Babeș-Bolyai University
Faculty of History and Philosophy
Doctoral School of Philosophy

The Fifth International Conference for Doctoral Students in Philosophy

Limits of Knowledge - Limits of Ignorance

Cluj-Napoca, May 16-17, 2025

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Conference organized in collaboration with:
Center for Ancient and Medieval Philosophy
Center for Applied Philosophy
Department of Philosophy in Hungarian Language

Scientific committee of the conference:

Alexander Baumgarten

Ion Copoeru

Márton Attila Demeter

Mihaela Frunză

Dan Eugen Raţiu

Ciprian Mihali

Mihai Maga

Mihai Rusu

Andrian Luduşan

Andrei Marinca

Anton Crişan

Secretary of the committee

Vlad Ile

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Friday, May 16

Plenary Lecture I

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Time: 11.00-12.00
Moderator: Mihaela Frunză
Room: 138/François Chamoux
Online access: Zoom
Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87446228393?pwd=lU07RPINlFHvNBoqRp1Ga2bEAlLGE6.1
Meeting ID: 874 4622 8393
Passcode: 138463

Keynote lecture

11.00-11.40 MARTINA PROPERZI (Pontifical Lateran University of Rome)

Surfing Complexity: Minimal Self-Awareness in a Transdisciplinary Perspective

11.40-12.00 Discussions

Parallel sessions

Panel A. Aesthetics and Everyday Life (I)

Language: English/Romanian
Time: 12.00-14.00
Moderator: Dan-Eugen Rațiu
Room: 138/François Chamoux
Online access: Zoom
Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87446228393?pwd=lU07RPINlFHvNBoqRp1Ga2bEAlLGE6.1
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On-site

12.00-12.20 RADU-CRISTIAN ANDREESCU, Babeș-Bolyai University

Limits of Vision, Limits of Painting: John Ruskin and the Perfection of Details in

Art and Nature [Ro.]

12.20-12.40 ANDREEA MELISA MUREȘANU, Babeș-Bolyai University

The Biedermeier Era and the Development of Modern Urban Life in

Transylvania[Eng.]

12.40-13.00 Discussions

13.00-13.20 TUDOR POP, Babeș-Bolyai University

An Analysis of Curated Atmosphere Through Reading in Everyday Life - The

Case of Dark Academia [Eng.]

13.20-13.40 ANA IONESEI, Babeș-Bolyai University

Proustian Elements of Aesthetic of Everyday Life [Ro.]

13.40-14.00 Discussions

14.00-15.00 Lunch break - Room 139

Language: Romanian
Time: 12.00-14.00
Moderator: Ciprian Mihali
Room: 124/Lucian Blaga
Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86058100649?pwd=LML6wubXU4VEJmLXg6z8B22ALr4Qad.1
Meeting ID: 860 5810 0649
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On-site

12.00-12.20 MARA POPA, Babeș-Bolyai University

"Roma Reason" and the Theory of Social Recognition [Ro.]

12.20-12.40 ALEXANDRU STERMIN, Babeș-Bolyai University

What It Means to Love Nature - A Perspective from the Indigenous Communities

of the Kalapalo Ethnic Group in Xingu National Park (Brazil) [Ro.]

12.40-13.00 NADIA ANDREICA, Babeș-Bolyai University

Aspects of Emancipation in Karl Marx's Thought: From the Critique of

Liberalism to the Overcoming of Alienation [Ro.]

13.00-14.00 Discussions

14.00-15.00 Lunch break - Room 139

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Language: Romanian
Time: 15.00-17.00
Moderator: Dan-Eugen Rațiu
Room: 138/François Chamoux
Online access: Zoom
Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87446228393?pwd=lU07RPINlFHvNBoqRp1Ga2bEAlLGE6.1
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On-site

15.00-15.20 ALEXANDRA ȘTEȚI, Babeș-Bolyai University

Knowledge vs. Ignorance in NieR: Automata: The Impact of Truth on Androids'

Freedom and Existential Purpose [Ro.]

15.20-15.40 NICOLAE GOJE, Babeș-Bolyai University

Aesthetic Characteristics of Spiritual Experiences [Ro.]

15.40-16.00 IULIA-DANA PUȘCAȘU, Babeș-Bolyai University

AI and the Art World: Danto's Perspective Applied [Ro.]

16.00-17.00 Discussions

17.00-17.30 Coffee Break - Room 139

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Language: English
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Online

15.00-15.20 JACK EVAN, Tulane University

In Defense of Meinongianism [Eng.]

15.20-15.40 XU YUTONG, Binghamton University

Can Independence Principle Deliver Us from Cognitive Limitations? [Eng.]

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15.40-16.00 SILVIU-CONSTANTIN FEDEROVICI, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University

Brouwer on the Foundations of Mathematical Ignorance [Eng.]

16.00-17.00 Discussions

17.00-17.30 Coffee Break - Room 139

Panel E. Our Knowing and Knowledge

Language: English/Romanian
Time: 17.30-20.00
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On-site

17.30-17.50 DAVID-AUGUSTIN MÂNDRUȚ, Babeș-Bolyai University

Embodiment, Playfulness, and Humanization [Eng.]

17.50-18.10 RAREȘ NICOLAE BUSUIOC, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University

Scientistic Catfishing — Can Science Be Harmed by Its Exaggerated Image? [Eng.]

18.10-18.30 Discussions

18.30-18.50 CLAUDIA VARGA, Babeș-Bolyai University

Understanding Addiction - From Definitions to Subjective Experience [Ro.]

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Weaponized Ignorance: Denialism, Power, and the Destabilization of Knowledge [Eng.]

19.10-19.30 ANTHONY BAIJU, Birla Institute of Technology and Science

Responsible Knowing in an Age of Ignorance: Feminist Critiques and Integral Possibilities [Eng.]

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Panel F. Politics and Moral Responsibility

Language: English
Time: 17.30-20.00
Moderator: Mihaela Frunză/Mihai Maga
Room: 124/Lucian Blaga
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On-site

17.30-17.50 SIMONA ALBOI, Babeș-Bolyai University

The Crisis of the Real in Romania's Presidential Spectacle. Image, Influence and

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17.50-18.10 MICHAEL HAIDEN, University of Hohenheim

Hayek and the "Objective Attitude" [Eng.]

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18.30-18.50 LUKAS BARTOSCH, Corvinus University of Budapest

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Movement's Populist Discourse [Eng.]

18.50-19.10 ELIZABETH BECKHAM, University of Michigan

Epistemic Skepticism on Moral Responsibility [Eng.]

19.10-19.30 Discussions

Plenary Lecture II
Language: English
Time: 10.00-11.00
Moderator: Mihaela Frunză
Room: 138/François Chamoux
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Challenging the Aristotelian Epistemological Paradigm on the Motion of

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On-site

11.00-11.20 MARIA SIDĂU, Radboud University / EPHE-PSL

Demarcating Knowledge: Limits of Ignorance in Late Medieval Thought [Eng.]

11.20-11.40 GABRIEL ANDRÉS MOLERO, Radboud University

Numquid deciperet? Marsilius of Inghen on Skepticism, Simple Concepts and Divine Deceiving [Eng.]

11.40-12.00 Discussions

12.00-12.20 ALIS ANISIA IACOB, University of Kent / King's College London

The Argument of the Unity of God as Unity of Bodily Functions, and Its Empiricist Influence in the Principality of Transylvania (1570–1711) [Eng.]

12.20-12.40 LAVINIA GRIJAC, Babeș-Bolyai University

Augustine on Ignorance: Two Roman Cases in The City of God. [Eng.]

12.40-13.00 Discussions

13.00-14.00 Lunch Break – Room 139

Panel H. Politics, Human Condition and Contemporary Thought
Language: English/Romanian
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Moderator: Ciprian Mihali
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Online

11.00-11.20 JUSTINA SUMILOVA, Lithuanian Culture Research Institute

Philosophy of Limits in the Context of Animality [Eng.]

On-site

11.20-11.40 DIANA MARIA MIHEȘ, Babeș-Bolyai University

The Politics of Reality: What is the (Post-)truth? [Ro.]

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12.00-12.20 OCTAVIAN OJOG, Babeș-Bolyai University

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Boundaries of Ignorance in Political Psychoanalysis [Ro.]

12.20-12.40 ANCUȚA-IOANA SABOU, Babeș-Bolyai University

The (Pseudo-)Crisis of the Present and Fascist Discourse [Ro.]

12.40-13.00 Discussions

13.00-14.00 Lunch Break – Room 139

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Language: English/Romanian
Time: 14.00-16.00
Moderator: Alexander Baumgarten/Marinca Andrei
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Online

14.00-14.20 ILEANA CORNEA-LUCA, Babeș-Bolyai University

Boundaries of Interpretation: From Augustine to Nicholas of Lyra

or from the Hermeneutical Jew to a Hermeneutical Hebrew [Eng.]

14.20-14.40 DRAGOȘ BUTUZEA, Babeș-Bolyai University

Ignorance as the "Master Form". Outline of Montaignian Epistemology [Ro.]

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15.00-15.20 NICU PURCEL, Babeș-Bolyai University

Quid et qualis sit homo? *Eriugena and His* Cogito [Ro.]

15.20-15.40 FLORIN CHERMAN, Babeș-Bolyai University

Metametaphysics between Metaphysics and Groundlaying [Eng.]

15.40-16.00 Discussions

16.00-16.30 Coffee Break – Room 139

Panel J. Philosophy in Hungarian Language

Language: Hungarian
Time: 14.00-16:30
Moderator: Márton Attila Demeter
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On-site

14.00-14.20 RÉKA ERŐSS, Babeș-Bolyai University

Ignorance as Lack of Imagination (of the Other) in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Philosophy [Hu.]

14.20-14.40 BOTOND SZILÁGYI, Babeș-Bolyai University

Ideal and Real Abstraction [Hu.]

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15.00-15.20 RANCZ MÓNIKA, Babeș-Bolyai University

The Place of the Image – From a Hermeneutic Perspective [Hu.]

15.20-15.40 EVELIN VERES, Babeș-Bolyai University

Before and after. The French Revolution and its Versions by József Eötvös [Hu.]

15.40-16.00 MARIN DIANA-KAROLA, Babeș-Bolyai University

Absent Animals – Framework for the Ethical Evaluation of Animals [Hu.]

16.00-16.30 Discussions

16.30-17.00 Coffee Break – Room 139

Panel K. Knowing and the Limits of Old and New Media
Language: Romanian
Time: 17.00-18.30
Moderator: Mihaela Frunză/Anton Crișan
Room: 138/François Chamoux
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Online

17.00-17.20 ANDREEA-GABRIELA BĂRBIERU, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University

The Limits of Knowledge and Ignorance in Television Discourse: A Kantian

Perspective on the Construction of Media Reality [Ro.]

17.20-17.40 DORU-LAUREAN BĂLDEAN, Babeș-Bolyai University

Artificial Intelligence as a Creative and Communicative Agent – Ethical and

Philosophical Implications [Ro.]

17.40-18.00 DENIS CHIRIAC, Moldova State University

Exploring the Transcendent in the Philosophy of Russian Cosmism:

Epistemological Approaches [Ro.]

18.00-18.30 Discussions

On-site access

UBB headquarters, Str. M. Kogălniceanu 1, 1ˢᵗ floor, rooms: 124, 138, 139, 140

Clădirea centrală UBB, str. Kogălniceanu nr. 1, etajul 1

Online access

Room 138/François Chamoux
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Abstracts

RADU-CRISTIAN ANDREESCU

Limits of Vision, Limits of Painting: John Ruskin and the Perfection of Details in Art and Nature

My presentation will be part of a broader exploration of what Daniel Arasse calls the topos of the close/distant gaze: the idea of a varying degree of sharpness and details in a painting depending on its distance from the beholder or the distance of the objects the painting depicts can be traced in a number of writings on art, from Horace to Leonardo da Vinci, Giorgio Vasari, André Félibien, Roger de Piles, and Hegel. The limits of knowledge and ignorance take the form of the limits of the faculty of sight, but also the limits of painting, which, although it imitates reality, does so through the materiality of paint on canvas, so that painting comes into being through the fragile balance between image and painting, between transparency and opacity, between unconcealment and mystery. It is because of this "mystery" that my talk will focus on the Victorian-era thinker and critic John Ruskin and his theories from Modern Painters. Although Ruskin is by no means a formalist and is known for his harsh judgment of Whistler's painting, he is, in Modern Painters, a staunch defender of Turner, whose landscapes, unlike those of the old masters such as Lorrain and Poussin, are nevertheless characterized by a lower level of clearness (fog, smoke, clouds, and steam as signs of modern decay that Ruskin is aware of). Ruskin develops an interesting theory of "finish" in painting and drawing, showing that the true finish is not a superficial smoothing or polishing for the sake of appearance (which Ruskin finds in industrially produced objects), but that rendering which conveys a certain idea of Nature. But Nature always involves a "law of obscurity" and mystery precisely because Nature alone is truly infinite and perfect even in those minute details which the human eye rarely observes: a century before, Edmund Burke had suggested that, just like the great dimensions, the divisibility of matter to the marvels of the infinitesimally small might be considered a cause of the sublime insofar as the impression of infinite division is confused with the impression of vastness. Therefore, although he advanced the famous theory of the innocent eye, Ruskin advocates neither the mere ignorance of the painter nor the formalism, but the moral and metaphysical value of a painting which, once freed from the artist's prejudices about what they think they know, conveys an idea of the mystery of the world and becomes, through landscape, a modern form of devotion: a painting that indicates an authentic knowledge of the higher truths of the visible world, not merely the skill at rendering details (One might think of a parallel with Hegel's remarks on the Dutch masters of the 17th century). By revisiting some of his ideas about perfection in nature and art, I will explore the deeper meanings and some more subtle nuances of what is already known about Ruskin: that Ruskin remains the paradox of a critic who was able to assert Turner's superiority as a modern landscape painter over the old landscape masters, and at the same time a thinker who looked to an idealized medieval past for inspiration in order to formulate not a conservative critique, but a revolutionary vision of the industrial capitalist times, one of the last great critics who judged art and the world according to a religious conviction.

ANDREEA MELISA MUREȘANU

The Biedermeier Era and the Development of Modern Urban Life in Transylvania

The emergence of the nation-state had the consequential effect of modernizing higher education, aligning it closely with an agenda of patriotic instruction. What had once been an academic tradition—scholarly peregrination between centers of knowledge—was gradually restructured into a state-driven institutional framework, primarily oriented toward homogenization through discriminatory policies and the assimilation of the region's diverse populations.

Concurrently, Biedermeier artists and civic associations in Transylvania envisioned an alternative social order, one inspired by Enlightenment ideals, in which the pursuit of shared values and higher knowledge transcended ethnic, religious, and social divisions. Through the efforts of such local associations dedicated to maintaining international academic relationships—and despite an initial bias toward the German population—Hungarian and Romanian youth gradually gained access to varying degrees of academic and professional mobility. These associations fostered cooperation among different ethnic groups while providing instruction in public affairs, including city administration, local politics, finance, science, and, though less frequently, art and architecture. This period marked an early attempt to establish a conducive environment for social mobility and the construction of a pluralist society. To illustrate this perspective, I will argue that the novel *Mara* represents an effort to produce a cultural model of everyday life within Transylvania's complex social fabric. Moreover, the region's scholarly associations, which were voluntary and liberal in nature and embedded within civil society, maintained close relations with one another, sharing a common discursive framework despite their ethnically diverse memberships. Ultimately, these universalist cultural initiatives fostered a shared belief in Transylvania's European destiny.

This study aims to examine the development of urban sociability, understood as the acquisition of a model for urban everyday life, through the aims and failures of early liberal efforts for modernisation in Eastern Europe. Additionally, it seeks to map the production and dissemination of knowledge, rather than to trace the emergence of nationalism. This inquiry is closely connected to my broader research in the field of everyday aesthetics, particularly through an exploration of the relationship between the built urban environment and the practices of daily life.

TUDOR POP

An Analysis of Curated Atmosphere Through Reading in Everyday Life - The Case of Dark Academia

Dark Academia is an Internet aesthetic that glamorizes a specific learning experience (learning for learning's sake) and envisions an eclectic, imagined past, blending classical cultural motifs with gothic elements. While reading is mentioned as an important activity for dark academics within studies about this aesthetic, its role in the lives of the aesthetic's practitioners seems to remain secondary. Robert-Jan Adriaansen's study analyzes how Dark Academia counters hegemonic narratives through "counter-curation." His theory posits that Dark Academia can de-historicize the past, allowing for the inscription of more inclusive, ideologically nuanced perspectives and racialized bodies onto historical narratives. My contribution first engages with Adriaansen's framework, contrasting it with Giolo and Berghman's conceptualization of Internet aesthetics. By doing so, I aim to clarify the significance of choice in Internet aesthetics. Adriaansen's insights are highly valuable, particularly his use of the Heideggerian concept of *Stimmung* to explore the ontological dimension of Dark Academia and to frame its practitioners'

rejection of nostalgia for a literal, ideologically problematic past. However, my contribution contends that Internet aesthetics, while overlapping with certain aspects of mood, are distinct. I align with Giolo and Berghman's thesis that Internet aesthetics function as intentional, self-chosen tools for self-understanding. I aim to emphasize that Internet aesthetics possess a practical, purposeful nature and are not merely experienced. The second part of my contribution focuses on everyday aesthetics. I explore how routine engagement with literature contributes to atmosphere curation within Dark Academia. Drawing on Kalle Puolakka's writings, my contribution underlines how reading, as a daily practice, becomes a resource for cultivating and sustaining atmospheres specific to Dark Academia in the gaps between engaging with Dark Academia texts.

ANA IONESEI

Proustian Elements of Aesthetic of Everyday Life

Most of the key characters in the Proustian novel *In Search of Lost Time* exhibit strong aesthetical concerns, regarding both fine arts and their own *Lebenswelt.* Are their aesthetic experiences private and subjective or public and intersubjective? One of the most controversial and challenging issues of 'aesthetics of everyday life' (AEL) is the nature and value of the aesthetic experience. The proponents of the 'strong' version of AEL claim that there is a radical distinction and discontinuity between the experiences of art and the everyday aesthetic experiences, while the 'weak' version of AEL pleads for a concept of aesthetic that integrates both the differences between art and everyday life and their common features (Ratiu 2013, 2019; Dowling 2010). On the basis of certain phenomenological accounts from the first four volumes of Proust's novel and also using relevant Proustian ideas present in the rest of the book, I argue that *In Search of Lost Time* depicts art and everyday life as interwoven, according to the 'moderate', 'weak' formulations of AEL. Both Marcel-the-protagonist-narrator and his mentor Swann have significant aesthetic experiences, in which art interferes with everyday life. Moreover, both their singular experiences and their social experiences have an intersubjective dimension. The Proustian subject experiences what Thomas Leddy calls 'a spectrum of aesthetic intensity' (2021), in which we can detect dynamic relations between the different levels. I will illustrate the lack of tension between everyday world and the world of art, and the interconnection between the sensory and the cognitive sides of certain aesthetic experiences depicted in the Proustian novel. Drawing on Ratiu (2016), I will use the basic concepts of practical philosophy (practical knowledge, *Bildung*, judgement, *sensus communis*, and taste) in order to better understand how Marcel's creative self is shaped by the connection between the theoretical interest and the practical action, which means that the Proustian subject makes aesthetic and ethic choices. This embodied self undergoes transformative aesthetic experiences, and the Proustian novel contains significant benchmarks for the open interrogations of AEL, concerning the continuity of the experience and the unity of the self.

MARA POPA

"Roma Reason" and the Theory of Social Recognition

This paper has as its central hypothesis two main questions: "What does "Roma reason" consist of?" and "How do social recognition strategies work in the case of Roma communities?". To answer these questions, we will first appeal to the established works of two great philosophers: through a comparative analysis between the "black reason" of Achille Mbembe and through an understanding the functioning, the mechanisms social recognition of Axel Honneth.

The first objective that I wish to outline through the prism of constructing my work is that through which Achille Mbembe's perspective and methodology represent a beneficial direction regarding the subject addressed. Thus, Mbembe, among his ideas, analyzes the ways in which "black discourse" and "black reason" are constituted, the idea of race and the process by which forms of racism are constructed historically, politically, culturally, literaly, and phantasmatically. The second objective that I want to achieve in this text is the analysis of the concept of "social recognition" through the lens of Axel Honneth's works. The concept of "social recognition" aims to understand the ways in which social bonds are constituted and social space is created on the different levels of recognition. From the point of view of this theory, the realization of the human being is possible by establishing ethical relations in three distinct normative spheres: the sphere of primary relations, the sphere of legal relations and the sphere of communities of values.

Therefore, through the present work I will carry out an analysis through which, with the help of the perspectives of the two philosophers, Mbembe and Honneth, in particular, I will try to understand how a discourse regarding the Roma is constructed in society and how, based on this discourse, the mechanisms of social recognition are produced or affected. The pathologies of social recognition are those that, based on the prejudices produced by the discourse about the Roma, lead to exclusion and discrimination.

ALEXANDRU STERMIN

What It Means to Love Nature - A Perspective from the Indigenous Communities of the Kalapalo Ethnic Group in Xingu National Park (Brazil)

The WWF report of 2022 states that, on average, globally, the populations of monitored species from 1970 to 2018 have declined by 69%. The way resources are exploited and managed is the cause of 70-80% of the serious water scarcity situations that more and more regions around the world are facing. The biodiversity crisis and climate change are not just ecological problems, but also social, economic, and ethical ones, and therefore require a complex, integrated, and interdisciplinary approach. In this context, five directions for addressing the human-Nature relationship have been described: material, experiential, cognitive, emotional, and philosophical. The intensity of the relationship with Nature and the ability to generate reactions and attitudes increases from the most superficial level, which is the material one, to the strongest and deepest, which is the philosophical one. However, the philosophical level, is the least studied. In this context, we aim to explore the philosophical and emotional aspects of the relationship with Nature from the perspective of the question "What does it mean to love Nature?" Observations were made within the Kalapalo communities in Xingu, Brazil, during the period of 2024-2025, following two field visits. In this culture, people marry plants and animals, and from the interpretation of stories involving these relationships, we may understand one facet of what it might mean to love Nature. Exploring this aspect is a facet of ecoexistentialism, a way of studying and thinking about the processes through which the metabolism of existential issues (identity, well-being, love, freedom, death, and the meaning of life) is connected to Nature. Understanding how Kalapalo communities interact with Nature can reveal a new existential landscape, different from Western thought. These insights could help re-evaluate our relationship with Nature, fostering more effective approaches to the biodiversity crisis and global warming.

NADIA ANDREICA

Aspects of Emancipation in Karl Marx's Thought: From the Critique of Liberalism to the Overcoming of Alienation

This paper aims to analyze the concept of emancipation in Karl Marx's thought, following the way it evolves a legal-political form and a deeply human and universal one. In Marx's thinking, emancipation is not a univocal process, but has multiple interdependent aspects, reflecting the transition from a formal and legal understanding of freedom to a radical conception of human emancipation, tied to the overcoming of alienation and the establishment of a classless society.

The argumentative structure of the paper unfolds in three main points. (I.) Legal-political emancipation – the critique of liberalism: Marx begins with a critique of the liberal conception of individual rights. In the work *On the Jewish Question*, he distinguishes between political emancipation (the formal recognition of rights) and human emancipation (the real transformation of living conditions). I will analyze the idea that the modern state represents an instance of separation, not of unification, between the individual and the community. (II.) Social emancipation – class struggle and the role of the proletariat: Marx argues that emancipation involves confronting class-based relations of domination, and the proletariat not only seeks its own liberation but becomes the bearer of a universal emancipation. I will analyze the idea of emancipation in the *Communist Manifesto*, namely that the emancipation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself. (III.) Human emancipation – overcoming alienation and rebuilding the relationship between man and labor: I will analyze the concept of alienation in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* (1844), where Marx discusses the idea that man is alienated from the product of his labor, from others, and from his own essence. At the same time, I will explore the idea that full emancipation means abolishing the conditions that produce alienation, making labor an expression of human creativity and transforming social relations so they are no longer determined by the logic of capital.

Marx proposes a complex vision of emancipation that goes beyond the frameworks of law and formal politics. It involves a radical critique of capitalism and a profound reconstruction of society. Emancipation, ultimately, is the affirmation of humanity under social conditions free from domination and alienation.

ALEXANDRA ȘTEȚI

Knowledge vs. Ignorance in NieR: Automata: The Impact of Truth on Androids' Freedom and Existential Purpose

The game *NieR: Automata* explores profound philosophical themes, including the tension between knowledge and ignorance, and how truth can destabilize an individual's sense of purpose. The game presents a world where androids fight for the survival of humanity, only to discover that their creators have long since perished. This revelation shatters their raison d'être, leading to existential crises, nihilism, and self-destruction. Through this paper I aim to examine whether knowledge is always desirable or if ignorance can sometimes be a necessary condition for meaning and stability. Through the perspectives of the characters 2B, 9S, and A2, we see different responses to existential despair: blind adherence to an ultimate sense of duty, obsessive pursuit of truth, and the struggle to redefine personal purpose in the absence of external meaning. By drawing from the existentialist philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre and the posthumanist philosophy of Donna Haraway, this analysis will explore how *NieR: Automata* challenges the Enlightenment ideal that knowledge is inherently valuable. In this regard, I will also discuss free will and the autonomy of androids to determine to what extent they were ever truly free or if

their purpose was predefined within the limits set by the humans who created them. In this case, I will explore to what extent discovering the truth makes androids freer, giving them the ability to choose their own desires in life, or, on the contrary, whether discovering the truth nullifies the purpose for which they were created. Abandoned by their creators, the humans, who have died, and deceived by the higher authority into believing they are fighting for humanity's return from the Moon to Earth, the androids, upon learning the truth, feel not only despair at the loss of their purpose but also a sense of abandonment by their God, whom they have discovered to be dead. Deprived of direction, of a motivation that could give them a reason to live, feeling that their survival is meaningless, we can only wonder to what extent knowledge has liberated them or, on the contrary, has endangered their fate.

NICOLAE GOJE

Aesthetic Characteristics of Spiritual Experiences

There is a tendency in contemporary philosophical aesthetics to extend the scope of aesthetics beyond artistic objects. In the spirit of this tendency, the question can be raised to what extent religious experiences can be considered aesthetic.

The appeal to sensitivity rather than intellect, the extraordinary in contrast to the mundane, the intensity of the experience, the immersiveness and the transformative power (at the level of personality, ethics and worldview) are some of the characteristics that bring the category of the numinous (the sacred in experience) closer to that of the aesthetic.

In particular, the idea of harmony (which Dewey attributes to the aesthetic in general) is found in various descriptions of religious experiences (William James). The idea of harmony, which pertains to that of unity or integration, refers to the nature of consciousness. The integrative aspect of consciousness is not uniform, however, but has a structure: from the unitary character of ordinary objects of mundane experience, to artistic compositions, to narratives (embodied or not) and supra-mundane oceanic experiences. These can be described as encounters of consciousness with its own unifying aspect, with its own nature, to varying degrees.

One can raise the question of the nature of consciousness in this way also. Classical Cartesian dualism considers consciousness (the self, ego, or soul) as monadic, eternal, and unchanging. But while it satisfies certain intuitions about personal identity, the Cartesian model does not explain the dynamics of consciousness. Instead, one can suggest a model of identity between experience and consciousness. Experiences are characterized by: content (qualia), observational character (consciousness), and unifying character. The form of experience is also the form of consciousness: we don't experience content as if from a single point-perspective (this is just a consequence of the physiology of visual perception), but in a intimate or direct acquaintance with each part of the experience as well as with the whole, when it is available as such.

IULIA-DANA PUȘCAȘU

AI and the Art World: Danto's Perspective Applied

The art of the 1960s led Arthur Danto to become preoccupied with distinguishing between works of art and mere real objects—a problematic he found crucial in order to arrive at an understanding of what would be the essence of art. In today's age of rapid technological advancements, a similar type of concern emerges within the field of artistic creation and theory: the distinction between works of art and mere instances of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI), and the role of this distinction in shaping our understanding of art. This presentation examines how Danto's philosophical thought can be applied in approaching images and works of art created with—or purportedly by—AI. The primary focus is on his conceptualisation of 'the

artworld,' introduced in his 1964 essay of the same name, and on some of the subsequent refinements of this theory throughout his later work. Understood as 'an atmosphere,' a space of artistic theory and historical consciousness, the artworld is necessary to distinguish what the eye alone cannot decry. At the same time, it constitutes a condition of possibility for art itself: it is through participation in and understanding of this theoretical atmosphere that it becomes possible both to create art and to interpret something as such.

JACK EVAN

In Defense of Meinongianism

In 1905, Bertrand Russell published "On Denoting" in the popular journal *Mind*. A key part of "On Denoting" is Russell's criticisms of Alexius Meinong's theory of objects. The distinctive part of Meinong's theory of objects is that it holds that there are non-existent objects. Since "On Denoting" was published, some have rejected more than just Meinong's *particular* theory of objects due to Russell's criticisms. They have also rejected Meinongianism, the view that there are non-existent objects, on the basis of his criticisms. In what follows, I defend Meinongianism against particular criticisms from Russell in "On Denoting." To do this, I do three things. First, I explain which of Russell's criticisms could be taken as criticisms of Meinongianism and not *just* Meinong's particular theory of objects. Second, I outline three of Russell's criticisms that could be taken as criticisms of Meinongianism. Third and finally, I explain various ways the Meinongian could plausibly and successfully respond to these three criticisms.

XU YUTONG

Can Independence Principle Deliver Us from Cognitive Limitations?

Christensen (2011) raises Independence Principle to stand for the Conciliatory View in the context of peer disagreement, according to which one should evaluate the epistemic credentials in peer disagreements in a way that relies on the reasoning independent of her initial belief. However, independence principle is criticized for neglecting initial evidence. I will first illustrate that Christensen's independence fail to fully address the criticisms and reflect the inherent dilemmas within the principle itself: on the one hand, adopting a strong interpretation of Independence renders it untenable in cases of disagreement, since we cannot bracket all the evidence and beliefs to be independent. On the other hand, a weak interpretation violates the original theoretical motivation. I argue that we have a primitive disposition to "take something to be certain", and this disposition combines with evidence which form our belief. Thus, the belief-forming is a constructed process which is repeatedly and constantly based on our past certain beliefs. In support of this, I will defend the primitive disposition first and then propose a hypothesis of how it combines with evidence with a religious disagreement case. This hypothesis might shed lights on different conception of truth behind both views.

SILVIU-CONSTANTIN FEDEROVICI

Brouwer on the Foundations of Mathematical Ignorance

Brouwer's intuitionism famously challenged the limits of mathematical knowledge by questioning the unrestricted validity of several classical principles. His critique revealed that the formalist foundations of mathematics conceal various forms of ignorance, one of them being the pursuit of axiomatic systems instead of following a path of knowledge grounded in intuition (Brouwer, 1907). In response, Hilbert argued that such ignorance is irrelevant to the advancement of mathematics, as long as formal systems of axioms remain consistent and complete. The resulting opposition gave rise to a paradigmatic tension between intuitionism and

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formalism, particularly concerning the nature of axiomatic systems as epistemic limits of mathematical inquiry. This paper examines the foundational disagreement in order to assess whether Brouwer's intuitionism truly challenges the mathematical enterprise by portraying axioms as unnecessary and, perhaps, as obscuring a deeper form of ignorance regarding the true roots of mathematics, namely, intuitive knowledge. While Brouwer regarded the foundations of mathematics as phenomena rooted in lived experience, Hilbert conceived mathematics as a discipline governed entirely by formal derivation from axioms. Where Brouwer invited philosophical reflection on mathematical meaning, Hilbert dismissed such considerations as extraneous to mathematics (Hilbert, 1918a). The central argument of this study is that formal mathematics, as it developed historically under Hilbert's influence, had to overlook key intuitionistic challenges in order to progress—challenges that, from a contemporary epistemological standpoint, remain unresolved within classical frameworks. As such, its apparent completeness may be more superficial than commonly assumed. Additionally, the paper draws on a compelling insight by Marin Țurlea, who paraphrased a central Kantian idea by stating: "Knowledge begins with intuitions, continues with concepts, and ends with ideas." This interpretative rendering reflects a shared philosophical legacy that influenced both Brouwer and Hilbert, albeit in radically different ways. As a consequence, this paper analyzes both perspectives on the limits of mathematical knowledge, as illustrated by the problem of axiomatic foundations, and explores how disregarding intuitionistic meaning affects our broader understanding of mathematics. By revisiting this foundational debate in light of epistemic limits, this study contributes to the broader inquiry into the interplay between knowledge and ignorance in the context of the Grundlagenkrise.

DAVID-AUGUSTIN MÂNDRUȚ

Embodiment, Playfulness, and Humanization

This contribution engages with the thought of Marc Richir, in order to disclose the basic tenets of the relation between embodiment, play, and the process of humanization. First, I will be arguing that embodiment is the main feature of the infant's play, which permits the discovery of the shared world in its fullness (his Körper, the first empathy toward the other etc.). Following the observations of Marc Richir, who himself has drawn on Donald Winnicott's work, the infant's playfulness renders possible the discovery of the body (Leibkörper). Moreover, by virtue of the body, play becomes possible. Eugen Fink has stressed in several ways the peculiar role of embodiment in any sort of play-activity, while Marc Richir discussed the playfulness of interactions such as face-to-face exchanges (l'echange des regards), but he also alluded to the playfulness of babbling in the case of these face-to-face interactions. Returning to the notion of play, and following the illusion-model, proposed by Taipale's reading of Winnicott's work, it could be argued that the separation of the interior and exterior (worlds), is enabled by the resistance of infant's body, implicated in the play-activity. Thus, the body will be considered under two basic aspects of its existence, i.e. as resistance and as the possibility of self-affection, albeit the issue of hetero-affection will not be overlooked by our present study. The main claim of this paper is that the close interrelation between embodiment and play is the via regia toward the process of humanization. Therefore, the present article analyzes two possible approaches to the problem of playing, namely the one implying the infant playing alone and self-affecting himself, and the situation wherein the other is implicated in this sort of discovery, by virtue of the interactions mentioned above. Finally, by tracing the relation between embodied playing and the process of humanization, this study aims to prove that Winnicott's wording about playing

and reality, could be read as a sort of passage from embodied playing to several aspects of shared reality, which involve also our emphatic relation to others.

Rareș Nicolae Busuioc

Scientistic Catfishing — Can Science Be Harmed by Its Exaggerated Image?

The idea that scientific rationality is the privileged path to knowledge has shaped our society for centuries. Both scientists and the lay public agree on two main points which support its superior status: one the one hand, we have its results and accomplishments which testify to the truth of certain theories and the reality of the objects they describe and, on the other hand, we have the testability of scientific hypotheses, which sets it apart from other 'unfalsifiable' sources of knowledge. The present paper aims to show how this standard account produces an inaccurate image of what science really is and how this ultimately undermines the role of science in society. The mainstream attitude to uncritically embrace the image of science offered by traditional epistemology gives rise to a kind of scientific ignorance, which is a common root which science denial and scientism share. The historical and sociological study of the scientific endeavour reveals that the progress of knowledge relies on scientists' ability to come up with new and incompatible ways of theorizing and constructing the world, while loosening the criteria for theory refutation in the face of error. As a result, it becomes harder and harder to determine the specifics of scientific knowledge. Utilizing Paul Feyerabend's rather Popperian distinction between scientific theory and myth, as well as the more recent attempts to understand science through its interactions with the social and the cultural aspects of the world, the goal is to dispel the image of a totalitarian science, while at the same time reestablishing science's seat at the table of decision making with regards to the concrete problems that society faces.

Claudia Varga

Understanding Addiction - From Definitions to Subjective Experience

Are we limited in understanding the process of addiction only be personal knowledge, as humans who experience different forms of addiction? Are we able to really understand addiction? What is addiction? Is the limit of ignorance viewed through judgment and prejudice? Do they influence the society in the way addiction is accepted and treated?

My work will explore some of the definitions or connected concepts from classical philosophers as Aristotle, Kant, Sartre to phenomenological approach focusing on the lived experience of individuals (Copoeru, 2014), also as these definitions are found in the modern description of addiction as a bio-psycho-social-spiritual disease.

Kant's philosophy doesn't directly address addiction, but his ideas can be applied to understand it philosophically. Kant emphasizes the importance of rationality and moral duty, which could be seen as a framework for resisting addictive behaviors. Addiction, in this context, might represent a failure of rational self-control, where desires overpower reason. Some philosophical discussions explore addiction as a challenge to Kantian ethics. For instance, addiction might be viewed as a condition where autonomy is compromised. Philosophers have explored addiction through various lenses, often contrasting with Kant's emphasis on rationality and moral duty.

With more information about the biological nature of addiction, modern world still debates between determinism and free will. What are the limits of scientific knowledge and the limits of personal knowledge in recovery addiction process? Are we stuck in the knowledge of ignorance or in the ignorance of knowledge?

Laida Arbizu Aguirre

Weaponized Ignorance: Denialism, Power, and the Destabilization of Knowledge

This research questions the traditional view of denialism as merely a reflection of irrational thinking or cognitive constraints. Instead, it suggests that denialism represents a calculated and purposeful form of epistemological subversion, where epistemological frameworks are deliberately contested and weakened to validate existing power dynamics, social hierarchies, and prevailing ideological narratives. This study aims to redefine denialism as an active and persistent counter-narratives within the epistemological field by examining the intersections of knowledge, power, and ignorance through a critical perspective, highlighting its intricate connections with exclusionary processes and the sidelining of subordinate knowledge systems. This examination situates denialism within the broader context of agnotology, illustrating how ignorance is intentionally produced and maintained through the suppression of research and marginalization of dissenting perspectives. Furthermore, it theorizes denialism as an oppositional force, analyzing its tactical interventions and strategies for destabilizing epistemic agency. Additionally, the research investigates how denialism is institutionalized through social, political, and technological infrastructures, ensuring its persistence and resilience over time. By reconceptualizing denialism as an epistemic subversion, this paper highlights how strategically produced ignorance shapes ethical and political decision making. This approach challenges conventional theories of ignorance and offers new perspectives on epistemic injustice and the manipulation of knowledge.

Anthony Baiju

Responsible Knowing in an Age of Ignorance: Feminist Critiques and Integral Possibilities

Traditional epistemology often conceptualizes ignorance as a passive lack of knowledge, thereby neglecting its active production within socio-political structures. Feminist epistemology challenges this reductive view, reinterpreting ignorance as a politically charged phenomenon shaped by power, privilege, and systemic oppression. This paper advances an argument that ignorance is not merely a cognitive void but a socially constructed and maintained force that reinforces epistemic injustice and sustains structural inequalities. Drawing on the works of feminist scholars like Lorraine Code, Miranda Fricker, José Medina, and Nancy Tuana, the paper asserts that ignorance must be understood as an ethical and political issue—one that demands active resistance and epistemic accountability. Central to this argument is the claim that social consciousness mediated by hegemonic ideologies and marginalized subjectivities, plays a pivotal role in the sustenance of ignorance. Dominant epistemic frameworks systematically marginalize alternative ways of knowing by silencing voices, distorting knowledge practices, and undermining epistemic agency. Feminist epistemology insists on epistemic responsibility and attentiveness as necessary countermeasures—ethical practices that expose the mechanisms of ignorance while enabling liberatory modes of knowing. To further expand this critical perspective, the paper integrates Sri Aurobindo's philosophy of integral knowledge. His identification of seven types of ignorance—from material to transcendental—situates ignorance not merely as a social artifact but as a metaphysical condition that implicates the very structures of human consciousness. Sri Aurobindo's framework challenges the empirical boundaries of feminist epistemology and invites a more holistic interrogation of ignorance that encompasses ethical, spiritual, and ontological dimensions. By synthesizing feminist and integral epistemologies, this paper argues that ignorance should be viewed not only as an epistemic failure but also as a site of transformative potential. It critiques narrow definitions that equate ignorance solely with misinformation or political exclusion, advocating instead for a more

nuanced understanding that recognizes the interplay of cognitive, social, and spiritual forces. Ultimately, it proposes a model of conscious, responsible knowing as a form of epistemic resistance—one that not only dismantles oppressive knowledge structures but also opens pathways toward epistemic justice and collective liberation.

SIMONA ALBOI

The Crisis of the Real in Romania's Presidential Spectacle. Image, Influence and Fragility

This paper explores the transformation of political candidates into social media influencers, focusing on the Romanian presidential elections. In a media environment dominated by platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook, candidates increasingly adopt influencer strategies, including building personal brands, sharing curated aspects of their lives, and presenting themselves authentically to engage with voters.

The central thesis is that political authority is being replaced by aesthetic and performative influence. Rather than emphasizing ideological consistency or institutional legitimacy, candidates now prioritize visibility, relatability, and emotional resonance. This shift turns political communication into a digital spectacle, where attention and virality become more important than substance.

Through content analysis of candidates' social media accounts, the study identifies recurring trends, such as informal tone, storytelling, and aesthetic uniformity shaped by platforms. These elements contribute to a homogenized, depoliticized communication style, blurring the boundaries between political discourse and entertainment.

The paper draws on the works of notable thinkers including Guy Debord, Mario Vargas Llosa, Jean Baudrillard, and Hannah Arendt to argue that turning politics into a matter of aesthetics and spectacle raises profound ethical and philosophical concerns. As algorithms and media dynamics increasingly shape the public sphere, there is a risk that democratic participation will devolve into passive consumption of curated images and scripted narratives.

This raises an essential question: are voters making informed choices based on political ideas, or are they simply reacting to digital performances?

By examining how presidential candidates behave like influencers, this paper invites reflection on the nature of representation, the crisis of public reasoning, and the future of political responsibility in an era where politics itself becomes a spectacle.

MICHAEL HAIDEN

Hayek and the "Objective Attitude"

Skepticism about moral responsibility argues that we can never know if people are responsible for their actions. Various authors claim that the focus of personal responsibility from neoliberals, such as FA Hayek, unnecessarily punishes citizens for things they cannot be made responsible for. The thesis of this paper is that the criticism misses a crucial point about Hayek. He does not claim that we can for sure know that people are responsible for their actions. Instead, he argues that a free society cannot survive if citizens are viewed as not responsible. Hayek's point must be understood through PF Strawson's view that giving up responsibility would also mean giving up certain "reactive attitudes" towards people – such as resentment or love. Similarly, accepting skepticism on moral responsibility in Hayek's "free society" would undermine human dignity. In Hayek's free societies, we engage with people under the assumption that they are rational and can accept responsibility – such as when we trade with each other. Giving up moral

responsibility would mean giving up reasoning with others. This locates Hayek's argumentation in the Strawsonian tradition.

LUKAS BARTOSCH

Radicalizing Populism? The Political Logic of the Limits of Logic in the MAGA-Movement's Populist Discourse

This article will demonstrate how debates on the definition of populism helps us to avoid depoliticizing or even dismissing the agency of minoritarian forces in populist discourses. It contrasts two theoretic approaches to populism on the question of how subjects relate to and in populist narratives – even when they are ideologically incommensurable with their own (especially, with those considered far-right, nativist, nationalist etc.). In contrast to thinking social bonding in populism as concerning the context of the construction of a homogeneous ‚pure people' grounded upon fundamental „core concepts" (Mudde), we contend that the assemblages of actors in populist articulations are correlative to the conflictual constitution of „empty signifiers" (Laclau). Against framing this puzzle of minoritarian investment as ‚uninformed voters problem' or 'voting against one's interest' we argue for the necessity and radicality of *conceptual uncertainty.* The claim is that this becomes a pressing matter in a theorist, analytical, but also practical sense, when we attempt to mind or account for the multiplicity of political struggles at stake in (re-)constituting i.e. ‚collective interest' precariously and paradoxically as contested outcome *and* locus of these very struggles.

ELIZABETH BECKHAM

Epistemic Skepticism on Moral Responsibility

In this paper, I argue for the following thesis of epistemic skepticism: We are almost never in a position to confidently attribute responsibility based on leading compatibilist theories of responsibility. I will argue that most cases of responsibility attribution are messy in ways that make it difficult to tell whether the mechanism in question was reasons-responsive or whether the act was expressive of the agent's deep self, to give two examples of attractive compatibilist approaches. I will suggest that many cases raise complex questions of agency and moral competence I argue, cannot be answered. As a result, I suggest that we must withhold judgments of responsibility. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first section, I clarify the type of skepticism I wish to support (which is not metaphysical), review the background we already have for this type of skepticism, and motivate the stakes for getting responsibility attributions right (Rosen, 2004; Caruso, 2021). In the second section, I review two compatibilist theories (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998; Sripada, 2016; Wolf, 1987) in detail with a special focus on their *epistemic demands*: what do they require us to know? In the third section I make my argument for why these epistemic demands cannot be met with the tools on offer — why we cannot be sure of whether these conditions of responsibility are ever satisfied (and how the stakes also determine this evaluation).

MARIA SIDĂU

Demarcating Knowledge: Limits of Ignorance in Late Medieval Thought

Much can be said about the limits between ignorance and knowledge. But what does it mean to define a limit? For medieval thinkers, this question raised complex theoretical challenges. A limit was broadly understood as the boundary between two opposing states—or, in logical terms, between two contradictory propositions. If I am knowledgeable now, then just before this

moment, I was ignorant. The precise instant of change—let's call it φ—can be described either as the first moment of knowledge or the last moment of ignorance.

This paper explores how such questions were addressed in late medieval northern Italy, within an intellectual landscape shaped by the Oxford Calculators and the Parisian tradition. It focuses on a late scholastic debate between Peter of Mantua and Apollinare Offredi, found respectively in *De primo et de ultimo instant* (c. 1392–1395) and *De primo et de ultimo instanti in defensionem communem opinionem adversus Petrum Mantuanum* (1450). Their central disagreement concerns whether knowledge arises gradually—like a process that unfolds over time—or occurs all at once.

Using this problem as a point of departure, the paper reconstructs their arguments across several interrelated domains: natural philosophy, logic, and the theory of cognition. Among the topics examined are the distinction between sensitive and intellectual knowledge, the transitions between error, opinion, and knowledge, and the limits involved in knowing logical consequences.

GABRIEL ANDRÉS MOLERO

Numquid deciperet? Marsilius of Inghen on Skepticism, Simple Concepts and Divine Deceiving

In his *Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics* (from now on, *Metaphysics*), specifically in the first question of book II, Marsilius of Inghen assesses the question of *whether the comprehension of truth is possible for us*. The question opens with a set of canonical skeptic examples that aim to show the fallibility of our senses and, therefore, our inability to grasp the truth about the reality that surrounds us. Marsilius' solution to the problem is in line with John Buridan's and William of Ockham's: namely, knowledge, despite having its root in our senses, is only the knowledge of true propositions. While this seems to be generally a satisfactory solution, the problem persists in Marsilius's view. There are also theological reasons at play. After all, Marsilius claims, God could put an impression in my mind different from the object I am currently perceiving.

Besides theological concerns, I argue that Marsilius' need to assess skeptic arguments is a consequence of his analysis of simple concepts, *i.e.,* the concepts that are produced by the first act of the intellect when it is involved in a perceptive act, and which account for the building blocks of propositions. Indeed, in book VI, 6 of his *Metaphysics*, Marsilius affirms that a simple concept does not necessarily have due correspondence with an external object. Moreover, if due correspondence is not a necessary condition, what is the demarcation criterion between mental content and extramental reality?

Therefore, in this paper, I will proceed as follows. First, I will expose Marsilius' skeptic arguments exposed in *Metaphysics* II, 1, including some theological concerns related to them. Second, I will explain why Marsilius' endorsement of propositional truth as the object of knowledge does not fully solve the problem. And third, I will conclude by explaining how this is a consequence of his position on concept formation.

Through this exposition, this paper aims to shed more light on Marsilius' stance on perception and concept formation, and its relation to medieval debates on skepticism, including its theological dimension.

ALIS ANISIA IACOB

The Argument of the Unity of God as Unity of Bodily Functions, and Its Empiricist Influence in the Principality of Transylvania (1570–1711)

As a young state, the Principality of Transylvania (1570–1711) was brimming with political and intellectual possibilities. With John Sigismund Zapolya (1540–1571) as its first ruler, the state adopted a Humanistic tradition, as envisioned by the prince, which was continued under his successors. Like any respectable humanist, Zapolya invited a group of Italian intellectuals to the region, who became part of his close circle. In the midst of the Reformation, Transylvania became a cauldron for radical ideas propagated by this group. This paper proposes a closer examination of the anti-Trinitarian argument for bodily functions as proof of God's unity in the works of Michael Servetus (?-1553) and Giorgio Biandrata (1516–1588), as part of the radical ideas that flourished in the Principality during the Reformation.

The paper will follow this argument, beginning with Servetus' description of pulmonary function as having implications for the embodiment of the soul. This will be followed by an analysis of how Servetus' theory was adopted and developed by his student, Giorgio Biandrata. The latter's theory on birth and conception in relation to the embodiment of the soul and the nature of the human being will be discussed in the context of his theological and ontological arguments. The thesis that bodily functions serve as proof of God's unity will be linked throughout the paper to the experiences of both men as physicians, as well as their empiricist views, which were influenced by the Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564) circle in Italy—a circle with which both men were connected. To highlight this, the paper will draw on Servetus' *Christianismi Restitutio* (1553) and Biandrata's *Gynaeceorum ex Aristotele et Bonaciolo* (1539) and *De falsa et vera unius Dei patris, filii et spiritus sancti cognitione* (1568).

LAVINIA GRIJAC

Augustine on Ignorance: Two Roman Cases in The City of God

In this paper I argue that Augustine is particularly careful when blaming or simply associating the Roman people of pre-Christian times with ignorance in *De civitate Dei*, and that he works towards his goal in this apologetic work within the framework he has built regarding the fallen man's penal condition of ignorance and his possibility to partially overcome this ignorance by reason alone. For this purpose, I first situate this idea within the larger discussion on Adam's fall and humanity's ignorance and difficulty in Augustine's thought, focusing on the topics of ignorance, responsibility and grace, especially in relation to non-Christians. Using the unbelievers' reply in *De libero arbitrio*, 3.19.53.180 as my readings' "anchor", I then discuss the first case I selected to illustrate my point, that of pre-Christian pagan Romans and their laudatory descriptions in the second half of *De civitate Dei*, Book V. I proceed to draw a parallel between their case and the second one I selected, that of Varro as a learned pagan Roman, focusing on the possibility of the educated to partially ascend to God by reason alone or through philosophy as natural theology, a recurring Augustinian theme. Lastly, I propose a comparison between Augustine's positive perception of Varro in *De consensu evangelistarum* and his critical one in *De civitate Dei*, particularly in Book VII, to show that in *De civitate Dei* Augustine "reverts" Varro to a state of ignorance of God after his now much more careful review of Varro's identification of Jupiter with the God of the Jews. By addressing how Augustine adapts his discourse according to the different types of Romans in these particular cases, based on their implied occupation and available means to overcome their state of ignorance of the true God in any capacity, my paper further highlights Augustine's versatility as an author, but also his

willingness to correct himself, and shares new perspectives on his treatment of Roman *exempla* and authorities.

Justina Sumilova

Philosophy of Limits in the Context of Animality

The aim of this article is to analyse the concept of limit in the context of animality in philosophy. Firstly, the article aims to discuss the concept of the limit by exploring its origin in the "limit experience" which is present in Bataille's, Blanchot's and Foucault's philosophy. Later, the article aims to analyse Derrida's concept of limitrophy and also explore the concept of the limit in Agamben's biopolitics. Lastly, the article aims to "go beyond the limits" and explain the "limitless" philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. The article reveals that limit experience was coined by Bataille, Blanchot and Foucault. These philosophers related limit experience with transgression, madness and death. Limitrophy, on the other hand, differs from limit experience as it focuses on revealing what remains inside the limit. In Agamben's philosophy, the limit between human and animal is fluid. Animal is needed for the human to form what the human is by excluding the animal. Agamben's anthropological machine creates dehumanized and humanized bare life that is in the limit between being human and animal. In Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of becoming animal the human is able to experience another state of being that is not equal to becoming animal, but it opens up the possibility to go beyond the limits. Derrida's encounter of the cat can also be described as going beyond the limits because it causes a crack in the concept of the human. It encourages the questioning of the concept of what it means to be human and brings out the emotions that open up the limit experience.

Diana Maria Miheș

The Politics of Reality: What is the (Post-)truth?

The rise of the term "post-truth" has caused intense debates in philosophy, political theory, and media studies, which have often been framed as a fact-versus-fiction crisis. This paper challenges the false dichotomy between truth and post-truth, which oversimplifies the problem by assuming that truth can exist in a purely objective form, arguing that post-truth is not merely the rejection of facts but a manifestation of the political contingency of truth itself. Rather than treating post-truth as the mere rejection of facts, the aim is to explore the term as a phenomenon that reveals more intricate epistemological and political tensions. Connecting different theoreticians' perspectives on what truth is, such as Lee McIntyre, Richard Rorty, Bruno Latour, and Chantal Mouffe, the purpose of this paper is to show how truth claims are shaped by hegemonic structures, intersubjective consensus, and epistemic authority. Rather than reinforcing the dialectic of "feeling versus fact," this paper states that both are co-constituted through discourse, language, and power relations. By situating post-truth within these broader debates on epistemology and political philosophy, it seeks to address key questions: What conditions produce post-truth? Is it an epistemic crisis or a shift in the legitimacy of knowledge production? And should we attempt to move beyond it, or does it reveal a more profound need to rethink how truth functions in contemporary politics? This study ultimately argues that post-truth exposes the instability of truth regimes and the role of political struggle in shaping what is accepted as fact, without negating the possible threats or consequences it may have.

OCTAVIAN OJOG

Lacanian Epistemologies at the Crossroads: Reactionary Co-optation and the Boundaries of Ignorance in Political Psychoanalysis

Contemporary scholarship on Lacanian psychoanalysis, particularly within the Ljubljana School (Zizek, Dolar, Zupancic), Stavrakakis' *The Lacanian Left* or Valdes' feminist interventions has predominantly framed Lacan's legacy through leftist political praxis, emphasizing emancipatory potential. However, an empirical shift is emerging: reactionary thinkers such as Aleksandr Dugin and Ali Hammoud (Haz Al-Din) increasingly mobilize Lacanian concepts—the Real, jouissance, the Symbolic—to legitimize authoritarian, identitarian, or anti-liberal agendas. This paper interrogates the epistemic limits of both Lacanian exegesis and its political instrumentalization, asking: What latent conservative dimensions in Lacan's work enable its appropriation by reactionary ideologies, and how does this challenge the Left's hermeneutic monopoly over his thought? My research excavates Lacan's oeuvre through a dual lens: his intellectual debt to Kojève's Hegelianism (notably the master-slave dialectic's fatalism) and Saussurean structuralism's latent determinism (the arbitrary signifier as a conservative force). These elements, I argue, anchor Lacan's thought in a paradox: while his critique of totality resonates with leftist critiques of capitalism, his emphasis on the inevitability of lack, the intractability of desire, and the Law's foundational violence inadvertently furnishes reactionaries with a metaphysics of order. Lacan's skepticism toward revolutionary utopianism—exemplified by his 1968 dismissal of student movements as hysterical—further underscores this tension. By mapping how Dugin et al. strategically weaponize Lacanian "lack" to naturalize hierarchy or frame liberal pluralism as a pathology, the paper exposes the epistemological blind spots in canonical Lacanian political theory. It posits that the Left's selective engagement with Lacan— repressing his structuralist-conservative undercurrents—has enabled reactionary co-optation. Ultimately, this analysis reframes Lacan not as a stable ideological resource but as a battleground where the limits of knowledge (what Lacanians *refuse to know* about his work) and the frontiers of ignorance (the reactionary *misreadings* that thrive on textual ambivalence) collide. The conclusion urges a critical return to Lacan's texts to confront these ambiguities, reclaiming his complexity from both neoliberal and reactionary reductionisms.

ANCUȚA-IOANA SABOU

The (Pseudo-)Crisis of the Present and Fascist Discourse

In the present paper, entitled *The (Pseudo-)Crisis of the Present and Fascist Discourse*, we aim to identify—following the works of philosophers Jean-Luc Nancy, Bruno Latour, and Jason Stanley—the operational mechanisms of fascist discourse, in order to argue that such discourse cannot offer a viable solution to the crisis defining our present: namely, climate change, which threatens human existence as a whole. Rather than addressing this urgent issue, the recourse to fascist discourse serves to deliberately obscure the real problem. Against the backdrop of the disappearance of metaphysical meaning and in the context of the ongoing climate crisis, the emergence and spread of fascist discourse was perhaps inevitable. However, since such discourse does not contribute to a genuine understanding or engagement with the present, a critical examination of its inner workings is necessary for identifying it and taking a reflective stance toward it. The paper is structured into three parts, each addressing a key dimension: the pseudo-crisis of meaning, the global climate crisis and the urgency of action in the face of impending catastrophe, and finally, the logic underpinning fascist discourse and the reasons why it fails to account for contemporary reality. In the first part, drawing on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, we

examine how, with the end of metaphysics, the world no longer *has* meaning but *is* meaning. Although the disappearance of metaphysical significance does not constitute a real crisis of meaning, it nonetheless elicits a sense of loss and anxiety in modes of thought unable to comprehend the transition from metaphysical signification to a form of meaning that emerges within a world beyond which nothing else lies. In the second part, informed by Bruno Latour's analyses, we explore how the logic of modernization—specifically, the ideal of infinite progress—has led to the current climate crisis. Finally, in the third part, we outline the mechanisms through which fascist discourse operates, drawing on Jason Stanley's theoretical framework. The overarching goal of the paper is to demonstrate why a fascist return-oriented discourse cannot provide salvation from the existential crisis currently threatening our future.

ILEANA CORNEA-LUCA

Boundaries of Interpretation: From Augustine to Nicholas of Lyra or from the Hermeneutical Jew to a Hermeneutical Hebrew

Man has always tried to fill in the gaps in his understanding of the surrounding world. Since the forbidden fruit from the tree of knowledge, he thought that getting to know everything was making him equal to God. Knowledge was power, eternal life. Ignorance was weakness, the mortal condition of the humankind. Later on, the Church considered knowledge equal to conceit and ignorance to virtue. That didn't stop philosophers, such as Augustine, and scholars, such as Nicholas of Lyra, to search for the understanding of the unknown. But what happens when the unknown is your fellow, your neighbour, and your research is shadowed by "Believe and don't seek"?

As individuals need to define the unknown in order to tam it, by accepting or rejecting it, so that they won't be afraid of it anymore, when it came to "the unknown neighbour", from the late Antiquity to the Middle Ages, Church Fathers and theologians tried hard to build up the image of the Jews, from the perspective of their ongoing rejection of Christ. It is interesting to see how "the greatest philosopher of Latinity", as Hannah Arendt once named him, built up an image of a community he mostly knew by books. This paper would follow the boundaries between knowing and being ignorant in the approach of the Jewish topic by Augustine. Later on, following his line, but reinterpreting quite a few of Augustine's main ideas, Nicholas of Lyra approaches the problem of the Jewish rejection of Christ, from the hermeneutical perspective of the Old Testament.

Further on, both these perspectives will be analysed through the way they influenced ethical and political decision-making processes, considering the fate of the Jews during the Middle Ages. The paper will aim to explore what happens when ignorance is not replaced by knowledge, but by a pale imitation of it and what happens when instead of asking questions to reach an answer, they created their own in order to justify an already existing one.

DRAGOȘ BUTUZEA

Ignorance as the "Master Form". Outline of Montaignian Epistemology

The aim of the paper is to delimit the concept of "ignorance" within the epistemological theory and practice constructed by the French philosopher Michel de Montaigne in his work *Essays*.

In the beginning, we will describe the Montaigne's main ideas about human knowledge, as well as its limits in relation to truth, certainty and faith (the connection between epistemology and theology).

We will describe the concept of "ignorance", starting from ancient philosophical influences (Plato, Ecclesiastes, St. Paul), but especially from the medieval ones of Nicolaus Cusanus from

De docta ignorantia. We will then discover, arguing with some fragments from the *Essays*, the meaning of the theoretical concept of "ignorance" and its role in Montaigne's epistemology.

According to the statement "my master form, which is ignorance" (*Essays*, I, 50), we will bring some examples from Montaigne's work about the creative way in which ignorance has practical effectiveness: awareness of ignorance, time for living, lack of vanity, skeptical doubt.

Nicu Purcel

Quid et qualis sit homo? Eriugena and His Cogito

This paper revisits an idea of notable philosophical relevance: the Eriugenian cogito. While the cogito is commonly linked to Descartes, previous scholarship has drawn attention to a remarkable resemblance between his formulation and that of John Scotus Eriugena. Some scholars, such as Édouard Jeauneau, underline a major divergence between the two: for Eriugena, human essence remains unknowable, whereas for Descartes, it is accessible to reason. In contrast, others—most notably Jean-Luc Marion—see a continuity that connects Augustine, Eriugena, Descartes, and even Kant.

This study explores whether this apparent opposition can be resolved through a closer philological and conceptual analysis of how Eriugena and Descartes define human nature—particularly through the notions of *nature*, *essence*, and *thought*. The hypothesis advanced here is that the divergence emphasized by earlier scholarship may prove less fundamental than assumed, supporting a vision of continuity rather than rupture.

Beyond the question *quid sit homo?*, the inquiry turns to *qualis sit homo?*—how human nature manifests. Here, Jean-François Courtine's interpretation is essential: for Eriugena, temporality, corporeality, and movement are not accidental but constitutive of the human condition. In this regard, Eriugena appears more aligned with Kant's critique of Descartes than with Descartes himself. Thus, while the first dimension might reveal convergence, the second opens space for significant divergence.

Florin Cherman

Metametaphysics between Metaphysics and Groundlaying

The aim of this paper is to investigate the concept of metametaphysics in relation to Giorgio Pini's interpretation of Duns Scotus' *Questions on Metaphysics*, and Heidegger's *Kant and the problem of metaphysics*. The following are stated as objectives: first, to define the concept of 'metametaphysics', examining its viability and limitations within the broader context of the distinction between philosophy and metaphilosophy, likewise taking into the consideration the historical context of this concept; second, after arguing that groundlaying is itself a concept of metametaphysics, to confirm whether Heideggerian concept of groundlaying could play the role of a central concept for another kind of history of metaphysics; lastly, to return to Duns Scotus and ask the question about the foundation of metaphysics is his own conception. The founding intuition behind this approach, as well as its primary expectation, is that by shifting the focus from the content of various metaphysical systems throughout the history of thought to their foundational groundwork, a more comprehensive perspective on the history of thought can be achieved.

RÉKA ERŐSS

Ignorance as Lack of Imagination (of the Other) in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Philosophy

Imagination occupies a central position in Rousseau's philosophy, creating a link between his pedagogical theory, philosophy of language and political thought. „He who imagines nothing, feels only himself; he is alone in the midst of mankind."[1] – he writes in the *Essay on the Origin of Languages*. In Rousseau's thinking the anthropological difference is marked by the faculty of imagination, thus challenging the enlightenment consensus on the supremacy of ration. Interpersonal relations are set in motion as imagination awakens, causing the savage man to transcend the state of nature. In the essay Rousseau envisions a twofold origin of language. On the north, where the unfavorable circumstances force people to communicate for the sake of survival, language arises from need, while southern languages originate from the desire for company. The invocation for help motivated by need and the expressions of passion are both addressed to the other person. Therefore, need and passion, driving forces of imagination, would be unintelligible without an interpersonal framing. Imagination is set in motion by the presence of the other mediated in the experiences of need and desire.

In my presentation I emphasize the significance of imagination within Rousseauean philosophical anthropology and philosophy of language, relying mainly on Jean Starobinski's and Jacques Derrida's interpretations. I argue that imagination, which preeminently requires the presence of the other, is the vital spark in the savage man's becoming a social being. By assigning a central role to imagination in the establishment of culture, one can interpret the concept of ignorance as reluctance to imagine, where imagination always implies the other person's presence.

BOTOND SZILÁGYI

Ideal and Real Abstraction

Perhaps most fundamental – in any case, elementary – distinction that highlights the specificity of Marx's critical theory of capitalism is the one between ideal and real abstraction, articulated by Alfred Sohn-Rethel, but present, albeit not in this explicit form in the works of Marx himself. Sohn-Rethel argues that unlike abstractions of the mind, such as general abstract concepts, real abstractions arise on the unconscious level of a specific kind of social interaction: the exchange of commodities. Importantly, the kind of abstraction present in this social practice is not merely the real power of an intellectual abstraction (the way, for instance, ideas of justice have real effects in the organization of society), rather the abstraction itself is present in the action of commodity buyers and sellers, and crucially: absent from their minds. This distinction involves also a metaphilosophical thesis on the status of a critical theory of capitalism: such a theory is not primarily interested in the construction of models, rather is aimed at a correspondence between the concepts it uses and the object of its concepts – which is ultimately possible since the objects themselves are conceptual, although unconsciously so, in nature. After sketching out the contours of Sohn-Rethel's distinction, I will turn at the relevance it bears on the value critical approach to Marx's critical theory, honing in specifically on the concept of labour. I will then attempt to highlight the methodological importance of the distinction of ideal and real abstraction, as well as the substantive difference in shifting the focus from the act of exchange to labour as regards the problem of the historicity of capitalism.

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[1] Jean-Jacques Rousseau: *Essay on the Origin of Languages and Writings Related to Music*. (The Collected Writings of Rousseau vol. 7.) John T. Scott (ed.), University Press of New England, Hanover, London, 1998, 309.

RANCZ MÓNIKA

The Place of the Image – From a Hermeneutic Perspective

The hermeneutic perspective is characterized by betweenness, mediality, and an orientation toward the center. The place of hermeneutics is the middle. This orientation finds a concrete formulation in Gadamer's concept of play, in the articulation of an intermediary space that gives room to a play movement supporting reciprocal, dialogical, and horizontal relations. In Gadamer's thought, the playing activity describes the mode of being of the artwork.

In Truth and Method, Gadamer presents a thesis that calls for argumentation: that the image, like the temporal arts, constitutes an occasion of presentation, endowed with the privileged modality of play. The pictorial work, too, presents, elevates, and brings into light—it becomes a place in which appearance takes place.

In this study, I approach the problem of the artistic image as a way to explore the question of hermeneutic place. I seek to understand how the place-generating function of the image operates, and how this in-between space enables the work's belonging to a world. What does it mean for an image to belong to a world? How can this belonging be described in terms of Gadamer's structure of belonging, when the medium is visual rather than linguistic?

And what about the viewer? What role does the beholder of the image play within this relation? How does the viewer become implicated in the dynamic of belonging? Finally: what happens to the situatedness of the image when it is encountered in the museum space? Does the image's situatedness persist in the gallery—in a hermeneutic sense—or does the gallery rather signify a kind of homelessness for the image?

EVELIN VERES

Before and after. The French Revolution and its Versions by József Eötvös

Contemporary historians of the French Revolution thought they understood the moments of the Revolution, the causality between them, and the place and role of ideas. They interpreted events, as far as they can be interpreted by being part of them. In comparison with them, Alexis de Tocqueville had the opportunity to go beyond the events and to draw the lessons of the French Revolution from them. All these reflections appear in *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* published in 1856. József Eötvös, a Hungarian politician, historian and writer, also attempted an interpretative historiography of the French Revolution shortly after the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848-49, but did not publish his study *The History of the French Revolution*. After Eötvös reads Tocqueville's book on the French Revolution, its influence on him becomes immediately clear. Instead of publishing his study on the same subject, he wrote a review of the French philosopher's book and corrected his previous views. The rupture caused by the French thinker in his interpretations will also be seen later on, since in his *The Influence of the Ruling Ideas of the 19th Century on the State*, which is considered to be Eötvös's greatest work, he uses Tocqueville's analysis to explain the ideas that emerged after the French Revolution. In my presentation I will highlight the striking differences in Eötvös's thinking before and after Tocqueville's book on the Revolution. These differences include the reasons for the emergence of the French Revolution, his views on the reign of King Louis XVI, historical progress, the problem of popular sovereignty and freedom.

MARIN DIANA-KAROLA

Absent Animals – Framework for the Ethical Evaluation of Animals

In recent years, the fields of animal studies and posthumanist theory have brought critical attention to the ethical considerations surrounding animals. These fields advocate for a more ethical treatment of animals and emphasize the importance of recognizing them as sentient beings with inherent value—capable of experiencing both joy and suffering—while rejecting the notion that animals exist solely for the benefit of human life. Animal studies and posthumanist theory challenge the anthropocentric view of non-human nature and argue that the oppression and exploitation of animals and ecosystems are rooted in the artificial boundary between human/society and animal/nature. This separation is both arbitrary and detrimental to humans and non-humans alike.

The philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in his book The Open: Man and Animal, argues that the very concept of "man" relies on the exclusion of "the animal," and that this division allows for certain human groups to be considered "less than human"—and thus "killable"—in the same way that animals are deemed killable. Ecofeminists such as Carol J. Adams similarly claim that the subjugation of animals legitimizes the subjugation of women and other marginalized groups. In sum, there seems to be broad consensus that the boundary between human and animal is not only conceptually problematic, but also ethically harmful.

Animal studies and posthumanist theory offer various approaches to overcoming anthropocentric perspectives. One such approach involves dismantling the human-animal divide. Animal welfare advocates attempt to bridge this divide by extending human rights frameworks to include animals, while posthumanist theorists aim to deconstruct the anthropocentric subject altogether. They propose a conception of subjectivity that is open and relational, leading to playful and unpredictable entanglements between humans and animals.

Yet, what are the consequences of deconstructing the boundary between human and animal? On the one hand, there is the risk of anthropomorphism; on the other, the danger of reducing the animal to an ontological abstraction, and also the relativization of animal exploitation.

ANDREEA-GABRIELA BĂRBIERU

The Limits of Knowledge and Ignorance in Television Discourse: A Kantian Perspective on the Construction of Media Reality

Contemporary television profoundly shapes the public's perception of reality. From a discourse analysis perspective, this paper highlights two fundamental dimensions: the limits of knowledge referring to how television selects and structures the information it conveys and the limits of ignorance concerning what is deliberately omitted or distorted in televised programs. In this view, televised reality is not seen as a faithful reflection of the external world but as a mediated construction. Through the selection and interpretation of information, television can obscure certain aspects of reality or distort their meaning, thereby restricting the audience's access to complete and objective knowledge. These media structures create an agglutinated reality a partial and interpreted version of the world where knowledge is limited not only by the lack of information but also by how that information is presented. In this framework, ignorance emerges as a consequence of selection and omission. Beyond analyzing television as a reality-shaping agent, the paper also raises the question of whether this theoretical perspective can be extended to social media platforms, which have now become the dominant means of public communication.

DORU-LAUREAN BĂLDEAN

Artificial Intelligence as a Creative and Communicative Agent – Ethical and Philosophical Implications

Artificial intelligence (AI) has evolved from a mere tool to a creative and communicative agent, raising significant ethical and philosophical concerns. In fields such as art, literature, and music, AI can generate original content, challenging the traditional notion of human creativity. Simultaneously, natural language processing systems, such as chatbots, reshape communication, questioning authenticity and intentionality in human interactions.

From an ethical standpoint, responsibility for AI-generated content is a critical issue. If an algorithm produces a work of art or persuasive text, who is accountable for its societal impact? Additionally, AI can be used for misinformation, manipulation, or reinforcing biases embedded in its training data.

Philosophically, the debate focuses on the nature of consciousness and creativity. If AI can generate artistic content and engage in convincing conversations, should it be considered conscious or creative? Many researchers argue that AI remains a statistical model-based process, lacking genuine intentionality.

Therefore, the use of AI as a creative and communicative agent must be regulated to ensure transparency, fairness, and ethical integrity. Establishing clear principles for the accountability of developers and users is essential in this evolving technological landscape.

DENIS CHIRIAC

Exploring the Transcendent in the Philosophy of Russian Cosmism: Epistemological Approaches

This paper aims to investigate how transcendent elements are articulated within the tradition of Russian Cosmism from an epistemological perspective. The thesis maintains that, in cosmist thought, the search for the transcendent is not confined to mere metaphysical speculation but is organically integrated into a holistic vision of the universe, emphasizing conscious evolution and the comprehensive development of the human being. By examining the main representatives of Cosmism—such as Nikolai Fiodorov, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, and Vladimir Vernadsky—the paper demonstrates that overcoming human limitations is not exclusively based on religious perspectives but also on rational arguments rooted in scientific progress, which cosmist thinkers consider essential for achieving a higher humanistic ideal.

The purpose of this research is to highlight the interdependence between the epistemological dimension and spiritual beliefs, underscoring the central role played by science and technology in the cosmist view of transcending the human condition. Accordingly, the paper seeks to answer questions such as: What are the foundations that support the integration of the transcendent into the conceptual framework of Russian Cosmism? How is the synthesis of spiritual visions with techno-scientific approaches epistemologically justified? To what extent does scientific progress contribute to articulating and validating the transcendent ideal?

The argumentative progression begins with a comparative analysis of the writings of key figures in this movement, followed by a theoretical discussion of the epistemological principles underlying Cosmism. The study also highlights correspondences with contemporary findings in the philosophy of science and with anthropological interpretations of spirituality, emphasizing the convergence of scientific inquiry and the aspiration toward a higher order of existence. Consequently, the research reveals that transcending the human condition within Cosmism occurs through an original synthesis of scientific progress and spiritual dimensions, thereby opening new horizons for conscious evolution.

Furthermore, the paper underlines the contemporary relevance of this topic, illustrating how cosmist ideals can influence current reflections on humanity's future and technological development. Thus, a unified perspective on the phenomenon of transcendence in Russian Cosmism is outlined, emphasizing its significance in shaping an integrative paradigm of knowledge and human evolution.