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Migration Dynamics and New Trends in European (In)Security Conference Proceedings 2020

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- Coordonatori -

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SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN THE EU, AN IDENTITY TRIGGER WITH REPUTATION

Adrian-Daniel STAN¹

ABSTRACT:

THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN THE LAST THREE DECADES, BOTH AS A SECURITY PROVIDER AND AS A STRATEGIC PLANNER, IN TERMS OF ADVANCING INTEGRATED SECURITY SOLUTIONS. ITS COMPETENCES AND THE VAST NETWORK OF SECURITY ACTORS (RANGING FROM INSTITUTIONS, AGENCIES, THINK-TANKS TO NGOS) HAVE ALWAYS BEEN PERCEIVED AS AUTHORITATIVE VOICES FOR EU'S GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY. THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT THE HYBRID CONSTRUCTION OF THE CFSP AFTER THE LISBON TREATY PROVIDES ENOUGH SPACE FOR ACTION ON BEHALF OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN KEY SECURITY AREAS UNDER CONTROL, PROVING THAT THE COLLECTIVE SECURITIZATION IS NOT JUST A RHETORICAL EXERCISE, BUT ALSO A RESULT DRIVEN COURSE OF ACTION. EU'S SECURITY GOVERNANCE ALSO FACED INHERENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, BUT ITS EFFORTS TO BUILD AN IDENTITY FOR ITS CFSP, EMPHASIZED BY ITS RESILIENCE CAPACITY, ACTS AS A STRONG PLEAD TOWARDS STRATEGIC AUTONOMY FROM OTHER SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS NATO OR THE UN.

KEYWORDS: SECURITY GOVERNANCE, GRAND STRATEGY, CFSP, SECURITIZATION.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2016 the European Union stated its main priorities, while as defining its vital interests, in the form of the *European Global Strategy(EGS)*. Unfortunately, EGS has not received the proper attention from the EU institutions, as well as from other major European states.

The rise of populist movements, coupled with some of the largest waves of refugee inflows ever overloading the European Union have made Europeans reconsider their options in terms of security values and their protection.

In March 2016, the EU-Turkey Agreement was reached, designed with the sole purpose of deterring refugees from arriving to Europe. Three years later, the European Union managed to securitize its problems, either by using extraordinary measures, like the EU-Turkey deal or by supporting emergency relocation mechanism.

Shadowed by the Brexit referendum and also by three major terrorist attacks in 2016 (Brussels bombings in March, Ataturk Airport attack in June and Nice truck attack in July), the impact of the EGS was rather limited in terms of public awareness, its strategic ethos as a driving force for change being hardly noticeable among powerful stakeholders.

IN PURSUIT OF A COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE AUTONOMY

Although the European pedigree lacked an autonomous security vision in the period between 1950 and 1960, because of the failure of the European Defence Community (the rejection of the Pleven Plan in October 1950 and of the Fouchet plans in 1961 and 1962) after the Maastricht Treaty

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and especially after Saint Malo's Declaration of December 4th 1998, a major shift in attitude can be observed.

During the British-French summit of Saint Malo, the two Member States were primarily focused on the defence cooperation and building a political identity for the project, thus establishing some clear responsibility guidelines. The conclusions of the joint declaration of Saint Malo were also anticipated during the Pörschach informal European summit (24-25 October 1998) and the Franco-German summit in Potsdam (1 December 1998).

The identity of a common EU security and defence policy was mainly configured during the efforts made between December 1998 and December 2000. Events at Saint Malo, the European Council meetings in Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999) and Nice (December 2000) are considered to be pivotal moments for the birth of a common European policy on security and defence.²

Another structural reform of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy was the launching of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), based on Article 42.6 of the Treaty of Lisbon and Protocol 10 (initiated a few years later, in 2017). PESCO was projected as a security enhancer that allowed the security and defence sector to be treated as a single construction with the help of three major packages: the *Coordinated Annual Review on Defence* (CARD), the *European Defence Fund* (EDF) and the *Military Planning and Conduct Capacity* (MPCC).

The establishing of the European Defence Fund was announced in 2016 by President Jean-Claude Juncker, and consists of two stands: research and development & acquisition, the European Commission announced that its budget for 2021-2027 will be €13 billion.³

A brief look into EU's defence expenses shows a great deal of the progress made in the last few years to properly advance the framework of the CFSP, as well as pointing out some constraints.

The data recorded by Eurostat shows that in 2016 the amount of defence expenditure represented 1.3% of GDP for the EU-28, states like Estonia (2.4% of GDP), Greece (2.1% of GDP), the United Kingdom (2% of the GDP) having recorded the highest levels of expenditure in defence.⁴ In comparison with the GDP, the total government expenditure for defence amounted to 2.9% in the EU-28.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the vast majority of European members have yet to reach the 2% target, because only four meet the symbolic threshold (Estonia, Greece, Lithuania and the United Kingdom).⁵

Besides funding, a major role in achieving strategic autonomy is performed by the concept of strategic culture. Taking into consideration that this is rather an abstract notion, which shifts in relationship with each elections cycle or government change, it is hard to enforce its ethos upon the intricate pooling and sharing mechanism or that of a smart defence

The challenge of gaining autonomy in security and defence is related to its operational capacity, procurement and defence equipment funding. For this reason EU's autonomy is dependent on four major security areas such as: domestic protection of the EU Member States (internal

² Besides these meetings of the European Council we must advance other major moments, vital to this construction, although not that clearly highlighted by the research literature in the field. Examples can be found in: the Informal reflection at Western European Union on Europe's security and defence (February 24th 1999), the informal meeting at Eltville with EU's foreign ministers, where the German proposal called "Strengthening the common policy on security and defence" was made (13-14 March 1999), Franco-German Defence and Security Council held at Toulouse (29 May 1999), the Joint declaration on European Defence, part of the Anglo-French summit in London (25 November 1999), as well as in other bilateral meetings and declarations (Porto Declaration, Maastricht Declaration, Marseille Declaration) that culminated with the European Council of Nice (7-9 December 2000).

³ European Commission, Press release, *EU budget: Stepping up the EU's role as a security and defence provider*, available at : http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4121_en.htm

⁴ Alexandre Mathis, *Defence: Member States' Spending*, DG IPOL, Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs, May 2018.

⁵ Lucie Beraud-Sudreau, "On the up: Western defence spending in 2018", *The Military Balance 2019*, 15 February 2019, available at : <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/02/european-nato-defence-spending-up>

security), its strategic goals projected on its broad neighbourhood, maintaining global connectivity and collective security, and updating its military level of ambition.⁶

THE STRATEGIC HORIZON OF THE EU, PROJECTIONS FROM WITHIN

The European Security Strategy of 2003(ESS) was built around the pivotal role of the good governance and democracy. Despite its attempts to enforce these ideas, the European Union view was too optimistic. That is why, there was a need for a more realistic and executive approach for the CSDP.⁷ Another major difference between the two strategies were the people involved in creating the drafts. If in the case of the ESS there was just a small unit involved in this process, the EGS was the result of consulting member states representatives, EU committees and networks, think tanks and major European institutions, in order to obtain a balance between national and transnational dynamics.⁸ The internal approval for the document is also visible from its last section, Federica Mogherini making sure that all major stakeholders in security and defence are behind the project.

Although in European Security Strategy of 2003 there is no mention of strategic autonomy on behalf of the European Union, this rationale changed after the introducing of the 2010 Headline Goal which set the ground for introducing a set of pragmatic objectives, alongside with the Capability Development Plan, which ``serve as benchmark of these instruments (CARD, EDF, MPCC, PESCO) to ensure that their combined outcome will be a more coherent set of deployable, interoperable, sustainable capabilities and forces``.⁹

The planning process is vital in setting strategic needs, equivalent to the ambition level that the European Defence Agency is aiming to, which then establishes the connection between the operational needs and their subsequent industrial decisions.

Although The European Global Strategy of 2016 does not offer an *a la charte* definition for strategic autonomy, this reference is present in the document, its influence being attached to a certain level of ambition in promoting common values and principles, as well as in maintaining peace and security within and beyond its borders. Besides these rather general objectives, the strategic autonomy concept is used to emphasize the importance of the industrial component and its implications towards multilateral digital governance and global cooperation framework on cybersecurity, aspects that require autonomy in decision and action.¹⁰

The importance of the industrial and technological complex for EU's defence has also been advanced by the European Commission in a White Paper on Defence¹¹, where the industrial autonomy was being associated with the quality and quantity of defence spending, investments into critical and strategic infrastructure and establishing a regulatory framework for third country direct investments in the EU strategic industries.¹²

EU's strategic autonomy might be translated into matters of collective security and foreign policy, which are to be treated unilaterally, unfortunately there are migrational issues, climate change problems, cyber warfare that need collective means to surpass these obstacles.

⁶ Sven Bishop, ``Fighting for Europe-European Strategic Autonomy and the Use of Force``, *Egmont Paper 103*, Egmont Institute, January 2019, ISBN 979-10-96843-17-6.

⁷ Sven Bishop, ``The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics``, *Security Policy Brief 75*, June 2016, pp. 1-6.

⁸ Maria Mälksoo, ``From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: external policy, internal purpose.``, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 37 (3), 2016, pp. 374-388.

⁹ Jorge Domecq, *European Defence - 2018 EU Capability Development Plan approved*, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/47749/european-defence-2018-eu-capability-development-plan-approved_ro

¹⁰ Federica Mogherini, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, June 2016, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

¹¹ EC, Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence, 7 June 2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf

¹² COM(2017) 494 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-494-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>

French President Emmanuel Macron in his Sorbonne keynote speech in September 2017 has laid the foundation for the European Intervention Initiative (E2I), its *Letter of Intent*¹³ being signed by 10 Member States (including the UK, that will leave the EU).

Macron's vision was also inspired by the adoption of a White Book on National Defence and Security in 2013¹⁴ (this being the fourth such document after those in 1972, 1994 and 2008), that calls for a strategic autonomy aimed at developing France's industrial and technological base which is mainly controlled by the public sector. Macron's Speech was preceded by Angela Merkel's speech after her return from the G7 summit in Taormina, Sicily (May 2017), the German Chancellor stating that the Europeans could no longer rely on the United States and UK and urged them to "take their destiny into their own hands".¹⁵

Germany hasn't embraced the concept of strategic autonomy in its Defence Industry Strategy of 2015 and the White Book on Security Policy of 2016, but has defined a few core elements that might suggest this, especially when dealing with its critical infrastructure and the support for the preservation of selected key technologies and industrial capabilities. The major difference between the French and the German defence and security industry, is that in France this is almost entirely state-owned, while in Germany we mainly have small and medium sized enterprises, so the private initiative is dominant. Western organisations and institutions are faced with shifting patterns of wealth, military power, and influence.¹⁶

Although great progress has been made in terms of interoperability, joint task forces and defence capacity building, we are still far from a collective defence industry due to the fragmented nature of protectionist national measures of security policies and lack in standardization.

The relationship between the EU and NATO was institutionalised in 2001, using mainly the cooperation with the Western European Union, followed by the 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and Defence Policy (having actually set the basis for the so called "Berlin Plus" Arrangements). This type of agreement provided the support of NATO for EU-led operations, for which NATO, as a whole is not engaged. The fact that NATO and EU have 22 Member States in common is another essential key-element in the close EU-NATO cooperation.

WHAT ABOUT EU'S GRAND STRATEGY?

The term Grand Strategy¹⁷ is coined by American foreign policy analysts (Eg: Paul Kennedy in a collection titled *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*), the concept revolving around the US liberal hegemony in the beginning of the Cold War. The notion is still considered a blueprint for American initiatives all over the globe.

The syntagma Grand Strategy was treated both as a research agenda, a variable, an ongoing process, and a pattern for decision-making, all these interpretations being offered by scholars from different traditions such as: structural realists, neoclassic realists, neoliberalists, constructivists, as well as researchers in broad sociological, historical or political sciences fields. Usually a Grand Strategy was an objective to be pursued when a superpower was faced with inherent problems or saw its influence diminished in an area where it had vital interests. There is an important stream of literature that stresses on the fact that EU's normative power is declining, ranging from historical studies about empires¹⁸, to unstable political structures due to the domination of a core elite over

¹³Having no specific criteria for state's participation E2I is structured around: EU-NATO compatibility, common vision and commitment to European security operation, long term efforts in defence and ability to deploy liaison officers and effective capabilities. Full Speech of Emmanuel Macron is available at: http://www.crif.org/sites/default/fichiers/images/documents/english_version_transcript_-_initiative_for_europe_-_speech_by_the_president_of_the_french_republic.pdf

¹⁴ French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 29 April 2013.

¹⁵ The Speech was delivered on May 28, 2017, at a German Christian Democrats rally in Munich.

¹⁶ Steve Marsh, Wyn Rees, "European Union in the Security of Europe: From Cold War to Terror War", New York and Abingdon, Routledge, 2012, p.160.

¹⁷Nina Silove, Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of "Grand Strategy", *Security Studies*, 2017, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2017.1360073

¹⁸ Michael Doyle, *Empires*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986, p.24.

peripheral societies¹⁹, to the historical debate on power transition²⁰, to the relationship between the world economy and leadership in world politics²¹ to mention just a few.

In the actual fluctuating international climate, the European Union needs to advance its own view in proposing collective mechanisms of action. The retreat of the US hasn't left the international scene undisputed, with actors such as China, Russia and other major regional powers having made great progress at populating the global power landscape. The question that arises here is as follows: *What does the European Union's strategic autonomy entails in view of its stance during this global rebalancing game?*

A possible answer might be forseen in the level of ambition that the European Union is pursuing both domestically, and in its foreign policy endeavours. But is it more suitable to have a robust Grand Strategy, complimented by a consensus over the main principles of action, backed by a regular dialogue between European stakeholders, or will it be better for a normative Grand Strategy embeded into its regulatory politics to be embraced?²² What seems to be a harmful, and plausible answer for the implementation of a European Grand Strategy, could be the support for a more inclusive rules-based agenda, that allows further protection for the international institutions, in order to actually provide solid guarantees for human rights and liberal democracy worldwide. The term ``grand strategy`` was defined by P. Kennedy and J. Gaddis as the ``*calculated relationship between means and large ends*``.²³ In the category of means a ``grand strategy`` uses resources, tools and military & security strategies, as well as policies, while the ends are represented by policy goals, interest and the capacity to adress threats.

EU's quality of being a relevant diplomatic actor was amplified after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU achieving is unitary judicial personality, this new stance reffering to ``EU's capacity to engage authoritatively in the core processes of negotiation, representation and communication in order to influence third parties``.²⁴

The European Union also has the toolkit for global influence because it is widely considered to be a soft power, so its main attribute being the power of attraction. Soft power derives from multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, and it is achievable through a set of values, culture, policies and institutions.²⁵

Constructivist approaches are more suitable to explaining the roles performed by a grand strategy, since these aproaches are mainly focused on identity, norms and socially constructed intersts. From a constructivist point of view there are at least 3 main staged to design a Grand Strategy.

In the first stage the threat assessment and the setting up for objectives will be done taking into account the origines of the treats and its previous interactions with it, which allows the unfolding of a specific securitization. The second stage deals mainly with the strategic plan of action, that will take into consideration relevant stakeholders opinion and establishing a correct ratio between final outcomes and resources to be wasted. In the third stage the best resources and means of action are to be chosen and allocated in order to achieve the objective.

CONCLUSION

¹⁹ Richard Lachmann, ``Elite Self-Interest and the Economic Decline in Early Modern Europe``, *American Sociological Review*, Vol 68(3), 2003, p. 348.

²⁰ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 66.

²¹ George Modelski, William R. Thompson, *Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economies and Politics*, Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1996, p. 41.

²² Neil Winn, ``European Union grand strategy and defense: strategy, sovereignty, and political union.`` *International Affairs Forum*, Vol. 4(2), 2013, pp. 174-179, DOI: 10.1080/23258020.2013.864887.

²³ Jolyon Howorth ``The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?`` in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.48(3), 2010, pp.455-474.

²⁴ Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj, *The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor*, Springer, 2011, pp. 2-5.

²⁵ Joseph Nye, ``Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics``, New York, PublicAffairs, 2004, p. 31.

Every ``Grand Strategy`` has its main focus on the strategic mindset that defines foreign policy. However, this trajectory, especially in the European Union, needs to be consistent with the aspects of physical security, economic statecraft and value projection.²⁶

European Union`s Grand Strategy is the product of cyclical investments into maintaining operational capacity. Like every life cycle it needs maturing, more mutually agreed solutions to sustain its strategic autonomy, as well as solidarity among decision makers, either EU institutions or their national counterparts. The European integration process and its success over the last seven decades proved to be an important base layer for EU`s security and defence ambitions.

Although EU`s two major Security Strategies do not acknowledge the internal conflicting identities, especially due to the attention in maintaining a good reputation. This purpose has also been attached to the creation of ``a collective will``, thus keeping the EU in charge of two of its main objectives: the securitization of European military security and the safety of the citizen from external attacks. The EGS was labelled as looking more towards the domestic well-being of its Member States.

Moving away from a geopolitical-territorial perception tight to the inside-outside dichotomy, in an attempt to focus better on common projects might be a good recipe for the CFSP. Promoting flexible cooperation, alongside with identity-building, would lower the probability of conflict and increase the cost efficiency.

²⁶ M. S. Smith, ``Liberal grand strategy in a realist world? Power, purpose and EU`s changing global role``, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol 18 (2), 2011, p.150.

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23. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4121_en.htm

EUROPEAN CITIES FACING THE MIGRATION

Mihaela BOC²⁷

ABSTRACT:

THE MIGRATION PHENOMENON REPRESENTS A MAJOR CHALLENGE THAT THE EUROPEAN UNION MUST FACE NOWADAYS. THIS IS NOT A NEW ISSUE IN THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, BUT IT IS CERTAINLY BECOMING MORE AND MORE COMPLEX.

BEFORE BEING A STATE ISSUE, MIGRATION IS A MATTER THAT PRIMARILY CONCERNS HOST CITIES. THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS ARE THE FIRST ONES TO FACE THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE INCOMING IMMIGRANTS. THEY ARE THE ONES TO TAKE THE FIRST MEASURES IN ORDER TO HELP THE PEOPLE ENTERING THEIR TERRITORY AND TO MANAGE THE SITUATION THAT THIS PHENOMENON IMPLIES.

THE PRESENT ARTICLE INTENDS TO BE AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHALLENGES THAT LARGE EUROPEAN CITIES FACE IN MANAGING THE MIGRATION PHENOMENON. IT AIMS AT ANSWERING SOME IMPORTANT QUESTIONS SUCH AS: WHICH ARE THE TOOLS THE CITIES HAVE AT HAND IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH MIGRATION? HOW IS MIGRATION PERCEIVED BY THE INHABITANTS OF THE RECEIVING CITIES? HOW COULD IMMIGRANTS COHABITATE WITH THE LOCALS? WHICH ARE THE POSSIBLE ACTIONS THAT CITIES COULD UNDERTAKE IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS?

IN THE SAME TIME, ONE AIMS AT ANALYZING THE SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND NOT LEAST, THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGES THAT EUROPEAN CITIES FACE IN THE MIGRATION PROBLEM.

KEYWORDS: IMMIGRANTS, EUROPEAN CITIES, INTEGRATION, SUPPORT, CHALLENGE.

INTRODUCTION

European Union, this unique economic and political organization²⁸, turned out to be a magnet for the immigrants in the last years. With a population of over 446 million inhabitants and a surface of over 4 million km²⁹, UE is a place with high living standards, political predictability, economic stability, important independent organizations that assure the functioning of democracies in the member states. The rule of law is guaranteed and closely monitored in each member state. Despite the shortcomings of its institutions functioning, one can not deny that the European Union has had a major contribution to maintaining peace on the European continent in the last 50 years.

Peace, political stability, social support, economic development, employment opportunities, these are the main factors that determine people from abroad to choose countries from the European Union as adoptive-homes.

The present article approaches the migration phenomenon focusing on the entities that are the first ones to deal with this issue, that is to say, the hosting cities. Whenever immigrants arrive in a country, the local public administrations must take the first measures to manage the situation. And we refer here especially to the immigration waves and not necessarily to isolate cases. Although there are national legislation and national procedures to be applied in these kinds of situations, the burden of

²⁷ Collaborator, PhD., Babeş-Bolyai University, mihaelaboc@yahoo.com

²⁸ https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en#from-economic-to-political-union, Accessed 11 August 2020.

²⁹ https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en, Accessed 11 August 2020.

dealing with migration problems falls on the cities.

BEGINNINGS OF MIGRATION PHENOMENON IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Migration nowadays has two major causes. On the one hand, people leave their home-countries fleeing the war and therefore migration becomes a humanitarian issue. In this case, immigrants arrive in the host countries usually in big groups, unprepared, deprived of the minimum means of subsistence, and as a consequence urgent help is required.

On the other hand, people leave their home countries looking for a better working place which may ensure them a better living standard. Therefore, in this case, the immigrants are the labor force that the host countries need to carry out certain activities. Immigrants are coming to these countries usually thinking about going back home as soon as they have made enough money to justify their absence.

Another category of migrants is made out of people who decide to leave their home-countries not because they flee the war or because economic conditions oblige them to do so, but because they are seeking for a change, a living place that is more compatible to their personality, better career opportunities or just for simple personal reasons. But this special category is not very numerous and does not raise major issues.

Countries from the European Union have dealt with the migration phenomenon unevenly, in different periods and each of them adopted different measures that were supposed to help them keep under control of this phenomenon. Even though they are under the same umbrella, the EU, each European country has its specificity, particularities, its own cultural issues. Therefore, the migration issue has been approached differently according to the causes that started it, the reasons that determined the choice of that particular country, and the social and political environment of the host country. New political measures were undertaken according to the migration evolution, because migration is related to political development.³⁰

The first generation of migrants was formed in France in the 1970 's.³¹ The generation was mostly formed by Maghrebi workers (workers coming from North Africa Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria). In 1974, due to the fact that migration from North Africa was becoming a social issue, the French government established the first Secretariat of State for Immigration.³² In the same time, support organizations were established in order to guarantee the immigrants' rights.

1973 was marked by the rise of oil price, the Arab-Israeli war and the economic crisis that followed. In 1977, France introduced a scheme to provide financial inducements to immigrants to return home. At the same time, workers without documents were sent back home which determined hunger strikes. The level of racism also grew up in that period and numerous attacks were noticed against North Africans.³³

Considering the fact that the number of Maghrebi workers constantly increased³⁴, they were perceived by politicians as good voters. Therefore, in 1981, the Socialist Party platform included the proposal to give long-term residents the right to vote for the municipal elections. This proposal faced strong opposition both from French people and from Moroccan and Algerian governments. Invoking the need for constitutional amendments, this issue remained only at the level of the proposal.

³⁰Moses, Jonathon W., *Emigration and political development*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 59.

³¹Brand, Laurie E., *Citizens Abroad – Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa*, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 47.

³²Brand, Laurie E., *Citizens Abroad – Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa...*, 47.

³³Brand, Laurie E., *Citizens Abroad – Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa...*, 47

³⁴Stephen Castles, *Here for Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities*, (London: Pluto Press, 1984), 55.

Year	Algerians	Moroccans	Tunisians
1969	608000	143000	89000
1981	817000	444, 000	193000

In 1981, the restrictions on foreigners' rights of association were lifted and the common right of associations was to be applied to North Americans ever since. This was a major step forward in recognizing fundamental rights to foreigners in France³⁵.

As years passed by and the children of the migrants remained in France, a different associative generation has developed, a generation with a different mindset due to its professional and educational background. A generation ready to speak loud for their rights and asking for more and more acceptance. They are not willing to accept the living conditions their grand-parents and parents were forced to. On the other hand, they are still tied in certain ways by their old tradition which makes them difficult to be integrated into France. Therefore, frustration and lack of successful integration often end up in violent conflicts between the state authority and migrants.

To France, immigrants' integration is a very sensitive issue, approached differently by the politicians, according to the electorate they address to, *in a nation that cherishes an image of itself as a unified community of citizens, regardless of where they live.*³⁶

In other European countries, such as Germany, Belgium, or the Netherlands, the North African migration started after the 1960s, as completion or replacer of the Eastern European labor force (In Italy and Spain even later). Therefore, this wave of migration was seen as a temporary one, no worries for assimilation or integration of the migrant community.³⁷

The economic crisis of 1973 affected these countries too, and efforts were made to motivate the workers to go back to their home countries. Despite these efforts, a large number of workers used the liberal family reunification policy that most countries adopted over the years, and so the number of immigrants did not decrease but even grew up. Immigrants' families came with new challenges for European countries. It was not only about labor accords and workers' rights anymore. It was about new socio-political measures, cultural issues, and family integration.³⁸ In the Netherlands for example, in order to deal with this matter, in 1984 the Government created a consultative body where representatives of different minorities held seats. The Government needed to consult this body on any question related to minority policy.³⁹

In 1985, the long period non-Dutch residents (five years residence) were given the right to vote in municipal elections. In 1986 they could even run in municipal elections.⁴⁰ The Dutch government also supported the obtaining of Dutch citizenship without renouncing the citizenship of origin.⁴¹

As far as Germany is concerned, like the other European countries, it tried to encourage workers to go back home following the 1973 economic crisis. Even though the number of workers started to decrease shortly after adopting this policy, the number began to rise in the late 1970s.⁴² Taking advantage of the family reunification policy, the workers, reunited with their families, decided to stay in the adoptive country and so, a new generation was born with complex characteristics.

In 1982, Chancellor Helmut Kohl (right-oriented political coalition) militated for immigration restriction and repatriation. Obtaining German citizenship was not possible without renouncing to the citizenship of origin. This was valid until the year 2000 when German nationality law was changed.⁴³

Migration became a very serious issue for Germany starting with Angela Merkel's policy of opening the borders for Syrian refugees in 2015. A large number of persons fleeing war entered the European Union following Angela Merkel's announcement that refugees are welcome to Germany.

³⁵Brand, Laurie E., *Citizens Abroad – Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa*, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 48.

³⁶Weinar, Agnieszka, ed. *Emigration and Diaspora policies in the Age of Mobility*, (Springer international Publishing, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 2017), 86.

³⁷Weinar, Agnieszka, ed. *Emigration and Diaspora policies in the Age of Mobility* . . . , 50.

³⁸Weinar, Agnieszka, ed. *Emigration and Diaspora policies in the Age of Mobility* . . . , 50.

³⁹Weinar, Agnieszka, ed. *Emigration and Diaspora policies in the Age of Mobility* . . . , 50-51.

⁴⁰Weinar, Agnieszka, ed. *Emigration and Diaspora policies in the Age of Mobility* . . . , -51.

⁴¹Weinar, Agnieszka, ed. *Emigration and Diaspora policies in the Age of Mobility* . . . , 50-51.

⁴²Weinar, Agnieszka, ed. *Emigration and Diaspora policies in the Age of Mobility* . . . , 53.

⁴³Weinar, Agnieszka, ed. *Emigration and Diaspora policies in the Age of Mobility* . . . , 53.

Around one million refugees arrived in Germany in 2015, this large number raising a series of problems for the German Chancellor. At first, her decision was widely accepted being considered a humanitarian one and being supported by the general wave of emotion that gripped the European population. But as years passed by, the German Chancellor faced numerous critics from the opposition or even from her political coalition regarding the decision she took in 2015. There is no secret that her welcome had in the background the need for a cheap labor force, besides the humanitarian aspect. But the uncomfortable situations that managing this large number of refugees implied, cost her a decrease in popularity and raise her problems in the following elections.

Nonetheless, countries in the European Union seemed to understand that migration became normality nowadays. Even though migration waves are not that numerous, they still come constantly. Series of procedures and programs have been established at the European level to help countries deal with this phenomenon. Still, each country, each host-city must deal with the specific problems that migrants integration implies. The main challenge they face is to fill in the gap between the “inside” and “outside”⁴⁴ world which sometimes is source of racism, social frustration and even violence.

INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS -EUROPEAN UNION POLICY

Immigration became a priority to the institutions of the European Union for years now. 89% of Europe's population growth between 1999 and 2000 is due to immigration. Official statistics show that 4,6 million immigrants are Africans (the real number is estimated at around 8 million), that is to say, 30% of immigrants come from Africa.⁴⁵

The large number of people that migrate from Africa to Europe is justified by economical purposes. Migrants are looking for a safer and better place to live and form a family. Therefore, they come to Europe to stay, and thus the integration issue comes forehead.

At the same time, statistics show that the European population is aging. This causes imbalances in the social-economic system. Working people will have to support the retirement system which becomes a more and more heavy burden. The median age is expected to be 52,3 years old by 2050. On the other hand, 60 percent of Africa's population is under the age of 25 (and the natality rate is at a very high level). This young population, if well integrated, could help European economies stay performant at the international level.⁴⁶

Nonetheless, a recent study of the European Commission shows that migration has a limited effect on changing the EU's age structure. The reason for that is the fact that migrants settle for the long term and they age just as the native population does.⁴⁷ Therefore, demographic aging remains a trend in the EU, despite the young immigrant population that reaches the European territory.

As we have mentioned above, migration is usually caused nowadays by economic factors, by flee from war or political persecution. In the latest case, migrants are asking for asylum, and therefore, if granted, they can benefit from legal protection.

In 2018, 2.4 million people migrated to the EU from non-member countries. These are official figures given by EUROSTAT. At the same time, 3.9 million people immigrated to one of the EU member states and 2.6 million emigrants were reported to have left one of the EU member states.⁴⁸

Next, we will present some official relevant statistics for our study, the source being EUROSTAT.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Collyer, Michael, *Emigration Nations Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*, (Palgrave Macmillan, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship Series, London, 2013), 11.

⁴⁵ Mangala, Jack, *Africa and its global Diaspora – The policy and politics of Emigration*, African Histories and modernities, p.17, <https://www.springer.com/series/14758>, Accessed 15 August.

⁴⁶ Mangala, Jack, *Africa and its global Diaspora – The policy and politics of Emigration*, African Histories and modernities, p.17, <https://www.springer.com/series/14758>, Accessed 15 August.

⁴⁷ <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/demographic-scenarios-eu> , Accessed 17 August 2020.

⁴⁸ <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/1275.pdf> , Accessed 30 July 2020.

⁴⁹ <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/1275.pdf> , Accessed 17 August 2020.





Table 1: Immigrants from outside EU and emigrants to outside EU



(*) Includes Romanian data for 2009.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_acq)

eurostat

Table 2: Number of persons who acquired the citizenship of an EU member state (2009-2018)

In January 2019, 21.8 million non-EU citizens were living in one of the EU member states. That is to say, 4.9% of the EU population has the citizenship of a non-member country. Germany is the host for the larger number, 10.1 million persons, followed by Italy (5.3 million), France (4.9 million), and Spain (4.8 million).

On the other hand, 13.3 million persons living in one of the EU member states had the citizenship of another EU member state.⁵⁰

Within the European Union, the member states are primarily responsible for the integration of migrants, including their inclusion in the labor market. Historically, some European states imposed immigrants quota, therefore a previously established number of non-EU persons were accepted in the states, but recently, the general tendency is to introduce some specific criteria that applicants need to fulfill if they want to enter those states, following the model of the European Blue card. Thus, according to the state needs, the criteria refer to education, professional skills, experience in a certain field of activity, etc...

The European Union supports the national and local policies of immigrants' integration with

⁵⁰<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/1275.pdf>, Accessed 18 August 2020.

policy coordination, exchange of knowledge, and, of course, financial resources.⁵¹ Therefore, the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund has been created, which finances transnational projects to promote labor market integration. These types of projects can be also financed through the European Social Fund and the Employment and Social Innovation program.

After 2015, the EU significantly increased its funding for migration, asylum and integration policies, and these subjects became a priority on the European agenda.⁵² Workgroups reuniting specialists from all the implied fields of activity, including the civil society, have been created and supported in order to find better solutions and propose legislative modifications to help dealing with this phenomenon.

The EU law imposes some specific obligations to the member states as refer to immigrants. The Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU)⁵³ refers to the member states' obligation to provide asylum seekers decent reception conditions (housing, food, clothing, or a daily allowance and access to health care, psychological care, and employment. At the same time, in some specific, exceptional cases, the member states have the right to reduce or even withdraw all these material conditions (Art.20). Applicants for international protection have the right to enter the labor market, at the latest nine months after lodging their application (Article 15(1)). Still, the member states have the right to restrict access for reasons of labor market policy and give priority to Union citizens and EEA nationals, as well as legally resident third-country nationals (Article 15(2)).

Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU)⁵⁴ provides the member states' obligation to ensure access to integration facilities. The member states, considering the specific profile and needs of beneficiaries of refugee status or of subsidiary protection status, must establish integration programs in order to simplify the accommodation of beneficiaries with the new state and to integrate into the society.

In order to support member states in their effort of elaborating viable integration policies, on 7 June 2016, the European Commission adopted an Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals. This action plan describes in detail the measures that the European Commission will implement in this matter. Even though this Action plan refers to third-country nationals in the EU, it also contains actions to undertake within the challenges the refugees need to face.

As we have mentioned above, the European Union has established the framework for the migrants' integrations, but the responsibility belongs to member states. The European directives are transposed into the national legislation and so, each member state establishes specific actions and programs to be applied in order to facilitate the migrants' integration.

There are four types of migrants that come to the EU: labor migrants, demanders for asylum, beneficiaries of family integration programs, and seasonal workers. Migration within the member states is relatively more simply to be managed by the European institutions and that is because there are a series of common rights that the European citizens have and these rights are guaranteed by the European law, which each member state needs to respect.

Moreover, each state is politically represented at all levels within the European institutions, and therefore, having a common background and common political and law institutions, things are much simpler to manage. Things get a little bit more complicated when we talk about third-country migrants.

In these cases, besides the economic and social aspects, we also must deal with significant cultural differences which sometimes are very difficult to overcome. Labor migrants don't necessarily want to settle for good in the host country, and that is partly why they regard their stay as a temporary status and do not want to be integrated into the new community, but want to remain loyal to their old culture and traditions. People from the host-communities sometimes are reticent in letting someone new to disturb their way of living and here come the integration challenges.

⁵¹https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/integration_en, Accessed 16 August 2020.

⁵²<https://www.bruegel.org/2018/05/eu-funds-for-migration-asylum-and-integration-policies/>, Accessed 30 July 2020.

⁵³<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0033>, Accessed 17 August 2020.

⁵⁴<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32011L0095>, Accessed 17 August 2020.

In order to simplify migration procedures, in December 2011 was adopted the Single Permit Directive, which gives the non-EU workers legally residing in an EU state some important rights, out of which, the right to equal treatment with nationals in the country they work and reside.⁵⁵ This Directive is applicable to the majority of the non-EU workers who have the authorization to reside and work in the EU, ignoring the initial reason for accessing the UE territory. Therefore, this Directive refers to a single permit for residence and work, a single application procedure for the permit, and a series of rights such as working conditions, freedom of associations, education, recognition of diploma, tax benefits, social security, etc...⁵⁶

- Family reunification seems to be the main reason for immigration in the last 20 years.⁵⁷ Family reunification is the right given to the legal immigrant (the sponsor) to be reunited by his family. The Directive on the right to family reunification is applicable to 25 out of 27 member states (Ireland and Denmark are excepted) and includes a series of common procedures to be followed by family reunification seeker. The legal immigrant can be joined by his spouse, minor children and the children of their spouse. The reunification with an unmarried partner, adult dependent children, or dependent parents and grandparents could be allowed by the member states. After receiving the residence permit, the family members get access to education, labor force, and vocational training.⁵⁸

Member states have the right to establish some special admission conditions such as for the sponsor to have good accommodation conditions, health insurance, financial resource, and they can impose a waiting period of no more than two years. Polygamy is not accepted.

For the refugees, taking into account their special situation, the family reunification conditions are simplified.⁵⁹

The EU gives the possibility to long-term residents to receive the EU long-term permit as a consequence of the good behavior they had within the community for an uninterrupted period of five years.⁶⁰ Therefore, in 2003, the Directive on the status of non-EU nationals who are long-term residents has been adopted. This long-term residence permit can be received if the applicant fulfills some conditions such as having a stable financial situation and regular income, health insurance, not being a threat to public security and public policy, following some integration measures (if required by the member state).⁶¹

The long-term permit, which is renewable, gives the owner the possibility to enjoy certain rights as the EU citizens such as access to employment, education and vocational training, social protection, etc...⁶²

The European Union makes constant efforts in order to stop migrant smuggling.⁶³ Desperate people, fleeing war or hunger, contact criminal networks of smugglers that sell them the chance to enter the EU. Images showing numerous boats with hundreds of people crossing the Mediterranean Sea trying to reach the EU territory were very common and raised international compassion especially in 2015-2016. These criminal networks put people's lives in great danger for a very large amount of money. They are well connected to criminal networks within the EU territory which sometimes could offer counterfeit legal documents.

⁵⁵https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/work_en , Accessed 17 August 2020.

⁵⁶https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/work_en , Accessed 17 August 2020.

⁵⁷https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/family-reunification_en, Accessed 17 August 2020.

⁵⁸https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/family-reunification_en, Accessed 17 August 2020.

⁵⁹https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/family-reunification_en, Accessed 17 August 2020.

⁶⁰https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/long-term-residents_en, Accessed 18 August 2020.

⁶¹https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/long-term-residents_en, Accessed 18 August 2020.

⁶²https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/long-term-residents_en, Accessed 18 August 2020.

⁶³https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy_en, Accessed 17 August 2020.

These illegal migrants are very fragile and often subject to labor exploitation and trafficking in human beings.

In order to discourage the migrant smuggling, the EU had made some significant improvements within its legislation, strengthened the external borders, and the cooperation between surveillance authorities.⁶⁴

Despite all the efforts that the European Union undertakes in order to deal with the migration phenomenon, this remains a very sensitive subject. Rather we talk about the migration within the member states or about the migration from non-EU countries, this phenomenon comes with a series of challenges that are not all the time easy to deal with. According to the social-economic situation of a particular state, migration is often used as a political issue especially by right-oriented political parties, which determine an increase in frustration that eventually leads to social tensions, often reorientation of national policies or even acts of violence. Migration and its negative effect on the national economy was one of the favorite subjects of Brexit militants, raising many debates and frictions at the European level during Brexit negotiations.

Nonetheless, it is largely accepted within the European Union that migrants contribute to the development of their host society, rather we talk about economic, social, or cultural development.⁶⁵ It all depends on how the integration process succeeds.

INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS – ACTIONS TAKEN AT THE CITIES LEVEL

Integration is defined by the EU member states in their internal legislation, but the common ground for defining integration is the principle of a *dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation*.⁶⁶

From their experience, the member states noticed that the main integration challenges are connected to the difficulty in accessing the labor market, especially for women. The problematic issues are lack of language knowledge, lack of recognition of qualification or the need to accept a job that does not match the qualification or the skills of the applicant, and discriminatory practices applied by the employers.⁶⁷

Statistics show that the unemployment rate for people born outside the EU but EU residents is higher in the large majority of the EU countries. In the same time, as far as the risk of poverty or social exclusion is concerned, 21 % of nationals, 29 % of foreign EU citizens and 45 % of non-EU citizens living in the EU faced the risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2018.⁶⁸

2019 EU (27 member states) ⁶⁹	For those born outside the EU	For the native-born population	For those born in another EU Member State.
Employment rate for people aged 20 to 64 years	64.4 %	73.9 %	75.3 %
Unemployment rate for people aged 20 to 64 years	12.3 %	6.0 %	7.3 %

Figure 1

⁶⁴https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy_en, Accessed 17 August 2020.

⁶⁵https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/integration_en, Accessed 17 August 2020.

⁶⁶https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/00_eu_labour_market_integration_final_en.pdf, Accessed 1 August 2020.

⁶⁷https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/00_eu_labour_market_integration_final_en.pdf, Accessed 1 August 2020.

⁶⁸https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_at_risk_of_poverty_and_social_exclusion, Accessed 18 August 2020.

⁶⁹https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators, Accessed 18 August 2020.




Table 3

Migrant integration is a responsibility assumed at the national level, but in some cases, national authorities devolve some integration responsibilities to local authorities or subnational authorities.⁷⁰

In the end, local and regional authorities are the ones to deal directly with migrants, and therefore, they need to properly handle the support they take from the national and European level.

The main challenge the integration process supposes is the access to the labor market. Once the migrants defined their legal residence papers, they need to start supporting themselves. Sometimes, finding a job is not a very easy task to do. And the local authorities need to help them with this matter.

Finding a job is not the final chapter of the integration process. Integration also implies social aspects, cultural and educational aspects.

We present below some actions undertaken by several European cities that deal with migration, presented in a rapport of the Eurocities on Labor market integration of refugees and asylum seekers from December 2017.⁷¹

The above-mentioned report shows that regarding the integration of refugees in the labor market, cities such as Enschede, Lisbon, Milan, Ostend, Riga, and Tampere have direct responsibility, while Berlin, Dortmund, Munich, Nantes, Nuremberg, Stuttgart share responsibility with regional, federal or national governments.

Employment agencies, job centers, and the ministries for labor and social affairs are responsible. Munich, for example, has established a consultancy service for migrants in order to match the workers skills with the needs of local businesses.

Some European cities don't have a direct responsibility in migrant integration, but they assume an indirect, voluntary one. Barcelona and Ghent, for example, support complementary services, structures, or programs to complete the national ones.

Gothenburg, Malmo, and Stockholm cooperate with the state, which has direct responsibility through the Swedish public employment service, by providing support such as language courses, housing, etc.

As far as policymaking is concerned, some cities share this responsibility with job centers and the city's economic affairs, education, culture, and sports departments (Berlin, Dortmund, Enschede,

⁷⁰ file:///C:/Users/840G3/Downloads/MPIE_UrbanAgenda_LabourMarketIntegration-FINAL.pdf, Accessed 3 August 2020.

⁷¹ http://nws.eurocities.eu/MediaShell/media/Labour_market_integration_of_refugees_and_asylum_seekers.pdf, Accessed 5 August 2020.

Nuremberg, Riga, and Tampere). Others cooperate with social care services providers (Barcelona, Gothenburg, Malmo, Munich, Ostend, Stockholm, and Stuttgart). Some cities have dedicated structures for working on migration and refugees (Barcelona, Vienna, Milan, Lisbon).

Usually, most European cities, to address access to the labor market for the migrants, cooperate with different structures that might help in this endeavor.

Rather we talk about internal cooperation (interdepartmental cooperation within public authorities, usually under the coordination of the social affairs and integration department - Barcelona, Berlin, Dortmund, Enschede, Lisbon, Nuremberg, and Tampere - or cooperation with stakeholders (cooperation with private companies, social services, employment agencies, foundations, and other social and economic organizations), and NGOs (Barcelona, Berlin, Dortmund, Ghent, Gothenburg, Lisbon, Milan, Munich, Ostend, Nuremberg, Riga, Stockholm, Vienna), integration of migrants supposes a holistic approach, not only concerning access to the labor force. We refer here to health care, housing, language skills, psychological assistance. And this approach, due to its complexity, requires strong cooperation with institutions, public and private, from the regional and national levels, which is often formalized into formal agreements.

The big number of refugees and asylum seekers found some cities public administrations unprepared and they encountered big difficulties in dealing with this new situation. Therefore, cities like Enschede and Tampere hired new personnel to deal with integration into the labor market of refugees.

Cities also reported legislative issues regarding the difficulty of obtaining a residence permit and the diploma/skills recognition to be able to access the labor market (Berlin, Dortmund, Nuremberg, and Stuttgart). Therefore, they worked with the national authorities to promote laws that respond to the actual needs.

The Eurocities study that we refer to mention some measures undertaken at the local level by the cities to facilitate access for the migrants to the labor market. Out of these measures, we remind here the most important ones:

- free language courses (Berlin, Dortmund, Ghent, Gothenburg, Nuremberg, Malmo, Milan, Munich, Stockholm, Stuttgart, Tampere and Vienna, Malmo)
- motivational and counseling programs, information group activities (Berlin, Ghent, Malmo, Munich, Vienna)
- vocational training, education for skills development (Berlin, Milan)
- job-matching services (Barcelona, Berlin, Dortmund, Ghent, Gothenburg, Malmo, Milan, Munich, Nuremberg, Stockholm, Stuttgart, and Tampere).
- social clauses in public procurement (Barcelona)- clauses that encourage business that win public contracts to hire asylum seekers or refugees

The above-mentioned services for the migrants are free and provided in different languages. As far as the money is concerned, it comes from the city, national, federal, and EU level (European Social Fund, e Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund) or public-private sponsorship.

MIGRATION ISSUE IN ROMANIA

Romania became a member of the EU in 2007. Every since, it adopted into its national legislation the community acquis and the legislation regarding immigrants do not make an exception. The national main normative acts that refer to migrants are the Emergency Ordinance no. 194/2002 regarding the aliens' regime, the Law no. 122/2006 regarding the Asylum in Romania and the Ordinance no.44/2004 on the social integration of foreigners who have acquired a form of protection in Romania.

Romania is one of the European countries with the highest percentage of emigrants, one estimating that if this trend continues, by 2060 the Romanian population will decrease to around 12 million inhabitants.

The high level of emigration determined a lack of working force in Romania, which determines the entrepreneurs to seek workers in non-EU countries.

Romania is traditionally considered to be a friendly country for foreigners. Due to the fact that in the last 25 years Romanian citizens had the chance to travel much more easily abroad and with the change in generations, Romanians became more open-minded. Still, especially in rural or less developed areas, one can still find racism and intolerance towards foreigners. A recent example was the case of a bakery in Ditrău, Harghita county, where hundreds of locals protested against hiring workers from Sri Lanka. Local authorities tried to settle the conflict and the large national opinion was supportive to Sri Lanka workers.

In order to have a general overview of the situation of migrants in Romania, we have addressed a request to the General Inspectorate for immigration and by the response to our address no.347866, they have communicated us the following statistics:

Figure 2: Illegal Migrants

State of origin	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	30.04.2020	Total
IRAK	71	256	1012	202	78	27	1646
SYRIA	154	125	205	41	39	123	687
AFGANISTAN	61	73	50	25	71	39	319
PAKISTAN	17	103	83	30	17	2	252
IRAN	24	25	117	44	29	4	243
OTHER	107	238	184	164	160	155	1008
TOTAL	434	820	1651	506	394	350	415

Figure 3: Asylum applications

State of origin	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	30.04.2020	Total
IRAK	117	292	2589	970	622	111	4701
SYRIA	228	182	494	87	153	269	1413
AFGANISTAN	90	66	240	43	174	133	746
IRAN	22	17	198	160	116	2	515
PAKISTAN	20	82	231	29	32	4	398
OTHER	102	157	258	263	724	422	1926
TOTAL	579	796	4010	1552	1821	941	9699

State of origin	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	30.04.2020
MOLDAVIA	9272	10485	10313	9990	11920	13101
TURKEY	8882	9087	9317	9235	10458	10564
CHINA	7542	7728	7894	7894	8391	8380
VIETNAM	820	790	1150	3026	5447	5623
SYRIA	4505	4852	5282	5255	5252	5204
OTHER	2923	31955	33179	33782	40878	44372
TOTAL	60257	64897	67135	69182	82346	87244

Figure 4: Migrants with a residence permit

State of origin	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	30.04.2020	Total
VIETNAM	18	51	624	2508	3797	586	7584
TURKEY	270	289	425	644	1796	612	4036
SRI LANKA	85	124	199	415	1832	570	3225
NEPAL	4	49	136	411	1707	860	3167
CHINA	332	374	491	529	1072	169	2967
OTHER	915	833	1088	1860	6152	2431	13279
TOTAL	1624	1720	2963	6367	16356	5228	34258

Figure 5: Working permit

As the above figures show, migration doesn't raise, at present, major problems for Romania. But if emigration continues in such a large proportion, the Romanian entrepreneurs will need to seek more and more workforce into the non-EU countries.

CONCLUSION

Migration is a continuous phenomenon that comes with significant challenges for the countries involved. Rather we talk about refugees, temporary workers, or asylum seekers, in the end, the purpose remains the integration of the migrants into the host communities. Failure to do so gives birth to frustrations, poverty, acts of violence, and thus disturbs the equilibrium and the well-being of the community.

Our analysis showed that EU countries take similar actions while dealing with integration, being all of them under the umbrella of the European legislation.

Nevertheless, the European cities develop pilot programs for the integration of migrants, according to the specific problems they encounter. Sharing experiences and working together to find improved solutions to this phenomenon could end up in better integration.

Thus, what we consider the cities need to do is not only to work on the integration of migrants but also to work on acceptance by the locals. The key to finding an equilibrium in their community is, apart from financial resources that integration requires, education on both sides, equal rights and opportunities, tolerance, and social participatory programs. It is essential to learn to accept and respect the differences in behavior, culture, or mentality but the respect needs to be mutual.

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EXPLORATION AND ASSIMILATION OF ARCTIC TERRITORIES BY RUSSIA

Mihai-Răzvan ILEA⁷²

ABSTRACT:

FOR CENTURIES, THE ARCTIC HAS BEEN A TERRITORY THAT DUE TO THE SEVERE CLIMATE HAS BEEN DIFFICULT TO EXPLORE AND ASSIMILATE. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING THE EXPANSION TO THE EAST, RUSSIA MANAGED TO ENCOMPASS THE TERRITORIES OF THE NORTH OF THE EURASIAN CONTINENT. FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THIS PROCESS, WHICH LASTED SEVERAL CENTURIES, FOR A PERIOD OF TIME THE ARCTIC AREA MEANT FOR THE RUSSIAN LEADERS ONLY A BUFFER ZONE FROM WHICH THEY CANNOT BE ATTACKED. IT WAS NOT UNTIL LATER THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD THE POTENTIAL OF THIS REGION AND TRIED TO ASSIMILATE IT WITH THE HELP OF SEVERAL AUTHORITIES IN ORDER TO EXPLOIT IT. DUE TO THE VASTNESS AND CLIMATIC CONDITIONS, THE SUCCESS OF THE SOVIETS WAS LIMITED. AFTER THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONTINUED THE SOVIET EFFORTS TO ASSIMILATE THESE TERRITORIES, MAKING THEM ONE OF THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND HOW IMPORTANT THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THIS REGION ARE, THE EFFORTS OF THE RUSSIAN STATE TO ASSIMILATE AND EXPLOIT THE POLAR TERRITORIES OVER THE CENTURIES WILL BE PRESENTED AND ANALYZED.

KEYWORDS: EXPLORATION, ASSIMILATION, RESOURCES, ARCTIC, RUSSIA

INTRODUCTION

The Arctic has been and is closely linked to the evolution of Russia over the centuries, representing a border difficult to explore even nowadays. Due to the immensity of these territories, Russia needed several centuries to explore and assimilate these territories. In the sixteenth century, Russia began to expand eastward by enlarging its territories beyond the Urals, managing in 1680 to extend to the Pacific Ocean, and in 1741 to occupy Alaska. This expansion was largely not conducted by the state, but by Russian traders in search of furs and other riches, thus the true potential of the Arctic was understood much later.

Despite the assimilation of the Arctic territories and their exploration, Russia's presence in the region was limited until the twentieth century, when the Soviets understood the potential of these territories that the countries perceived only as a buffer zone from which the Tsarist Empire could not be attacked. The Soviets began exploring these territories and tried to turn the Arctic into a base of resources, but were only successful to some extent due to technological limitations and extreme conditions. Instead, contemporary Russia, which has failed to develop its economy and remained dependent on the export of natural resources, has turned the development of the Arctic into a national mission as its currently exploited deposits are being depleted. For these reasons, the Arctic remained an undiscovered territory. Russia's assimilation of the Arctic territories represents a particular case as the natural order of events has been reversed. They have been able to assimilate huge areas of

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territories, but failed to fully explore them as opposed to the natural order where territories are generally explored and later on assimilated.

From the evolutionary context of the contemporary Russian economy (which is largely based on the export of natural resources), of the situation of the Arctic (which is one of the last unexplored territories) and the phenomenon of global warming, we draw the thesis of the present research, respectively how Russia assimilated these territories and why it has been involved in the development of exploitation projects of Arctic resources at an unprecedented level.

The research objectives are to present the evolution of events in order to understand the role that these territories have for the contemporary Russian state. The research questions are: What does the Arctic represent for Russia? How has Russia explored and assimilated the Arctic territories over time? Why did Russia need so much time to assimilate and explore the Arctic territories? Why is Russia currently looking to develop the Arctic territories?

The research hypothesis of this paper starts from the idea that the Arctic is very important for Russia and over time, in various forms, has influenced its history. To understand this, we analyze how Russia assimilated and explored the Arctic, the different forms the country took over time and what role these territories have played for Russians in each historical stage. This topic has also been addressed by authors such as Scott G. Borgerson, Marlene Laruelle and Paul R. Josephson.

The paper consists of an introduction that raises awareness to the subject, namely how Russia explored and assimilated the Arctic territories. The content of the paper consists of three parts, the first covering the period until the end of the Tsarist Empire, the second covering the period of the Soviet Union and the third covering the period of contemporary Russia. Based on the facts presented in the three parts, a series of conclusions will be formulated at the end of the paper.

1. THE EXPANSION OF THE TSARIST EMPIRE IN THE ARCTIC AND EXPLORATION OF THESE TERRITORIES

The Arctic area in the literature is identified as the frozen region in Earth's Northern Hemisphere located beyond the Polar Circle, more precisely beyond the latitudinal line of 66 ° 34 'North.⁷³ For centuries, due to its extreme natural and climatic characteristics, it was a frontier that was very difficult to reach. Despite the inaccessibility, it has attracted the interest of many countries due to the riches it presents. One of the states with a historical link to these territories is Russia, as presented below.

By the end of the 16th century, Moscow had managed to assimilate all the territories in the western part of the Ural Mountains. In 1581, the Russians managed to cross the Ural Mountains, in 1628 reached the Yenisei River and in 1680 reached the Pacific Ocean. In the next century, in 1741, they managed to cross the Bering Strait and occupy Alaska. Led by merchants looking for furs⁷⁴, this expansion was directed to the East, but also included the territories in the North of present-day Russia, territories that in the following centuries became a security buffer that served as a protective wall for a state that always feared being surrounded.⁷⁵

Even though Northern territories had been assimilated, Russian leaders did not explore them until they had to protect Russia's interests over them. Following this situation, at the beginning of the 19th century, a series of Russian expeditions were organized, such as those of F. Litke (1821-1824), G. Ber (1837) and P.P. Kruzenshtern (1862). In the second half of the 19th century, the Tsarist Empire was no longer interested in the Arctic, despite states such as Britain, Norway, Sweden and Germany showing an interest in exploring them in search of new areas for fishing and coal extraction from Spitsbergen Island. Proof of these actions is the fact that the Swedes arrived on Spitsbergen Island and the Germans arrived on Bear Island, both islands being part of the Svalbard Archipelago,

⁷³ "What is the Arctic?", National Snow & Ice Data Center, accessed April 25, 2020, <https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/arctic.html>.

⁷⁴ Marlene Laruelle, *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 25.

⁷⁵ Kathrin Hille, "Russia's Arctic Obsession", *Financial Times*, October 21, 2016, accessed April 25, 2020, <https://ig.ft.com/russian-arctic/>.

an archipelago that in 1871 was annexed by the Swedes. Also, in 1872 the Franz-Josef territories were discovered.⁷⁶

Due to the neglect of the Arctic territories by the Russians, the Norwegians began to take advantage of this situation by fishing in Russian waters and selling the catch to the Russians. Following the situation, Russian leaders began to assess the economic and strategic potential of the region and adopted local protection laws such as banning Norwegian fishermen from storing their catch in Russian ports and building new ports such as the port of Aleksandrovsk (now Polyarny).⁷⁷

Following the development of ports in the North, the Russians, Germans and British began to develop the Kara Route on a small scale, used to transport materials needed to build the Trans-Siberian Railway. The use of this route revealed the need for exploration and mapping in order to be used in the transport of goods, resulting in a mission in 1897 to research the area. Despite the research of that region, it was not possible to operationalize this route. In the same year, the Murman Scientific Expedition Committee was set up to remedy the precarious situation of the Russian settlements on the Arctic shores, during which the possibility of fishing in the Arctic waters was discovered. Shortly after this discovery was made, English and German trawlers began fishing in Russia's Arctic waters.⁷⁸

Following this situation, in 1899 the Tsarist Empire sent its first icebreaker, Yermak, to the Svalbard Archipelago in order to assert its rights to this archipelago. Following the voyage, it was found that an icebreaker can reach places that conventional ships cannot reach. At the same time, the Russian banker M.K. Sidorov and a number of Russian lawyers sought to demonstrate the partially closed sea status of the Kara Sea in order to turn it into national territory and to declare the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago Russian territory.⁷⁹

To protect its interests in the Arctic territories, Russia began to be more active in the region by exploring it in the early twentieth century. Thru these efforts, the Russians tried to make their presence felt after a series of Scandinavian expeditions in The Kara Sea in the second half of the nineteenth century, which represented more of the total number of expeditions than the ones led by Russia. Following these events, the Russians launched a large number of expeditions to the Arctic. One of the best-known expeditions is the Russian Polar Expedition from 1900 to 1902, which was led by the Russian geologist of Baltic origin, Eduard Toll, who conducted the expedition because he believed that navigation along the Siberian coast should be developed. Unfortunately, the expedition failed in 1902, after abandoning the ship Zarya and returning by the Lena River.⁸⁰

Following this expedition, the Vice Admiral of the Imperial Navy Stepan O. Makarov tried to convince the tsarist leadership of the immense potential of the Kara Route and requested the construction of a fleet of icebreakers, but was refused. In 1904, war broke out between Russia and Japan, marking the moment when the potential of the sea crossings in the Arctic waters was accomplished, after the Trans-Siberian railway became overworked by military transport. As a result of this situation, the Kara Route became of use, with a successful expedition of 17 ships and an icebreaker. Unfortunately, this expedition was not large enough and failed to transport enough military equipment to the East, being one of the reasons why the Tsarist Empire lost the war with Japan in 1905.⁸¹

Following the loss of the war, the huge advantage of the much shorter sea route through the Arctic waters was found, and shortly after the war the Russian leadership began to finance the exploration of this sea passage. In 1906, a commission studied the Northeast Passage project and recommended the construction of two icebreakers to map the northern coast of Siberia. To carry out this project, a naval department was created to provide the two new icebreakers, which were built in Russia and were named Taymyr and Vaygach, named after the territories they were to explore. The

⁷⁶ Pier Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic*, (New York: Routledge, 1991) 8-10.

⁷⁷ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic ...*, 17-18.

⁷⁸ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic ...*, 18-19.

⁷⁹ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic ...*, 8-10.

⁸⁰ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic ...*, 13-14.

⁸¹ Marlene Laruelle, *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North*, 25-26.

two icebreakers were sent East to Vladivostok from where they would begin exploring the Arctic route to the West.⁸²

In 1911, the Northwest Passage exploration operation was initiated, in which the two icebreakers started from Vladivostok and mapped the shores of Siberia from East to West. In 1914, the two were trapped in the ice near Cape Celiuskin, and the Russians sought help from the Norwegians, who offered their support and managed to unblock them. During this period, only once was it possible to cross the passage in 1914, by Nordenskiöld's expedition, which was made in 2 seasons after the ship was stuck in ice. In addition to successfully crossing the sea, Nordenskiöld's expedition discovered the Severnaya Zemlya Archipelago and helped identify the Northern territories that belonged to Russia.⁸³

In 1916 Russia sent a diplomatic note to its allies and to the neutral states claiming the new islands it discovered, but also islands discovered by other states such as Bennett, Herald, Jeannette and Wrangel islands based on the principle of contiguity (neighboring territories), which meant that most of the islands that were discovered near the coast of Siberia would belong to Russia due to their position. Based on this diplomatic note from 1916, the northern border of Russia was described with relative accuracy for the first time. Unfortunately, the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution marked the end of the Russian Northern exploration.⁸⁴

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia adopted a more active policy in relation to the territories of the Arctic only after feeling its sovereignty threatened in the region, when the Norwegians began fishing in Russian waters in the North - West and the Americans began to make their presence felt in the East. Only after these situations the Russians began to explore, develop and finally claim and delimit their northern territories. As a result of these events, the northern territories truly became territories under Russian sovereignty.⁸⁵

2. INVOLVEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARCTIC TERRITORIES

Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution, the leadership of the Soviet Union in the 1920s began to realize the potential of the Arctic and to show increasing interest in this region in order to strengthen sovereignty through the development of the Northern Sea Route. The development of this passage was continued with the establishment of a research station in Murmansk, which mainly researched fishing, and was later transformed into the Northern Industrial Scientific Expedition. Also, for the research of Northern waters, the Floating Research Institute was created, which had the mission of mapping and researching all the Siberian rivers and their connections with the Arctic Ocean. Following the fast progress of aviation at that time, the Soviet Union began to develop trans-Arctic aviation, which stimulated research in the Arctic.⁸⁶

Following the awareness of the potential of this region, the Soviet leadership set the goal of transforming the Northern territories into a production area. These territories presented a real challenge because, by the 1920s, the nearly 6000 kilometers of Arctic coast stretching from northern Europe from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait were not even properly mapped.⁸⁷

Despite the expansion of the borders to the Bering Strait, the great challenge for the Soviets was to establish administrative control over self-governing Arctic territories. In the first stage, the Soviets tried to establish local party cells or executive committees, which failed. The next solution during the 1920s was to assign responsibility to popular institutions, committees and commissariats,

⁸² Pier Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic*, 15.

⁸³ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic ...*, 15-16.

⁸⁴ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic ...*, 16.

⁸⁵ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic ...*, 19-20.

⁸⁶ Marlene Laruelle, *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North*, 26.

⁸⁷ John McCannon, *Red Arctic – Polar Exploration and The Myth of The North in The Soviet Union*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 5.

which coordinated their activity far too vaguely, which led to overlapping responsibilities and limiting Soviet activity in the region.⁸⁸

All these efforts focused on these territories were carried out by the Soviets in order to establish the authority for the development of the economic potential of the Arctic. After managing to enter these territories, in the initial phase, the Soviets focused on the animal industry and foreign trade, which consisted of the development of fur collection centers and the export of timber from Siberia, and later the fishing industry was developed, which became one of the food sources of the Soviet Union.⁸⁹

Despite attempts to assimilate and develop the Arctic territories, a major problem of the Soviets was that they did not have the necessary training and equipment to conduct economic activities in the region due to lack of scientific knowledge. Following this situation, during the 1920s, several scientific commissions and academies were set up to research the polar territories.⁹⁰

Finally, the approach of using multiple authorities in the assimilation of the Arctic territories proved to be erroneous, at which point the Soviets adopted a new approach to the administration of the Arctic territories, which consisted of centralizing these agencies within a single authority. The authority chosen to coordinate maritime and economic activity along the Northern Sea Route was the Committee of the Northern Sea Route (Komseveroput) which has existed since 1920, but became the main authority responsible for the Arctic only in 1928 with the launch of the First Five-Year Plan. Gradually, from the management of the waterway, this authority came to coordinate the work of several dozen agencies and to have more responsibilities that were established through the Five-Year Plans. This authority became very important after the Northern Sea Route was included as a key element in the Soviet Union's plans for the development of the Arctic territories, by developing the maritime transport network along the Arctic seas to be connected by Siberian rivers to Trans-Siberian railway.⁹¹

Komseveroput together with the Arctic Institute, during the 1920s managed to make a series of voyages that helped to successfully map the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago (1921), the Franz Josef Archipelago (1923), Wrangel Island (1924), the New Siberian Islands and Laptev Sea (1927) and make voyages on the rivers Ob, Yenisei, Kolyma and Lena. All these successes helped to strengthen the knowledge of the Soviets in order to build the infrastructure necessary for the operationalization of the North Sea Route, such as ports, supply bases and radio stations. These elements favored maritime and river transport in the region, which helped to develop trade by exporting raw materials and importing industrial equipment.⁹²

Repeated transport trips on the Kara route during the 1920s helped to strengthen the experience of Soviet navigators who increased the navigation period from 48 days in 1920 to 70 days in 1928, which contributed to the significant increase in the volume of transported goods. This experience helped to make further trips to the East and to increase the volume of trade in the Arctic, but they were not efficient because much of the volume of goods transported was for export and far too little for import. Despite economic problems, these trips helped to strengthen the Soviet presence in the Arctic.⁹³

During the first Five-Year Plan, Komseveroput helped strengthen the Soviet presence in the Arctic by consolidating the infrastructure elements and increasing the number of trips to the region that led to a growth in the number of inhabitants in the Arctic territories. Despite establishing a permanent presence, the Committee failed to develop the agriculture needed to transform these settlements to be able to sustain themselves, which led to a very costly process for the Soviet Union, and ended up having to permanently supply these settlements with food.⁹⁴

⁸⁸ McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 5, 21-22, 23.

⁸⁹ McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 22.

⁹⁰ McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 24.

⁹¹ McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 5, 24, 25.

⁹² McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 26-27.

⁹³ McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 28-29.

⁹⁴ McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 31-32.

Despite the contribution to the assimilation of the Arctic territories, in 1932 Komseveroput was abolished because it could not meet the expectations in the Five-Year Plan, which deviated much from the initial plans to develop exports of timber, fishing and hunting to the development of natural resources. In 1932, the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput) was set up to explore and develop the Arctic, and was led by explorer Otto Schmidt. This agency assimilated all Komseveroput staff and received much more power, managing the work of around 200,000 people and being responsible for the research, development, exploitation and transport of natural resources in the region. The new agency continued the development of the Northern Sea Route in order to operationalize the maritime passage and transport natural resources from the Arctic territories. In the 1930s, metals from the Kola Peninsula, coal from Vorkuta, oil and gas from Ukhta were exploited with priority, and in the 1940s the exploitation of metal deposits began in the Norilsk region, in the context of the Soviet Union adopting a new strategy for the rapid development of the industry.⁹⁵

Glavsevmorput became the most powerful authority to gain control of all Soviet forces in the North, but because of its complexity it failed to determine its main purpose, namely scientific research or industrial development. In 1933 the agency turned to economic development, neglecting research due to pressure from the Soviet leadership, seeking to use the polar stations in the development of the Arctic territories.⁹⁶

In an attempt to operationalize the Northern Sea Route, since 1932 Glavsevmorput has organized a series of expeditions along the entire maritime passage to be completed in a single season, succeeding in 1936 to organize the first commercial voyage consisting of a convoy of 14 ships carrying cargo. After that, the agency aimed to develop navigation on Siberian rivers by extending the length of navigation routes.⁹⁷

In terms of exploration, Glavsevmorput distinguished itself by sea voyages along the Northern Sea Route, by conducting trans-Arctic flights and landings at the North Pole such as the 1937 landing, and by establishing the first outpost at the North Pole. All these expeditions strengthened the prestige of the Soviet Union in the Arctic.⁹⁸ Despite the great successes, Glavsevmorput failed to live up to expectations after encountering a number of logistical and economic difficulties due to accidents, which came to affect its funding, as it failed to capitalize on the Arctic territories due to the failure to coordinate the work of his staff.⁹⁹

Eventually due to the poor economic results Glavsevmorput was demoted in favor of Dalstroy (Main Administration for Construction in the Far North) which led to the transfer of economic responsibilities and staff to the new authority responsible for the Arctic. This authority was chosen because it had results through its approach. It initially developed the infrastructure and only later the exploitation of natural resources (these results are found in the way the gold deposits in the Kolyma River area were exploited after developing the infrastructure in the region). In 1938, in turn, Dalstroy was assimilated and integrated into the GULAG system, which addressed the development of the exploitation of the Arctic territories with the help of forced labor camps that lasted until 1956. This approach was changed with the rise of Nikita Khrushchev to the leadership of the Soviet Union, who made the decision to use paid labor instead of forced one.¹⁰⁰

Following the demotion of Glavsevmorput, that was not disbanded but was given a single mission, the operationalization of the Northern Sea Route, which it did in 1939. The operationalization of this maritime passage proved very useful with the beginning of World War II in 1939, reaching to transfer its military fleet, natural resources and supplies received from the Americans with the help of the Northern Sea Route.¹⁰¹ After the war, the Glavsevmorput was recognized by the Soviets as a success and was honored for its support of the Red Army, resuming its

⁹⁵ Marlene Laruelle, *Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North*, 26.

⁹⁶ John McCannon, *Red Arctic – Polar Exploration and The Myth of The North in The Soviet Union*, 34-40.

⁹⁷ McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 55-56.

⁹⁸ McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 68-78.

⁹⁹ McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 145-146.

¹⁰⁰ McCannon, *Red Arctic...*, 168-170.

¹⁰¹ Pier Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic*, 68-69.

activity and having the largest fleet of icebreakers and aircraft operating in the Arctic until 1970, when it was replaced in 1971 by the Administration of the Northern Sea Route.¹⁰²

In 1950 the Soviet Union resumed the Polar Expeditions by establishing floating stations at the North Pole, which were continued until the late 1980s. These expeditions helped to discover an underwater mountain range, namely the Lomonosov Ridge and the accumulation of information for submarines by researching the salinity of seawater that influences the operation of sonars. During these expeditions, in 1977, another success was recorded by navigating to the North Pole with the help of the Arktika nuclear icebreaker.¹⁰³

In the context of the Cold War, throughout the Arctic, exploration received a military connotation in which the Soviet Union competed with the United States in the construction and use of submarines in navigation under the ice of the Arctic Ocean, in order to develop strategic advantages in the situation of a nuclear attack.¹⁰⁴

Exploring these territories proved useful in helping to resume commercial transport activities, which in 1956 were highlighted by Nikita Khrushchev who called for the transformation of the Northern Sea Route into a mass transport route. Following this request, freight transport was reorganized in the region, new vessels capable of navigating Arctic waters were purchased and new, more powerful icebreakers were developed. One of the consequences of this request was the development of nuclear icebreakers that were much more powerful, the first such ship being put into operation in 1957, named Lenin.¹⁰⁵

Continued exploration and research in the Arctic have paid off for the Soviets, who in the 1960s and 1970s made a number of important discoveries such as a number of important oil and natural gas fields in the Kara Sea, the Yamal Peninsula and the West of Siberia. An extensive project was developed on the deposits in Western Siberia, which involved the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Ukraine, by transporting the necessary materials and equipment through the Northern Sea Route.¹⁰⁶

Despite technological progress, the construction of new port facilities in the North and the development of a new fleet of ships capable of navigating Arctic waters, every few years there is an anomaly that makes the ice much more resistant, which shows that the Arctic area was not fully understood. Such anomalies took place in 1965, when 40 ships were damaged, in 1979 when 124 ships were damaged and in 1983 when about 70 ships were blocked in the western section of the Northern Sea Route, several ships were damaged and one of them sunk. These incidents reveal the technological limitations of the Soviet Union, which, despite sustained efforts to develop the Arctic, has failed to gain full control over these territories.¹⁰⁷

3. CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA AND THE EXPLOITATION OF ARCTIC NATURAL RESOURCES

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, projects for the Arctic began to face a state of uncertainty about their future. Shortly after the collapse, wages and buildings in Arctic cities lost their state subsidies, leading to a sharp decline in the urban population of the Arctic from 2.7 million to 2 million inhabitants. As a result of this event, many small towns in the Arctic have been abandoned or their population has fallen sharply.¹⁰⁸

During the 1990s, Russia faced a number of economic problems caused by the transition to a market economy that severely affected economic activities that led to the abandonment of many settlements in the region and the suspension of many exploration missions. But during the 2000s, several states such as the United States, China and Canada became more involved in the region,

¹⁰² John McCannon, *Red Arctic – Polar Exploration and The Myth of The North in The Soviet Union*, 173-176.

¹⁰³ Pier Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic*, 108.

¹⁰⁴ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic...*, 107-110.

¹⁰⁵ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic...*, 118-119.

¹⁰⁶ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic...*, 130-133.

¹⁰⁷ Horensma, *The Soviet Arctic...*, 121.

¹⁰⁸ Paul R. Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 334.

attracting the attention of the Moscow leadership, which revised its vision on the Arctic territories after it came under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. Since 2001, Russia has organized a series of research expeditions to collect data related to the claim of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean.¹⁰⁹

Russia's new strategy for the Arctic has been outlined by Vladimir Putin, who believes that the exploitation of natural resources will underpin the development of Russia's new economy. In Putin's view, Russia's vast reserve of resources would turn it into a major economic power through the development of the natural resource extraction and processing industry. Under these conditions, during the 2000s, the Russian president pursued a policy of gaining control of the state over the reserves of natural resources and their development.¹¹⁰

Within this strategy, the huge deposits of natural resources that were discovered in the Arctic territories were transformed into one of the main directions of development pursued by the Russian state. Under these conditions, the Russian leadership has adopted a series of laws by which Russia strengthens its sovereignty over the area of economic exclusivity and the continental shelf. In 2001, Russia has submitted additional claims in connection with the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean, in an attempt to extend the area of economic exclusivity up to the North Pole, which covers an area of about 1.2 million km². Russia's claim was incomplete and rejected, which is why the Russians adopted a policy to conduct research in the Arctic in order to assimilate these territories, launching a series of new expeditions. One of the best known of these expeditions took place in 2007 when Russia, with the help of submarines, mounted its flag on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean at the North Pole.¹¹¹

After experiencing a period of economic prosperity during the 2000s due to the export of natural resources, it was even more determined in the development of the exploitation of the Arctic natural resources. This determination was found in the creation in 2011 of a special army corps for the Arctic and the development of the third generation of nuclear icebreakers. In 2012, only for the mapping of the Lomonosov Ridge, Russia allocated a budget of 70 million dollars and made an anniversary expedition with the Arktika icebreaker to the North Pole.¹¹²

Within this ambition, the development of the Northern Sea Route plays a central role in the progress of the exploitation of Arctic natural resources. That is why the development of a new generation of nuclear icebreakers is very important, as their mission is to support freight journeys between Asia and Europe along the Northern Sea Route, and their most important activity is to facilitate access to hydrocarbon extraction areas. The reason behind the interest for these deposits found in the Arctic, is because are among the largest deposits of unexplored natural resources in the world. To understand how valuable these territories are, in 2012 alone, about 11% of Russia's GDP and 22% of Russia's export earnings were generated from the Arctic territories which are occupied by only 1% of the country's population.¹¹³ Under these conditions, Vladimir Putin signed a law in 2012 by which he created the Northern Sea Route Administration, which would deal with the management of the sea passage.¹¹⁴

In addition, Russia's determination to exploit natural resources is also reflected in how it perceives climate change as a phenomenon that favors access to areas that were previously inaccessible to exploitation. In these circumstances, one of the reasons why Russia has begun to support expeditions and scientific research on the Arctic, is to find the best methods of exploiting natural resources in an environment that is in the process of change due to climate changes. Under these conditions, climate change is perceived by Russian specialists as a result of the natural cycle, and they seek to highlight the benefits they bring such as the opening of the Northern Sea Route. This stream of benefits from climate change has ultimately led to the influence of Russia's policy on this

¹⁰⁹ Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*..., 337-339.

¹¹⁰ Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*..., 340.

¹¹¹ Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*..., 343-345.

¹¹² Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*..., 345-346, 348.

¹¹³ Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*..., 350.

¹¹⁴ ***, "Putin signed the law on the establishment of the administration of the Northern Sea Route", *Ria Novosti*, July 30, 2012, accessed April 27, 2020, <https://ria.ru/20120730/712578195.html#ixzz2WbacgHFe>.

issue. An example of a political decision taken in this regard was in 2010, when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev withdrew Russia from the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that the limits set in this protocol are intended to limit Russia's actions to assimilate natural resources.¹¹⁵

Research and studies conducted by the Russians in the Arctic have revealed that the area is undergoing changes such as the shrinking of ice-covered water surface and has proven the existence of global warming. These findings are used by the Russians to support economic interests. It can be seen that the Russians are aware of the danger that climate change represents, but take the risk and get involved in the exploitation of resources in the fragile environment of the Arctic.¹¹⁶

Following the discovery of the immense potential of the Arctic territories and the legacy of knowledge gained by the Soviet Union, contemporary Russia has the determination and ambition to develop large-scale projects in assimilating Arctic natural resources, ignoring any danger that may arise in the Arctic. One example is the fact that the development of large-scale exploitation of natural resources requires an enormous amount of electricity, a problem for which Russia has found the solution to build floating nuclear reactors to power the Arctic shores.¹¹⁷

All of the above show the determination of contemporary Russia in the exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic. This action represents a new stage in the history of Russia, a country that most often tried to compensate for its weaknesses through its actions. After the defeats suffered during the Second World War, Russia pursued the development of military technology and during the Cold War, after falling behind from a technological stand point, it developed the industry strongly, a phenomenon that repeats itself even today.¹¹⁸

CONCLUSIONS

In the period before the disappearance of the Tsarist Empire, the Arctic was perceived more as a buffer territory that provided security from which Russia could not be attacked. Russia's expansion was not directed towards these territories, but was directed towards the East, including in its course the Northern territories. Russian tsars began to be interested in this region in order to claim it so would not be assimilated by other states, this happened only after other states began to explore them. Under these conditions, the Russians were too late in realizing the potential of the Arctic, only after the Tsarist Empire lost the war with Japan.

Instead, the Soviet Union had a different view of the Arctic territories, which it sought to assimilate in order to exploit natural resources. Over time, in addition to exploration missions, the Soviets used various agencies that had different approaches to assimilate and exploit the Arctic territories, such as: Komseveroput, which made expeditions to develop naval transport; Glavsevmorput, which developed polar stations to be used in the assimilation and exploitation of these territories; Dalstroy and GULAG, that used forced labor penitentiaries to exploit Arctic resources; the Northern Sea Route Administration, which used the sea passage to facilitate the exploitation of hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic territories. All these expeditions and agencies, despite their limited economic success, helped to strengthen the Soviet presence in the Arctic during the twentieth century.

Contemporary Russia, which has developed an economy dependent on the export of natural resources, has made the development of the Arctic one of the main directions of development of strategic importance. Russia is currently seeking to compensate for its weak economy based on the export of natural resources that is not sufficiently developed to export finite products, seeking to cover this weakness by developing the Arctic as a miracle of Russian technology. Because of this, natural resources are very important for contemporary Russia, which recognizes the fragility of the Arctic but has a positive view of global warming that facilitates the operation of the Northern Sea

¹¹⁵ Paul R. Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*, 371-372.

¹¹⁶ Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic...*, 376-377.

¹¹⁷ Kenneth Rapoza, "Russia's First Floating Nuclear Power Plant Turns On, Set To Replace Coal", *Forbes*, December 19, 2019, accessed April 28, 2020, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/12/19/russia-first-floating-nuclear-power-plant-turns-on-set-to-replace-coal/#3798882a1e3d>.

¹¹⁸ Paul R. Josephson, *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*, 382.

Route and the access to natural resource deposits in the Arctic. The Russian perspective on global warming and the rapid development of exploitation over the Arctic by the Russian state, today can have very serious consequences for the future of the country, given that the first negative effects of climate change have already appeared on the territory of Russia. One of the phenomena caused by climate change that took place in Russia was a huge fire that took place in the summer of 2019 in Siberia and became a calamity that by its size came to be considered a threat to the environment.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ Lynn Jenner, “Huge Wildfires in Russia’s Siberian Province Continue”, *NASA*, August 16, 2019, accessed April 29, 2020, <https://www.nasa.gov/image-feature/goddard/2019/huge-wildfires-in-russias-siberian-province-continue>.

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INTERDEPENDENCE AND ENERGY SECURITY – RUSSIA AND EUROPE – BUILDING BALANCE

Gheorghe RADU¹²⁰

ABSTRACT:

THIS PAPER WILL TRY TO EXPLAIN THE WAY RUSSIA MANAGED TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF THE EUROPEAN ENERGY POLICY (FROM 2014 UNTIL NOW). MAINLY, IT WILL REFLECT ON THE ROLE OR THE INFLUENCE OF THE TWO STATE OWNED COMPANIES GAZPROM AND ROSNEFT ON THE EUROPEAN MARKET. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THEIR RESERVES OF GAS AND OIL, THEIR DELIVERY CAPACITIES AND PRICE PER UNIT, WE WILL TRY TO SEE IF IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO BE REPLACED BY ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTOR ON EUROPEAN MARKET. ANOTHER AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO UNDERSTAND WHERE THE TENSIONS BETWEEN OPEC (MAINLY SAUDI ARABIA) AND RUSSIA WILL LEAD, WHAT ARE THE GOALS IN THIS ECONOMICAL WAR AND HOW WILL THIS AFFECT EUROPEAN UNION. THE FINAL PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO FIND POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS REGARDING THE ENERGY MARKET IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, SUCH AS A NEW HISTORICAL ACCORD BETWEEN OPEC AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION, OR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE RUSSIA OIL WITH ARABIAN OIL ON THE EUROPEAN MARKET, ANALYZING AND COMPARING OFFICIAL REPORTS AND DATA, SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES AND PAPERS.

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA, EUROPE, OIL, GAS, SECURITY.

INTRODUCTION

Through this paper we want to analyze how Russia was able to extend and maintain its influences in the European market when it comes to energy policies starting with 2014 until today. It will be mainly axed on the role and impact of Gazprom and Rosneft on the European Market, their cooperation with OPEC and the negotiations results between Russia and OPEC alliance. Considering the fact that Russia has considerable resources of natural gas and oil and a well-developed transport infrastructure, we will analyze the probability of Russia to be replaced as an exporter on the European market by other country. Another aim of the paper is to understand the “interests” that stand between Russia – OPEC tensions.

The research question that underlies the paper is: *Why European Union is not ready to replace Russian Federation on the energy market for being able to decrease its political influence?*

This research is relevant because of the important role Russia plays on the international arena, managing to participate in the international policies as a big power and to constantly extend its influence in specific areas. Another fact is that starting with the Soviet Union until present day, Russian Federation was able to combine *hard power* and *soft power*, this giving the possibility of creating and maintaining good relations with important states from Asia and Middle East.

Regarding the methodology, we will use comparative analysis of data collected from annual reports and official sources about prices, exports of gas and oil from Russia, Saudi Arabia and other countries to European Union. Also, we will analyze scientific articles and paper related to the subject

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to talk about the way Russian administration manages to be present in the administration of Gazprom and Rosneft and to make them part of the external policy.

GAZPROM AND ROSNEFT ON EUROPEAN MARKET

In this section we will analyze the way Russian administration managed to create two main companies on the energy market: Rosneft and Gazprom. We will try to evidence the main advantages of these two companies and the advantages of owning full control over them. Also, we will try to see how influent are they on European oil and gas market and how dependent are European countries.

As it is officially known, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Ex-Ministry of Gas was transferred to the state and became a state-owned company named Gazprom. The importance of this company was early remarked by Vladimir Putin in his paper “Mineral-raw resources in the development strategy of the Russian economy”¹²¹, this being one of the most important causes why he gave management positions to people that are close to him. Rosneft has a different story because it appeared as a private company which shares were bought by the state through AO «Rosneftgas». During its history this company was favored by the state to be able to absorb other oil companies from Russia that possessed significant resources. An example here could serve Basnett which was owned by Vladimir Evtushenko, its value being estimated at that time at \$7,2 billion.¹²²

For the beginning we will analyze the evolution of Gazprom exports. Scrutinizing the annual reports starting with 2014 until today and graphs published on the company website, we can observe that both reserves and exported quantities show a constant growth trend. If we talk about stored quantities, in 2014¹²³ the company owned 37.073,2 bcm of gas, while in 2016¹²⁴ this number changed to 37.433 bcm and then to 36.342 bcm in 2018¹²⁵. The 2018 descending tendency can be explained by the considerable increase of exports in European Countries (United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia). The annual report for the same years (2014 – 2016 – 2018) shows a significant growth of the exported quantity in 2014 and 2016 from 113,7 bcm of gas to 179,5 bcm of gas, and 191 bcm of gas for the 2018. Because at the time of the elaboration of this paper the annual report 2019 was not yet published, we can assume that in 2019 Gazprom registered another export growth or at least a constant export in comparison with 2018, while 2019 was not marked by major political events capable of disturbing this growth. Also, we can observe that there are states that tried to decrease the dependency of the Russian gas, but this was possible only for a period of 1-2-3 years (ex. Great Britain, France, Austria, Hungary), this being observed in the table below.

Gas exports to Europe (bln m ³) ¹²⁶							
	2012 ¹²⁷	2013 ¹²⁸	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Great Britain	11,2	16,6	15,5	22,5	25,7	29,1	34,2
France	8,2	8,6	7,6	10,5	12,5	13,2	13,3

¹²¹ Vladimir, Putin, *Минерально-сырьевые ресурсы в стратегии развития российской экономики*, Записки Горного института, Санкт-Петербург, Том 144(1), Санкт-Петербург, 1999.

¹²² Cătălin Apostoiu. *De ce Rosneft, cea mai mare companie petrolieră a Rusiei, câștigă mereu*. Accessed 20.02.2020, <http://www.zf.ro/business-international/de-ce-rosneft-cea-mai-mare-companie-petroliera-a-rusiei-castiga-mereu-16707949>.

¹²³ ОАО «ГАЗПРОМ», *ГОДОВОЙ ОТЧЕТ 2014*, accessed 23.04.2020. <http://www.gazprom.ru/f/posts/16/616270/gazprom-annual-report-2014-ru.pdf>.

¹²⁴ ОАО «ГАЗПРОМ», *ГОДОВОЙ ОТЧЕТ 2016*, accessed 23.04.2020. <http://www.gazprom.ru/f/posts/36/607118/gazprom-annual-report-2016-ru.pdf>.

¹²⁵ ОАО «ГАЗПРОМ», *ГОДОВОЙ ОТЧЕТ 2018*, accessed 23.04.2020. <http://www.gazprom.ru/f/posts/09/716075/gazprom-annual-report-2018-ru.pdf>.


¹²⁶ This table was made by the author of the paper. All the data were collected from Gazprom annual reports starting with 2012 until 2018.

¹²⁷ ОАО «ГАЗПРОМ», *ГОДОВОЙ ОТЧЕТ 2012*, accessed 23.04.2020. <https://www.gazprom.ru/f/posts/21/499896/gazprom-annual-report-2012-ru.pdf>.

¹²⁸ ОАО «ГАЗПРОМ», *ГОДОВОЙ ОТЧЕТ 2013*, accessed 23.04.2020. <https://www.gazprom.ru/f/posts/18/681453/gazprom-annual-report-2013-ru.pdf>.

Netherlands	2,9	2,9	4,7	8,4	27,5	17,4	21,4
Germany	34	41	40,3	47,4	57,9	67,1	65,7
Italy	15,1	25,3	21,7	24,4	24,7	23,7	22,6
Poland	13,1	12,9	9,1	8,9	11,1	10,5	9,9
Czech Republic	8,3	7,9	0,8	0,9	3,1	3,8	2,6
Austria	5,4	5,2	4,2	5	7,5	9,8	9
Hungary	5,3	6	5,4	6	5,7	7	7,3
Slovakia	4,3	5,5	4,4	3,8	3,7	4,5	5

If we talk about Russian oil exports, we should know that in this sector two major companies are responsible for extraction, storage and export: Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (part of Gazprom Holding). Taking into consideration this, and the fact that Rosneft is the biggest Russian company specialized in oil industry, we will analyze the evolution of the total amount of oil exported by the country only between 2014 and 2018.¹²⁹¹³⁰



Graphic 1.1¹³¹

After we analyzed the data, we observe that Russia is the main oil exporter for the European Union, followed by Norway, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia. Between 2014 and 2018, exported quantity was never below 140 million tons of oil, which is the total export of Norway, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 2016.

The exports from Russia and Norway experienced a decrease in 2018, but according to a Statista analysis¹³² they should increase in 2019 by approximately 12.3% observing the last tendencies and also the fact that Germany and United Kingdom are constantly increasing the internal oil consumption.

Taking into consideration the information mentioned in this part of the paper, we are able to conclude that Russian Federation was, is and will be a key actor for the next 5 – 10 years on the European energy market. From the gas perspective it is because this country has the largest amount of resources and the most developed delivery system, from the oil perspective this is because none of

¹²⁹ https://ec.europa.eu/energy/data-analysis/eu-crude-oil-imports_en?redir=1, accessed 10.03.2020.

¹³⁰ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/f/f2/Crude_oil_imports_by_country_of_origin%2C_EU-28%2C_2000-2017_%28million_tonnes%29.png, accessed 20.02.2020.

¹³¹ Graph 1.1 was made by the author with data collected from sources 8 and 9.

¹³² <https://www.statista.com/statistics/265303/oil-imports-into-europe/>, accesses 20.04.2020.

the other countries that export oil on the European market is able in present to reach such a big quantity as Russian Federation, or at least to create a partnership between countries and to compensate this quantity.

RUSIA-OPEC RELATIONS BETWEEN 2014-2020

Through this section we want to evidence the main highlights between Russia and OPEC beginning with 2014 when Crimea was annexed. The moment represented an important step in Russia's history that was followed by the EU sanctions and OPEC response that lead to the fall of oil price, the fall of the Russian ruble because of a new economic crisis. It is important for us to know more and understand the curve of this "relationship" because, from the point of view of energy policy, European Union is directly depended of OPEC and OPEC+ (non-OPEC) countries (in our case we talk about Saudi Arabia and Russian Federation). This interdependency relation occurred from lack of other suppliers, capable of exporting the needed oil quantities and means that if the exporting countries will decide that they need to rise or cut extracted quantities, European Union will have to conform to it and pay higher or lower prices.

If we take a closer look at the Russia – OPEC relation after the fall of the Soviet Union,¹³³ we are able to observe four main events¹³⁴ that somehow shaped the oil market and industry. First one, between 1997 and 1998 when the oil price dropped from \$25/bbl to below \$10/bbl. This was a consequence of OPEC decision to increase output but not knowing about the drop of oil demand and the Asian and Russian economic crises that will follow.¹³⁵ Second one between 1999 and 2001 when the OPEC countries and non-OPEC states (Russia, Norway, Mexico and Oman) assumed to reduce the global oil supplies by 2.1 million bbl/d (barrels per day) and the independent players by 388000 bbl/d. The cause of new tensions was Russia which assumed to reduce its output by 4%, but in reality its output constantly raised, this leading to the increase of price per barrel and to the increase of the Russian Federation incomes¹³⁶ After the terrorist attacks in 2001, when OPEC decided to cut oil productions to avoid a collapse and saw that Russian oil industry was constantly¹³⁷ rising was somehow "forced" to cede the European market because the other exporting countries were no longer capable to provide such a big quantity of oil as Russia was. The third highlight is one of the most important because it happened in the context of the Great Recession, between 2007 and 2009, when the oil price fell from a historical record of \$147/bbl to a low of \$39/bbl. An important role at that time played the actual Chief Executive Officer, Igor Sechin, who is also considered the second most powerful person in Russian Federation and Vladimir's Putin "right hand". At that time, he was the prime minister responsible for energy and "attended three consecutive OPEC meetings as an observer, consistently encouraging production constraint from OPEC but providing no promises of help from Russia."¹³⁸

Explained in general lines, those and the future "highlights" appeared because of overproduction of oil on the market. In consequence each time existed some meetings between Russian representants and OPEC representants in which Russians brought arguments why they cannot stop or shrink their oil extraction process and asked OPEC members to do this. Another reason is that usually after negotiations, instead of decreasing the quantity of oil sold on European or

¹³³ Joseph, Mann, "Russia's Policy Towards OPEC", Middle East Journal, Volume 45, 2009.

¹³⁴ James Henderson and Bassam Fattouh, "Russia and OPEC: Uneasy Partners", p2, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2016), accessed 30.04.2020.

¹³⁵ "The next shock?", The Economist, May 4, 1999, <https://www.economist.com/special/1999/03/04/the-next-shock>, accessed March 25, 2020.

¹³⁶ Youssef Ibrahim, "Oil Countries Approve World Cutback of 3%", The New York Times, March 24, 1999, , accessed April 3, 2020, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9401E1_DB1F31F937A15750_C0A96F958260&sec=&spon=&page.

¹³⁷ Sabrina Tavernise, "Russia Raises Oil Output and Exports", The New York Times, August 24, 2001, accessed April 4, 2020, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE0DE1231_F9_37A_157_5BC0A9679C8B63&scp=4&sq=Russia.

¹³⁸ James Henderson and Bassam Fattouh, "Russia and OPEC: Uneasy Partners", p3, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2016), accessed 30.04.2020.

Asian market, Russia continued to increase it, being aware that, in case of oil restrains, its economy will be significantly affected.¹³⁹

In 2016, European Union decided to impose economic sanctions to Russian Federation after the annexation of Crimea. Russian economy faced a new challenge that was represented by the devaluation of the Russian ruble and the incapacity of its companies to export products to the European or US markets. Another problem at that time for the OPEC and non-OPEC countries was represented by United States that earlier decided to give free rein to its companies to enhance oil production. This was perceived as a danger mainly by Saudi Arabia and Russia because their contracts and incomes were threatened. As a measure, OPEC and its allies decided to increase oil production in order to diminish oil prices and kick out United States shale firms from the market. After series of meetings and arguments, Russia and OPEC signed a new agreement which was expected to “cement a long-term cooperation”.¹⁴⁰ Knowing that previously Russian cuts were more on paper than on the market, now it was expected from Russia to gradually cut the prices until 300000 bbl/d. Russia output was expected to fall from 11.247 million bbl/d to 10.947 million bbl/d.¹⁴¹

Even if in “crisis” situation OPEC countries and their allies decided to reduce the exports and extracted quantities, generating significant income loss while Russian energy companies were the only ones to register an insignificant loss or even higher incomes. How was this possible?

On one hand it was possible because, after negotiations, instead of cutting its exports, Russia decided to cut them only for a very short period of time and after to return to the initial quantities or even higher quantities. Taking into consideration that, in addition to the quantities provided in the long-term contracts, European countries usually import some *extra* quantities of oil or gas, while Russia was always able to supply them with the needed quantities. Also, all the payments from a company, legal or physical entity to the Russian administration are made in Russian ruble and the value of the currency decreased due to economic sanctions imposed by European Union and USA, it is not so hard to understand that the income has risen. On the other hand, it was possible for those companies to increase their incomes, because, for example between 2014-2016 the state assumed to pay a part of export taxes for the companies and to cut some of taxes the companies had to pay to the state, this leading to a significant payments cut.^{142 143}

FUTURE SCENARIOS

In this section we will try to emphasize three probable scenarios for the future of the European energy market. These scenarios will try to synthesize the information mention in the above sections, and also to explain how the last events that took part in 2019-2020 could influence the international policy.

The first scenario and probably the most anticipated one is about a new agreement between OPEC countries and its allies. Talking about the tensions that appeared in the oil industry in the last 2-3 years a new economical conflict has to be expected. The first problem appeared when United States turned from an important oil importer into a dangerous oil exporter.¹⁴⁴ After Saudi Arabia and Russia formed an alliance to kick out from the market the American companies as mention in the previous section, this alliance was canceled and here appeared the second problem. The new problem is because of the misunderstandings between Arabs and Russians when the market was affected by the new COVID 19 virus. Because of the global lockdown the oil demand has fallen and oil exporters

¹³⁹V. Busshuev and N. Isain, , “Нефть и инновационная экономика России”, p.161–166, ЖурналНЭА, №4(16),2012.

¹⁴⁰Dmitry Zhdannikov, “OPEC, non-OPEC agree first global oil pact since 2001”, Reuters, December 10, 2016, accessed March 20, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting-idUSKBN13Z0J8>.

¹⁴¹Zhdannikov, “OPEC, non-OPEC agree first global oil pact since 2001” ...

¹⁴²M. Kashirina and M. Juravlev, “Особенности налогообложения при добыче газа в России”, Financial journal No.4 2016.

¹⁴³Alina Fadeeva, “Минфин решил сохранить налоговые «нашиленки» для «Газпрома» и нефтяников”, RBC, September 10, 2019, accessed June 5, 2020, <https://www.rbc.ru/business/10/09/2019/5d760ab09a7947153289af37>.

¹⁴⁴Stanley Reed, “How a Saudi-Russian Standoff Sent Oil Markets Into a Frenzy”, *New York Times*, March 9, 2020, accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/business/energy-environment/oil-opec-saudi-russia.html>.

had to cut productions to avoid an eventual collapse. Of course, Russia rejected this demand and a new crisis began. Knowing how important is this country for the European market and that Saudi Arabia needs Russia for being able to maintain United States out of the market, we can say that an agreement is inevitable, because United States is still waiting for the possibility of kicking out Russia from the market. According to Bloomberg, in the first half of April 2020 OPEC+ alliance signed a new agreement which was meant “to cut global petroleum output by nearly a 10th, putting an end to a devastating price war but not going far enough offset the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.” The main idea of this first scenario is that a future collaboration between Saudi Arabia and Russian Federation is a *need* for being able to maintain United States out of the European energy market and regulate the prices as they need.¹⁴⁵

A second possible scenario is that Saudi Arabia will decide together with OPEC and non-OPEC countries to kick out Russia from the European market as a consequence of continuous cheating attempts regarding to the oil cut agreements. The main questions are: Is Saudi Arabia able to do it? Will the OPEC countries be able to compensate Russian oil on the market?

Well, theoretically, according to the official OPEC statistics this thing is possible. Analyzing the data that we will find in this bulletin¹⁴⁶, we will observe that:

- a) From 2016 until 2018, Saudi Arabia proven¹⁴⁷ oil reserves have raised from 266.208 million/b to 267.026 million/b, comparing to Russian official reserves that according to OPEC remained at 80000 million/b during the same three years. The only problem here is that Russia used to publish erroneous data¹⁴⁸, this possibly being just an approximative number;
- b) Analyzing the world exports (measure unit 1000 b/d) we will observe that in 2016 Saudi Arabia exported 7463,4, in 2017 it exported 6968,3 and 7371,5 in 2018, this being compared to Russia that exported 5080,6 in 2016, 5061,5 in 2017 and 5069,1 in 2018;
- c) The different oil quality. This is a very important consideration when we talk about the oil quality, because it also should influence the oil price and its destination. During the years, Russia was accused for delivering “dirty oil” to Europe and Asia, at a high price.^{149 150} On the other side, Saudi Arabia always delivered better-quality oil at a lower price. In the case European countries decide to change the oil supplier, this will play an important role.^{151 152}

¹⁴⁵Javier Blas, Salma Wardany, and Grant Smith, “Oil Price War Ends With Historic OPEC+ Deal to Slash Output”, *Bloomberg*, April 12, 2020, accessed April 14, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-12/oil-price-war-ends-with-historic-opec-deal-to-cut-production?ref=StzN0HjU&utm_content=business&utm_source=facebook&cmpid=socialflow-facebook-business&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwAR13uKtZ05nrYFYvDd871apZ4WJP7MW2ayBQBxwZbFbvhx-oVx5w-k-UU.

¹⁴⁶ OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2019, <https://asb.opec.org/index.php>.

¹⁴⁷ When we talk about natural resources (oil/gas) there are 2 types of quantities: proven and estimated by the owner state. When we talk about proven resources, there are some specific procedures in dependence of resource, that are internationally agreed and used when reporting quantities to and international organization (ex. OPEC countries to the organization for being able to make the bulletin.) There are also unproved/estimated quantities, that are measured by the country/owner of pipeline (ex. Gazprom/Rosneft) for their own interest for being able to make their future strategy (proven and unproven quantities are measured in the same unit). Usually proven quantities are lower.

¹⁴⁸ Analyzing the data from the upper mentioned bulletin we are able to observe that quantities of oil changes after each year. Considering the fact that Russia is one of the main exporters, and extracted/ sold quantities vary from a year to another, it is clear that the total quantity can't stay at a standard 80000 bcm.

¹⁴⁹ Florence Tan, Olga Yagova, “Oil traders sell dirty Russian crude to Asian buyers”, *Reuters*, May 21, 2019, accessed April 24, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-oil-quality-asia/oil-traders-sell-dirty-russian-crude-to-asian-buyers-idUSKCN1SR0XD>.

¹⁵⁰ Juliane Geiger, “Russian Crude Could Still Be Dirty By Mid-2020”, July 20, 2019, Oilprice, Accessed May 27, 2020, <https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Russian-Crude-Could-Still-Be-Dirty-By-Mid-2020.html>.

¹⁵¹ Mihail Khodorkovsky personal interview for TV2, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CcRupatMrbQ>, accessed May 15, 2020.

¹⁵² Serghy Guriev personal interview, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTBiAGHIF0Y>, accessed May 16, 2020.

The third scenario can sound a little bit more futuristic but at a deeper analysis we will understand that it's very possible in the actual circumstances. In this scenario, after the global lockdown passes, and people worldwide will discover again what means clean air and low pollution level, they will decide to make some changes and start to promote renewable energy and use electric cars. According to Statista¹⁵³, in 2017, 50,11% of the global oil production was used by the “road sector” this mean that, if people will buy more and more electric vehicles, the global oil demand will decrease, creating some changes in this industry. European car makers already started or accelerated their development of the electric cars to be able to enter this market in 2020.¹⁵⁴ This means that, for example if Tesla, VAG-Group and other major car producers will be able to produce mid-cost and low-cost electric vehicles, the big powers such as United States, Saudi Arabia and Russia will register higher losses.

CONCLUSION

When trying to make the conclusion, we should not forget about the most important fact: *International business at such a level was and will always be in an interdependent relationship with politics.*

Russia was always an important actor on the international arena and one of the “Big Powers” that somehow influenced the World Order in different periods. If we talk about the present and about the European space, we see that, in the last years European Union faced different challenges. Trying to make a timeline from 2010 to 2020 we should remember about the Crimea annexation (a “fantastic” process that was unexpected in the Europe of the XXI century), NotPetya cyber-attack (the most devastating cyber-attack in history)¹⁵⁵, Sergei Skripkal assassination in United Kingdom (when Russian military officers used a chemical weapon named A-234), Cambridge Analytica Case, and other cases that reminded us that Russia is still powerful and will always look to achieve its goals.

One of Russia's advantages is that the administration was always able to combine soft, hard and newer to use the *sharp power* that means “an approach to international affairs that typically involves efforts at censorship or the use of manipulation to sap the integrity of independent institutions¹⁵⁶”. That combination lead to good relations with periodical fluctuations with the Middle East powers and China, the last being one of the biggest Russian oil and gas buyers. Also, this combination of diplomacy allowed Russian to create stable allies among the European Union countries, such as Austria, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and other countries that always were opened to “collaboration” and to promote some special projects or ideas that in a way or other advantaged Russia.

Talking about “The Balance”, we should not forget that there is a strong interdependency from economical and energetical point of view between European Union and Russia. While Europe consumes Russian gas and oil, Russia continues to spread its political influence in Europe using Gazprom and Rosneft¹⁵⁷. We should also take in considerations that such a big provider can't be kicked out of a market so easy, considering the fact that Russia is the main oil and gas supplier we can say that she holds the monopoly, this fact being due to the developed transportation infrastructure and ambitious projects such as Nord-Stream or Turk-Stream will make Russia be one step forward its competitors.

¹⁵³ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/307194/top-oil-consuming-sectors-worldwide/>, accessed 01.05.2020.

¹⁵⁴ Jasper Jolly, “2020 set to be year of the electric car, say industry analysts”, The Guardian, December 25, 2019, accessed May 2, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/dec/25/2020-set-to-be-year-of-the-electric-car-say-industry-analysts>.

¹⁵⁵ Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History”, August 8, 2018, accessed May 1, 2020, <https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/>.

¹⁵⁶ Christopher Walker, “What Is ‘Sharp Power?’”, p. 9–23, Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (2018).

¹⁵⁷ Nina Poussenkova, “Lord of the rigs: Rosneft as a mirror of Russia's evolution”, JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY, 2007, p.47.

Also, when talking about the balance between Russia and Europe, we should take into consideration the relationship between Europe and Saudi Arabia are weak¹⁵⁸ because of its ruling system, lack of liberty, lack of internal reforms able to build a better state and the local rivalries with Iran. From this point of view, Russia is a better and more stable partner with which the building of a political-economical balance is more prone to success.

Even if the second scenario somehow becomes real and Saudi Arabia kick out Russia from the European market, we can expect higher prices for gas from Russia of even a situation when Europe is blackmailed with gas delivery cessation. But according to the course of things, Saudi Arabia and Russia care too much about their relation and know that United States will never be such a “good ally”.

Otherwise we should never forget about the interdependency relation that exists between Europe and Russia. We are no longer prepared to give up Russian gas and oil in the detriment of another supplier of the renewable energy, and that’s the main reason why we are dependent and vulnerable.

¹⁵⁸Beth Oppenheim, “*You never listen to me: The Europea-Saudi relationship after Khashoggi*”, <https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2019/you-never-listen-me-european-saudi-relationship-after>, accessed 20.05.2020

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CONSIDERATIONS ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING THE TERRORIST PHENOMENON

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ABSTRACT:

THE AUTHORS ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF PREVENTING AND COMBATING THE TERRORIST PHENOMENON, IN THE CONTEXT OF EXPANDING ITS MANIFESTATIONS GLOBALLY, AT THE SAME TIME THE PHENOMENON TURNED IT INTO ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS SECURITY THREATS.

DUE TO ITS TRANSBOUNDARY NATURE, IN THE AUTHORS OPINION THE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE FIELD OF PREVENTION AND CONTROL MUST BE GLOBAL, AND THE ACTIONS TAKEN IN THIS REGARD MUST BE SUPPORTED BY BOTH INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AND STATE ENTITIES.

THE AUTHORS REVIEW THE CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK THAT CHARACTERIZES THE ACTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, HIGHLIGHTING THEIR ROLE AND NECESSITY, AS WELL AS THE OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES ACHIEVED.

AT THE END OF THE ARTICLE, IS BROUGHT IN THE DISCUSSION THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ACTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ENSURING THE STABILITY OF THE SECURITY EQUATION AS A WHOLE, AS WELL AS IN THE CONCERTED ACTION AGAINST THE FORMS OF MANIFESTATION OF THE TERRORIST PHENOMENON.

KEYWORDS: SECURITY, TERRORISM, EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A complex phenomenon, widespread on a global scale, considered being one of the most destabilizing challenges to which humanity is subject, terrorism is a major danger facing today's society. The evolution of the terrorist phenomenon, from the beginning of the 21st century to the present, imposes the need of understanding its complexity, especially since its manifestations and implications have affected stability and social balance in more than one of the regions of the world.

In recent decades, terrorism has been a tool of terror used to inoculate fear and mistrust - which disregards origins, religion, age, sex, race, political appetite or intellectual orientation and a trigger for chaos and destabilization of public order. Fright, fear or terror, spread by terrorist acts, are of an unprecedented scale, their causality often exceeding the boundaries of human understanding, betraying the rational factor, this makes the emotional response of innocent people - potential victims, or of entities involved in combating the phenomenon, facing the uncertainty created.¹⁶¹ The inability of some state decision-makers to be aware of their unpredictable danger and, at the same

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¹⁶¹ Cătălin, Peptan, *Terrorism-Security threat in the context of globalization*, Annals of the „Constantin Brâncuși” of Târgu-Jiu, Letter and Social Science, Series 1/2019, 126-142.

time, by their reduced ability to react in such situations, due to ignorance and a poor security culture have amplified the effects of terrorist acts.

Assuming that the terrorist phenomenon has a complex, cross boundary nature, with a global vocation, the measures necessary to be adopted to prevent and counteract it can only be global, a unilateral approach to such a threat being, for the most part, doomed to failure. With this in mind, as possible must take actions order to stop the phenomenon. Without effective collaboration and cooperation, in preventing and combating the terrorist phenomenon, the chances of eliminating this scourge substantially reduce.

History, including recent history, has shown us countless times that without interstate collaboration and cooperation, even the most politically and military influential states cannot counteract the destructive effects of terrorism.

2. PREVENTING AND COMBATING TERRORISM AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.

2.1. Measures taken at the level of the United Nations.

Terrorism is not a relatively new concept, as it appeared in the public and specialized spheres long before the globalized world, in which we live today, was so interconnected and interdependent. Efforts to prevent and combat the terrorist phenomenon, undertaken at international level, began long before the establishment of the United Nations (UN), preoccupying the international community since 1937, when the League of Nations prepared a project for a convention¹⁶² aimed at prevention and punishment of terrorism.

Although this convention was not finalized or adopted, and the definition of terrorism did not concern terrorist acts against civilians, but rather those directed against the state, it served as a reference point for further discussions on this topic, when the UN and regional intergovernmental organizations have addressed the issue from a legal and political perspective.

Due to the structural architecture of the UN, there have been discrepancies in the harmonization between the relevant national legislation and the normative standards of this international counter-terrorism institution. The lack of agreement on a unitary definition of the term does not mean that the international community has not made progress in combating the terrorist phenomenon, with the UN and other international organizations succeeding in formulating ad hoc conventions on addressing its specific forms of manifestation. At the same time, UN has laid the foundations for the emergence of a variety of terminology in the field of terrorism, as evidenced by documents issued by the UN, its role being to provide guidelines to assist states in implementing measures requested by international institutions, namely creating appropriate legislative frameworks for the adoption of the most effective counter-terrorism measures.

Since 1963, with the increase in awareness of the terrorist phenomenon, the international community has developed multiple legal instruments (conventions, resolutions, etc.) aimed at preventing and combating international terrorism.¹⁶³ Among the most important and recent being the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, of 14 September 2005, and Resolution no. 1904/2009 of the UN Security Council on the application of sanctions against Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban groups.¹⁶⁴

Following the terrorist attack¹⁶⁵ on Lod Airport near the Israeli city of Tel Aviv, and the abduction and killing of 11 Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics, the issue of terrorism has become the epicenter of attention at the UN General Assembly. Thus, by a note dated 8 September 1972, the Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, requested the General Assembly to include

¹⁶² The draft convention defines terrorism as the totality of criminal acts directed against a state and has the intention or purpose of creating a state of terror in the perception of individuals, a group of persons or the public.

¹⁶³ Javier, Ruperez, *The united nations in the fight against terrorism*, 3-11, available at https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/2006_01_26_cted_lecture.pdf, accessed on 18.06.2020.

¹⁶⁴ <https://www.sri.ro/fisiere/studii/cadrullegislativ.pdf>, accessed on 24.09.2020.

¹⁶⁵ On May 30, 1972, three members of the Japanese Red Army terrorist group recruited by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine carried out an attack. The target was Lode Airport, the current Ben Gurian International Airport near Tel Aviv. Because of the attack, 26 people were killed and another 80 were injured.

in the agenda of the seventh session an additional item of an important and urgent nature, entitled „Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence that endanger human lives or endanger fundamental freedoms”.

Compared to the organizational framework and internal rules of operation and decision-making, the work of the UN General Assembly reflects the global vision on the issue of terrorism in recent decades, distinguishing three different periods in terms of conceptual and action modalities. Thus, from 1972 to 1989, the approach to terrorism as a general issue attribute mainly to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, in a set of „Measures to Prevent International Terrorism”. At the time, there was a disagreement over how to act in preventing terrorism, with some members calling for international cooperation for suppressing terrorist acts, while others called for the need to eradicate the sources of this scourge.¹⁶⁶

In the second period, between 1993 and 2001, basic approaches to terrorism focused on the development of measures to combat international terrorism, but with a focus on respect for human rights. The General Assembly issued numerous resolutions condemning acts of terrorism and calling on the Member States to cooperate in preventing and combating terrorism. However, there was no consensus among members of the Assembly on how to act to repress the terrorist phenomenon.

The terrorist attacks in 2001 against the USA, marked the beginning of the third stage, changing the orientation of the counter-terrorism policy in the General Assembly. The activity of this forum evolves towards the elaboration of concrete and effective measures to combat it, the starting point being the adoption of Resolution no. 1373/2001 of the UN Security Council on combating terrorism. At the same time, in the General Assembly there was a coagulation of opinions on future action, which contributed to the birth of numerous international conventions and protocols on terrorism, implemented by the Security Council, which are a key element in the global effort to combat terrorism. A document of exceptional significance in terms of actions to combat the terrorist phenomenon represents the Resolution no. 2178/2014. Through this resolution, UN imposed the adoption of cooperation measures at the level of the member state entities of this body, in order to adopt a pragmatic and effective response to the threats posed by the exponents of the terrorist groups.

The UN Security Council has taken most of the responsibility for resolving the issue of global terrorism since the early 1990s, almost 10 years before the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, by imposing sanctions and restrictions on states known to have terrorist organizations bases or camps on their territory.

In the context of the terrorist attacks of the late 1980s, which shook international public opinion, orchestrated by the dictatorial authorities in Libya¹⁶⁷, in January 1992 the Security Council adopted Resolution 731 warning the Tripoli regime of the measures that will be taken if Libyan authorities will not proceed to hand over the suspects in the attacks. Afterwards, in March of the same year, the Security Council adopted Resolution no. 748, which cataloged the actions of the Libyan authorities as a threat to international peace and security, invoking the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in the application of a wide range of sanctions imposed on the Libyan state.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Ruperez, *The united nations in the fight against terrorism...*, 3-11.

¹⁶⁷ In December 1988, Flight 103 Pan-Am crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland, following the explosion of an explosive device introduced on board of the aircraft. The 259 passengers on board and 11 people on the ground killed. See *Pan Am Flight 103 explodes over Scotland*, available at <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/pan-am-flight-103-explodes-over-scotland>, accessed on 20.06.2020;

In September 1989, French flight UTA 772 crashed in Niger after an explosive device on board of the aircraft detonated and 171 people died. See *Aviation Safety Network*, available at <https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19890919-1>, accessed on 20.06.2020.

¹⁶⁸ See <https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19890919-1>, accessed on 20.06.2020. In 1996, six Libyan nationals tried and convicted of participating in attacks on the UTA plane. The two Libyans, suspected of organizing the attacks on the Pan-Am flight, handed over to the Netherlands, on 5 January 1999, for trial by Scottish authorities in accordance with law. One of the defendants, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, sentenced to life in prison in 2001 for life in a Scottish prison.

Because of sanctions imposed by the Security Council, France obtained from Libya a partial fulfillment of its requests, and on September 12, 2003, after the Tripoli regime officially declared responsibility for the attacks and agreed to pay billions of dollars to the families of the victims as compensation, the Security Council lifted the sanctions imposed on Libya.¹⁶⁹

Translating the issue to the last decades, a relevant example of the actions of the UN Security Council is the series of measures applied to Afghanistan, in the context in which the support given to the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, is well known. The Council adopted a considerable number of resolutions between 1999 and 2009, aimed at imposing sanctioning measures. These measures included freezing the funds of entities of individual or collective entities that commit, participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts, the adoption of procedural standards for the listing of persons associated with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban regime. There were also travel restrictions imposed for persons associated with the terrorist group, embargo on the delivery of weapons to entities that could in any way support the terrorist group.¹⁷⁰

Unfortunately, the complexity of the phenomenon and the relations created between the actors involved, including at state level, have made the measures imposed by the Council not always have the expected results. Being an institution with a strong political character, there were many situations in which its members did not reach a consensus on how to act.

2.2. Measures taken at Interpol level.

Contemporary terrorism characterizes by a multitude of forms of manifestation, in recent years manifesting its presence in conflict areas (especially in the Middle East and Central Asia) of the so-called „foreign fighters” from various geographical areas, including from Western Europe (UK, France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands). Terrorist networks cause a significant number of individuals, often young people, to leave their communities and travel to conflict zones, recruitment and radicalization being carried out with an increasing emphasis on the use of social networks and other digital channels.

On the other hand, a specificity of current terrorism is the presence in terrorist acts of „lone wolves” who, in their own name or under the coordination of established terrorist groups, engage in terrorist acts using explosive, chemical, biological or even radioactive materials.

In this context, Interpol has taken on an important role in the fight against terrorism globally. The institution successfully uses the bases containing information on biometric data, which are of major importance in identifying foreign terrorist fighters and preventing them from crossing borders, in their efforts to move to conflict zones. Through Interpol's IT network¹⁷¹, police agencies or partner military structures can access and disseminate information on transnational terrorist networks and alert, in real time, their counterparts in third part countries. Biometric data can help accurately identify people who use a false identity, thus improving efforts to locate terrorists and conduct effective investigations.¹⁷²

One of the approaches to terrorism, from the perspective of Interpol's activity, aims at cooperation between military structures and police structures, the institution being the first international organization to develop and implement a model for exchanging information between police and military structures. This course of action ensures that information from conflict areas are made available to the judiciary, in order to support their investigations and in the prosecution process. In addition, the military environment may disseminate relevant declassified information, collected

¹⁶⁹ <https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19890919-1>,

¹⁷⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Sanctions regime against Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist groups*, available at http://mae.ro/sites/default/files/file/userfiles/file/pdf/Sanctiuni%20in%20vigoare/2010_08_AI%20Qaeda,%20Usama%20bin%20Laden%20si%20Talibanii.pdf, accessed on 05.10.2020.

¹⁷¹ The institution has created a program called "Project First" which aims to improve the identification of terrorists and their affiliates, by using the latest technology in digital image processing and facial recognition.

¹⁷² Interpol, *Identifying terrorist suspects*, available at <https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Terrorism/Identifying-terrorist-suspects>, accessed on 20.06.2020.

from theaters of operations, to Interpol's National Central Offices, which processes the information in accordance with a well-established set of rules and then introduces the results into the databases. Information from Interpol databases contain information on approximately 48,700 foreign terrorist fighters, collected from areas of interest (border checkpoints, theaters of operations, conflict zones, and prisons).¹⁷³

In order to streamline the activity, Interpol has developed and implemented two programs¹⁷⁴ at regional level, in cooperation with partner organizations, focusing on training and building the capabilities of police forces to combat terrorism.

Another approach on terrorism, aims to interrupt the flow of funding, as an essential element for obstructing and reducing the activity of the organizations involved, being well known that the main sources of terrorist financing are as it follows. Therefore, the sources are kidnappings to obtain a ransom; interested use of non-profit organizations; illicit trade in digital goods and currencies; donations from financially powerful entities that embrace the ideology of terrorist groups; funds obtained from arms or drug trafficking etc.¹⁷⁵

Such activities carries out through the relationship between specific institutions with¹⁷⁶ a strategic role in developing policies in the field, but also through cooperation between institutions that manage information such as financial institutions and national police institutions. In order to encourage the exchange of information, the systematic inclusion of financial information related to the activities of terrorist groups in Interpol alerts having an essential role.¹⁷⁷

In view of the alarming increase in the number of bombings using explosives and chemical or bacteriological substances, which endanger public safety and can have a severe impact on the economic and political stability of states, Interpol has been actively involved in preparing and supporting member states¹⁷⁸, to specialize personnel in preventing and providing a relevant response to such attacks.

On the other hand, Interpol, through the Bioterrorism Prevention Unit, is concerned with the prevention and operational response to any form of action limited to bioterrorism, as part of a global security strategy, cooperating in this regard, at international and regional level, with national law enforcement agencies, health institutions and academia.¹⁷⁹ At the same time, Interpol has concluded a large number of partnerships with institutions¹⁸⁰ involved in combating terrorist actions of a chemical, radiological or nuclear nature.

In the context of Interpol's work, the United Nations Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions recognizing the institution's global role in combating terrorism. To streamline the fight against terrorism, Interpol and the Executive Board of the United Nations Counterterrorism Committee and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have reached agreements, the activity being focused on combating organized crime and terrorism.¹⁸¹

¹⁷³ Interpol, *Preventing terrorist travel*, available at <https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Terrorism/Preventing-terrorist-travel>, accessed on 21.06.2020.

¹⁷⁴ The Scorpius Project and the Trace Project.

¹⁷⁵ Interpol, *Tracing terrorist finances*, available at <https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Terrorism/Tracing-terrorist-finances>, accessed on 21.06.2020.

¹⁷⁶ Financial Action Task Force, Egmont Group, etc.

¹⁷⁷ Interpol, *Tracing terrorist finances*, available at <https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Terrorism/Tracing-terrorist-finances>, accessed on 21.06.2020.

¹⁷⁸ The Watchmaker project is a global initiative that provides specialized support to member countries, using Interpol's notification system to alert security institutions around the world on the matter of people using or manufacturing improvised explosive devices. Interpol's database contains approximately 38,750 entities associated with chemical, biological and improvised explosive devices.

¹⁷⁹ Interpol, *Bioterrorism*, available at <https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Terrorism/Bioterrorism>, accessed on 21.06.2020.

¹⁸⁰ Europol; UN Office on Drugs and Crime; League of Arab States; US Federal Bureau of Investigation; French National Higher Police School; British Department of Business; NATO; United Nations Office on Terrorism; World Health Organization.

¹⁸¹ Interpol, *Terrorism*, available at <https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Terrorism/Partnerships-against-terrorism>. Accessed on 21.06.2020.

2.3. Measures taken at the level of the N.A.T.O.

One of the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is to protect the civilian population, by developing the modern technological capabilities of the military component, against terrorist attacks, thus, the „Defense Against Terrorism Program of Work”, known also as DAT POW, has been implemented. NATO¹⁸² approved the program, at its meeting in Turkey in 2004, aiming to strengthen the Organization's contribution to preventing and combating the terrorist scourge, by developing technical capabilities and human resources to support various military operations and to encourage international cooperation. A major milestone in the operationalisation of the program was the meeting of NATO leaders, in 2017, when it was agreed the need for the increased role of NATO in the international fight against terrorism.¹⁸³

Among the objectives of the Program is the development an appropriate framework for the management of terrorist attacks, by training and developing the skills of personnel involved in combating actions against the terrorist phenomenon and identifying measures to improve the organization and coordination of such attacks. Given the importance of the critical maritime infrastructure, the Program has developed tools for collaboration between civilian and military representatives to ensure the security against attacks involving improvised explosive devices. In 2018, under the coordination of France, DAT POW contributed to the development of the multinational exercise „Cut Away”, which aimed to ensure port security.¹⁸⁴

Another objective is the protection of the organization's military personnel and aims at initiatives to train and improve personnel to reduce their vulnerabilities and the technique used, for a better conduct of operations, regardless of the nature or magnitude of threats. These initiatives comprise attacks with portable systems on military and civilian aircraft; threats caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defense against chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear attacks; use of improvised explosive devices.

Through the measures adopted, NATO aims to prevent terrorist entities from acquiring and using chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear (CBRN) materials, while ensuring the security of the population and territories of the Member States. In this regard, the CBRN Joint Defense Center of Excellence, located in Vyskov, Czech Republic, aims to create and improve resilience to such an attack, namely to provide expertise in the field and make it available to the command structure of NATO and allied forces in theaters of operations.¹⁸⁵

Another initiative aims to prevent threats posed by explosive devices and manage the consequences that may arise from the explosion of such devices. In this case, the objective is to improve the capabilities of the organization, by training and improving teams specializing in the detection of explosive materials and ensuring optimal management of the effects of a terrorist attack with explosive devices. DAT POW supports NATO exercises and tests, coordinated by the Center of Excellence located in Trencin, Slovakia. With regard to improvised explosive devices, NATO supports the combat, through the Center of Excellence in Combating Improvised Explosive Devices located in Madrid, Spain. The Center proposed technological solutions for the detection of improvised explosive devices, while evaluating the information obtained from the application of attack management solutions with such devices.¹⁸⁶

DAT POW also undertook the development of capabilities covering staff training and technology development, in order to improve the early identification and targeting of an effective response to the key points of terrorist networks that pose a security threat, by implementing the concept of network involvement. In this sense, by creating the Center of Excellence for HUMINT,

¹⁸² The program developed on the principle of joint funding, through the contribution of NATO countries, for the development of projects aimed at developing technologies and developing effective measures necessary to ensure the security environment in the context of contemporary terrorism.

¹⁸³ NATO, *Defense Against Terrorism Program of Work*, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50313.htm, accessed on 21.06.2020

¹⁸⁴ NATO, *Defense Against Terrorism...*

¹⁸⁵ NATO, *Defense Against Terrorism...*

¹⁸⁶ NATO, *Defense Against Terrorism...*

located in Oradea, Romania, the tools used in the identification and early warning of terrorist activities developed in order to improve technical interoperability within the NATO community regarding HUMINT¹⁸⁷ information sources. On the other hand, the aim was to develop technologies that use biometric information, covering all areas necessary to ensure full capabilities. Subsequent to this approach, the role and necessity of the Special Operations Forces, an important component in the Counter-Terrorism Program, is noted.

3. PREVENTING AND COMBATING TERRORISM AT EUROPEAN LEVEL

3.1. Measures taken at EU level.

The issue of the fight against terrorism has been one of the important concerns of the European Union (EU) institutions. The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted in 1977, amended by the Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention of 2003, sets out a number of obligations of the signatory states with regard to the actions that need to be taken in order to combat the crime of terrorism, as defined in previously adopted international treaties. The Convention lists offenses, which the parties undertake not to consider political offenses are offenses related to political offenses or as politically motivated offenses. Yet, considering them acts of terrorism if they consist of the following activities hijacking of aircrafts, kidnapping and hostage-taking, the use of explosive devices, grenades, missiles, letters or packages that consume explosive devices, if their use endangers the physical integrity, life or liberty of persons.¹⁸⁸

In order to ensure that the premise of discrimination does not create, the Convention expressly provides that no rule thereof shall oblige a signatory party to extradite a person prosecuted on racial grounds, religion, nationality or political opinion.¹⁸⁹

The main obligation contained in international treaties aimed at combating terrorism, which consequently also operates in the case of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, refers to the introduction of offenses defined in the treaties in domestic criminal law, sanctioning acts of terrorism by sentences reflecting the seriousness of the crime. States that take part to these Treaties also agree to establish universal jurisdiction over such offenses. That is, to take the necessary measures to give the courts a very wide jurisdiction over the offenses in question, including jurisdiction based on territoriality, the nationality of the offender and of the victims, or a jurisdiction based on the mere presence of a suspect on the territory of a state.¹⁹⁰ At the same time, States Parties accept the obligation to extract any suspected offenders identified in their own territory, or to initiate criminal proceedings against them. In order to facilitate extradition, these treaties provide that criminal offenses classify as political offenses, as they will not be subject to the extradition procedure under international law. In order to be effective, the provisions have to base on a certain level of cooperation between States Parties, materialized in the adoption of actions that have the effect of preventing terrorist acts or in the investigation and prosecution of crimes limited to the terrorist phenomenon.¹⁹¹

The increase in the different forms of terrorism in the Middle East in the first years of this decade, with the involvement of a large number of foreign terrorist fighters from the European area, has brought the issues on the agenda of the Council of the European Union and the European Council. There were attempts to identify coherent directions of action that would constitute a pragmatic response to this threat. On the other hand, the scale and media effect of the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015 led the EU leadership to take concrete, prompt, response measures against

¹⁸⁷ NATO, *Network engagement*, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50313.htm, accessed on 21.06.2020.

¹⁸⁸ *Regional Cooperation Council, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism-1977*, available at <https://www.rcc.int/p-cve/docs/97/european-convention-on-the-suppression-of-terrorism-1977>, accessed on 20.06.2020.

¹⁸⁹ *Regional Cooperation Council, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism...*

¹⁹⁰ Daniel O'Donnell, *International treaties against terrorism and the use of terrorism during armed conflict and by armed forces*, *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 8, no. 864, December, 2006, available at <https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/a21937.pdf>, accessed on 21.06.2020.

¹⁹¹ O'Donnell, *International treaties against terrorism...*

terrorist groups. Thus, a month later, a debate held on how to combat this type of security threat and, through a joint declaration, the vectors to guide EU action in three directions outlined ensuring a climate of security for citizens, measures to prevent and combat radicalization, safeguard values, and ensure cooperation measures with international partners.

In view of the EU's legal concerns about countering the activities of „foreign fighters”, of major importance consists the adoption on 22 November 2015 of the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. The Additional Protocol signed by EU representatives, and The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, being adopted a decade ago (16 May 2005) in Warsaw.

Of particular importance are the steps taken in recent years by many EU countries to re-conceptualize the regulatory framework for preventing and combating terrorism, the most important changes referring to the ban on leaving the national territory of their own nationals, in order to engage in terrorist acts abroad (France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, and Italy).

One of the EU's approaches to the issue of terrorism was the establishment in January 2016 of the European Counter-Terrorism Center (ECTC). In the context in which Islamist terrorist organizations have changed their strategy on how they operate, their attention has also shifted to Western Europe, amid escalating conflicts in the Middle East and the involvement of European states in the global fight against terrorism. On the other hand, with the migration phenomenon that has characterized the last decade, a large number of members of various Islamist terrorist organizations have entered European territory, this state of affairs producing changes and generating new security challenges at the level of the continent.¹⁹²

Designed as a central EU institution in the fight against terrorism, the Centre's activity is to: provide operational support at the request of any EU Member State for conducting investigations; combat the activities of members of terrorist organizations; ensure the exchange of experience and information on terrorist financing¹⁹³; combat online terrorist propaganda and extremism; combat illicit trafficking in arms and ammunition; ensure international cooperation between institutions with responsibilities for preventing and combating the terrorist phenomenon.¹⁹⁴

The ECTC's work bases on tools that have measured its effectiveness in the fight against Europol's terrorist networks, with the Center organizing teams of experienced specialists from EU Member States. Their main mission is to gather operational information from the judicial institutions of the Member States, as well as from third parties, and to draw up reports whose beneficiaries are senior European decision-makers, in order to develop effective counter-terrorism policies.¹⁹⁵

As part of Europol's operations department, ECTC works closely with other Europol operational centers (the European Center for Combating Cybercrime and the European Center to Combat Immigrant Smuggling), as well as other important partners, such as Interpol and Euro just, for the efficient management of information on the evolution of the terrorist phenomenon.

3.2. Measures taken at the level of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Having the attributes of an international security institution and consisting of both European countries and other geographical coordinates (North America, Caucasus, Central Asia), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has undertaken the task of preventing conflicts, managing crisis situations and getting involved in post-conflict reconstruction on the European continent.

¹⁹² Cătălin, Peptan, Considerations regarding the security equation determined by the problematics of refugees in the middle east, *Research and Science Today*, Nr 1(19)/2020, 9-18

¹⁹³ Through the Program for Tracking the Financing of Terrorist Organizations and the Financial Intelligence Unit.

¹⁹⁴ European Counter Terrorism Center, ECTC, *A central hub of expertise working to provide an effective response to terrorism*, available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc>, accessed on 22.06.2020.

¹⁹⁵ European Counter Terrorism Center, ECTC, *A central hub of expertise working to provide an effective response to terrorism...*

Compared to one of the fundamental dimensions of the OSCE's work, namely the issue of politico-military aspects of security in Europe, Member States concluded that the contemporary terrorist phenomenon is one of the most significant threats to peace, security, stability, human rights, social and economic development, in the OSCE area and beyond. In this sense, they proceeded to the implementation of effective measures to prevent and combat terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations.¹⁹⁶

The organization makes a substantial contribution to counter-terrorism efforts, promoting a coordinated approach and in a spirit of cooperation at all levels (between national authorities, cooperation between states, cooperation with relevant international and regional organizations and, where appropriate, supports the creation of public-private partnerships between different state authorities and the private sector, civil society and the media), to combat terrorism. These efforts are guided by and supported the UN overall counter-terrorism strategy, as well as relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Activities to combat terrorism undertaken at the OSCE level are subsequent to the following areas: promoting the implementation of the international legal framework for combating terrorism and streamlining international legal cooperation in criminal matters related to terrorist activities; combating the sources that generate violent extremism and radicalization in order to commit terrorist actions, through a multidimensional approach. In addition, preventing and combating terrorist financing activities; implementation of measures that have the effect of preventing the use of information systems for committing or supporting terrorist actions; promoting a climate of cooperation and dialogue on counter-terrorism issues. In particular, through public-private partnerships between state authorities and the private sector, and between civil society representatives and the media, strengthening the effort at Member State level to implement the provisions of Resolution no. 1540 of the 2004 UN Security Council¹⁹⁷ aimed at combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, strengthening the security elements present in travel documents and, finally yet importantly, implementing measures to promote and protect fundamental human rights and freedoms in the context of measures to combat the terrorist phenomenon.¹⁹⁸

3.3. Measures undertaken by the Bern Club

In the context of the escalation of the activities of terrorist organizations at international level but also at the level of the European area, during the 60's, the leaders of prominent European intelligence services have decided to establish the „Bern Club” as an informal association in which the strategic direction of the European intelligence services was discussed. Since its inception, European intelligence services have cooperated with Israeli partners in the Shin Bet and Mossad intelligence structures, as well as with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. Intelligence services from the 27 EU Member States are currently cooperating within the Berne Club to find ways to respond, from the intelligence agencies perspective, to security threats at European and international level.¹⁹⁹

In order to streamline operational cooperation following terrorist threats, the Berne Club decided to set up the „Counter-Terrorism Group” (CTG) in 2001. A common intelligence system supports it, starting with 2016, using an operational platform common to the security structures of the EU Member States that offers the possibility of real-time dissemination of information on potential

¹⁹⁶ OSCE, *Countering terrorism*, available at <https://www.osce.org/countering-terrorism>, accessed on 22.06.2020.

¹⁹⁷ In 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, which was the first international document aimed at addressing the global and integrated approach to the issue of weapons of mass destruction and related materiel, imposing strong obligations on Member States. preventing and discouraging various entities from accessing this range of resources. See <https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/ge3danbtgq3q/decizia-nr-809-2017-in-spartzenul-punerii-in-aplicare-a-rezolutiei-1540-2004-a-consiliului-de-securitate-al-the-organization-of-the-united-nations-regarding-the-non-proliferation-of-weapons-of-destruction-in-mass->, accessed on 22.06.2020.

¹⁹⁸ OSCE, *Countering terrorism*, available at <https://www.osce.org/countering-terrorism>, accessed on 22.06.2020.

¹⁹⁹ Matthias Monroy, Secret documents: European domestic intelligence services networking worldwide, available at <https://digit.site36.net/2020/03/04/secret-documents-european-domestic-intelligence-services-networking-worldwide/#more-2325>, accessed on 06.09.2020.

terrorist acts. The exchange of information mainly concerns the activity of terrorist organizations of Islamist origin, without neglecting the issue of other areas related to European security. In its efforts to counter terrorism at European level, the cooperation between Europol and the CTG in bilateral investigations is noteworthy. Europol's 2018 annual report highlights the level of cooperation between the two institutions, while highlighting participation in joint exercises with the Migrant Smuggling Center and Europol's Internet Content Dissemination Office.²⁰⁰

4. CONCLUSIONS

The evolution and manifestation of the terrorist phenomenon, globally, in recent decades, has highlighted the need for concerted action to combat it, both by international institutions involved in the fight against the phenomenon and by state entities whose societal life has been deeply marked by the harmful effects of terrorist acts. The amplification of the forms of manifestation of the terrorist phenomenon imposed the adaptation from a conceptual and operational point of view of the answer offered by the institutions with attributions in achieving security. The results obtained in the fight against this scourge, especially in the last decade, express the viability of the measures adopted, the current reality highlighting a relative blurring of the dynamics of terrorist attacks globally. The danger of terrorism is unpredictable and imminent, and can occur anytime and anywhere, thus, individuals are exploiting vulnerabilities of the factors that characterize social life or groups who seek to generate chaos and destabilize public order, by instilling fear and distrust among citizens.

Complementary to the global or regional institutional actions, which constitute the prerogative of the different security organizations presented in the previous chapters, we believe that the state should take measures. The measures mean to strengthen national counter-terrorism capacities, improve cooperation and exchange of information between competent authorities, identify and stop terrorist financing channels, develop and implement a national crisis management system. The measures mean identify and block terrorist channels and means of communication, review and tighten legislation on terrorism and organized crime, and, last but not least, to improve cooperation with external agencies. On the other hand, of major importance is the revision and tightening of legislation on money laundering and terrorist financing, prioritizing the fight against terrorism by allocating financial, human and technological resources and analyzing the implications and damages caused to the national economy by terrorist phenomenon.

In the context in which terrorism has acquired a dynamic character, due to the diversification of the means of spreading fear, we believe that a series of gradual measures can prevent and diminish terrorism. The measures should aim at raising awareness of the danger by civil society and creating a culture of security at society level, being well known that, from the civil society standpoint, security also means as the need to „preserve an acceptable lifestyle for citizens”²⁰¹, which provides the premises to meet their needs, in a climate of individual and collective security. Thus, the citizen must become a „generator” of state security, through an active position and partnership with security institutions, being aware of their role and necessity in modern society. As many of the actions subsequent to the terrorist phenomenon have ethnic or religious causes, we believe that an important role in easing the sources of conflict, which are the motivational germs of terrorist acts, belongs to non-governmental organizations, associations or minority representatives, through dialogue and negotiation, in order to identify and resolve problematic issues.

In conclusion, we appreciate that the security culture represents a fundamental dimension of education, seen as a primary way of an evolving society in the context of transformations in all fields, but also as a vector for enhancing and maximizing the power of any state in the architecture of the globalized world.

²⁰⁰ Jan, Jirat, *The Club de Berne: a black box of growing intelligence cooperation*, available at <https://aboutintel.eu/the-club-de-berne/>, accessed on 06.09.2020.

²⁰¹ Approaches of the National Defense College, Canada, (1991), respectively of Ole Weaver, (1993). See Cristian, Troncotă, *Security Studies*, „Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu, 2008, p. 6, Apud Nicu Sava, *Security Studies*, (Romanian Center for Regional Studies, Bucharest, 2005), 18-19.

Nowadays it became a truism to say that prevention is much more effective than counteracting the destructive effects of terrorist actions.

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RESILIENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE - ROMANIA AFTER 1989

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ABSTRACT:

COMMON ACTIVITIES, HABITS AS WELL AS TRADITIONS AND CULTURE ARE THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES AND SOCIETIES THEMSELVES. THESE CHARACTERISTICS REFLECT THE DECISION-MAKING MADE BY INDIVIDUALS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY LIVE, BEING IN CLOSE CORRELATION WITH THIS ENVIRONMENT AND AS THE ENVIRONMENT CHANGES AUTOMATICALLY CHANGES OCCUR IN SOCIAL NORMS. PHENOMENA SUCH AS SOCIAL CHANGE AND MIGRATION HAVE BEGUN TO ATTRACT MORE AND MORE BOTH THE INTEREST OF RESEARCHERS AND DECISION-MAKERS. THIS INTEREST SEEKS TO OVERCOME THE SIMPLISTIC AND GEO-DETERMINISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPACT THAT HUMAN MOBILITY HAS ON STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SOCIETY. THIS HAS LED TO THE RECOGNITION OF THE IDEA OF "MIGRATION AS ADAPTATION" IN RESEARCH ON MIGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT (REFERRING HERE TO THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT).

ROMANIA HAS ALWAYS KNOWN THE PHENOMENON OF MIGRATION, A PHENOMENON THAT HAS EXPERIENCED FLUCTUATIONS MAINLY DETERMINED BY THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT. MORE PRECISELY FROM THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT IN WHICH THE COUNTRY WAS FOUND, OR, IN THE RECENT PERIOD, THIS PHENOMENON HAS BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND BY OTHER ELEMENTS THAT FAVOR THE MOBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.

KEYWORDS: RESILIENCE, SOCIAL CHANGE, MIGRATION

INTRODUCTION

In this paper we will try to analyze how, demographic changes, labor market instability, changes in people's mobility as well as changes and political and economic uncertainty create patterns of change that are in constant motion. We will emphasize the concepts of social change as well as the resilience of society. By analyzing the data available at the National Institute of Statistics we will try to find key patterns of the change process as well as of the migration phenomenon in the Romanian society. Thus, the indicators used in the analysis are those referring to the stable population of Romania (before and after 1989), life expectancy, the evolution of minimum incomes as well as indicators regarding the emigration rate before and after 1989.

Social resilience is a concept that develops in the 1970s, from the need to identify those qualities that human societies have to regain / readjust themselves as a result of a bad event, a conflict, a state of insecurity, or even in relation to day-to-day changes. Therefore, resilience is

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represented by the ability to transform a hostile issue / event into personal, relational and collective growth, by strengthening existing social commitments and by developing new relationships, with creative collective actions.²⁰³ This capacity to react to "something hostile" involves three processes: recovery, support and growth or it can be increased.²⁰⁴ The specialized literature attaches more importance to the recovery process because after a certain shock, the consequences of the existence are largely experienced, so, in order to restore the balance after such an adverse event, it must make some psychophysiological and social adjustments. Despite some shocks, communities and individuals are able to continue their activities and this serves as an element of the sustainability process. Resilience also includes the growth reflected in progress and the changes in perspective that have resulted from adversity.

The concept of "resilience" has become a powerful principle and a discursive tool in national and international security. Moreover, although this concept remains rather vague, it has become popular in the lexicon and in the discourse of international and regional organizations that complement and further advance the concept of sustainable development.²⁰⁵

Resilience has become somewhat of a sticker in the discourse of international relations and especially in the EU's foreign policy. This is one of the priority objectives of the European Union Global²⁰⁶ Strategy (EUGS), which was unveiled in June 2016, being certainly an initiative that attracted great attention from academia and politicians.²⁰⁷ In this case, resilience is referred to as "a broad concept that encompasses all individuals and the whole society," which characterizes "democracy, trust in institutions, sustainable development and reform capacity."²⁰⁸

Given the nature of EU policy, coupled with an increase in nationalism, it is not surprising that the countries of the region are pursuing self-survival strategies, trying to build their own resistance against growing political, economic and social challenges and threats.

The EU's Global Strategy for External and Security Policy contains significant changes compared to the 2003 EU Security Strategy and can be described as a post-neoliberal document driven by recent developments in the EU and worldwide.

This paradigm shift is evident from the EU's attempts to shift its emphasis from its normative power projection, visible in Enlargement Policies and Neighborhood Policy, to a more cohesive attitude internally as a result of the deterioration of the strategic component on most of the levels of policies that it supports, especially in the area of foreign and security policy. We are thus faced with a scenario of accepting a decrease in the EU's influence, in conjunction with the non-linearity of changes at local, regional and international level. Thus, in this context, the strategic approach to resilience proves to be useful because this concept establishes the necessary but insufficient conditions for nonlinear change.

Another important novelty of this strategy is its multidimensional approach and its efforts to overcome what constitutes a "silo mentality"²⁰⁹ in EU policy approaches and discussions. In order to

²⁰³ Cacioppo John., Reis Harry & Zautra Alex. (2011). "Social Resilience, The Value of Social Fitness With an Application to the Military", *American Psychologist*, 66(1), 43–51

²⁰⁴ Zautra Alex, John S. Hall, Kate E. Murray (2008). "Resilience: A new integrative approach to health and mental health research". *Health Psychology Review* 2, 41-64

²⁰⁵ Charles Perrings, "Resilience and Sustainable Development", in *Environment and development Economics*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2006), p. 417-427; see also United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), disaster risk reduction and resilience in the 2030 agenda for Sustainable development, 2015, http://www.unisdr.org/files/46052_disasterriskreductioninthe2030agend.pdf

²⁰⁶ Global" is not a term to be seen only in a geographical sense: it also refers to a wide range of policies and tools promoted by the Strategy. It focuses on military capabilities and terrorism as well as on employment opportunities, inclusive societies and human rights. It is concerned with the consolidation of peace and the resistance of states and societies, in and around Europe.

²⁰⁷ European Union External Action Service (EEAS), Shared vision, Common action: a Stronger Europe. a Global Strategy for the European union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/node/339>

²⁰⁸ European Commission, *a Strategic approach to resilience in the Eu's External action* (JoIN/2017/21), 7 June 2017, p. 3, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52017JC0021>.

²⁰⁹ Silo mentality is a mental framework existing at the level of departments within a company or organization, which makes them look only indoors and resist the exchange of information or resources with other departments / sections of the

break away from the previous division of individual policies, an ambitious effort is proposed to increase coherence, coordination and inclusion between the various EU actions - whether they have a developmental nature in the fields of energy, security, humanitarian aid, infrastructure, development, climate or political-diplomatic issues.

SOCIAL CHANGE

Social change is also a significant phenomenon of human life with incidents important for adapting to new demands in a changing environment. We are talking here about economic and political changes, migration from rural areas to urban areas as well as international migration. These social changes bring with them both challenges and opportunities for human development.²¹⁰ For example, urbanization involves changes in lifestyle, thus proving that some of the adaptive skills that are important in the rural context lose their value, while cognitive-oriented competencies become essential to ensure successful adaptation.²¹¹ Because not all the consequences are proven to be benign in the long run, new challenges ("post-transformation") may need to be answered; sometimes almost suggesting reinventing solutions to replace old ones that are out of reach applicability. Such a process does not have a well-defined result, and the initial sequences of change, followed by the change in social order, make the intended consequences of the answers appear to follow the "logic" of political and economic transformation.

It has also become clear that although other societies in their transformation process (eg, some successor states of the former Soviet Union such as Vietnam or China) have been put to find their own operating solutions, conceptualizing the mechanisms change, challenge of the old status quo and the reaction could be generalized, in order to be applied in the form of gradual changes encountered in economic systems enjoying greater stability.

In Romania, internal migration between the 70s and 90s has seen a predominant direction from rural to urban areas (figure 1). Since 1992, the number of those who have moved from rural areas (villages) to urban centers (cities) has begun to diminish, and mobility has begun to take shape in the opposite direction (from urban to rural areas). This was largely due to the economic transition and the decrease of the working possibilities in the cities. After 1997, the migration from urban to rural areas exceeded the number of those who moved from villages to urban centers, which is only partially due to the phenomenon of suburbanization.

same organizations or companies. Such a mentality will reduce the efficiency of the company's operations; contribute to lessening the importance of organizational culture and diminishing the role of morality in its current work. In such companies, there is an implied resilience to change, and often managers do not take a proactive attitude toward changes that are natural to other companies.

²¹⁰ Cigdem Kağıtcıbası, Zeynep Cemalcılar, and Nazlı Baydar Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey, ISSBD Bulletin Number 1 Serial No. 55

²¹¹ Cigdem Kağıtcıbası, Zeynep Cemalcılar, and Nazlı Baydar Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey, ISSBD Bulletin Number 1 Serial No. 55




Figure 1. RESIDENT (STABLE) POPULATION BY AREA (1971-2018)

Note: the data used were chosen so as to give us a perspective on both the situation before 1989 and the recent situation until 2018

Source: own representation with data from the National Institute of Statistics (Demographic Yearbook, 2019).

After 1990, the new changes, international economic alliances, socio-political diversity, discoveries in information technology and the application of scientific innovations in all areas of human activity have brought important changes in all aspects related to the development of activities in society. New modes and concepts of development appear, the concept of nation state loses its traditional rigidity. Concepts and issues related to sustainable development, efficient education for all, market liberalization, and technology transfer appear on international agendas. These represent only a part of the new concepts that arrive in developing countries due to the geopolitical interests of the industrialized countries. The net complex of these changes, not only redirects the actions of nations / societies at international level, but creates new conditions of development, with a social impact especially on developing countries. In the recent documents of the United Nations (UN)²¹² and the World Bank may refer to:

- increasing human capital,
- reducing inequality
- structural changes in the care of quality of life

²¹² [United Nations Development Programme](https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html), available at: <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html>




Figure 2. LIFE EXPECTANCY (1971-2018)

Note: the data used were chosen so as to give us a perspective on both the situation before 1989 and the recent situation until 2018

Source: own representation with data from the National Institute of Statistics (Demographic Yearbook, 2019).




Figure 3. MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGES

Source: own representation with data from Eurostat (Minimum wages in EU Member States, 2019).

A wave of economic and social changes spanned the country in the 2000s. The new decade conveyed enthusiasm through the changes in social conventions that were taking place at that time. As the economy grew, wages increased which led to a higher standard of living and a rather aggressive growth in consumption (figure 3). Although most lives have not been radically transformed by the advent of new technologies, this evolution has changed the way they dress, think and act in a way that has had an impact on parents and the more traditional ones in society. These changes were encouraged by the new media that included increasingly accessible mobile telephony and the Internet.

Life expectancy data (figure 2) shows that it has grown steadily in the analyzed period, with higher increases after 2000, the average life expectancy increased by about 8.4 years for women and about 6 years for men between 1971 and 2018. These changes in life expectancy can result from long-term changes of certain factors, including changes in the political regime, economic and socio-economic changes as well as changes in education. Moreover, this accentuated increase of life

expectancy as well as of the minimum wage, can be attributed to Romania's accession to the EU, accession that can be seen as a process of integrated development.

As a factor of change, the political regime is used as a distal determinant of life expectancy at the country level.²¹³ For example, a democratic state recognizes more easily the rights of citizens to express themselves and act on political views and, therefore, this involvement can generate public services that are more closely linked to social needs.²¹⁴

In electoral processes, it is assumed that politicians govern national policies to increase per capita incomes, to make public health systems more efficient, and to improve the health and quality of life of the population. The power of representation can be demonstrated as an important promoter of health.²¹⁵ Some studies have shown that people living in more democratic societies, who have been given more autonomy, have longer life expectancies and lower mortality rates than people living in more autocratic societies.

MIGRATION PHENOMENON

Migration, as a social phenomenon, especially after 1989, has become a very important aspect for Romanian society, because either leaving the country and returning or internal migration to the development poles both condition and influences the major economic and social processes.

Often, migration flows occur to meet immediate needs and in response to latent socio-economic conflicts and tensions. Initially, the benefits generated for the 2 sets of countries (origin and destination) are considerable. The countries of origin manage to solve problems related to employment, social and political burden and obtain remittances, which also contribute to the economic development of the departure regions. As a cause of change, migration has been analyzed from a cultural perspective (emphasizing its potential for value / normative transformation) and from a structural perspective (which highlights its demographic and economic significance).

- The neoclassical approach, based on an individualistic calculation of benefits and costs among potential migrants;²¹⁶
- The "new economy" approach, based on the concept of relative deprivation and focus on family strategies to overcome the imperfections of the capitalist market;
- The perspective of the world system, based on the concepts of structural penetration and the "unbalance" of peripheral areas, makes the conditions for mass movements determined;
- The sociological approach, based on the notions of "path dependence" and on the reduction of the costs of migration. These concepts are invoked to explain the origin of migration as the continuation and development of resistance over time in terms of their structural properties or their beliefs and values.

The power of migration to make changes in the countries of origin of migrants depends on three main factors: number of people involved; length of stay and class composition.

Regarding the first factor, it is obvious that small displacements have little causal power, rarely exceeding the lives of those involved and their close relatives. At the other extreme, "telluric movements" can have dramatic consequences. As far as the second factor is concerned, short-term circular flows tend to produce a less sustainable change than permanent movements. Under certain conditions, cyclical movements can strengthen existing social structures rather than inoculate their

²¹³ Navarro V, Muntaner C, Borrell C, Benach J, Quiroga A, Rodriguez-Sanz M, Verges N, Pasarín MI. *Politics and health outcomes*, Lancet. 2006; 1033–1037

²¹⁴ Gerring J, Bond P, Barndt WT, Moreno C. Democracy and economic growth: a historical perspective. (World Polit. 2005), 323–364

²¹⁵ Cattaneo LB, Chapman AR. The process of empowerment: a model for use in research and practice. (Am Psychol. 2010), 646–659.

²¹⁶ Alexandra Porumbescu, Defining the New Economics of Labor Migration Theory Boundaries: A Sociological-Level Analysis of International Migration, RSP No. 45, 55-64

change. This can happen, for example, when the income of migrant workers contributes to supporting productivity growth in countries of origin, thereby enhancing their long-term viability.

Finally, the third factor - the composition of migratory flows - affects the potential of changing migration in unexpected ways. Moves composed of people with higher human capital would have a greater impact on recipient societies due to the ability of these migrants to express themselves and to protect their cultural traits. Good human capital translates into better opportunities on the labor market and easier entry into the host economy's basic economy. The flows of poorly trained workers can have a lasting impact due to the initial ignorance of the host language and culture and the tendency to maintain their own habits and values. Finally, streams that are made up of diverse classes, which include both high-capital migrants and those with low human capital - are most likely to lead to ethnic enclaves. This is due to the fact that skilled migrants are able to set up businesses that use the masses of their co-ethnic, both as a market and as a source of labor.²¹⁷ In turn, less educated immigrants find in these ethnic enterprises an alternative source of employment opportunities and even a "training mechanism".

If the political transition is conceived as a fine, peaceful, pragmatic and organized transformation, we can say that Romania had a history that is both promising and dangerous. The fall of the old regime has paved the way for the institutionalization of pluralism and civil liberties after decades of authoritarian rule. A new Constitution has been adopted and several representative and independent bodies have been created.

In 1990, one of the first steps taken by the Transitional Government in Romania was the liberalization of the passport regime. The right to hold passports and to leave the country depended only on the financial possibilities, because the entry into many Western countries was no longer restricted by a visa regime (figure 4).




Figure 4. MIGRATION REGIMES AFTER 1989

²¹⁷ Kenneth, Wilson, Alejandro, Fortes, "Immigrant enclaves: An analysis of the labor market experiences of Cubans in Miami", American Journal of Sociology 86 (September) 1980, 295-319.




Figure 5. EMIGRANTS OFFICIALLY REGISTERED BETWEEN 1985 AND 1989

Source: own representation with data from the National Institute of Statistics (2006 Demographic Yearbook of Romania and 2007 Statistical Yearbook).




Figure 6. EMIGRANTS OFFICIALLY REGISTERED BETWEEN 2013 AND 2018

Source: own representation with data from the National Institute of Statistics (Demographic Yearbook of Romania and 2019 Statistical Yearbook)

After 1989, Romania faced the phenomenon of international migration, which led to the decrease of the (stable) resident population. The resident population was on July 1, 2018 smaller by about 1 million than in 1971, being around 19.5 million inhabitants.(figure 7)




Figure 7. RESIDENT (STABLE) POPULATION BY SEX (1971-2018)

Note: the data used were chosen so as to give us a perspective on both the situation before 1989 and the recent situation until 2018

Source: own representation with data from the National Institute of Statistics (Demographic Yearbook, 2019).

According to the presented data, in the period 1989-2013, the stable population of Romania decreased by over 3.1 million inhabitants. Over 77% of the negative growth of the (stable) resident population during this period was due to emigration. Moreover, between 2014 and 2018 the population of the country decreased by over 500 thousand people.

International migration has led to an average annual reduction of Romania's population by almost 104.2 thousand people. In 2002, the number of emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants of the resident population of Romania was 48.6, and in 2012 this indicator increased to 116.5. On 1 January 2018, the resident population was 19.52 million people, down 120.7 thousand people as of January 1, 2017.

After 1989, the economic and political transition created a context, causing many categories to consider migration as an opportunity to obtain the resources needed to maintain daily life or materially support social status. The context has generated a relative surplus of population that cannot be reintegrated into the new emerging economic system and has limited alternatives: it can conform (by adapting the way of life to the resources available), it can protest (in a circle to determine the policy to promote susceptible measures to change the socio-economic context or derailment, may emerge from unfavorable economic circumstances, trying to find more favorable existential contexts. Migration seems to have emerged as the dominant response to this situation.

In times of rapid change, as was the period immediately after 1989 the old rules, norms and institutions it no longer works as before. One of the challenges of development in the 1990s is to bring new ways to the center of the policies developed to ensure long-term human development. This new way of thinking and applying policies has made it necessary to revise some of the basic elements regarding the assumptions of economic development and the governance of society. The new social agenda required a fundamental rethinking of the existing forms and identifying new roles of the state that can generate improved forms of popular participation and social consensus.

As an industrialized country progressively moves towards a model of national development that involves dismantling the remaining aspects of a welfare state, it is obliged to look for similar alternatives of social development at an extremely high social cost. Thus, alternatives may include reducing state social investments, increasing privatization of social services and setting different tax models.

Migratory networks function as a form of social capital, consisting of links between those in certain destination countries and those in a particular region of origin, links governed by a set of

reciprocal obligations derived from relatives, friendship or any other relationship type, which implies certain types of obligations defined in informal terms. These networks, on the one hand, provide information that is relevant to those who consider migration to be an option and, on the other hand, they make connections that can be mobilized, used in a context in which someone is engaging in migration.

The complex that includes the new development trends, the increased globalization of international economy that has generated new models of trade liberalization and the formation of consolidated coalitions between different countries, more or less industrialized, has had major political and economic implications for most developing countries.

The concept of social resilience is developed in relation to:

1. The issue of persistence and change within ecosystems;
2. The ability of the system to change its specificity to the way it allows it to return to a state of equilibrium;
3. Opportunities for reorganization that arise from exposure to various disturbing factors;

Resilience may include the following manifestations: maintenance / stabilization, marginalization and renewal. In the sense of stabilization / maintenance, resilience can induce a migration securitization, at this level the emphasis is placed on the exogenous shock.

The communities in Romania predominantly represented such a pattern as:

- Migrants have insisted on the protection of social cohesion at the expense of the transformation shock caused by their displacement;
- They insisted on protecting the lifestyle of that community, which is seen as a securitization attempt, even if only locally;
- Identifying the junction point between the old lifestyle and their adaptation to the host state is suggestive in understanding the transformation capacities of the respective communities;
- Why junction / turning point? Because such a critical moment has fundamentally altered the projection of community members in the host state, both in terms of status and their manner of integration.
- Thanks to social resilience, communities have had to be secured outside the Romanian state's borders so that they can then develop a new type of identity, that is, a social imaginary one with which to identify themselves.
- Migrant networks have contributed to building social capital and increasing the resilience of societies / communities in the country of origin through the material resources sent, through knowledge that brings added value, new technology, new products and services adapted to local needs.

“We must see human social life as always structured but incomplete”.²¹⁸ This structure, seen as a dynamic phenomenon, is more a process of change than a process of stability.

Social change is a significant human phenomenon that has important implications for adapting / resisting changes that have occurred or have taken place. Starting from economic and political changes, from international migration to rural migration to urban areas (towards development poles), social change brings with it both challenges and opportunities for

CONCLUSIONS

Demographic change, labor market instability, people's movement, climate change and economic uncertainty are patterns of change that are in a continuous movement. Migrant social networks have helped build social capital and increase the resilience of home communities by

²¹⁸ European Commission, a Strategic approach to resilience in the Eu's External action (JoIN/2017/21), 7 June 2017, 3, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52017JC0021>.

increasing social resistance in beneficiary countries through the transfer of knowledge, innovation technologies and other resources. Diasporas could, for example, be a fragmentation and instability factor by generating divided loyalties, challenging traditional notions of citizenship and leading to the formation of disputed social groups. By eroding, or by perceiving the erosion of the cultural basis of national identity, international migration can favor "the insecurity of society."

Migration flows also have the potential to affect the power of a state, be it economic, military or diplomatic. However, migration can also have benefits in the sense that "states compete to harness well-educated and highly skilled migrant workers, especially in areas such as information technology and the knowledge-based economy, two areas that represent assets and vectors of power in the context of globalization ". Migration can prevent stagnation of the social system by exerting pressure on the innovation and creativity sectors. In Romania, migrant networks have contributed to building social capital and increasing the resilience of communities through the cash flow sent, through knowledge that brings added value, new technology, new products and services adapted to local needs.

An integrated and comprehensive approach to migration is needed in the European Union. But the common policy on migration remains an ambitious goal. A common approach to the management of economic migration and the harmonization of Member States' migration policies is a challenge for the European Union due to an aging population and a decrease in fertility among young people.

In conclusion, the analyzed indicators give us an overview of the changes that have occurred in Romanian society in the recent period. Starting with the changes in the political regime and continuing with the related changes in the other fields, economic, industrial and technological, the Romanian society has known more or less profound changes in the social norms. With the liberalization of individuals' mobility and later with the elimination of visas and EU accession, Romania began to feel the emigration process more acute.

Migrant networks have contributed to building social capital and increasing the resilience of societies / communities in the country of origin through the material resources sent, through knowledge that brings added value, new technology, new products and services adapted to local needs. Also, the diasporas contribute massively to the import of consumer culture, the culture developed mainly after 2007. And any change in the usual norms, whether we are talking about political, economic, educational changes, stimulates in one way or another the process of emigration.

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