The Paradox of Consciousness and the
Realism/Anti-Realism Debate

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Abstract: Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for metaphysics and philosophy, in general.

Realism, Relativity and Representation

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Abstract: The paper argues that Einstein's distinction between '*constructive* and *principle* theories' involves representational claims about physical reality and therefore has implications for the question of realism. Einstein was mostly interested in the latter kind of theory because it imposes fundamental *constraints* on both the phenomena and their scientific representation. The Special Theory of Relativity (STR) represents physical reality in such a way that only the invariant is to be regarded as physically real. This invariance view arises from the imposition of constraints on the reference frames in the STR. A consideration of constraints shows that structures are of central concern in the relativity theory. The concern for structure puts Einstein's views in the vicinity of structural realism.

Vagueness and Paradox
(Ontology at the Limit)

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyse some logic and philosophical aspects of vagueness, e.g. the sources of vagueness, the paracomplete solution(s) to sorites paradox, the existence of higher-order vagueness, the soundness of Evans argument and the vagueness in semantical paradoxes. Afferent, the problems involved by the ontology constructed at the limit of paradoxicality are discussed. All these matters are considered in a double register: with arguments *pro* and *contra*.

Irrealistic Pluralism, Extensionalism, and Existence

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Abstract: This paper argues that any pluralism rooted in noetic irrealism must solve two problems—the "anything goes" challenge and the "consistency" challenge. In order to solve those problems, however, it is argued that no pluralist of this type can be an extensionalist but rather must hold that existence is a (real) property.

Paradoxes of logical realism

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Abstract: The thesis argued in this article is that logical realism generates paradoxes. Logical realism must be distinguished from other forms of realism such as ontological, linguistic or epistemic realism. Logical realism admits that the individual variables in a formula can be interpreted both by individual and predicative constants. In this way, logical realism disregards syntactic differences between the two types of constants. If, during the interpretation of variables, we take into account the syntactic constraints, and the logical realism is rejected, then, paradoxes such as *Impredicable*, or other types of paradoxes, are removed.

The Meaning of the Logical Constants and Classical Negation

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Abstract: In this paper I review the project of providing of proof-theoretic justification of the logical laws, with a particular emphasis on the possibility of justifying classical negation.

Feyerabend on Fire: Analysis and Critique of Three Arguments

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Abstract: Paul Feyerabend offers arguments in favor of Democratic Relativism in "Democracy, Elitism, and Scientific Method" that may provide a measure in how we look at science. There are problems in the consistency of his arguments that provide dilemmas in how to implement the changes he wishes to make in a free society, with concern to the scientific view. In a generous analysis of his work, I am at showing how he does not add any sort of new method to understanding science, or its relation to the concerns of the public.

Collectives as Theoretical Entities

David BOTTING

Abstract: The question is often asked whether a group of agents cooperating together constitutes an agent in its own right. I want to approach the problem by starting from a slightly different question: does a group constitute an entity in its own right? From positivism I offer the answer that groups and individual agents are on the same footing with regards to being counted as entities, and from entity realism I add that terms referring to these entities do genuinely refer provided that we can manipulate these entities. There is still a significant difference, though, between individual agents and groups that should not lead us to abandon methodological individualism. A group cannot be an agent in its own right because it does not possess intentional properties in its own right. Individuals are irreducible in a sense that groups cannot be, because no proper part of an individual has intentional properties. Groups are reducible, because they have no properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of its individual members; the group mereologically supervenes, in possibly complex ways, on its members.

Intuition and synonymy – the extension of coverage of a concept
An analytical approach

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Abstract: This article has as objective a particular analysis, from the perspective of linguistic synonymy, of the report *common language / mathematical language*. The analysis is based on a case of study: "the extension of coverage of a concept". The case of study approached has mainly an algebraic content. The interpretation of the case of study also requires a semiotic frame. We introduced a "compliancy condition of the senses". The compliancy condition of the senses means, that the sense of the expressions in the two different languages: mathematic and common is given by the sense in the reference language, i.e. the common one.

On the effectiveness of Kalmár's completeness proof for propositional calculus

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Abstract: Ever since Kurt Gödel's proof of the completeness theorem of first-order logic in 1930 other few alternative proofs have been produced, whose logical, mathematical or epistemological virtues are worth taking into consideration. In what follows we will deal with one of these alternative proofs for propositional calculus, namely that of Laszlo Kalmár. What strikes as remarkable in the case of this proof is, on the one hand, its constructive character, which offers an effective procedure of determining the proof of any tautology within the respective propositional calculus, and on the other hand, its simplicity. In his completeness proof, Kalmár uses a crucial lemma which glues syntactical derivation with semantic computation. The aim of this paper is to

highlight two ways of understanding the effectiveness of Kalmár's proof for this lemma, and to pinpoint a small problem regarding the effective character of the lemma alongside a solution to this problem.

Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism:
An Integrated Approach from Participant Stance and Affect

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Abstract: Following the recent surge in experimental philosophy exploring how unprimed intuitions enable the folk arrive at judgments concerning free will and moral responsibility, a widespread anomaly in folk intuitions has been reported. This has given rise to two different explanatory frameworks- one counting on affect that has been projected as making all the difference between compatibilism and incompatibilism and the other relying on Strawsonian participant attitude while accounting for compatibilist responses. The aim of this paper is to bring to the fore the asymmetric folk intuitions regarding ascription of moral responsibility, the expository accounts- one put forward by Shaun Nichols and the other by Eddy Nahmias, and show possibility of reconciliation between the two apparently different views, especially when it comes to unravelling the psychological mechanism underlying compatibilist intuition.

Does Moral Discourse Require Robust Truth?

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Abstract: It has been argued by several philosophers that a deflationary conception of truth, unlike more robust conceptions of truth, cannot properly account for the nature of moral discourse. This is due to what I will call the "quick route problem": There is a quick route from any deflationary theory of truth and certain obvious features of moral practice to the attribution of truth to moral utterances. The standard responses to the quick route problem are either to urge accepting a conception of truth more robust than deflationism (Boghossian 1990), or to revise deflationary accounts in order to block straightforward attribution of truth to moral utterances (Field 1994). I contend that neither of these standard responses is well-motivated, for it is a merit of deflationary accounts rather than a defect that such accounts present a quick route to moral truth.