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Does Challenge to Truth and Consistency also Redefines Boundaries of Rationality?

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explore how the challenge to foundational notions like truth and consistency in mathematics is reflective of a change in our understanding of human rationality. Inflexible boundaries of a strong notion of rationality posit strict parameters, such as, *truth*-preservation and *consistency*. We show in this paper that the growing challenge to truth and consistency also reveals a shift from traditional normative understanding of rationality to a notion of a liberal rationality which grants allowance for both normativity and non-normativity.

Keywords: rationality, logicity, truth, consistency

Virgil Drăghici

Definability and Paradox (some considerations)

Abstract: This paper exposes some aspects of the way in which the selfreference and negation do generate the limitation results, both in the usual language (in the form of some paradoxical constructions) and in the formal languages (in the form of limitation theorems). These results can be analysed from the point of view of definability, by using two formal languages, one without negation and in which the semantic notions are definable, L_{poz} , and a language with negation, in which the presence of semantic notions leads to paradox and therefore to in-definability results, L_{Σ_0} . A comparison with self-referential structures containing syntactic concepts reveals the asymmetry semantic-syntactic. Finally, as a case study, the analysis of Heidegger's apory of tematization will reveal us that no mystery is involved in the idea of indefinability of Being; on the contrary, this apory, simply, has the structure of Russell's schema.

Key words: definability, paradox, self-reference, formal languages, limitation theorems, vagueness, Heidegger's apory.

Sharmistha Dhar

Affect and Moral Judgment: An Empirical Perspective

Abstract: Out of their zeal to solve the antediluvian debate between reason and emotion, a group of philosophers have recently started to give much coverage to the role of affect, if there is any, in manipulating our moral judgment, drawing upon and themselves conducting folkpsychological research in the area of moral reasoning. Some of them are acclaimed Sentimentalists. But there are philosophers like Shaun Nichols who are on the lookout of some wherewithal to bridge the gap between reason and emotion. They contend that affect is a prime factor that enables us to distinguish moral norm violations from non-moral violations.

Moreover, affect almost imperceptibly shapes the cultural viability of not just moral norms but also non-moral norms that engender abhorrence, if transgressed. The paper aims to capture some of their arguments in support of the hypothesis that affect shapes our ability to make moral appraisal.

Keywords: Affect, Moral Norm Violation, Conventional Norm Violation, Core Moral Judgment, Sentimental Rules.

Ionel Narița

The Paradoxes of Strict Implication

Abstract: In order to find a solution for the paradoxes of material implication, C.I. Lewis introduces a new constant in the vocabulary of propositional logic, namely, the constant named *strict implication*. This constant has the role to symbolize the relation of deduction between the premises and the conclusion of an inference. Starting from the Aristotle's analysis of inference, that the conclusion is necessarily deduced from premises, Lewis admits a modal interpretation for the strict implication. But, in this way, although the material implication paradoxes are eliminated, new paradoxes appear, namely, the paradoxes of strict implication. We can avoid this kind of paradoxes, admitting a different analysis of strict implication without a modal component. Strict implication can be reduced to material implication and the quantification of propositional variables.

Keywords: strict implication, paradox, necessity, tautology.

Marcel Bodea

The Nature of Mathematical Elements. A First Definition of the Inclusion Function

– A philosophical approach –

Abstract: This article approaches its subject in a philosophical manner. It has as objective to construct a first definition of the inclusion function based on the nature of elements of a set. The analysis is based on the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms. The study mainly approaches an algebraic content. The interpretation of the construction and definition also requires an epistemological frame. We introduced a function: the “nonhomogeneous choice function”. This study is a first step. The next part of the study is the second definition of the inclusion function, with applications in interpretations on the nature of mathematical elements in the extensions of fields and in the splitting fields.

Keywords: axiom, set, choice function, property of elements, subset, inclusion function, splitting field.