HOW PARADOXICAL IS THE LIAR PARADOX?

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Abstract: The Liar Paradox has been generally understood as a serious difficulty for semantics and particularly for an adequate treatment of the notion of truth. Given the present state of language studies, this diagnostic is utterly unwarranted. To derive the paradox it is required for truth to be a property of sentence, but no contemporary theory of language accepts sentences as the bearers of truth. A preliminary conclusion is that what the liar paradox shows is precisely that making of sentences the truth bearers leads to contradictions. And this conclusion perfectly fits the contemporary theories of meaning. Radical Contextualism, Relevance Theory and Inferentialism are pragmatist proposals that place logical and semantic properties on what is said by utterances in context. Minimalism or Literalism, on the other end of the spectrum, also distinguishes between what is said and the meaning of sentences, and makes truth rest on the former. Then, placing the discussions about truth and the liar paradox in the realm of contemporary theories produces the dissolution of the paradox in a natural and non ad hoc way.
THE BISHOP AND PRIEST:
TOWARD A POINT-OF-VIEW BASED EPISTEMOLOGY
OF TRUE CONTRADICTIONS

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Abstract: True contradictions are taken increasingly seriously by philosophers and logicians. Yet, the belief that contradictions are always false remains deeply intuitive. This paper confronts this belief head-on by explaining in detail how one specific contradiction is true. The contradiction in question derives from Priest’s reworking of Berkeley’s argument for idealism. However, technical aspects of the explanation offered here differ considerably from Priest’s derivation. The explanation uses novel formal and epistemological tools to guide the reader through a valid argument with, not just true, but eminently acceptable premises, to an admittedly unusual conclusion: a true contradiction. The novel formal and epistemological tools concern points of view and changes in points of view. The result is an understanding of why the contradiction is true.

PARADOXES

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is twofold: 1. the analysis of the way the Liar paradox is related to the limitative theorems, by a) a presentation of the linguistic form of Gödel sentence \( G \) (of Findlay’s account), b) a formal-arithmetical reconstruction of the sentence \( G \), and c) an abstract formal analysis (Smullyan’s style) of the limitative theorems, in order to discover their relationship with Liar paradox, and 2. the analysis of a possible solution to some paradoxes, by detecting the inconsistencies of some self-referential systems, both in a syntactical approach and a modal one.
NONEISM AS ONTOLOGICAL FREE LUNCH?  
A CASE STUDY OF METHOD IN METAPHYSICS

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Abstract: The paper discusses some methodological questions of metaphysics, taking the controversy around noneism as its point of departure. The first two paragraphs shortly outline the ontological conception of noneism and then set it apart from fictionalism. After underlining the use and importance that noneism could have, the main part of the paper engages the question whether noneism is comprehensible after all. The discussion of this topic raises some methodological questions for metaphysics in general.

PARADOXES OF  
THE MATERIAL IMPLICATION

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Abstract: The paradoxes of the material implication are some valid formulas of the Propositional Logic containing the material implication symbol so that their interpretations are incorrect reasonings, despite their validity. This study shows that the paradoxes disappear whether the material implication is interpreted by deduction only when its terms are universally quantified. More than that, in order to represent the truth relationships between propositions we need of a propositional calculus with quantified propositional variables. On the other hand, it is developed a decision method for the formulas with quantified propositional variables.
A WELL DEFINED CONCEPTUAL ASSOCIATION

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Abstract: Mathematics is a source of analogy. This article is a philosophical study: the use of the mathematical language. This study shows how a “linguistic interpretation” can have a “linguistic meaning” for a symbolic mathematical interpretation. It is not a mathematical approach; even if there are some mathematical case studies for linguistic examples and their contents need a correspondence with abstract algebra. We introduce a linguistic construction which does not exist in mathematical language: the “well-defined [mathematical] conceptual association”. Finally we want to prove that for two classical concepts, the concepts “set” and “element”, it is not possible a well defined conceptual association.

SKOLEM’S PARADOX AND MATHEMATICAL RELATIVITY

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Abstract: In the present paper I argue for the possibility of deriving a reasonable (though uncomfortable) sense of a relativity of set-theoretical concepts on the basis of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and on the so called Skolem Paradox. This relativity is, in fact, a consequence of the non-categoricity of first order theories admitting infinite models. Moreover, I suggest that, (at least) in the special case of set theory, this relativity also opens the possibility of arguing for a pervasive vagueness of set-theoretical concepts.