security Nexus* (2020).